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ABSTRACT
PORTRAIT OF A TURKISH SOCIAL DEMOCRAT:
ISMAIL CEM
Örmeci, Ozan
Ph.D., Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Berrak Burçak
APRIL 2011
İsmail Cem (1940-2007) was a Turkish intellectual and social democratic 
politician who spent his life investigating the characteristics and problems of Turkish 
modernization and social democratic solutions to these problems. Cem started his career 
as a peculiar socialist journalist who had a special curiosity towards the Ottoman past in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. With his books and articles he became an influential and 
prestigious figure in the leftist intellectual and political circles and served as the manager 
of Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). Unlike usual leftist-modernist 
intellectuals, he was very critical of “top to bottom” Turkish modernization and had 
propositions to solve Turkey’s political problems within the limits of democracy. During 
these years, Cem’s democratic socialism slowly evolved into social democracy. Starting 
from the 1980s, Cem appeared this time as a social democratic politician and tried to 
realize his projects and reduce his theories into practice. He was one of the leading 
figures of Turkish social democracy and was the creator of the “Anatolian Left” together 
  
 
iv
with Deniz Baykal. In the mid-1990s he served for a short time as the Minister of 
Culture and starting from 1997 -with short interruptions- for five years he worked as the 
Foreign Minister of Turkey. He continued to write about Turkish politics and foreign 
policy and left behind an important collection of books and articles. 
İsmail Cem saw his life’s work as involving basically three tasks: to reconcile 
Turkey with its Ottoman past by softening the radical modernist mentality of the earlier 
Republican period both on the intellectual and social levels, to find solutions to Turkey’s 
various political problems by making a social democratic interpretation of Kemalism 
and thus, achieving democratic consolidation in Turkey and to transform his country into 
a respected regional power in international relations by pursuing an active foreign policy 
through full membership to the European Union as well as by developing relations with 
Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries. Both as a public intellectual and politician, he 
was able to take considerable steps in order to realize these three tasks, though he did not 
have chance to complete his mission. Although he was an important part of the 
intellectual force behind Turkey’s pro-Western secular segments, we do not know too 
much about Cem’s personal life and intellectual development throughout the years. This 
thesis is an attempt to analyze İsmail Cem by focusing on his life, his ideas, his political 
career, his propositions to Turkey’s major democratic problems and his foreign policy 
understanding and practices analytically.
Keywords: Ismail Cem, Republican People’s Party, Social Democracy, Turkish Left, 
Kemalism, New Left, Turkish Foreign Policy.
  
 
vÖZET
BİR TÜRK SOSYAL DEMOKRATININ PORTRESİ: 
İSMAİL CEM
Örmeci, Ozan
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Berrak Burçak
NİSAN 2011
İsmail Cem (1940-2007) hayatını Türk modernleşmesinin özelliklerini ve 
sorunlarını araştırmaya ve bunlara sosyal demokrat çözüm önerileri bulmaya adamış bir 
entelektüel ve sosyal demokrat politikacıdır. Cem kariyerine 1960’ların sonları ve 
1970’lerin başlarında Osmanlı tarihine özel ilgi gösteren ilginç bir sosyalist gazeteci 
olarak başlamıştır. Kitapları ve köşe yazılarıyla sol siyasal ve entelektüel çevrelerde 
etkili ve saygın bir kişi haline gelmiş, bir dönem TRT Genel Müdürü olarak da görev 
yapmıştır. Dönemin yaygın modernist solcu entelektüellerinin aksine Cem Türk 
modernleşmesinin tepeden inmeci metotlarını eleştirmiş ve Türkiye’nin siyasal 
sorunlarını demokratik sistem içerisinde çözmesi için çözüm önerileri geliştirmiştir. Bu 
yıllarda Cem’in demokratik sosyalist dünya görüşü yavaş yavaş sosyal demokrasiye 
doğru evrilmiştir. 1980’lerden başlayarak Cem artık bir sosyal demokrat politikacı 
olarak sahne almış ve projelerini gerçekleştirmeye ve teori ile pratiği birleştirmeye 
çalışmıştır. Türk sosyal demokrasisinin önemli bir ismi haline gelmiş ve arkadaşı Deniz 
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Baykal’la beraber Anadolu Solu’nun teorisyeni olmuştur. 1990’ların ortalarında kısa bir 
dönem Kültür Bakanı olarak sahne alan Cem, 1997 yılından başlayarak -kısa aralıklarla-
beş yıl süreyle Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dış İşleri Bakanı olarak görev yapmıştır. Bunun 
yanında Türk siyasal hayatı ve dış politikasıyla ilgili yazmaya devam etmiş ve ardında
önemli bir külliyat bırakmıştır. 
İsmail Cem Türk siyasal ve düşünce hayatındaki yerini üç somut vazife ile
ilişkilendirmiştir; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ni Kemalizm’in radikal özelliklerini 
törpüleyerek hem entelektüel, hem de toplumsal düzeyde Osmanlı tarihiyle barıştırmak, 
Kemalizm’in sosyal demokratik bir yorumunu yaparak Türkiye’nin demokratik 
pekişmesini sağlamak ve hem Avrupa Birliği üyeliği, hem de Orta Doğu ve Avrasya 
ülkeleriyle yakın ilişkiler kurmak suretiyle Türkiye’yi bölgesinde etkili bir güç haline 
getirmek. Bu üç görev doğrultusunda hem bir entelektüel, hem de bir politikacı olarak 
Cem önemli ölçülerde yol almış ancak görevini tamamlamaya fırsat bulamamıştır. Türk 
siyasal ve entelektüel hayatında bu denli önemli roller oynamasına karşın Cem’in özel 
hayatı ve yıllar içerisindeki düşünsel gelişimiyle ilgili pek az şey bilinmektedir. Bu tez 
İsmail Cem’i analiz etmek için onun hayatı, fikirleri, siyasi kariyeri, Türkiye’nin 
demokratik sorunlarına getirdiği çözüm önerileri ve dış politika perspektifi ve 
uygulamalarını analitik bir şekilde incelemek amacıyla yapılmış bir denemedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İsmail Cem, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Sosyal Demokrasi, Türk 
Solu, Kemalizm, Yeni Sol, Türk Dış Politikası.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Who is afraid of democracy and democratization? In Turkey, consequences of 
globalization and democratization have begun to disturb millions of people who 
think that their state is in fact collapsing, although Turkey conducts full accession 
negotiations with European Union at the same time. This is mostly caused by the 
sociopolitical issues related to the secularism-Islam clash, the Kurdish question and 
civil-military relations, three problematic aspects of Turkish political life. Is a 
democratization and globalization process in conformity with the state’s founding 
principles possible for Turkey? There is no doubt that this phrase has become the 
main research field for social scientists in Turkey especially in the last decade due to 
Turkey’s serious problems overcoming the difficulties related to globalization, 
accession to the European Union and democratization. These problems became 
apparent and much stronger after the collapse of the coalition government headed by 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the takeover of the Islamist originated Justice and 
Development Party in 2002. İsmail Cem (1940-2007), a distinguished Turkish social 
democratic theoretician, journalist and politician who was one of the most important 
members of the collapsed coalition government as the Foreign Minister of Turkey, 
  
 
2with his unique approach to Turkish modernity and the Turkish political system as 
well as his moderate social democratic propositions for Turkey’s democratic 
problems, deserves to be understood and remembered on the eve of new democracy 
problems Turkey is about to meet.
İsmail Cem was a Turkish intellectual and social democratic politician who 
spent his life investigating the characteristics and problems of Turkish modernization 
and social democratic solutions to these problems. Cem started his career as a unique 
socialist journalist who had a special curiosity towards the Ottoman past in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. With his books and articles he became an influential and 
prestigious figure in the leftist intellectual and political circles and served as the 
manager of Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). Unlike usual leftist-
modernist intellectuals, he was very critical of “top to bottom” Turkish 
modernization and had propositions to solve Turkey’s political problems within the 
limits of democracy. During these years, Cem’s democratic socialism slowly evolved 
into social democracy. Starting from the 1980s, Cem appeared this time as a social 
democratic politician and tried to realize his projects and reduce his theories into 
practice. He was one of the leading figures of Turkish social democracy and was the 
creator of the “Anatolian Left” together with Deniz Baykal. In the mid-1990s he 
served for a short time as the Minister of Culture and starting from 1997 -with short 
interruptions- for five years he worked as the Foreign Minister of Turkey. He 
continued to write about Turkish politics and foreign policy and left behind an 
important collection of books and articles. He also brought courtesy to Turkish 
politics due to his gentle style and was respected by nearly all political actors and 
circles both within and outside of Turkey. Cem’s political rivals and allies have been 
  
 
3able to find a large common ground in agreeing that Cem was a real democrat and 
humanist. 
İsmail Cem saw his life’s work as involving basically three tasks: to reconcile 
Turkey with its Ottoman past by softening the radical modernist mentality of the 
earlier Republican period both on the intellectual and social levels, to find solutions 
to Turkey’s various political problems by making a social democratic interpretation 
of Kemalism and thus, achieving democratic consolidation in Turkey and to 
transform his country into a respected regional power in international relations by 
pursuing an active foreign policy through full membership to the European Union as 
well as by developing relations with Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries. Both as 
a public intellectual and politician, he was able to take considerable steps in order to 
realize these three tasks, though he did not have chance to complete his mission. 
Although he was an important part of the intellectual force behind Turkey’s pro-
Western secular segments, we do not know too much about Cem’s personal life and 
intellectual development throughout the years. 
This thesis is an attempt to analyze İsmail Cem by focusing on his life, his 
ideas, his political career, his propositions to Turkey’s major democratic problems 
and his foreign policy understanding and practices analytically. It will be 
investigated how and why İsmail Cem’s policies and managing style allowed a high 
majority of the Turkish people to accept globalization and full accession to the 
European Union not as a threat to secularism or independence, but as a positive 
process that would complete the modernization and democratization movement of 
the country that started with its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This question is also 
meaningful regarding Turkey’s recent polarization and popular third-world 
tendencies of Turkey’s secular segments as a reaction to threats and dangers in the 
  
 
4way of democratization and globalization. In Turkey’s recent strained position, 
İsmail Cem’s analysis of Turkish modernization, his proposals for Turkey’s political 
problems, his vision for Turkey’s EU membership and his foreign policy 
understanding based on a kind of synthesis between protecting national interests and 
supporting the democratization process and globalization, seem to be necessary for 
Turkey to be better analyzed and understood especially concerning the successes 
achieved in the realm of international relations during his tenure in office in the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry. That is why throughout the thesis the main question will 
be whether a democratization and globalization process in conformity with the state’s 
founding principles could be possible for Turkey. Cem’s contributions to Turkish 
intellectual and political life as well as his foreign policy understanding will be 
analyzed within this perspective and it will be asserted that a social democratic 
moderate version of Kemalism, as was created and suggested by İsmail Cem, could 
bring social peace to Turkey and could allow democratization and globalization not 
to be perceived as a threat to the Turkish state and the state’s founding principles by 
the Turkish people and the Turkish state elite.
The scarcity of biographical works and elite studies in Turkish political 
science orientate scholars to explain political developments solely based on social 
dynamics and international relations. However, the importance of the role of agents 
(political elites) has been the focus of Western scholars starting with Dankwart 
Rustow1, especially in studies concerning democratic transition. Rustow and his 
transitionalist approach emerged as a reaction to the inefficiency of structuralist and 
modernist approaches in understanding the role of contingency and political actors. 
Rustow basically asserted that democracy is produced by the initiatives of human 
                                                
1 Dankwart Rustow. 1970. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model” in Comparative 
Politics 2 (April). 
  
 
5beings [i.e. political elites], that democratization is not a worldwide uniform process 
and that there can be many roads to democracy. Rustow proposed to students of 
comparative politics to concentrate on political actors and their strategies which are 
assumed to be rational and autonomous. He also underlined the importance of choice 
and contingency. Moreover, Rustow rejected and offered an alternative to 
functionalist theories. Together with the devaluation of the modernization theory and 
class-based structuralist approaches, functionalist theories began to lose their 
supremacy in comparative politics works. There is no doubt that Rustow’s accent on 
agency, process and bargaining opened a new field in comparative politics and 
increased the value of elite studies. In this sense, analyzing İsmail Cem’s life, 
personality and deeds is an important step to explain Turkish democratic 
transformation in the last decade. It must also be noted that biographical works can 
be much more successful when the events and memories are fresh and witnesses and 
actors of these events are still alive. With this thesis, I hope to make a significant 
contribution to Turkish political studies by analyzing an important social democratic 
figure who contributed to Turkish democratization and foreign policy and offered a 
new model of moderate social democratic version of Kemalism that could prevent 
harsh political confrontations. 
İsmail Cem, as a man of letters and ideas and one of the leading theoreticians 
of Turkish social democracy, wrote many books and articles which allow this thesis 
to make a comprehensive analysis based on primary sources.2 Throughout the thesis, 
                                                
2 İsmail Cem. 1986. “1988 Genel Seçimine İlişkin Seçim Organizasyonu ve Çalışma Modeli”.
İsmail Cem. 1984. “Birbirine ‘Katlanmak’ zorunluluğu” in DEMOKRASİ Ortak kitap 2. İstanbul: 
YAZKO.
İsmail Cem. 1999. Dış İşleri Bakanı İsmail Cem Konuşmalar Demeçler Açıklamalar. Ankara: 
Dışişleri Bakanlığı Enformasyon Dairesi Başkanlığı.
İsmail Cem. 1987. Engeller ve Çözümler Türkiye’de Sosyal Demokrasi. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 1994. Gelecek İçin Denemeler. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 2000. Gelecek İçin Denemeler. İstanbul: Can Yayınları.
İsmail Cem. 1980. Siyaset Yazıları: 1975-1980 Türkiyesi. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
  
 
6in order to substantiate his ideas, all of Cem’s books, articles, declarations and 
speeches will be analyzed. In this sense, this study will also be based on discourse 
and content analysis. While discourse analysis will enable us to study Cem’s rhetoric 
and basic arguments by using the tools of qualitative research, content analysis of the 
primary and secondary sources will help us elicit the main concepts used by Cem in 
formulating his foreign policy. The richness found in the area of primary sources is 
not available for secondary sources since the number of secondary resources related 
to İsmail Cem is very limited.3 This is caused by the lack of biographical works in 
Turkish political studies, the “second man” position of Cem, being the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs instead of Prime Minister and the proximity of Cem’s deeds. 
                                                                                                                                         
İsmail Cem. 1984. Siyaset Yazıları: “Geçiş Dönemi Türkiyesi” (1981-1984 Yılları). İstanbul: Cem 
Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 1994. Sol’daki Arayış. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 1989. “Sosyaldemokrat Ekonomi Modelinde Emeğin Rolü ve Sorumluluğu” in Sosyal 
Demokraside Ekonomi Politikaları: Uluslararası Konferans 11-13 Eylül 1989. İstanbul: MOZAİK.
İsmail Cem. 1990. “Sosyal Demokrasi Açısından Verimlilik-Eşitlik İlişkisi ve Çelişkisi” in Yurdakul 
Fincancı (ed.) Sosyal Demokrat İdeoloji. İstanbul: Anadolu Matbaa Tic. Koll. Şti.
İsmail Cem. 1984. Sosyal Demokrasi Ya Da Demokratik Sosyalizm Nedir, Ne Değildir... Ve 
Türkiye’de Olabilirliği. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 1998. Sosyal Demokrasi Ya Da Demokratik Sosyalizm Nedir, Ne Değildir. İstanbul: Can 
Yayınları.
İsmail Cem. 1987. “Sosyal Demokrasinin Bunalımdan Çıkış Yolları, Tanım, Kimlik, İdeoloji 
Sorunları”.
İsmail Cem. 2004. Sosyal Demokrasinin Geleceği. İstanbul: Cem Ofset Matbaacılık Sanayi AŞ.
İsmail Cem. 1993. Tarih Açısından 12 Mart. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 1976. TRT’de 500 Gün … bir dönem Türkiye’sinin hikayesi. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 2000. Turkey in the 21st Century. Mersin: Rustem Bookshop.
İsmail Cem. 2001. Turkey in the New Century. Mersin: Rustem Bookshop.
İsmail Cem. 2004. Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya Birinci cilt: Strateji Yunanistan Kıbrıs. İstanbul: Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
İsmail Cem. 2005. Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya İkinci cilt: Avrupa’nın “Birliği” ve Türkiye. İstanbul: 
Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
İsmail Cem. 1970. Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 1970. Türkiye Üzerine (Araştırmalar).  İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
İsmail Cem. 2003. Yeni Bir Türkiye İçin… . İstanbul: Cem Ofset Matbaacılık Sanayi AŞ.
İsmail Cem and Deniz Baykal. 1992. “SHP’de YENİ SOL’un Türkiye Programı - DEĞİŞİM”.
İsmail Cem and Deniz Baykal. 1992. Yeni Sol. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi. 
3 Abdullah Muradoğlu. 2002. Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem. İstanbul: Bakış 
Yayınları.
Can Dündar. 2008. Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim “İsmail Cem Kitabı”. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası 
Kültür Yayınları.
Cem Gökçe. 1975. İsmail Cem Olayı. İstanbul: Panda Yayınları.
İsmet Solak. 1975. İsmail Cem Dosyası. Ankara: Anka Yayınları.
Oktay Duran. 2007. İsmail Cem’in Ardından. İstanbul: Cem Ofset.
Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası Ankara Şubesi. 1975. Anayasa Işığında Kanun Hükmünde 
Kararnameler ve İsmail Cem’in Durumu. Ankara: Orkide 67 Basımevi.
  
 
7Moreover, books written on Cem are mostly journalistic and stray from academic 
validity. It must also be noted that these books do not really focus on Cem’s 
achievements or his ideological orientation and do not have concrete arguments 
about Cem’s political stance. Abdullah Muradoğlu’s book entitled Selanik’ten 
İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem is basically a controversial and non-academic 
research book about the İpekçi family and their members, in which a large part was 
dedicated to İsmail Cem’s life story and family background. Can Dündar’s Ben Böyle 
Veda Etmeliyim is based on Dündar’s interview and discussions with İsmail Cem 
about Cem’s life and deeds in his last days and carries very important, detailed and 
chronological information about Cem’s life and political career. Cem Gökçe’s İsmail 
Cem Olayı is a short book written in the mid-1970s in order to defend the “just 
cause” of İsmail Cem against his removal from the TRT directorial position. İsmet 
Solak’s İsmail Cem Dosyası is a more comprehensive version of Gökçe’s book, 
which covers İsmail Cem’s TRT years. A book published by the Turkish Journalists 
Syndicate’s Ankara branch Anayasa Işığında Kanun Hükmünde Kararnameler ve 
İsmail Cem’in Durumu is about an academic discussion between law professors 
about the controversial removal of Cem from the TRT office. Oktay Duran’s İsmail 
Cem’in Ardından consists of articles and notes written on Cem by distinguished 
statesmen, politicians, journalists and intellectuals after Cem’s passing away. 
Although secondary works written on İsmail Cem do not have academic validity, 
they still make an important contribution in collecting and analyzing Cem’s life, 
political affiliations and memories. There are also numerous political history books 
and memoirs that will be used in the thesis in which İsmail Cem takes part.4
                                                
4 Aydın Engin. 2007. “Politika Gazetesi” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce cilt 8 Sol. İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları.
Can Dündar and Rıdvan Akar. 2008. Ecevit ve Gizli Arşivi. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
Cemal Süreya. 1991. 99-Yüz. İstanbul: Sistem Yayıncılık.
  
 
8This study will necessarily draw from multidisciplinary fields including 
political science, international relations, sociology, history, political psychology and 
European studies. The interdisciplinary character of this dissertation will enable us to 
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focuses on İsmail Cem’s biographical details, his political career and dominant 
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1980s in the third chapter called “Cem as a public intellectual”. Cem’s views will be 
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developments and with the addition of some memoirs and events from Cem’s 
personal life. Cem’s understanding of social democracy will be explained 
analytically under some subheadings that will expose a comprehensive analysis of 
Cem’s world view and his place in Turkish intellectual life. In the fourth chapter, 
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9Islam-secularism discussions, will be dealt with. Cem’s views on these problems and 
his suggestions for solving these problems will be analyzed in detail. The dissertation 
will follow with a detailed summary and analysis of the developments in Turkish 
foreign policy during Cem’s tenure in office as the minister of Foreign Affairs. The 
core aims and principles of Cem’s foreign policy will be explained in detail topic 
ally. Cem’s policies and performance on six major topics: namely Turkish-American 
relations, Turkish-EU relations, the struggle against international terrorism, the 
Cyprus problem and relations with Greece, and relations with the Eurasian and 
Middle Eastern countries will be examined closely and separately in this chapter.
Chapter 6 will also focus on Cem’s contributions to Turkish foreign policy. The 
thesis will end with the concluding Chapter 7 that summarizes and focuses on the 
main findings of the thesis.
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CHAPTER II
A MAN OF LETTERS AND ROMANCE
İsmail Cem (1940-2007) was a prestigious and important figure in Turkish 
intellectual and political life, who spent his life investigating the characteristics and 
problems of Turkish modernization and social democratic solutions to these 
problems. Cem had a successful, adventurous and colorful life.
2.1. Family Background, Childhood and Parents
İsmail Cem İpekçi1 is a descendant of the famous İpekçi family, émigrés from 
Salonika2. The İpekçi family is a large, rooted and rich family that emigrated to 
İstanbul from Salonika in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries.3 The family takes 
                                                
1 İsmail Cem İpekçi in journalism and his political career preferred to use “İsmail Cem” as his name 
and refrained from using his last name “İpekçi”. Cem told Can Dündar that this was caused by his 
chief from Milliyet newspaper Turhan Aytul’s preference. Aytul, in 1963, in the early days of Cem’s 
journalism career when Cem handed in his first article, advised Cem not to use his last name in the 
signature part since his cousin Abdi İpekçi was the editor-in-chief of the Milliyet newspaper and this 
situation could overshadow the success and the prestige of Cem’s writings. See; Can Dündar, Ben 
Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 70. Later, when Cem was the director of TRT (Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation), Justice Party deputies stressed Cem’s preference of not using his last name in 
hot parliamentary debates by making reference to Sabetaism-Judaism discussions and blamed him for 
committing a crime of hiding one’s last name as an official of the state. Cem after this accusation 
shortened his name and made “İsmail Cem” by court decision. See; Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda 
Etmeliyim, p. 72.
2 Selanik in Turkish and Thessaloniki in Greek.
3 Cem’s grandfather migrated to İstanbul in 1912 from Salonika after the entry of Greek soldiers to the 
city. See; Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 8.
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its name from their commercial activity.4 What makes the İpekçi family so 
recognized and publicized is not only their wealth, but also their famous members5
and claims about their Jewish-Sabetaist background.6 The Sabetaism debate has 
become one of the most popular and controversial topics in Turkish intellectual life 
in the last decade although it was a matter of interest only for political Islamists two 
decades ago. As it was stated by Cengiz Şişman, many prestigious people including 
İsmail Cem became victims of this madness.7 Although what has been written on 
Sabetaism and the non-academic controversial claims about the Sabetaist background
of the İpekçi family could cover much more space, this thesis will leave aside these 
conspiracy theories and the Sabetaist witch-hunt and will rather focus on Cem’s life 
story and personality.
İsmail Cem was born on 15 February 1940 in İstanbul in the early days of the 
Second World War. Although Turkey did not enter into the war, it was inevitably 
economically affected in a very negative way because of the extraordinary conditions 
in most developed countries of the world which Turkey approached as trade partners. 
                                                
4 The İpekçi family for long years dealt with silk production and trade but after migrating to İstanbul 
they were engaged in other commercial activities such as storekeeping, the cinema business, film-
making and postcard production. See; Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve 
İsmail Cem, pp. 7-8.
5 The famous journalist and the editor-in-chief of Milliyet newspaper Abdi İpekçi (1929-1979) was 
İsmail Cem’s cousin and a member of the İpekçi family. Abdi İpekçi was assassinated in 1979 by 
ultra-nationalist groups. The assassin was Mehmet Ali Ağca, an ultra-nationalist militant, member of 
the Grey Wolves organization and a sympathizer of the Nationalist Action Party, who later tried to 
assassinate Pope John Paul II on 13 May 1981. Fashion designer Cemil İpekçi was an adopted child 
who became a member of the İpekçi family and İsmail Cem’s cousin. İsmail Cem’s father İhsan 
İpekçi was the owner of İpek Film and a well-known film-maker, writer and scenarist. The famous 
caricaturist of Cumhuriyet newspaper Ali Ulvi Ersoy was İsmail Cem’s sister’s husband. Soprano “La 
Diva Turca” Leyla Gencer, journalist Ergun Balcı, actor Engin Cezzar, journalist İbrahim Çamlı, 
musician Özdemir Erdoğan and writer Erdal Öz were all somehow related to the İpekçi family. See; 
Tayfun Er. 2007. Erguvaniler Türkiye’de İktidar Doğanlar, İzmir: Duvar Yayınları, pp. 76-77.
6 This claim was never proved or accepted by İpekçi family members. However, Cemil İpekçi in an 
interview given to Aksiyon magazine approved the claim. See; Cemal A. Kalyoncu. “Cemil İpekçi: 
Sabetay Sevi’nin torunuyum”, Aksiyon, 18 Eylül 1999, issue: 250, pp. 33-38. Cem’s daughter İpek 
Cem Taha also negated these claims about her family background. 
7 Cengiz Şişman. 2008. Sabatay Sevi ve Sabataycılar: Mitler ve Gerçekler, Ankara: Aşina Kitaplar, p. 
16.
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Moreover, İsmet İnönü8, the “National Chief (Milli Şef)” implemented an 
authoritarian regime in these difficult years in order to protect Turkey from internal 
uprisings and negative consequences of the World War. However, İsmail Cem 
admits that he was a lucky child and that he had a very happy infancy.9 Cem lived in 
a large apartment in Nişantaşı-Teşvikiye with his family, but spent summers in their 
summer house on the Prinkipo Island (Büyükada). Cem’s family was wealthy, but 
his biggest luxuries were his bicycle, spindals made of glass and tin soldier toys in
those years.10 Although he reacted negatively to his teacher for the homework she 
had given him on the first day of elementary school (the elementary school branch of 
Işık College11), he finished the first year as the most successful student and was 
awarded with Ferenc Molnár’s The Pal Street Boys book by his teacher.12 The Pal 
Street Boys was little Cem’s favorite book alongside some heroic nationalist stories. 
He did not remember himself as a naughty child but later his mother Rikkat İpekçi 
complained to his wife Elçin Cem about the naughtiness of İsmail Cem when he was 
a little boy. The fundamental feeling Cem had during his childhood was feeling sorry 
for other children who did not have the same opportunities as him13, a psychological 
                                                
8 İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) was a Turkish Army General during the Turkish Independence War. He 
became one of the national heroes and closest friend of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the establishment 
of The Republic of Turkey. He served as Prime Minister three terms (1923-1924, 1925-1937, 1961-
1965) and as the second President of the Republic (1938-1950). Professor Metin Heper, who made a 
comprehensive analysis of İnönü’s personality and political career, concluded that İnönü had always 
believed in democracy and wanted to establish a healthy democracy in Turkey. However, İnönü 
thought that he needed to protect the regime first in order to establish democracy; that is why he used 
some authoritarian methods in the past. İnönü loved participatory democracy but also prudent 
government. He thought of the next generation of his country more than the next elections, which 
means he was not a politician but rather a statesman. He wanted RPP to act as the guardian of general 
interests and did not engage in daily politics. Heper points out that İnönü was respected by people 
more than he was liked. Heper also mentions that although İnönü was completely secular in the 
political sense, he was a religious man. He was dreaming of cooperation between different political 
parties in the country rather than competition. For details see; Metin Heper. 1998. İsmet İnönü The 
Making of a Turkish Statesman. Leiden: Brill.
9 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 3.
10 ibid., pp. 4-5.
11 Known as the school of wealthy Istanbulite families. See; Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten 
İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 112.
12 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, pp. 6-7.
13 ibid., p. 8.
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aspect that probably shaped Cem’s social democratic world view. Little Cem’s 
favorite social activity was going to his father’s cinema to watch movies on Sunday 
mornings with his friends. 
İsmail Cem’s father İhsan İpekçi (1901-1966) naturally played an important 
role in the formation of his son’s personality. Cem had great respect and love 
towards his father and he felt very comfortable being the “son of the boss” when he 
was a child. İhsan İpekçi was a well-known film-maker and scenarist and had 
acquaintances with leftist intellectuals such as Sabahattin Ali14 and Nazım Hikmet15. 
The İpekçi family’s close friend circle mostly consisted of intellectuals and artists 
with social democratic/socialist views.16 However, Cem remembers that his father 
never talked about politics when he was around, probably in order to not direct him 
towards a certain ideology. In Cem’s view, his father was not really interested in 
politics, but he was a passionate romantic, humanist and democrat.17 His novels 
published in the Hürriyet (Liberty) newspaper with the nickname of “İhsan Koza” 
were based on grievous love stories that took place in war periods.18 İhsan İpekçi’s 
humanism naturally affected his intelligent son and played a great role in shaping 
                                                
14 Sabahattin Ali (1907-1948) was a socialist journalist and writer who opposed to some policies of 
the single-party period in Turkey and who was later killed in a suspicious assassination. Ali Ertekin, 
the man who took responsibility for committing the murder, was sentenced to only four years and he 
was set free after an amnesty law announced in the same year.
15 Nazım Hikmet Ran (1901-1963) was Turkey’s most famous poet who spent most of his life in 
prison and in exile because of his communist views and romantic revolutionary works. Cem’s father 
İhsan İpekçi tried to help Nazım Hikmet in his difficult days by giving him a job as a scenarist of İpek 
Film. According to İsmail Cem, this was caused by his father’s humanist personality and admiration 
for Nazım’s poems rather than his ideological positioning. Nazım Hikmet also spent his last night 
before escaping to exile in İhsan İpekçi’s house. According to rumors, Nazım Hikmet also signed a 
poem to İhsan İpekçi with a note saying “to the only bourgeois I love”. See; Can Dündar, Ben Böyle 
Veda Etmeliyim, p. 9. İsmail Cem’s admiration of Nazım Hikmet was no less than his father’s. In 
2002, during a special night organized in order to commemorate Nazım Hikmet, Cem was touched by 
Nazım Hikmet’s poems read by Genco Erkal and accompanied by Fazıl Say’s piano compositions. 
Cem was pictured as crying. See; Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail 
Cem, p. 92.
16 ibid., p. 117.
17 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, pp. 10-11.
18 Senede Bir Gün (A Day in a Year) was one of İhsan İpekçi’s novels that became very famous after 
its adaptation to the screen. See; Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail 
Cem, p. 31.
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Cem’s romantic and tolerant personality. The İpekçi family did not have a strict 
political attitude but still Cem remembers that the founder of the Republic of Turkey 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk19 was a real hero for them20 and his father was close to 
Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party21 although he was against certain policies of 
İsmet İnönü such as the Wealth Tax22. İhsan İpekçi had close ties with the Kemalist 
government and he even had the chance to cinematize Atatürk twice upon his 
request.23 However, the İpekçi family’s admiration for Atatürk was not an obstacle 
for them to have sympathy for the transition to a multi-party regime and the take-
over of the Democrat Party24 after 27 years of rule of the Republican People’s Party 
in 1950.25 İhsan İpekçi was also a very productive and innovative person since he 
became one of the pioneers of the cinema industry in Turkey. Cem’s insistence on 
change and innovation in his political career (which will be shown later with 
                                                
19 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) was the cult military and political leader of the Turkish 
Independence War, founder of the Republic of Turkey and the first President of the Republic. See; 
Metin Heper. 2006. Türkiye Sözlüğü Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür. İstanbul: Doğu Batı Yayınları, pp. 
143-144.
20 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 12.
21 Founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friends, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) is 
Turkey’s first and oldest political party that established the modern Republic of Turkey and laid the 
foundation of a secular and democratic state. Starting from the mid-1960s the party transformed itself 
from a Kemalist party into a social democratic one and became a member of the Socialist 
International. See; Metin Heper, Türkiye Sözlüğü Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür, pp. 183-186. For a 
detailed study on RPP see; Ayşe Güneş Ayata. 1992. CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji). Ankara: Gündoğan 
Yayınları. Also see; Bila, Hikmet. 1999. CHP 1919-1999. İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ.
22 Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi in Turkish) was a forced tax taken on the wealthy citizens of Turkey in 
1942, with the purpose of raising funds for the country’s defense expenditures because of the danger 
of probable engagement in the Second World War. The Wealth Tax was paid by all Turkish citizens 
but the country’s non-Muslim citizens were generally imposed higher tariffs. See; Abdullah 
Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 117.
23 The first film turned out to be a scandal since Atatürk’s negative reaction to some of the spectators 
was recorded. However, later Atatürk loved this part most and watched the film many times. The 
second film was about Yugoslavian king Alexander’s visit to Turkey. See; Hıfzı Topuz. 2000. Eski 
Dostlar. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, pp. 137-138.
24 Founded in 1946, the Democrat Party (DP) was an economically liberal and culturally conservative 
party that formed the government between 1950 and 1960 and started the populist right-wing tradition 
in Turkey. By the 27 May 1960 intervention, the party was closed down but it was succeeded by 
Justice Party (1960-1980), True Path Party (1983-2007) and Democratic Party (2007-). See; Metin 
Heper, Türkiye Sözlüğü Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür, pp. 200-201. For a detailed study on Democrat 
Party see; Cem Eroğul. 2003. Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları. 
Also see; Cemil Koçak. 2010. İkinci Parti: Türkiye'de İki Partili Siyasi Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları 1945-
1950 Cilt 1. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi.
25 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 10.
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examples from Cem’s life) probably comes from his father’s feverish character. 
İhsan İpekçi was also a warm-hearted person who was devoted to animals, especially 
dogs. İsmail Cem too became a very devoted person to animals and cared for a 
canary and dogs in addition to his aquarium hobby.26
İsmail Cem’s mother Rikkat İpekçi also naturally contributed a lot to the 
shaping of his character. Cem told journalist Can Dündar that his mother was a very 
cold-blooded and calm person unlike his passionate father and his own tranquility 
probably comes from his mother.27 Cem was very close to his mother since he spent 
most of his time in the house with her while his father was out for business. İsmail 
Cem had a bit distant but harmonious relationship with his elder sister Alev İpekçi. 
Cem later told Can Dündar that the way his parents, especially his mother brought 
him up, provided him with self-confidence28 and a well-balanced emotional 
character.29
2.2. Robert College Years
After finishing the elementary school of Işık College, Cem started Robert 
College of İstanbul, a very famous, rooted and selective private school known for its 
high-quality English teaching and American style of education. Cem loved Robert 
College a lot because of the opportunities and the liberal atmosphere it offered. In 
Turkey too, the early 1950s were the years of economic advancement and political 
liberalization. At Robert College, İsmail Cem had the chance to listen and learn 
symphonic music and encounter the works of authors such as Ernest Hemingway, 
                                                
26 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, pp. 271-278.
27 ibid., p. 14.
28 For instance, after Cem was removed from the directorship position of TRT, he wrote in his 
memoirs that he would have much more important memoirs than TRT days in the future; a statement 
that clearly shows Cem’s self-confidence and determination in politics. See; İsmail Cem, TRT’de 500 
Gün … bir dönem Türkiye’sinin hikayesi, p. 6.
29 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 26.
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Charles Dickens, John Steinbeck, Arthur Miller and Albert Camus for the first time 
by reading their books in English.30 Robert College in a sense allowed Cem to start 
thinking beyond national borders and invent new worlds because of his knowledge of 
the most widely spoken language of the world. Cem remembers his college days with 
pride and praises his school for its libertarian atmosphere, allowing free-speech and 
free discussion through student clubs.31 Cem learned the basis of rhetoric, rules of a 
democratic political discussion, the art of photography and the main principles of 
journalism in college. He even worked as a reporter for the school journal entitled 
Echo (Yankı) with his friend Ercan Arıklı who later became a famous journalist.32
Cem also wrote his first poems also in Robert College. One of his poems he wrote 
for the street cleaners he saw in the mornings named “Sabahleyin Sokaklar (Streets 
in the Morning)” was even published in a literary magazine in Edirne, which 
delighted young Cem.33 The poem was simple and obviously not a masterpiece, but 
still its social content gave traces of Cem’s idealistic and romantic personality that 
does not accept the inequalities and desperation of poor people. 
STREETS IN THE MORNING
Streets are completely different in the morning,
Garbage men are there,
And freezing workers.
Garbage men are in the streets,
They all have homesickness,
They chant folksongs
They twist their moustaches and cuss
With their garbage smelling hands.
Streets smell dirt and hope in the mornings,
You can read goodness from people’s faces.
Garbage men and workers are in the streets,
It touches my heart. 34
                                                
30 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 15.
31 ibid., pp. 14-15.
32 ibid., p. 18.
33 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 117.
34 SABAHLEYİN SOKAKLAR
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İsmail Cem also took part in school’s chess team, touring and photography 
clubs. When his father brought a new Folklander photographic machine from 
Germany35, he became an amateur photographer and never lost his passion for 
photography during his entire life.36 In 1956, when Robert College witnessed the first 
student demonstration in its history, Cem photographed the demonstration and 
published pictures in Cumhuriyet (Republic) newspaper with the help of his elder 
sister Alev İpekçi’s husband, Ali Ulvi Ersoy, who was working as a caricaturist in 
that journal.37 At the age of sixteen, Cem started to enjoy journalism since his 
pictures were published in a respected newspaper.38 Cem also participated in the 
opening ceremony of Anıtkabir39 with his father and filmed the ceremony.40 He 
loved most literature and logic lessons but did not like biology and geometry 
                                                                                                                                         
Bambaşka olur sabah sokaklar 
Çöpçü vardır sokaklarda 
Ve üşüyen ameleler. 
Çöpçüler vardır sokaklarda; 
Hepsi sıla hasreti çeker. 
Türkü söylerler 
Bıyık burup, çöp kokan elleriyle 
Küfrederler. 
Pislik ve ümit kokar sabahleyin sokaklar, 
İnsanların yüzlerinde okunur iyilik. 
Çöpçülerle ameleler vardır sokaklarda, 
Yüreğime dokunur.
See; Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 22.
35 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 118.
36 İsmail Cem later published two photographic album books (the second one is called 
“Mevsimler/Seasons”) and arranged five exhibitions. In photography, Cem adopted an artistic style 
and produced photographs based on the color harmony of picturesque landscapes rather than social 
realist perspective. See; Cüneyt Özdemir. 2000. Reytingsiz Sohbetler. İstanbul: Su Yayınları, pp. 99-
100. However, some of Cem’s pictures -such as “Les Clochards” and “Global Reality” which could be 
seen in the attachment part- touched upon social problems and showed parallel tendencies with Cem’s 
political stance. Other than these two rare social based photographs, in his book Seasons, Cem wanted 
to “present impressions from seasons that are beyond the calendars”. See; İsmail Cem, 
Mevsimler/Seasons, p. 1. To see some of Cem’s photographs from the book Seasons, see attachments.
37 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, pp. 119-120.
38 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 49.
39 The mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Ankara.
40 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 19.
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although he was a very successful student.41 He also acted in two dramas as a 
member of Robert College’s theatre club.42 İsmail and Elçin Cem first met in Robert 
College but their relationship was no more than friendship in those years. Elçin Cem 
remembers young Cem as bright, intelligent and good-looking but also a different 
person from his fellows with whom she loved to talk on different matters.43
One of the most interesting events in Cem’s college years was his voyage to 
the USA with the American Field Service exchange program for a year (1956-1957). 
Cem stayed with an American family (the Parkhursts) in San Francisco and had the 
chance to visit “splendid” American cities like New York.44 Cem admits that he was 
affected by the glorious aspects of the American style of living, but he never lost his 
passion for his own country unlike some of his friends who became Americanized 
after a year in the USA.45 Cem was successful at school both in courses and social 
life. He had very good relations with the Parkhurst family members, but his political 
choice for the 1956 American presidential elections was against the family’s wishes. 
Cem had sympathy for the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, Adlai 
Stevenson, whereas the Parkhursts, as a traditionally Republican family, supported 
the Republican Party’s candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower. Cem’s support for the 
weaker side, for instance in boxing matches or in American presidential elections, 
led the Parkhursts to call him the “supporter of the underdog” in a jocular way.46
Cem also had his first political experience working for the Democratic Party’s 
student club in college. Cem loved some aspects of the American system, for 
instance having the chance to speak freely and criticize the American system in 
                                                
41 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 20.
42 ibid., p. 45.
43 ibid., p. 22.
44 ibid., p. 26.
45 ibid., p. 27.
46 ibid., pp. 30-31.
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school even as a non-American student.47 However, he also found American life, 
especially fraternity clubs system in the school, too competitive and felt sorry for 
students who did not make it socially at school.48 Although Cem was impressed by 
the USA’s technological possibilities, glorious cities and freedom of thought, his 
sympathy for the aggrieved side led him to find the American system too draconian 
and disadvantageous for the weaker ones. He also felt a kind of responsibility for 
developing his country and aiding the poor children who did not have the same 
opportunities as Cem did after experiencing American life. Cem’s experience in the 
USA might have played an important role in the shaping of his “underdevelopment” 
theory in subsequent years. Cem loved American people and found them helpful and 
optimistic, but opposed many American policies starting from his youth.49 In Cem’s 
view, what made the American state powerful and the American society integrated 
was the environment of liberty that the system offered to people to protect their own 
sub-cultures and live according to their own preferences, despite perpetual enormous 
inequalities in the system.50
After spending a year in the USA, Cem returned to Robert College, but this 
time as a more politicized student. Since he had worked in a student club of the 
Democratic Party in the USA and became experienced, Cem wanted to work for the 
Republican People’s Party and organize his friends. So, he became a member of 
RPP’s Teşvikiye branch and soon became the head of the RPP Teşvikiye’s youth 
department in 1958.51 Cem organized free courses of English for citizens in RPP’s 
Beşiktaş branch.52 The late 1950s were politically very heated and increasing 
                                                
47 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 33.
48 ibid., p. 35.
49 ibid., p. 38.
50 ibid., pp. 40-41.
51 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 117.
52 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 47.
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pressures of the Democrat Party government and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
over the media, bureaucracy, and the Republican People’s Party led to the first 
student demonstrations and mass protestations. At the time, Cem was reading all 
sorts of publications including Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s53 Büyük Doğu (Grand East) 
in addition to his favorite Cumhuriyet newspaper.54 In fact, Cem always had a great 
curiosity towards the East because his Western lifestyle and education did not satisfy 
his passion for information and culture on its own. Starting from his youth, Cem tried 
to learn about Islam.55 Thanks to his Turkish literature teacher from Robert College 
he read Hallac-ı Mansur56 in his early college days.57 Although he did not have a 
strict political ideology in those years, he was extremely uncomfortable with the
DP’s authoritarian policies and censorship practices over the press. Cem even kept 
guard duty in front of the RPP leader and National War hero İsmet İnönü’s house as 
a reaction to physical assaults made to İsmet Pasha by DP supporters.58 Cem later 
admitted that in those years as an unconscious young partisan, he was in favor of 
military intervention to straighten things out in the country.59
2.3. The Lausanne University Years
İsmail Cem graduated from Robert College in 1959 and began to look for 
university education options. His father wanted him to become a lawyer.60 İhsan 
İpekçi was a bit disturbed of Cem’s circle of friends in İstanbul who were from 
                                                
53 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983) was a famous Turkish poet, writer and philosopher known for
his Islamic and anti-communist political views. See; Metin Heper, Türkiye Sözlüğü Siyaset, Toplum ve 
Kültür, p. 328.
54 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, pp. 46-47.
55 ibid., p. xvii.
56 Mansur al-Hallaj (858-922) was a Persian and Shiite philosopher and writer known for his famous 
saying “En-el hak (I am God)”.
57 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 15.
58 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 117.
59 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 55.
60 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 121.
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wealthy families and he wanted him to study abroad.61 However, Cem was not sure 
about going abroad, especially in those difficult days of his country, because of the 
DP’s authoritarianism. He felt that leaving his country would be treason62 and he was 
dreaming of saving the country.63 However, upon his father’s insistence he took the 
exams and qualified for Lausanne University’s Law department. Cem’s hesitancy of 
going abroad disappeared after some of his friends from Robert College were 
admitted to Lausanne University.64 In September 1959, Cem arrived at Lausanne to 
start his law education. He was a very active student in Lausanne among the Turkish 
community and he became the president of the Turkish Student Union. Polarization 
within the country between RPP and DP supporters was also reflected among 
Turkish students in Lausanne. Cem, in accordance with the major intellectual trend 
of those years in Turkey, was in favor of military intervention and the adoption of a 
new constitution that would increase and guarantee civil freedoms.65 İsmail Cem 
learned of the take-over of the Turkish military on 27 May 1960 on the phone and 
welcomed the event like all other family members and most of the Turkish 
intellectuals of that period.66 However, during trials, especially after the execution of 
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes67, Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan and Foreign 
Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, he felt extremely despondent.68 In Cem’s view, 27 May 
was a turning point for Turkey to develop its democracy and intellectual 
                                                
61 İhsan İpekçi’s discontent was caused by young İsmail Cem’s smoking habit, political activities and 
flyaway entertainments. See; Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 53.
62 ibid., p. 53.
63 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 122.
64 İsmail Cem’s wife Elçin Cem (Trak), his sister İnci Arıklı (Trak) who later became Ercan Arıklı’s 
wife, Ercan Arıklı, Alp Yalman, Ali Pasiner, Haluk Ferhatoğlu, Tamer Soyer, Şener Soyer and Ahmet 
Tekeli were all İsmail Cem’s friends from Robert College who also studied at Lausanne University. 
See; Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 54.
65 ibid., p. 55.
66 ibid., p. 56.
67 Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) was the founder and leader of the Democrat Party, the first fully 
democratically elected Turkish Prime Minister who ruled the country between 1950 and 1960 but was 
executed in 1961 after the 27 May 1960 military intervention. See; Metin Heper, Türkiye Sözlüğü 
Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür, p. 358.
68 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 57.
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accumulation, especially concerning Marxist-leftist ideology and the syndical 
movement.69 The 1961 constitution expanded the scope of democracy and 
established the necessary institutions that would limit the government’s power and in 
that sense it was a progressive step. However, as Cem grew older, he understood 
better the negative consequences of 27 May military intervention.
In Lausanne, İsmail Cem met with French-European culture and was greatly 
impressed by it. He learned French and improved his cultural knowledge of art. As a 
young man living on his own in a foreign country, he learned how to cope with 
difficulties of life and how to study in a more disciplined way. In those years, the 
French dispute over Algeria was heated and as a classical and romantic “underdog 
supporter” Cem was in favor of a free Algeria.70 Cem’s ideological transformation 
also started in Lausanne since he had first read Marxist classics at the university.71
Cem, who would later become one of the most important theoreticians of Turkish 
social democracy, had the chance to observe and analyze European socialist/social 
democratic movements in Lausanne. He started to perceive the world and politics in 
a more class-based materialistic manner and to use historical materialism72 in his 
researches. He also got closer to Elçin Trak in Lausanne and the young lovers 
decided to marry after spending a year together abroad.73 Cem’s days with Elçin 
Trak in Lausanne were entertaining. They were also very comfortable being Turks in 
Europe. Turkey in those years was an important country for the Western democratic 
world as the frontier post that neighbored the USSR. Cem remembered that Turkey’s 
image was very good in the eyes of Europeans due to the Cold War conditions but 
                                                
69 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 57.
70 ibid., pp. 58-59.
71 ibid., pp. 60-61.
72 Communist theoretician Karl Marx’s (1818-1883) methodological approach to social sciences, 
which is based on class-conflict analysis and economic determinism.
73 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 61.
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this situation changed after the termination of the Cold War and Turkey’s problems 
of democracy became important issues in the West.74
2.4. Journalism
İsmail Cem graduated from the Law School of Lausanne University in 1962 
and began to work at the Milliyet (Nationality) newspaper with the help of his 
famous journalist cousin Abdi İpekçi in 1963.75 Milliyet was a “left of the center
(ortanın solu)”76 newspaper which made it very convenient for Cem to reflect his 
views openly and develop his knowledge by working with experienced liberal and 
social democratic figures of the period.77 Cem prepared a short section of news from 
foreign countries. His section’s name was “5 Dakikada Dünya Turu (Tour around the 
World in 5 Minutes)”.78 He also helped Abdi İpekçi, Turhan Aytul and Hasan Pulur, 
three of the most famous journalists of that period, in their researches. His section in 
Milliyet newspaper turned out to be a real success, but Cem was not satisfied with 
translating and summarizing international news agencies’ daily news. He was 
dreaming of expressing his views on Turkish and international politics freely in his 
own column. Cem loved Milliyet’s atmosphere and worked passionately in family-
type closeness with his colleagues. Similar to his colleagues, he idealized his job as 
                                                
74 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 62.
75 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 124.
76 “Left of the center” symbolizes Republican People’s Party’s transformation towards a social 
democratic party after 27 May military intervention and the adoption of 1961 constitution. The term 
was first used by İsmet İnönü on 25 July 1965 but Bülent Ecevit, young secretary general of the party 
in the 1960s, was the leading architect of the movement. See; Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer, 2006. CHP: 
1965-1980 Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu. Antalya: Yeniden Anadolu ve Müdafaa-i Hukuk 
Yayınları, p. 59. Ecevit also wrote a booklet called Ortanın Solu (Left of the Center) in 1966. See; 
Bülent Ecevit. 1974. Ortanın Solu. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.
77 Milliyet’s staff of the 1960s can be described as a “Dream Team”. Abdi İpekçi (editor in chief), 
Sami Kohen, Dinçer Güner, Ali Gevgilili, Mete Akyol, Mehmet Ali Birand, Hasan Pulur, Turhan 
Aytul, Çetin Altan, Burhan Felek, Talat Halman, Refik Erduran, Kemal Bisalman, Metin Toker, Bedri 
Koraman, Mümtaz Soysal, Örsan Öymen, Yılmaz Çetiner and Bülent Ecevit were Milliyet’s most 
important writers. 
78 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 67.
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being like Robin Hood79, fighting against injustices in order to protect the poor and 
weaker side.80 He followed political developments closely but he was not a member 
of a political party. Instead of a political party, Cem was working for Turkish 
Journalists Syndicate (Gazeteciler Sendikası) which was tied to Türk-İş
(Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions).81 He worked on the education activities of 
Türk-İş and gave lectures to workers and shantytown inhabitants about their social 
rights and advantages of organized democratic syndicalism. Cem admitted that these 
activities developed his knowledge about Turkey and gave him the opportunity to 
break from the theoretical world and encounter real social problems.82 As the well-
educated son of an elite Istanbulite family, union activities improved Cem’s dialogue 
with ordinary people and his oratory skills. Cem’s first article in Milliyet was 
published on 28 August 1963. The article was about a demonstration of African-
Americans in order to protest discriminatory laws against them in the United States.83
Meanwhile, İsmail Cem married Elçin Trak on 23 December 1963 and the young 
couple’s dream that started in Lausanne became real.84 During those years, RPP was 
also discovering its leftist identity by the official declaration of İsmet İnönü85 and 
winds were starting to blow from the left in the country. Although İnönü later tried to 
clarify his words and underlined that due to their statist (étatiste) economic 
preferences he had called RPP as a party on the left of the center, and that their 
                                                
79 A protagonist from English folklore known as a man who robs the rich to give their wealth to the 
poor.
80 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 67.
81 The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) is Turkey’s biggest syndical confederation 
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82 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 69.
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economic programme was similar to American President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s86
“New Deal” policy, RPP soon began to be perceived as a social democratic party in 
the country.87
Cem was successful and happy at Milliyet but he felt that his cousin Abdi 
İpekçi could not give him what he deserved because of his fears of rumors about 
their kinship.88 However, Cem decided to rise and he could not be easily satisfied 
with a translation job. After a short discussion with Abdi İpekçi, Cem decided to 
leave Milliyet and soon began to work at the Cumhuriyet newspaper. Cumhuriyet was 
the battleground of Kemalist and leftist ideologies in the media and Cem had the 
chance to work with very important names.89 Cem worked as the assistant editor at
Cumhuriyet and tried to highlight news concerning the Turkish Labor Party (Türkiye 
İşçi Partisi).90 The Turkish Labor Party (the TLP) was Turkey’s first real socialist 
political party that made a serious impact on Turkish politics in the 1960s. With 
TLP’s entry into parliament, thanks to the proportional representation electoral 
system that was implemented after the 27 May intervention and the 1961 
constitution, for the first time socialist ideas found formal representation in the 
parliament with fifteen delegates and began to gain popularity.91 Cumhuriyet in 
the 1960s in a sense was serving as an umbrella representing Kemalist, social 
                                                
86 Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945), shortly known as FDR, was the 32nd President of the 
United States. He was a central figure of the 20th century during a time of worldwide economic crisis 
(Great Depression of 1929) and world war (Second World War). Elected to four terms in office, he 
served from 1933 to 1945 and is the only U.S. president to have served more than two terms. 
Roosevelt was known for his sympathy for statist-leftist economic policies and lack of enmity towards 
USSR.
87 Özkan Ağtaş, “Ortanın Solu: İsmet İnönü’den Bülent Ecevit’e”, p. 197.
88 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 70.
89 Some of Cumhuriyet’s writers in the 1960s were; Nadir Nadi, İlhan Selçuk, Ecvet Güresin, Cevat 
Fehmi Başkut, Uğur Mumcu, Server Tanilli, Ali Ulvi Ersoy (İsmail Cem’s sister Alev İpekçi’s 
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91 Igor Lipovsky. 1992. The Socialist Movement in Turkey 1960-1980. Leiden: Brill, p. 19.
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democratic/socialist, communist, Yön (Direction)92 type and National Democratic 
Revolution (Milli Demokratik Devrim)93 ideas. At the same time, the young 
secretary general of the RPP, Bülent Ecevit, was challenging the system and 
making efforts to transform the RPP into a “democratic leftist” party.94 Ecevit 
first attracted the attention of the media in 1963 as a young Minister of Labor and 
Social Security who achieved to legalize the right to strike and law of collective 
bargaining.95 Ecevit was close to European socialist and social democratic parties 
but he was also an anti-imperialist similar to Latin American populist leaders.96
According to socialist writer Emin Alper, Ecevit was trying to make a unique
synthesis of European Keynesianism and third world socialism for Turkey.97
İsmail Cem was also similar to Ecevit, that is closer to European socialism than 
Chinese or Soviet versions of socialism, and he was also skeptical and critical 
about so-called Westernization in Turkish history. In addition, although he never 
approved of a total rejection of private property and free-market economics, his 
ideas in the 1960s were closer to the TLP.98 Cumhuriyet was very active and Cem 
was both serving as an assistant editor and as a contributor-writer in his column 
                                                
92 Founded by the famous writer Doğan Avcıoğlu, Yön (published between 1961 and 1967) was the 
legendary leftist magazine of the 1960s. Yön typified the socialism of the 1960s in many respects. The 
Yön group was mainly comprised of intellectuals, bureaucrats and patriotic officers. The strategy 
of the founders of Yön was to change the society from the top down by using an eclectic ideology 
containing anti-imperialist socialist and Kemalist elements. They promoted a military coup which 
would be undertaken by the progressive intelligentsia and officers. Avcıoğlu represented his 
views best and with integrity in his famous work Türkiye’nin Düzeni (The System of Turkey). 
See; Doğan Avcıoğlu. 1974. Türkiye’nin Düzeni Dün, Bugün, Yarın. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
93 The National Democratic Revolution (NDR) movement was an important leftist fraction in Turkish 
left in the 1960s led by Mihri Belli. The NDR was ideologically close to the Yön movement but they 
implemented the strategy of guerilla warfare and found followers especially among university 
students. For a detailed study about socialist movements in Turkey see; Igor Lipovsky. 1992. The 
Socialist Movement in Turkey 1960-1980. Leiden: Brill.
94 In the early 1970s Ecevit and his followers began to use the term “democratic left (demokratik sol)” 
instead of “left of the center (ortanın solu)”. See; Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer, CHP: 1965-1980 Türk 
Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu, p. 144.
95 Emin Alper. 2007.  “Bülent Ecevit” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce cilt 8 Sol. İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları,  p. 204.
96 ibid., p. 203.
97 ibid., p. 213.
98 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 73.
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“Düşünenlerin Düşüncesi (The Idea of the Mindful)” on the second page of the 
newspaper.99 Cem was witnessing the split of the Turkish left as an employee of 
Cumhuriyet. Although in many ways, his ideas intersected with the Yön movement100
and Kemalist writers, he was on TLP’s side and developing himself with many 
writers that are not accepted as a part of the classical Turkish left such as İdris 
Küçükömer101, Kemal Tahir102 and Şerif Mardin103. Notably, İsmail Cem’s devotion 
to Kemal Tahir (similar to Bülent Ecevit) was a determining factor in his political 
stance. In fact, Cem was with Kemal Tahir a day before his passing away in 1973 in
journalist Mehmet Barlas’ house for a meeting among some intellectuals of the 
period including Mete Tunçay, Ali Sirmen and Afşin Germen.104 After Tahir’s death, 
Cem in his article defined Kemal Tahir as the man who first made Turkey’s accounts 
with its past.105
In 1966, Cem wanted to take his chances, so he left Cumhuriyet and 
published a weekly magazine called ABC with his close friend Ercan Arıklı.106 The 
magazine found readers among intellectuals but due to financial problems it was 
                                                
99 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 73.
100 After his death, Cem wrote an article about Doğan Avcıoğlu and praised him as one of vanguards 
of socialist movement in Turkey although he expressed that his methods were controversial. See; 
Hikmet Özdemir. 2000. Doğan Avcıoğlu Bir Jön Türk’ün Ardından. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, pp. 263-
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101 İdris Küçükömer (1925-1987) was a Turkish economist and philosopher known for his anti-
Jacobin, anti-authoritarian approaches on the left. Küçükömer was defending revolution from below 
and was very critical of the state’s dominant role in Turkish modernization. Küçükömer also 
approached pious Anatolian people with sympathy. His most influential work is Düzenin 
Yabancılaşması (Alienation of the System). See; İdris Küçükömer. 1994. Düzenin Yabancılaşması. 
İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık. See; Metin Heper, Türkiye Sözlüğü Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür, pp. 343-
344.
102 Kemal Tahir (1910-1973) was a Turkish writer who brought a critical approach to Turkish 
modernization and leftist movements in Turkey with his best-seller novels. Together with Bülent 
Ecevit, İsmail Cem was a devoted reader of Tahir. Writer Yalçın Küçük even called Cem and Ecevit 
“Tahiri -follower of Tahir-”. See; Yalçın Küçük. 2002. Şebeke Network. İstanbul: Yazı-Görüntü-Ses 
Yayınları, p. 44.
103 Şerif Mardin (1927-) is a prominent Turkish sociologist who received his PhD from Stanford 
University and who is recognized for his works on center-periphery cleavage, Turkish modernization 
and religious brotherhoods. See; Metin Heper, Türkiye Sözlüğü Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür, p. 355.
104 Mehmet Barlas. 2005. Rüzgar Gibi Geçti. İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, pp. 153-154.
105 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 164.
106 ibid., p. 125.
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short-lived. After this failure, Cem once again began to work for Cumhuriyet and in 
1968 he decided to fulfill his military service at a time when leftist student 
demonstrations were at the peak everywhere in the world. Cem served first in Tuzla 
Infantry School and had chance to meet with very different people coming from 
different parts of Anatolia. Cem explained military service as an educational and new 
experience. After 6 months in Tuzla, Cem began to work in the Military Academy as 
an education planner.107 Although both Cem and his friend and lawyer journalist 
Uğur Mumcu were recognized as “leftists”, in the escalating political violence and 
turbulence of the late 1960s, Cem did not make “unfavorable infantry (sakıncalı 
piyadelik)” like Uğur Mumcu.108 During his military service, Cem also researched
and wrote about Turkish history and politics in order to publish his books in the near 
future.109 After returning from the military, Abdi İpekçi this time offered him a 
regular columnist position at Milliyet. Cem accepted this attractive offer and began to 
work again at Milliyet. In 1970, after making a long journey in the region, he 
published a series of news and articles about social problems in south-east Anatolia 
where the population mostly consisted of Kurdish citizens. “Acılı Doğu (East in 
Pain)” was published between 12 June and 18 June 1970 and became a sensation in 
the media.110 Cem published this series in his first book Türkiye Üzerine 
Araştırmalar (Researches on Turkey).111 The book was journalistic and far from 
showing Cem’s theoretical knowledge, but it was still very important because it was 
one of the earliest books written on the Kurdish question. In the same year, he 
                                                
107 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 75.
108 The famous journalist Uğur Mumcu was a good friend of Cem, but he did not hesitate to point out 
Cem’s privileged position of coming from a wealthy family in their military duty period. See; 
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published his most well-known book Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi (History of 
Underdevelopment in Turkey), in which Cem tried to explain Ottoman and Turkish 
political history from a historical materialist perspective.112 The book turned out to 
be a real success and became a classic of 1970s theoretical books in the leftist 
tradition. What is interesting is that the book also took positive reactions from the 
rightist-conservative circles because of its critical attitude towards the Westernization 
process of Ottoman and Turkish states and Cem’s interest in national values though 
having been educated abroad. İsmail Cem’s name and his soft writing style gained 
recognition and popularity. He also wrote interesting articles about social chaos in 
India after making a visit to this country.113
2.5. The 12 March Days
By early 1971, Turkey was in a state of social unrest. The growing 
activities of the leftist groups and, to some extent, rightist circles and the 
increasing militancy of workers’ demonstrations weakened Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel’s114 Justice Party government to the point of paralysis. The 
government was incapable of putting an end to the violence in the universities 
and the streets. In those circumstances, the chief of the general staff issued a 
memorandum on 12 March 1971, which interrupted the normal functioning of the 
parliamentary regime and suspended democratic freedoms. The 12 March regime 
forced Prime Minister Demirel to resign and the Constitutional Court to close 
down and outlaw the socialist TLP and the Islamic-oriented National Order Party 
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led by Necmettin Erbakan115. 1961 constitution was accused of being a luxury for 
Turkey and it was amended in order to limit social and political freedoms. Cem, 
as a social democratic journalist close to the TLP, was completely against the 12 
March regime and its policies.
Cem’s opposition to the 12 March’s technocratic government, which was
backed up by the military under the Prime Ministry of RPP deputy Nihat Erim, 
made him a star in the media and on the left similar to young secretary general of 
RPP, Bülent Ecevit.116 Before and during the 12 March, Cem criticized the Yön
movement and the National Democratic Revolution thesis for their adventurism 
and militarism (search for leftist junta).117 Cem criticized the military harshly but 
also blamed JP leader Süleyman Demirel for cooperating with the military and 
RPP leader İsmet İnönü for supposedly creating and supporting the 12 March 
regime. Cem even blamed the 12 March’s so-called “Atatürkist” technocratic 
government for being on the verge of fascism.118 Ecevit and Cem’s popularity 
rose after their democratic stance against the military memorandum. Both were 
fighting to transform the RPP from the state’s party into a people’s party under 
the guidance of social democratic principles.119 In their view, the 12 March was 
the consequence of the Demirel government’s orientation towards a multi-
dimensional international policy after problems occurred with the USA.120 Their 
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rhetoric was anti-imperialist, in favor of state-led economic development and 
more equal allocation and distribution of the state’s resources. In 1973, Cem 
collected his articles about the 12 March in a book called 12 Mart (12 March) and 
tried to make a structural explanation of military intervention. A few years later,
he published a two-volume book Tarih Açısından 12 Mart (12 March in Terms of 
History)121 about the 12 March in which he added a detailed interview with the
Demirel government’s Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil122 to his articles. 
The book once again became sensational for Cem’s materialistic explanations of 
the 12 March intervention and especially for the interview he made with 
Çağlayangil. Çağlayangil during the interview decoded the 12 March and 
confessed the hidden American effect behind this military intervention.123 Cem 
continued to write brave articles against the 12 March regime and he made 
interviews with important politicians including Süleyman Demirel and Bülent 
Ecevit during the same period in question.
While Cem was becoming an important figure and a theoretician of the 
left, Ecevit was preparing to topple down legendary İsmet Pasha in the RPP 
General Assembly. On 14 May 1972, Ecevit realized the impossible and became 
the third secretary general of the RPP after Atatürk and İnönü.124 Cem’s critical 
articles about the 12 March regime put Milliyet and Milliyet’s chief editor Abdi 
İpekçi on the spot and İpekçi had to warn Cem to soften his criticism.125
                                                                                                                                         
intervene in Cyprus to prevent ethno-political conflicts between the two communities. During the late 
1960s and 1970s Turkish-American relations never became coherent as before the Johnson Letter.
121 İsmail Cem. 1993. Tarih Açısından 12 Mart. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
122 İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (1908-1993) was a famous Turkish politician who served as Foreign 
Minister from Justice Party during 1965-1971 and 1975-1977. See; Metin Heper, Türkiye Sözlüğü 
Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür, p. 188.
123 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 81.
124 Fatin Dağıstanlı, Sosyal Demokratlar, p. 55.
125 Abdullah Muradoğlu, Selanik’ten İstanbul’a İpekçi’ler ve İsmail Cem, p. 127.
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However, Cem, as “stubbornness enclosed with soft material”126, continued to 
criticize the 12 March regime harshly and raise his reputation among social 
democratic circles. After Ecevit’s takeover in RPP, Cem began to show more interest 
in the RPP and its populist social democratic program. His pro-TLP rhetoric was 
replaced by a pro-Ecevit stance and pro-RPP expression.127 At the 1973 elections, 
RPP with its new, young and charismatic leader garnered 33.3 % of the votes and 
became the first party in the parliament.128 Ecevit made an unexpected move and 
formed a coalition government with Erbakan’s Islamic oriented National Salvation 
Party on 26 January 1974.129 Cem was very happy about the RPP’s takeover and he 
saw this coalition as a chance to get over the Islamist-secularist clash, which he 
identified as a “historic mistake (tarihi yanılgı)”.130 In Cem’s view, Turkey’s social 
problems were not related to superstructural secularism discussions but were rather 
related to class-based economic inequalities. Similar to Mümtaz Soysal, an 
influential leftist academician and journalist of the period, he saw the growing 
Islamic movement as a “metaphysical reaction of the suppressed masses”.131 Ecevit 
also made similar evaluations and even defended some of his projects such as “land 
reform” with Islamic arguments.132 After the 12 March, Cem also increased his
unionist efforts and between 1971 and 1974, he served as the head of the Journalist 
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Union of Turkey in its İstanbul branch.133 He continued to write in Milliyet until a 
sudden telephone call changed his life.
2.6. The TRT Years
On 7 February 1974 when the RPP-NSP coalition government received its 
vote of confidence from the parliament and officially started its position, Cem was in 
Ankara for an interview with İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil.134 In the afternoon, he went to 
the office of his friend Deniz Baykal135 who was in those years the promising young 
deputy and the Minister of Finance of RPP.136 Baykal told Cem that Prime Minister 
Ecevit wanted him to become the director of the TRT (Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation). Cem was surprised and ambivalent about how he would answer, but he 
was also confident and thought he would do a good job if he accepted the offer. The 
next day, Cem went to the Prime Ministry and met with Ecevit and his important 
deputies such as Turan Güneş, Orhan Birgit and Deniz Baykal. Cem thanked Ecevit 
for the offer and requested permission for a day to think about the offer.137 On his 
return to İstanbul, he telephoned Baykal and kindly refused the offer. Cem had no 
government job experience and he had never wanted to leave İstanbul for Ankara.138
Cem was a keen admirer of İstanbul and he thought that Ankara’s gray tone and 
bureaucratic nature would not fit him.139 Moreover, becoming the head of the TRT 
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was a very difficult task given the rising atmosphere of polarization in the country.140
These were the main motives for Cem in refusing the offer. Fifteen minutes after his 
refusal, his telephone rang; this time it was Prime Minister Ecevit on the phone.141
Ecevit told Cem that this was a matter of state and he should accept the offer.142
After a long telephone call, Cem felt like he had to accept the offer and said “yes” to 
Ecevit. He was now the head of the TRT, a very important position, especially in the 
days of a single television channel that could heavily affect large populations.
Cem’s appointment received different reactions from leftist and rightist 
circles. In general, the leftist media celebrated Cem’s take-over, whereas the 
nationalist media focused on his lack of experience and Sabetaist family 
background.143 Classical Kemalist/Atatürkist circles and the entrepreneur class got 
suspicious mostly because of Cem’s socialist ideology and coalition partner NSP’s 
anti-Western, anti-secular and anti-capitalist rhetoric.144 Islamist circles, on the other 
hand, surprisingly supported Cem and exalted his views in Türkiye’de Geri 
Kalmışlığın Tarihi that were close to İdris Küçükömer and Kemal Tahir.145 Later, 
Bülent Ecevit told journalist İsmet Solak that he had chosen Cem for the TRT 
deliberately in order to gain the support of Erbakan and to not create a disagreement 
among coalition partners in the early days of the partnership. Ecevit also remembered 
that Erbakan became very happy after hearing Cem’s name from Ecevit.146 Cem did 
not respond to harsh critics and began to collect and read books about 
communication, broadcasting and television technology. He also tried to take advice
and tips from his journalist friends. He felt responsible and under pressure, but he 
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was also determinate and energetic. On 15 February 1974, on the day of his 34th
birthday, Cem took the train for Ankara and started his job officially.147
Cem met with the clumsy bureaucratic nature of the state for the first time at 
the TRT. He tried to surmount bureaucratic difficulties with an interactive 
management and close dialogue with the staff.148 Because of clientelistic political 
exercises of governments, the TRT owned more than 5.000 permanent staff; most of 
them did nothing except take their wages.149 Starting from his first day in the office, 
Cem tried to stretch or even sometimes reverse some “ridiculous rules and 
precedents”.150 For instance, he visited all TRT buildings and offices and met with 
the staff by presenting himself instead of waiting for their visit. He built a positive 
social dialogue with employees.151 At the beginning, because of his young age, he 
felt a bit disturbed by the elder staff of TRT’s obedient addressing to him.152 TRT 
had the ability to take on staff by itself without a cabinet decision in addition to 
appointments made by the political authority. Moreover, once a person was 
employed it was impossible to fire without giving severance pay. In addition, the 
effects of the 12 March intervention were still in force at TRT and retired officers 
were filling in the critical positions. These were Cem’s first considerations about the 
reason behind TRT’s highly populated staff and its money squandering tradition. 
Cem, at the expense of breaking his friends’ and relatives’ hearts, tried to use TRT’s 
resources in a very close-fisted way and brought work and financial discipline to the 
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institution.153 After making his protocol visits to state institutions and political party 
leaders154, Cem at short notice formed his own young crew at TRT. The crew 
consisted of Cem’s close friend and journalist Mehmet Barlas, Mustafa Gürsel, Hıfzı 
Topuz, Mete Buharalı, Rua Tezcan and Haluk Şahin.155 At the administrative board, 
Cem did not have problems except with two members; retired Admiral Sezai Orkunt 
and Fikret Ekinci, two names close to the Turkish military and the 12 March 
regime.156 On 11 March 1974, Cem made a press conference and stated that “TRT 
would follow a modern, democratic, pluralist broadcasting policy in terms of 
constitution and laws”.157 He also mentioned that “TRT’s mission is not acting like 
the voice of governments” but rather “serving as a communication and cultural
instrument for Turkey”.158 Cem promised a more dynamic news agency and stated 
that “being uninformed is similar to being immobile”.159  Another remarkable point 
Cem made was that under his control “TRT’s cultural policy would be Turkey’s 
culture”.160 Cem’s preference of “Turkey’s culture (Türkiye kültürü)” instead of 
“Turkish culture (Türk kültürü)” became a polemic after his press conference.161
Starting from his first day in office, Demirel, JP deputies and the rightist press began 
to attack Cem for meaningless or insignificant issues.162 However, Cem later wrote 
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that these attacks increased Cem’s determination and attachment to his work instead 
of intimidating him.163 Cem was ready to make changes and to display his talents.
As the new director of TRT, Cem first decided to make a technological leap 
forward in order to add all parts and cities of Turkey in the service area. Following 
the construction of TRT İstanbul studios, new broadcasting stations opened in 
Mudanya, Antalya, Kayseri, İstanbul and İzmir.164 Preparations for the opening of 
new broadcasting stations in Samsun, Gaziantep and Diyarbakır were terminated.165
TRT was broadcasting five days and twenty hours per week before Cem’s take over. 
Cem increased TRT’s broadcasting to seven days and fifty-two hours per week.166 In 
order to accustom people to watching television, he started with popular sports 
programs such as Telespor.167 Although he took criticism from Marxist intellectuals 
for numbing people, he started the live broadcasting of the Turkish Football League 
and World Cup matches.168 With the aim of elevating people’s knowledge about 
nature, world history, politics and culture, he regularly put European-made and 
highly qualified documentary films in the broadcasting schedule.169 Classical Turkish 
novels such as Aziz Nesin’s Yaşar Ne Yaşar Ne Yaşamaz, Sait Faik Abasıyanık’s 
Kumpanya, Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil’s Aşk-ı Memnu and Ömer Seyfettin’s short stories 
were cinematized and shown on TRT during Cem’s managerial period.170 Even 
nationalist writers like Refik Özdek felt the need to congratulate Cem for this 
success171 and defined him as “young, bright and energetic” but in favor of 
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socialism.172  Cem made contracts with important Turkish film directors such as 
Halit Refiğ173, Metin Erksan and Lütfi Akat in order to adapt these literary classics to 
television properly.174 Cem also planned the broadcasting of the 1976 Olympics in 
color and the opening of the TRT-2 channel but his tenure in office ended before he 
realized these innovations.175 After Cem, Turkey was not able to pass into color 
broadcasting until 1982 and TRT-2 opened at last in 1986.
Another important change Cem made was related to TRT’s news center. Cem 
always believed that the failure of TRT news was caused by the dilemma that TRT 
reporters lived because of their double identity; being a journalist and being a civil 
servant.176 So, he appointed Mehmet Barlas, a young and bright social democratic 
journalist of the 1970s, as the chief of TRT’s news center and provided freedom177 to 
TRT’s journalists to carry out their job without governmental or bureaucratic 
pressure.178  TRT gave a very successful test during Turkey’s Cyprus Peace 
Operation179 and became the world’s first news agency and channel to declare that 
Makarios180 was alive and that Turkey started a military intervention in Cyprus.181
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TRT’s panel discussions which were moderated by Mehmet Barlas became very 
successful and all sides were represented equally in these discussions.182 During 
Cem’s period TRT, although it was one of the founding members of the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU), for the first time became elected to the administrative 
board (1975-1978 period), due to its successes and Turkey’s social democratic 
government’s positive image against the Greek military junta in power.183 Cem 
remembers that thanks to Turkey’s membership to EBU, TRT’s and thus Turkey’s 
influence about news concerning Turkey’s Cyprus Peace Operation became more 
effective.184 Moreover, leading European television magazine Gong, after interviews 
with 51 television critics, elected TRT as the fifth most successful television channel 
in Europe.185 During Cem’s period Turkey also for the first time participated in the 
Eurovision Song Contest and was represented by Semiha Yankı’s “Seninle Bir 
Dakika (A minute with you)” song.186 Although Turkey finished the contest with 
three points in last place, the participation was important since it showed Cem’s 
confidence in his own country to compete with developed European countries and 
his support of globalization and of catching up with European standards. 
Unfortunately, TRT’s expenditures for the qualification to select Turkey’s song for 
Eurovision and the failure of Semiha Yankı at the contest were interpreted as a 
disgrace by nationalist circles. However, Cem was brave enough to say that “We had 
our language listened to by 800 million Europeans, this is a success”.187
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Maybe the only problematic action of Cem was to prevent female news-
casters to appear on television.188 Jülide Gülizar remembers that one day suddenly 
İsmail Cem and Mehmet Barlas made a speech and declared that television news 
would be presented by male news-casters whereas radio news would be presented by 
female news-casters.189 Jülide Gülizar saw this action as an insult to Turkish women 
at the 50th anniversary of the Republic and thought that it was made because of the 
coalition partner NSP’s pressures.190 However, soon it was found out that the 
decision was made by Cem and Barlas because of Turkish television spectators’ 
higher interest in female news-casters rather than news.191 After reactions shown by 
Kemalist circles and women’s associations, Cem had to apologize to Gülizar and 
other female news-casters and annulled his decision.192 İsmail Cem’s innovative 
management showed its effects also in radio broadcasting. Cem brought experienced 
journalist Hıfzı Topuz to head the radios.193 Topuz soon established two new radio 
stations, TRT-2 and TRT-3, with his limited budget and turned TRT-2 radio station 
into a public university and tried to increase the Turkish people’s education level.194
TRT, with its television channel and three radio stations, became a very respectful 
and popular institution with the works of Cem and his squad. All public opinion polls 
showed that Cem brought energy and respect to TRT.195
Although Cem and his squad made visible innovations and developments, the 
rising atmosphere of polarization in the country led to harsh criticisms targeting 
TRT’s practices and Cem as a person. Kemalist-leftist circles -what Cem called 
“petty bourgeois radicals”- criticized Cem from his early days in office for his 
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tolerant approach to religious groups and rhetoric.196 For instance, the removal of a 
drama called Maymun Davası (The Monkey Case) from the schedule for its 
Darwinist content that could disturb pious people created discomfort in Kemalist 
circles.197 Kemalist magazine Yankı attacked Cem and labeled TRT as ORT -
Ottoman Radio and Television- by making reference to Cem’s tolerant approach to 
conservative circles and admiration of Kemal Tahir.198 Classical Kemalist circles and 
the capital owner class approached the coalition and Cem’s practices with doubt and 
considered the mixture of socialism and Islamism as the historical antithesis of 
Atatürkism.199 The Republican People’s Party and social democratic circles 
supported Cem but complained about Cem’s objectivity.200 RPP supporters and 
deputies anticipated support from TRT’s broadcasting with its new manager 
appointed by RPP and its Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, but soon they found out that 
Cem was completely objective as a manager. Socialist circles embraced Cem most 
and supported his democratic openings as well as his innovative practices. For 
instance, famous socialist poet, writer and philosopher Attila İlhan praised Cem for 
“transforming TRT into people’s television”.201 The only problem Cem had with 
socialists was their orthodox Marxist viewpoint that led to their disdain of TRT as a 
superstructural institution.202
Rightist-nationalist circles on the other hand approached Cem in a very 
prejudiced way. Young and socialist Cem had a tendency to interpret and explain 
these attacks from a class-based perspective in those years because of his obsession 
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with materialism.203 Their first attacking point was Cem’s inexperience and leftist 
stance.204 The second attacking point was about Cem’s so-called “enmity towards 
Turkish culture and history”.205 In other words, Cem’s tolerant approach to religious 
people was annoying Kemalist circles but at the same time it was found inadequate 
by rightist nationalist circles.206 Cem was also blamed for corruption by JP deputies 
but these accusations were found to be false.207 Conservative-Islamist circles 
approached Cem with tolerance because of the NSP’s coalition partnership and 
Cem’s democratic stance.208 Erbakan even declared that “TRT manager should not 
have to be uncolored”.209 But soon after the dissolution of RPP-NSP coalition 
government and especially after the establishment of the National Front210
government, Cem’s family background and leftist views were also heavily criticized 
in the conservative press. Because of the parliamentary discussions focused on TRT, 
TRT’s young manager became the “İsmail Cem phenomenon” as it was written by 
Cem Gökçe.211
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The first parliamentary debates were about Cem’s appointment. In order to 
make Cem’s appointment, Prime Minister Ecevit on 15 February 1974 adopted a 
decree law and made TRT manager an exceptional employee status that did not 
require earlier public service experience.212 JP spokesman İbrahim Göktepe 
interpreted this as Ecevit’s plan to make TRT an ideological apparatus of the 
leftists.213 Republican Reliance Party214 spokesman Vefa Tanır read Cem’s articles 
about the TLP in the parliament and asked for a parliamentary inquiry for Cem.215 JP 
deputy Ahmet Buldanlı criticized TRT’s expenditures for making an interview with 
Sophia Loren and supported the inquiry.216 However, with the votes of RPP and NSP 
deputies, the parliamentary inquiry request was rejected. After the establishment of 
the National Front government, parliamentary debates about Cem and TRT became 
more frequent and heated. Cem responded to accusations by complaining about 
unjust accusations and “Byzantine intrigues” of the National Front government and 
tried to take the support of the media and people.217 The National Front government 
seemed to mount a campaign against Cem. On 28 January 1975, JP senator Yiğit 
Köker made a speech in the Republican Senate and  blamed Cem for insulting 
Atatürk because of the broadcasting of pictures of his chalet with Armenian origined 
French singer Charles Aznavour’s song about homosexuality.218 JP deputy İhsan 
Ataöv labeled Cem as a “tick that imbibes the state’s budget”.219 The National Front 
government’s plan was to annul Ecevit’s decree law and to make TRT manager a job 
that requires public service experience. For Cem, his job became a matter of rule of 
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law rather than his personal position.220 Many syndicates and civil society 
organizations made press statements and supported Cem.221 The National Front 
government passed the law for Cem’s dismissal from the parliament with big 
disturbance. For instance, RPP deputy Yüksel Çakmur blamed JP for “being the 
spokesman of holdings” and “being afraid of Cem’s objectivity”.222
Media and syndical support of the “Cem phenomenon” had snowball effects.
İsmail Cem became a heroic symbol of democracy. He received thousands of letters 
and messages from ordinary people showing their support and trust in Cem. Cem’s 
dismissal decision was approved by the President of the Republic Fahri Korutürk and 
Nevzat Yalçıntaş replaced Cem as the new director of TRT.223 The rightist press 
presented Cem’s dismissal as the “dethronement of Sultan Cem”.224 From now on, 
Cem executed a jurisprudence struggle. Cem’s case and his legal situation became a 
matter of various academic panels and journal articles. For instance, on 2 February 
1975, the Union of Turkish Journalists organized a panel with elite lawyers of the 
period.225 Cem appealed to the Council of State and aborted his dismissal decision.226
On 5 June 1975, Cem returned to TRT building lost in the applause of workers and 
ordinary people.227 He stated that “TRT was under the occupation of a person that 
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does not have legal rights”.228 Cem was legally advantageous but after when Ecevit 
pulled the rug from this matter, Cem did not want to lengthen this dispute and waste 
his energy. Ecevit told Cem that he would return to his seat when RPP would form 
the government again but did not contact him when he became Prime Minister on 5 
January 1978 via RPP’s coalition with the Republican Reliance Party and 
independent deputies.229 Cem told Can Dündar that he felt disappointment for 
Ecevit’s attitude. Cem in 1976 wrote a memoir called TRT’de 500 Gün (500 Days in 
TRT)230 about his days at TRT.
2.7. Back to Journalism
After a fertile but tiresome “500 days” at TRT, Cem decided to return to 
journalism. He was now a very popular name and a symbol on the left, but also a 
“persona non grata” for rightist circles and capital owners. Milliyet newspaper could 
not venture to take him on again.231 Cem decided to publish his own newspaper with 
Ercan Arıklı and Kadri Kayabal in 1975. The name of the newspaper was Ekonomi 
Politika (Political Economy) or Politika (Politics) in short.232 Cem was the chief 
editor of the newspaper and he was making efforts to make Politika resemble the 
famous leftist French journal Le Monde. He also became a member of RPP again and 
worked in the Kadıköy branch.233 With his reputation and theoretical knowledge, 
Cem made successful works and established important contacts at RPP that would 
later help him a lot in his rise in party politics.234 Cem also published a booklet called 
Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar (Main Concepts and Problems in 
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Democratic Left)235 which consisted of his interviews with Bülent Ecevit for Politika
newspaper in order to clarify the concept of “democratic left”. Politika could not 
become a popular newspaper and its readers consisted only of Cem’s followers and 
fans. Because of economic problems, Politika within a year was transferred to DİSK 
(Revolutionary Worker Syndicates Confederation).236 Cem continued to write in 
Politika for another year but because of the journal’s hardliner socialist views close 
to the illegal Turkish Communist Party, with the pretext of engaging into politics he 
left the journal in 1977.237 Cem also from time to time published articles in Hürriyet
newspaper. Cem was dreaming of a democratic socialist Turkey and the 1977 general 
elections increased his hopes. RPP acquired 41.4 % of the votes and declared a real 
victory of the left.238 However, Ecevit was not able to get a vote of confidence from 
the parliament until 17 January 1978 when he obtained support from independent 
and some Republican Reliance Party deputies.239 Cem’s hopes on the Ecevit 
government ended in smoke and because of the terrible economic conditions of the 
country (shortages due to heavy American embargos as a response to Turkey’s 
Cyprus Peace Operation) and rising political violence in the streets. Ecevit did not 
have a chance to realize his party’s land reform240, urban village241 or public sector242
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projects. Although he was the “conqueror of Cyprus” and “Karaoğlan” of people243, 
the RPP government failed and fell down in a few months.  
On 1 January 1979, Cem was shocked and shaken by the assassination of 
Abdi İpekçi by ultra-nationalist groups.244 He felt very sad and wanted to go away 
from his country that lived in anarchy.245 Assassination threats towards him became a 
pretext for him and upon his wife’s pressures, three months before the 12 September 
1980 military take-over, Cem and his family moved to Paris.246 Before going to Paris 
he published another book Siyaset Yazıları 1975-1980 Türkiyesi (Political Writings: 
Turkey between 1975 and 1980)247 in which he collected his articles about National 
Front governments. Cem in a sense felt the coming of a military coup248 and 
temporary dictatorship that would especially target the left and chose to escape from 
Turkey in order to protect himself and his family. He was desperate after Ecevit 
government’s failure and the assassination of his cousin Abdi İpekçi. As an anti-
militarist and anti-violence person, Cem was crestfallen after witnessing the death of 
thousands of young people and very important intellectuals because of ideological 
polarization. Paris was an escape to him. Moreover, beginning from the Committee 
of Union and Progress (CUP)249, Paris was the center of regime-opponent Turkish 
intellectuals.250 Cem’s view on 12 September was naturally negative. However, Cem 
confessed that the majority of people were desperate and fed up of endless armed 
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clashes in the streets and the lack of politicians to reach a consensus and solutions for 
Turkey’s problems.251 The declaration of the coup was also referring to politicians’ 
“infertile political rows and uncompromising attitudes” and the strengthening of 
“deviant ideologies” instead of Atatürkism.252 Cem did not blame Turkish people as 
cowards or fascists for their support of the 12 September’s junta regime and 
authoritarian 1982 constitution, because he knew and very well understood their 
desperate state of mind due to political violence.253 The assassination of Abdi İpekçi 
and the political violence of the 1970s probably directed Cem towards refraining 
from his romantic revolutionary ideas and to embrace social democracy more and 
more.  Starting from the early 1980s, although Cem continued to use historical 
materialism in his researches, he began to insist on a social democratic model 
(instead of a socialist path of development) in which capital owners (bourgeois) and 
wage earners (proletariat) could live in harmony.
Cem and his family were managing through Cem’s book sales revenue and 
their families’ help in Paris. But Cem soon found a research job at UNESCO with the 
help of his academician friend in Paris, Ali Kazancıgil.254 At the age of 40, he also 
began to attend to the master’s program of École Libre des Sciences Politiques in 
Paris and became a graduate student for a year.255 By being a graduate student in 
Political Science and by witnessing the rise of French socialists and François 
Mitterrand256, he improved his knowledge of modern social democracy. The topic of 
his master’s thesis was “democratic socialism” and thus, Cem had a chance to read 
all literature of the left, especially writings of Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein. 
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He was busy since he was both finishing a master’s degree and working in 
UNESCO’s research programs. Another important memory of Cem from those days 
was ASALA’s257 attack on Turkey’s Paris Consulate.258 Cem finished his master’s
thesis and together with his family he returned to Turkey in the fall of 1981. On his 
return he met with all of the negative consequences and practices of the 12 
September regime. The National Security Council on 16 October 1981 abolished 
with its 52nd declaration259 all political parties including Atatürk’s RPP.260 Nearly all 
important politicians were imprisoned and outlawed from politics. In 1982, Cem 
obtained an offer from a well-known and respected journalist Güneri Cıvaoğlu. 
Cıvaoğlu was preparing a new newspaper called Güneş (Sun)261 and he wanted Cem 
to become assistant editor-in-chief and columnist in the newspaper.262 Cem accepted 
the offer and began to write in Güneş.
2.8. Time for Politics
1983 was a turning point for Turkey because after the military intervention 
for the first time general elections were about to take place. With the approval of the 
12 September regime and the President of the Republic -the leading general of the 
coup- Kenan Evren, a center-right political party called the Nationalist Democracy 
Party (NDP)263 (its leader was a retired soldier Turgut Sunalp) and a center-left 
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political party -the Populist Party (PP)264 (its leader was Necdet Calp, an experienced 
bureaucrat)- were founded. At the same time, the 12 September regime’s Prime 
Minister Bülent Ulusu’s Deputy Prime Minister and Economy Minister Turgut 
Özal265 resigned from his position and established a center party called the 
Motherland Party266. Social democrats also were in the search of a new political 
party since they did not want to support the “Kenan Evren approved” Populist Party. 
The leader of PP, Necdet Calp, was trying to take their support by making visits to 
famous pre-12 September social democrat politicians and intellectuals including 
İsmail Cem.267 Calp could not find the support he needed and most of the “old 
school” social democrats established the Social Democratic Party (SODEP) under 
the leadership of İsmet İnönü’s son Erdal İnönü268. İsmail Cem was closer to SODEP 
but except for a few meetings with his politician friends, he did not engage in politics 
in the early 1980s. The 12 September regime did not allow SODEP to participate in 
the 1983 elections and only three parties -NDP, PP and Özal’s MP- took their 
chances on the ballot. Before the elections, during Özal’s visit to Güneş newspaper, 
İsmail Cem made an interesting guess and told Özal that he would win the 
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elections.269 Cem’s guess came true since MP took 45.1 % of the votes, while PP 
took only 30.5 % and NDP garnered 23.3 % of the votes in the 1983 elections.270
Cem continued to write in Güneş and collected his articles in a book called 
Siyaset Yazıları: Geçiş Dönemi Türkiyesi (Political Writings: Turkey in the 
Transition Period)271. Another important book for Cem’s writing career as a social 
democratic theoretician was Sosyal Demokrasi Ya Da Demokratik Sosyalizm Nedir, 
Ne Değildir (What Is, What Is Not Social Democracy or Democratic Socialism)”272
which was first published in 1984 and continued to make new prints. Cem in this 
book tried to summarize the birth and the development of the social democratic 
movement and to adapt social democracy to the newly emerging conditions in the 
world. He also published a short article in a book called Democracy in which
politicians and intellectuals from both the left and right criticized the 12 September 
regime and tried to underline the advantages of democracy.273 Cem’s article was 
about the supremacy of “pluralist democracy” and its name was “The Necessity to 
Coexist” (Birbirine Katlanmak Zorunluluğu). In those days, in order to unify all 
social democrats under the same roof, PP’s new leader Aydın Güven Gürkan and 
SODEP leader Erdal İnönü were making negotiations. A week before the general 
assembly for the union of these two parties, PP leader Aydın Güven Gürkan visited 
his friend İsmail Cem and asked for his participation and support of the new party.274
On 26 September 1985, on the day of the union of PP and SODEP with the name 
Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) under the leadership of Aydın Güven 
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Gürkan, İsmail Cem became a member of the party. Later, at the first Congress of the 
Party Erdal İnönü became the leader of the social democrats again.275 However, 
splits among social democrats seemed endless and as a reaction to this union, Ecevit 
supporters established the Democratic Left Party on 14 November 1985.276
According to Cem, although the left was divided into two parties (SDPP and DLP) 
and many fractions, in those days social democrats were still idealist and in the belief 
and search of creating a more free and equal system and society.277
In 1987, by a referendum, all political bans were lifted and important 
politicians like Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan, Alparslan 
Türkeş278 and Deniz Baykal returned to the political scene again.279 After the 
removal of the bans, Demirel became the president of the True Path Party (TPP) and 
Ecevit started to head DLP. Erbakan as the “natural leader” of political Islam 
returned to his post and began to command the Welfare Party. Türkeş also made his 
return and became the president of the Nationalist Task Party280. Baykal was not a 
leader but he also made a quick return to politics and re-established his faction in 
SDPP. In fact, Baykal during his whole political life was accused of being 
“factionalist-hizipçi”.281 While old school politicians were coming back to the scene, 
Özal called for early elections in order not to provide time for his opponents to 
strengthen.282 Elections were about to come and İsmail Cem was now ready for 
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politics. He thought that engaging in active politics now was a mission for him in 
order to help the recovery of the left and straighten MP’s ideology of 
commercialization of politics.283 He was a well-known and respected figure on the 
left and he actively engaged in SDPP’s electoral works. Unlike many other 
politicians and similar to Bülent Ecevit and Altan Öymen, he was not entering into 
politics for money or privilege, two things he already had and never gave enormous 
emphasis.284 Cem became a member of the SDPP’s Central Executive Committee.285
He knew that the left should renew itself and he wanted to be a part of this change 
process.286 For instance, Cem prepared a working plan and model for his party in 
order to increase the party’s votes in the general elections.287 He analyzed leading 
European social democrat parties’ (including the French Socialist Party, German 
Social Democratic Party-SPD and Spanish Socialist Workers' Party-PSOE) working 
models for elections and created a similar plan for SDPP.288 Cem also published a
very important book entitled Engeller ve Çözümler Türkiye’de Sosyal Demokrasi
(Obstacles and Solutions Social Democracy in Turkey)”289 in 1987. This could be 
considered as one of the earliest books in Turkey about the principles of modern 
social democracy. Cem was very hard working and productive in those years. 
Another important work written by him was his party publication about “Sosyal 
Demokrasinin Bunalımdan Çıkış Yolları” (Solutions for Social Democracy’s Escape 
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from Crisis)290. The booklet was short but Cem’s arguments about the problems of 
social democracy were interesting.
İsmail Cem for the first time became a parliamentary candidate in 1987 and 
took his chance for SDPP in İstanbul. In the 1987 elections, MP kept its lead with 
36.3 % of the votes, whereas SDPP garnered 24.8 % and TPP got 19.1 %. MP was 
still the leading party and formed the government although it lost nearly 10 % of its 
votes. Özal kept his place as the Prime Minister. Cem was now an İstanbul deputy 
for SDPP in the first constituency area which consisted of Beşiktaş and Kadıköy 
districts.291 Kadıköy was familiar to Cem since he worked there starting from the late 
1970s for RPP. He was the first ranked deputy candidate for SDPP and was elected 
easily. On 26 June 1988, at the second regular Congress of SDPP, İsmail Cem 
stepped forward and in the control struggles over the party between leader Erdal 
İnönü and group vice President Deniz Baykal, he courageously became a candidate 
for the party’s leadership.292 Cem was not hopeful about winning but what he wanted 
to do was to encourage discussions about renewal and ideological transformation of 
the party.293 Moreover, although he was a friend of Erdal İnönü and he respected him 
a lot, he never thought of him as a politician who could lead masses.294 Cem lost the 
leadership battle against İnönü but surprisingly garnered important votes. His friend 
Deniz Baykal became secretary-general of the party. A temporary İnönü-Baykal 
peace increased the SDPP’s power and SDPP acquired a great success in the 27 
March 1989 local elections. SDPP became the leading party with 28.8 % of the 
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votes, TPP followed with 25.1 % and MP with 21.8 %.295 After winning the local 
elections, the social democrats’ next target was to win the general elections. They 
were more hopeful especially after their success in the local elections and the 
weakening of MP after Turgut Özal left the prime ministry and became the 8th
President of the Republic, although social democrats were completely against Özal’s 
presidency.296 In order to win the general elections, on 20 October 1990 SDPP 
established a shadow cabinet, a practice that was not seen in Turkish politics before 
although it is common among European democracies. İsmail Cem together with 
Hikmet Çetin assumed the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs in SDPP’s shadow 
cabinet.297 In those days, Cem attended many conferences and made important 
speeches about the social democratic economic model. One of these was entitled
“Sosyaldemokrat Ekonomi Modelinde Emeğin Rolü ve Sorumluluğu” (The 
Responsibility and Role of Labor in Social Democratic Economic Model)298. 
Another one was entitled “Sosyal Demokrasi Açısından Verimlilik-Eşitlik İlişkisi ve 
Çelişkisi” (Efficiency-Equality Relation and Paradox in terms of Social 
Democracy)299. Cem’s interest seemed to pass beyond social democratic theory and 
international relations as an intellectual. He was developing himself on all issues 
including economics; he was preparing for more important posts. He was also 
representing Turkey in the Council of Europe300 in Strasbourg and developing his 
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relations with European social democrats.301 His critical look towards the 
Westernization of Turkey had been changing gradually and especially concerning 
human rights and freedom of opinion he supported European-Western standards. At 
the same time, the MP government was taking position in favor of the USA and 
allowed the opening of American military bases in Turkey by the U.S. Army in its
Gulf War against Iraq.302
The late 1980s were also very important concerning Turkey’s Kurdish 
question. The Kurdish Institute of Paris in those years was working actively and 
organizing conferences for developing and familiarizing the Kurdish language and 
culture. Upon French President François Mitterrand’s wife Danielle Mitterrand’s 
invitation, SDPP leader Erdal İnönü was even thinking about participating in a 
conference on 15 October 1989.303 Erdal İnönü at first perceived this organization 
within the lines of a cultural program for developing Turkey’s democracy. But soon 
it was found that the program was also involved with the PKK terrorist organization. 
İnönü renounced his answer and did not participate in the conference. However, the 
SDPP’s seven Kurdish deputies including Ahmet Türk, Adnan Ekmen, Salih Sümer 
and Mahmut Alınak attended the conference.304 SDPP was in turmoil due to the 
Kurdish question and their Kurdish originated deputies’ closeness to the PKK. Those 
seven deputies were expelled from the party305 and they soon established the 
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People’s Labor Party306. In order to clarify SDPP’s look at the Kurdish question and 
its solution proposals, the party declared its famous “South-East Report” in 1990.307
This report, instead of solving problems and clarifying the party’s ideology, caused 
heavy criticism and harsh reactions towards SDPP in the public opinion. State 
Security Courts even tried to start investigations on SDPP after this report.308 The 
report was in fact only defending the expansion of cultural democratic rights and the 
necessity of economic, cultural-educational and democratic development of the 
region and had no hidden political aim but reactions were very strong from rightist 
circles and state institutions.309 Even liberal President Turgut Özal defined the report 
as “objectionable” (sakıncalı).310 However, the report took support from the Socialist 
International which convened in June 1991 in İstanbul.311 The report indicated that 
the ban on the speaking, learning and teaching of the Kurdish language should be 
removed, but the official language should always be Turkish.312 Cem was in favor of 
democratic openings, but especially after İnönü’s decision to make an electoral 
coalition with PLP, Cem began to criticize İnönü’s policies in the Party Assembly 
together with Baykal’s followers.313 In Cem’s view, PLP’s candidates were linked to 
terrorism and he thought that this could damage the party’s democratic stance and 
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reduce its votes.314 Bülent Ecevit was also in those years strongly criticizing the 
SDPP’s electoral coalition with PLP and claimed that this would encourage 
terrorism.315 Baykal and his faction resigned from the SDPP’s Central Decision 
Execution Committee on 10 September 1990. İnönü and Baykal’s temporary peace 
was very short and soon Baykal began to criticize İnönü for his passivism. İsmail 
Cem seemed at first closer to İnönü316 but after assaults made towards Baykal during
his İzmir visit, he decided to support his friend Deniz Baykal.317 Baykal declared his 
candidacy for party leadership on 21 September 1990 together with İsmail Cem at a 
press conference. İnönü responded to the Baykal-Cem coalition by saying “they 
could not compete with me on their own”.318 On 29 September 1990, İnönü defeated 
Baykal and preserved his place.319
The struggle between İnönü and Baykal did not seem to have ended. So, on 
27 July 1991 at the third regular Congress of SDPP, Baykal tried to pass İnönü again 
but failed a second time.320 At the 1991 general elections, Demirel’s TPP took the 
lead with 27 % of the votes whereas the others followed as such; MP 24 %, SDPP-
PLP 20.8 %, Erbakan’s Welfare Party (WP) 16.9 % and Ecevit’s DLP 10.8 %.321  It 
was not a success for social democrats since their votes decreased. Moreover, the 
quick rise of the Islamist WP was alarming for social democrats who gave great 
emphasis to secularism. İsmail Cem considered this as the success of WP’s clever 
but fake leftist rhetoric that was mixed with Islamism and that took support from 
millions of “low-income earning people living in peripheral settlements of big 
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cities”.322 Moreover, electoral coalition with the PLP seemed unsuccessful in the 
western villages as Cem predicted. In addition, PLP deputies created a scandal in the 
opening oath ceremony of TGNA and they were dismissed from the parliament soon. 
Demirel’s TPP made a coalition with the SDPP and social democrats were able to 
become a part of the government and get rid of the MP trouble. Baykal and Cem 
(again İstanbul deputy) were in the parliament but as İnönü opponents they did not 
have a chance for the ministry. Although İnönü was the Deputy Prime Minister and 
SDPP was a coalition partner, SDPP’s internal struggles continued and Baykal 
challenged İnönü again on 25 January 1992. İnönü declared that he would resign if 
he lost and Baykal said that “now it’s his turn”.323 Baykal and Cem published a 
booklet called “Değişim” (Change)324 and displayed their program to everyone. They 
were very pretentious but İnönü was again able to defeat Baykal although by a small 
margin. Baykal and Cem were making a new plan for realizing their “new left” 
project.325 Cem was also writing articles about Turkish politics and especially about 
Turkish foreign policy in Sabah (Morning) newspaper in the early 1990s.
After three defeats against İnönü, Baykal and Cem did not give up and 
published a book called Yeni Sol (New Left) in order to put forward their program for 
social democracy’s transformation.326 The book became influential with Baykal and 
Cem’s arguments similar to “third-way”327 politics of the British Labor Party leader 
and British Premier Tony Blair. Cem was criticizing İnönü for being too passive and 
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SDPP for not making the necessities of a modern social democratic party.328 Cem 
and Baykal did not have the chance to realize their project in SDPP so, they decided 
to re-establish the Republican People’s Party in 1992. On 9 September 1992, the RPP 
Congress convened and Baykal became the fourth leader of RPP after Atatürk, İnönü 
and Ecevit.329 İsmail Cem became a member of the Party Assembly and the Central 
Decision Execution Committee and also assumed the role of Vice President.330 The 
Republican People’s Party and Baykal and Cem duo was the new hope of the social 
democrats. Cem confirmed this idea by saying “every beginning is a new hope”.331
Comparing these two young social democrat figures to each other, socialist writer 
Cemal Süreya claimed that Cem was the “Istanbulite and cleaner version of Baykal” 
and Cem represented ideas and theory whereas Baykal represented action and 
practice332. In a sense, these two figures completed each other and galvanized
younger social democratic generations. However, Süreya was pessimistic about 
Cem’s success in politics due to his “extreme optimism”333 and “naïve politician” 
image.334 Baykal and Cem’s RPP acquired twenty deputies in the parliament quickly 
after its foundation which allowed the party to found a formal group in the 
parliament and play a key role in the continuation of the TPP-SDPP coalition. They 
prepared a new program and constitution for the party by considering the changing 
realities of Turkey and universal principles of social democracy.335 In 1993, the 
positive atmosphere after RPP’s re-birth was overshadowed by the assassination of 
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journalist Uğur Mumcu and the horrifying “Sivas massacre”336. İnönü and SDPP 
were losing power and all social democrats blamed İnönü for observing the 
massacres passively.337 The discovery of İSKİ (Istanbul Municipality Waterworks)
corruption was a final blow for SDPP. SDPP municipalities and the party in total lost 
enormous prestige and the “honest” image of social democrats was soiled.338 In 
1993, after the unexpected death of Turgut Özal, TPP leader Süleyman Demirel 
became the ninth President of the Republic and his place was replaced by Tansu 
Çiller339. İsmail Cem unexpectedly and courageously became a candidate for the 
Presidency, but he could not find the support he needed. This was the second time 
(the first one was for SDPP leadership against İnönü) Cem was trying to step forward 
and this surely indicated that behind his very tolerant and gentle personality, Cem 
was a self-confident and ambitious man especially in politics. In those days, SDPP
leader Erdal İnönü could not resist criticisms and the troublesome life of politics and 
resigned from his office.340 The Demirel-İnönü combination was replaced by Tansu 
Çiller and SDPP’s new leader Murat Karayalçın. Çiller and Karayalçın took the 
decision of Turkey’s membership to the Customs Union, a controversial but 
important step for Turkey’s EU membership dream.341 SDPP-RPP negotiations for 
union increased after Karayalçın’s leadership but the two parties wanted to see first 
their own power in the 1994 local elections and delayed the union talks.
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1994 local elections were a turning point for Turkey considering the rise of 
political Islam. Although TPP was the leading party with 21.4 % of the votes and MP 
was in second with 21 %, the rise of WP to 19.1 % of the votes, the fall of SDPP to 
13.6 % and the failure of Ecevit’s DLP with 8.8 % and Baykal’s RPP 4.6 % votes 
shocked all social democrats.342 WP was able to win municipalities in İstanbul with 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and in Ankara with Melih Gökçek. Social democrats were in 
panic and the union of all social democratic parties seemed to be the only way to 
gain power. However, Bülent Ecevit was against this project and he closed the door 
for union in the first day of union talks. RPP leader Baykal and SDPP leader 
Karayalçın reached a consensus for the temporary leadership of the experienced and 
moderate Hikmet Çetin after the union of two parties under the Republican People’s 
Party’s roof.343 On 18 February 1995, Hikmet Çetin was elected the fifth President of 
RPP and assumed the role of Deputy Prime Minister by replacing Murat 
Karayalçın.344 Cem was the impulsive force in RPP for realizing this union.345 He 
also published two important books in 1994: Gelecek İçin Denemeler (Essays for the 
Future)346 and Sol’daki Arayış (Search in the Left)347. Especially Sol’daki Arayış was 
an interesting book because on the one hand Cem defended a new pluralist social 
democratic model, but on the other hand he criticized Turkey’s asymmetrical 
relations with the EU348 and defined the current EU process as a way to the Sevres 
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Treaty349. While Baykal was preparing to finally realize his dreams, Cem 
unexpectedly became the Minister of Culture on 7 July 1995 after Ercan Karakaş’s 
resignation and Hikmet Çetin’s offer.350
İsmail Cem stayed in the office of the Minister of Culture only a few months 
until 6 October 1995, but made important contributions with his assistant secretary 
Prof. Emre Kongar. In his early days in office, instead of defaming previous 
Ministers, Cem stated that he took over a giant institution and praised Kongar for his 
works.351 Kongar remembers Cem as a star, a true gentleman, a successful manager 
and a hard-working politician having principles.352 Especially, Cem’s effective 
management preventing bureaucratic delays and innovative personality353 impressed 
Kongar. Kongar thought that the TRT days helped Cem a lot to learn the difficulties 
about the workings of the state and made him a great manager and minister.354 The 
earliest deed of Cem was to sign a protocol for the establishment of a new “culture 
house” in İstanbul with the help of the İstanbul Stock Exchange.355 The second 
important project that Cem organized was a trip with 1.000 artists to the eastern and 
south-eastern villages of Turkey in order to strengthen Kurdish people’s ties to the 
state and to introduce them the beauties of theatre and music.356 Cem also brought 
the 700th anniversary of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire to the Ministry’s 
agenda and made some preparations for 1999.357 As the Minister of Culture Cem 
made another important deed and tried to refresh state choirs in Sivas, Diyarbakır 
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and Şanlıurfa.358 Cem also tried to organize a biographical movie of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk together with his friend and famous director Halit Refiğ but the project could 
not be realized.359 His days in the office of the Ministry of Culture ended in a few 
months and Cem could not realize his dream of organizing a mass pop concert 
to benefit survivors of the Bosnian conflict.360 Cem was popular and successful but 
he had a personal disagreement with Baykal although in his view ideologically they 
did not have many differences.361 There were different rumors about the Baykal-Cem 
disagreement; some people believed that Baykal was offended by Cem after Cem’s 
choice of temporary leader Hikmet Çetin’s ministry offer. Some others believed that 
Cem’s leadership ambitions disturbed Baykal.
On 9 September 1995, the real power struggle took place between Baykal and 
Karayalçın at the 27th Congress of the party and Baykal finally won the battle.362  
Baykal was now a key man for the continuation of the coalition and he was forcing 
Çiller to do what he wanted. The coalition was dispersed after Baykal’s insistence 
and a provisional government was founded between TPP and RPP again until the 24 
December 1995 general elections.363 Baykal appointed Fikri Sağlar in Cem’s place as 
the Minister of Culture in order to show his disappointment. The Baykal-Cem 
friendship and partnership was eroding and Cem declared that he would not be a 
candidate for RPP in the 1995 elections due to his personal problems with Baykal.
2.9. Cem and Ecevit Together 
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After the collapse of the Cem-Baykal coalition, Cem was thinking of a 
temporary retirement from politics and was willing to teach classes at university and 
write new books. However, Cem was a popular name and his success as the Minister 
of Culture directed Bülent Ecevit to offer him deputyship for the DLP. But DLP’s 
candidate list was nearly fully-prepared and Ecevit wanted Cem to prove himself. So, 
Ecevit offered him the first rank for three difficult cities; Kastamonu, Sinop and 
Kayseri. Cem chose Kayseri because he thought that the presence of an airport in this 
city could facilitate his electoral works.364 His chance seemed very low since Kayseri 
was the castle of the WP and conservative parties in general and RPP was DLP’s 
strong adversary in the left. WP’s Kayseri deputy Abdullah Gül was also telling the 
same to his friend İsmail Cem.365 Together with his son Kerim and his friends, Cem 
initiated a very successful electoral campaign and learned many new things about 
Anatolia. He thought that if he was not elected, his political life would end.366 Cem 
took 11 % of the votes in Kayseri and was elected as Kayseri deputy from DLP.367
This was his third term in the TGNA. However, he was at first disappointed because 
of the lack of intra-party democracy in DLP.368 Cem was checking Ecevit’s speeches 
before a party congress369, but at the same time Ecevit was trying to keep Cem 
outside of intraparty politics. In Cem’s view, DLP was ruled by three people; Bülent 
Ecevit, his wife Rahşan Ecevit and Hüsamettin Özkan.370 In the elections, WP took 
21.4 % of the votes and became the leading party for the first time. MP followed WP 
with 19.6 % and TPP with 19.2 % of the votes. Ecevit’s DLP made an important
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attack and acquired 14.6 % of the votes, whereas Baykal’s RPP had only 10.7 % of 
the votes and had a terrible defeat.371 After the elections, the TPP-MP coalition was 
established but it lived only for three months due to personal problems with MP 
leader Mesut Yılmaz372 and TPP leader Çiller.373 Finally, the scenario happened and 
Erbakan made a coalition with Çiller and on 28 June 1996 Refahyol (WP-TPP 
coalition) was established under the Prime Ministry of Necmettin Erbakan.374
The Refahyol government, with its hostile attitude towards the Western world 
and anti-secular practices and declarations, created many crises in its short 
governmental term. The government and Prime Minister Erbakan were perceived as 
a serious menace to Turkey’s secular regime by many in the secular establishment, 
especially by the military officers. In spite of having strong suspicions about WP’s 
secular as well as democratic credentials, military officers adopted a strategy of 
“wait-and-see” policy.375 WP was refraining “from challenging the basic promises of 
democracy” but its interpretation of democracy was “more majoritarian than liberal 
or pluralistic”.376 Regarding the economy, WP proposed an “Islamic-inspired” anti-
liberal “just order”. Thus, in a sense the party combined “religious and class 
appeals”.377 WP’s policies disturbed not only the Turkish regime but also 
international public opinion. Especially Erbakan’s scandalous visit to Libya378 and 
his controversial dinner organized in the residential estate of the Prime Ministry in 
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the honor of religious brotherhoods’ leaders379 exasperated secular segments of the 
society. At the 26 December 1996 meeting of the National Security Council, the 
commanders noted that since August of 1996, the Islamic threat had become greater, 
and retained their request that this matter be placed on the agenda of the NSC. At the 
same time, the commanders set up the so-called West Study Group (Batı Çalışma 
Grubu) in the General Staff headquarters.380 WSG aimed at monitoring the activities 
threatening the secular republic and planning appropriate measures for the threats. 
Also, a new organ called the Prime Ministerial Crisis Management Center 
(Başbakanlık Kriz Yönetim Merkezi) was formed within the NSC secretariat to 
observe and report on crises caused by Islamic reactionism and formulate responses 
to them. With this organ, the secretary general of the NSC was given the charge of 
control whether the NSC decisions were implemented by the parliament. In these 
circumstances, the historical February 28, 1997 NSC took place. 
The 28 February process was named after the date of the historical National 
Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997. In the NSC meeting on 28 February 
1997, a declaration similar to a military memorandum was issued. NSC decisions 
were strict and clear. The declaration was asking for the “careful protection of 
secularism”, handing over of the schools and dormitories of religious brotherhood to 
the Ministry of Education, putting into practice eight-year compulsory education, 
abolishing religious brotherhoods, banning the use of religious dressing in public 
sphere, etc.381 The Refahyol government’s only chance was to implement these 
decisions but Erbakan was resisting. In order to reduce tension, Erbakan and Çiller 
agreed on Çiller’s Prime Ministry and the continuation of the coalition government. 
However, Çiller was losing her control over TPP and a group of TPP deputies led by 
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the experienced politician and Demirel’s right-hand Hüsamettin Cindoruk left TPP
and established the Democrat Turkey Party (DTP) on 7 January 1997.382 Turkey also 
made a new intelligence sharing treaty with Israel during the 28 February process.383
In those days, the “Susurluk scandal” was another important issue on the agenda. The 
Susurluk scandal emerged after a car accident on 3 November 1996 near Susurluk. In 
this accident, former Deputy Chief of Istanbul Police Hüseyin Kocadağ, the ex-
leader of the Grey Wolves (Nationalist Action Party’s youth organization) Abdullah 
Çatlı384 and Çatlı’s girlfriend Gonca Us died, and TPP Şanlıurfa deputy Sedat Bucak
was injured. This group of people soon exposed “deep” connections between the 
security forces, politicians and organized crime.385 Leftist-social democratic circles 
initiated campaigns and organized big demonstrations against the “deep state”. 
However, the Refahyol government tried to veil the scandal and took harsh reactions 
from the media. A party closure case against WP was also opened by the Chief 
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court Vural Savaş during this process.386 Eventually, 
President Demirel nominated Mesut Yılmaz for making coalition negotiations 
instead of Çiller or Erbakan. Yılmaz after making efforts established MP-DLP-DTP 
(ANASOL-D coalition) by taking the support of RPP.387 Baykal’s only condition for 
supporting the ANASOL-D coalition was to take election decision as soon as 
possible. The ANASOL-D government put into action quickly eight-year 
compulsory education and a new tax bill.388 This coalition was a turning point for 
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İsmail Cem, because he was now entering the office of the Foreign Ministry to stay 
for a long period of time. 
2.10. In Office
İsmail Cem expected a ministry role in the ANASOL-D coalition 
government, but he was not sure about the Foreign Ministry. Rumors stated that Cem 
could be Minister of Culture again.389 Later, Cem learned that Prime Minister Ecevit 
wanted him as the Minister of Culture390 but President Süleyman Demirel insisted on 
Cem’s Foreign Ministry and Ecevit finally accepted this offer.391 Cem admitted that 
Ecevit had always tried to keep Cem’s place at middle-range distance in order not to 
lose control over him, but also not to be too close.392 Retired diplomat Yaman Başkut 
on the other hand wrote that Cem was very respectful towards Ecevit but as Foreign 
Minister he wanted to be very active and independent in shaping Turkey’s foreign 
policy.393 The coalition government was established on 12 July 1997 and Cem 
entered the office of Foreign Ministry. However, the effects of the 28 February 
process were still in force and upon Prime Minister Yılmaz’s criticism towards the 
military, on 20 March 1998 Turkish Armed Forces made a declaration and showed 
its sensitivity about secularism.394 Yılmaz’s only problem was not the military’s 
warnings; he had to deal with Baykal as well. Baykal was bombarding the 
government for elections and threatening to pull his party’s support from the 
coalition. Finally, Yılmaz had to accept Baykal’s wishes and elections were decided 
to be held in April 1999. Moreover, Baykal forced Yılmaz to resign from the Prime 
                                                
389 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 197.
390 ibid., p. 198.
391 ibid., p. 200.
392 ibid., pp. 196-197.
393 Yaman Başkut. 2004. Aferin İyiydin… Bir Diplomatın Anıları. Ankara: İnkılâp Kitabevi, p. 136.
394 Hikmet Bila, CHP 1919-1999, p. 416.
  
 
70
Ministry at the end of 1998 and to accept the formation of an electoral minority 
government in January 1999, a few months before the elections.395 Baykal was 
smiling but his insistence on elections and his “naughty child” image was reducing 
RPP’s votes while the Prime Minister of the minority government Bülent Ecevit and 
his Foreign Minister İsmail Cem were working hard for the capture of PKK leader 
Öcalan.396
While Baykal was trying to force the government to call for early elections, 
all actors of the National Security Council and especially the new Foreign Minister 
Cem were working on how to prevent Syrian support to PKK terrorism which was on 
the rise again. Finally, Land Forces Commander General Atilla Ateş on 16 
September 1998 made an important speech at the Syrian border in Hatay and warned 
Syria for the last time about not supporting and hiding PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan.397 In Cem’s view, the warning came under the cognizance of all NSC 
members and made a very positive effect on Turkey’s struggle against PKK 
terrorism.398 The cooperation between the military, the Presidency, the government 
and the Foreign Ministry and Turkey’s firm stance against terrorism softened Syria 
and finally with the “Adana agreement”399 on 20 October 1998, Syria had to stop
supporting the PKK and Öcalan. Öcalan was deported from Syria but this time 
appeared first in Russia and later in Italy.400 Finally, he was caught on 15 February 
1999 by the Turkish intelligence service near the Greek Embassy of Kenya.401 On the 
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morning of 16 February 1999, Prime Minister Ecevit gave the good news to the 
Turkish people.402 From this event in a sense, Greece was caught red handed and 
Cem was ready to use this issue for straightening out Turkey and Greece’s 
relations.403 This success was surely an important factor in the elections, too.
In the general elections held on 18 April 1999, DLP became the leading the 
party with 21.71 % of the votes. This was the result of Öcalan’s capture and Cem as 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs was one of the architects of the victory. The 
Nationalist Action Party with its new leader Devlet Bahçeli made a surprise attack 
and became the second party with 18.03 % of the votes. The Virtue Party-VP, the 
successor of the Welfare Party, got only 15.41 % whereas center-right parties created 
disappointment with MP’s 13.42 % and TPP’s 12.26 % of the votes. The real shock 
occurred with RPP’s 8.37 % of the votes.404 Baykal resigned from his office on 22 
April 1999, but returned to his place again after a short period of time. İsmail Cem 
was again elected from Kayseri but this time in an easier manner. TGNA was opened 
in a sensational way again because of VP deputy Merve Kavakçı’s insistence on 
entering into Parliament with her headscarf.405 Ecevit here made an important speech 
and reminded the VP deputies that the Parliament was not a place for “defying the 
state”.406 Eventually, Kavakçı’s deputyship was cancelled. On 28 May 1999, the 
DLP-NAP-MP coalition was established and Ecevit became the Prime Minister 
again.407 İsmail Cem preserved his position as Foreign Minister. He had now more 
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chance to prove himself because this time his party was the biggest partner of the 
coalition and normally had five years of governmental power. He was establishing 
his own working group in the Foreign Ministry.408 His only problem was being 
unable to walk in the streets and take pictures freely.409
Cem continued to produce and write during his tenure in office. The Foreign 
Ministry published a book compromising his speeches and declarations.410 He also 
published a book entitled Turkey in the 21st Century411 in order to explain his 
approach to Turkish foreign policy and tell more about his deeds in the office. The 
next year, with a few additional articles he published Turkey in the New Century412. 
In these books, Cem tried to make an analysis of classical Turkish foreign policy and 
create a new vision for the 21st century. One of Cem’s earliest deeds was to change 
Turkey’s classical EU policy which considered Turkey a weak, second-class country 
that should always give concessions in negotiations with the EU since it could 
contribute nothing to Europe by its membership to Union.413 Cem was in favor of the 
EU process but he was certainly against secondary class membership or a privileged 
partnership. Moreover, his basic aim was to make Turkey an important “world state” 
and the EU process was only a part of it.414 For instance, he always underlined the 
importance of becoming an influential state in the Eurasian zone by using Turkey’s
historical and cultural advantages.415 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project 
was concrete proof of Cem’s emphasis towards Eurasia and his efforts to bring 
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Turkey to a more advantageous position considering energy.416 By this project 
Turkey aimed at becoming a terminal of energy and thus, increasing its international 
geopolitical importance. Turkey did not forget to take the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) seriously in Cem’s period and actively attended all conferences.417
Cem even brought EU and OIC member countries together (EU-OIC Joint Forum) in 
İstanbul after the 9/11 incident and tried to give a peace message to world.418 In 
addition, Cem was courageous enough to tell EU officials that if at the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit, Turkish candidacy for full membership to the EU was not accepted, he 
would reconsider Turkey’s relations with the EU.419 Finally, Cem achieved what he 
wanted and Turkey was accepted as a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit on
11 December 1999.420 This was followed by the EU Commission’s preparation of 
“Accession Partnership for Turkey” in 2001. The coalition government announced its 
own National Program for the Adoption of the EU acquis on 19 March 2001.421 The 
media and people in Turkey perceived these developments as Cem’s great successes. 
However, Kemalist and nationalist circles criticized Cem for allowing the Cyprus 
Republic’s entry into the EU and not defending the rights of Northern Cypriot 
Turks.422
İsmail Cem attracted the attention of the global media mostly when he made 
enormous efforts to improve the relations between Turkey and Greece with his 
counterpart Mr. Yorgo Papandreou (junior). With his personal charm and peaceful 
language, he took the support of the European and Greek media. A booklet about 
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media reactions to his visit to Greece423 and his counterpart Mr. Papandreou’s visit to 
Turkey424 was published by the Turkish Prime Ministry. Turkey and Greece signed 
many important treaties in Cem’s period and began to cooperate in many areas by 
erasing the bad memories of the Kardak crisis425 and Öcalan’s capture. While 
Turkish-Greek rapprochement took positive critics from the international media, in 
Turkey Cem was criticized for not driving Greece into the corner when he had the 
chance. Cem also wanted Turkey to step forward in some international problems by 
making shuttle diplomacy between opposing countries. For instance, he prepared a 
plan for the peaceful partition of Jerusalem by taking the example of the Ottoman 
model.426 The plan was not implemented but Turkey’s efforts were praised both by 
the Palestinian and Israeli sides. Together with Papandreou, Cem also visited 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat427 when he was kept under house-arrest by the 
Israeli military and attracted the world’s attention to Arafat’s poor conditions.428
Cem also visited Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and tried to warn him about
possible American aggression.429 Due to his works for world peace, Cem was 
awarded together with Yorgo Papandreou the “Statesman of the Year” in 2000 by the 
East West Institute. Cem also took the Turkish Heart Foundation’s “Sakıp Sabancı 
Good Heart Award” and Bilkent University’s honorary doctorate.430 Thanks to Cem,
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during these years Turkey appeared as a very influential actor in international 
relations considering its important responsibilities in NATO missions and new 
energy agreements made in the Eurasian zone. Furthermore, after the 9/11431 tragedy, 
Cem tried to orientate his Western counterparts to not use the term “Islamic 
terrorism”.432 His efforts were not wasted since Turkey became a much more 
influential and respectable actor in international relations during and after his tenure 
in office. According to retired diplomat Yaman Başkut, Cem’s success was caused 
by his cordial dialogue with Turkish diplomats, intellectual accumulation and humble 
personality that affected all people including foreign countries’ leaders.433 Cem also 
praised Turkish diplomats for their courage434 but added they should be more self-
confident and contentious.435 However, there were some people who criticized Cem 
for always trying to step forward and not being hawkish enough.436 In addition, his 
close relation to USA Foreign Minister Madeleine Albright was presented as a 
“Jewish coalition” in some publications.437 Another important event during Cem’s 
ministry was the hacking of EU Commissioner for Turkish enlargement Karen 
Fogg’s e-mails and the discovery of her private relations with some Turkish 
journalists in addition to her strange idiom that was perceived as a humiliation to 
Turkish state officials.438 Cem tried to defend Fogg and Turkish journalists close to 
her by claiming that this hacking was against the freedom of information but the 
event created huge reactions against Fogg and the EU in Turkey and damaged Cem’s 
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prestige. Cem and the government in general were mostly accepted as successful 
abroad, but the coalition government had a very unlucky destiny considering 
domestic politics.
The coalition government was first shaken economically and psychologically 
after the terrible 17 August 1999 earthquake. The DLP-NAP-MP coalition still tried 
to make important legislation reforms in order to accelerate Turkey’s membership to 
the EU. Although NAP at first resisted to some of the reforms, the coalition 
government was able to pass a law concerning the abolition of the death penalty. One 
of the most important reforms made by the coalition government was the permission
of “the use of local languages other than Turkish in radio and television broadcasting 
and their teaching by private language courses”.439 The coalition was working mostly 
in harmony and Turkey was making important steps in the EU accession process. 
However, some of the members of the NAP created problems and in a sense slowed 
down the performance of the reformist government. Prime Minister Ecevit’s poor 
health and the terrible economic crises Turkey had in 1999 and 2001 also prevented 
the coalition from continuing to adopt reform packages and overshadowed Cem’s 
victories in foreign policy. After the crisis, hundreds of thousands of people lost their 
jobs and Kemal Derviş, in those days the Head of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), was brought to Turkey as the new Minister for Economic 
Affairs. Kemal Derviş adopted harsh measures and the economy began to give better 
signals. However, the government was tired because of the terrible consequences of 
two major economic crises and Bülent Ecevit’s poor health. In this situation, Cem’s 
name began to be heard as the successor of Ecevit as the new leader of DLP. Cem 
previously had to leave Erdal İnönü’s SDPP and Deniz Baykal’s RPP and the 
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conditions were pushing him towards another break up. There was incredible support 
in the Turkish and international media for Cem’s leadership and Ecevit’s retirement. 
Polls were showing that he was maybe the most popular politician of the period in 
Turkey.440 Cem was referring to the poor health of Ecevit by stating; “the coalition is 
Ecevit’s but it is without Ecevit”.441 Cem’s leadership ambitions were on the peak 
and he was not willingly to miss his chance finally for leadership. Events following 
this process were later labeled as a “civil coup” by many analysts including the 
journalist Fikret Bila.442
2.11. The New Turkey Party
In August 2001, a top ranked military official had an off-the-record talk with 
the journalists and declared that Ecevit’s health was poor and he should leave his 
place to Hüsamettin Özkan or İsmail Cem.443 In 2001 September, TÜSİAD444 and 
TÜSİAD-involved mass media started a campaign against Ecevit and important 
columnists began to offer a solution for the continuation of the coalition government 
without Ecevit, with the leadership of Özkan or Cem.445 The USA’s plan for 
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the tenth President of the Republic of Turkey. Later writer Yalçın Küçük said that he brought into 
agenda Sabetaism discussions again in order to prevent İsmail Cem from becoming the President of 
the Republic in 2000 since he considered Cem as a pro-American and pro-Israeli politician. See; Cenk 
Ağcabay. 2008. Megalomania. İstanbul: Sosyal İnsan Yayınları, pp. 163-168.
441 Can Dündar and Rıdvan Akar, Ecevit ve Gizli Arşivi, p. 488.
442 Fikret Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi, p. 
139.
443 ibid., pp. 27-28.
444 TÜSİAD refers to Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen's Association which was established in 
1971. With Turkey’s liberalization in the 1980s, TÜSİAD became an important political and civil 
societal actor in the country.
445 Fikret Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi, 
pp. 33-36.
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attacking Iraq and Ecevit’s negative opinion about this operation was another issue 
mentioned by journalists in those days.446 NAP’s opposition to the EU process was 
the last important factor driving Ecevit into the corner. The harmony of the coalition 
seemed lost for all these issues and İsmail Cem, Hüsamettin Özkan and Kemal 
Derviş’s names began to be used by journalists for the establishment of a new pro-
Western liberal party.447 All of these names rejected this plan but they were also 
thinking about the after-Ecevit period. Ecevit was resisting but he had to be 
hospitalized because of his walking and speaking problems related to this poor 
health. After Hüsamettin Özkan’s resignation from the Vice Presidency, İsmail Cem 
decided to wait for Ecevit’s move. Ecevit appointed Şükrü Sina Gürel to Özkan’s 
place.448 This was surely a message to Cem and Ecevit was showing that he would 
not leave his place to Cem. After this decision Cem resigned from DLP and together 
with Özkan and Derviş they began to make plans for a new political party. Politics 
was a draconian game and Cem seemed to learn it well during his years in politics. 
However, Cem’s departure from DLP during Ecevit’s extremely difficult days, shook 
his image as a trustworthy politician and especially after the failure of the New 
Turkey Party, Cem was blamed for taking part in the plot against the coalition 
government. The media labeled the Özkan-Derviş-Cem trio as the “troika 
movement”449 and many important intellectuals, journalists and academicians 
declared that they would support this movement. Cem was thought to be the leader of 
                                                
446 Fikret Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi,
p. 43.
447 ibid., p. 118.
448 ibid., p. 130.
449 Can Dündar and Rıdvan Akar, Ecevit ve Gizli Arşivi, p. 497.
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the movement, Derviş as the Minister of Economics and Özkan as the Interior 
Affairs Minister.450 On paper, the plan seemed well-thought, but in reality?.. 
On 12 July 2002, İsmail Cem held a press conference and declared that the 
troika movement would transform into a political party of the “modern majority” that 
would lead Turkey to full accession to the EU.451 The name of the party was the 
“New Turkey Party-NTP”, a name very convenient for Cem’s insistence of change 
and innovation for long years. The next day, the Washington Post praised the troika 
movement and indicated that this party could help Turkey to get along better with the 
Western world.452 In his interview with journalist Can Dündar, Cem told that as 
Foreign Minister he always tried to prevent the arrival of American soldiers onto 
Turkish soil to invade Iraq since it would have terrible consequences both for Turkey 
and the USA.453 He also added that the Justice and Development Party’s sudden rise 
and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s contacts in Washington gave him the impression that 
JDP’s sudden rise was related to the 1 March memorandum.454 A similar 
interpretation was also made by journalist Fikret Bila, but Bila was relating the coup 
to Ecevit’s pacification and illness, whereas Cem was focusing on the role of Kemal 
Derviş and the rise of JDP and Tayyip Erdoğan. Cem, as a fresh leader, was excited 
and hopeful for the future. However, Kemal Derviş’s late decision of joining RPP 
instead of NTP shocked Cem and decreased the NTP’s vote rates in the polls 
suddenly.455 Ecevit, Özkan and Cem were all feeling like they were betrayed by 
Derviş456 because Derviş deliberately or not was able to divide and destroy DLP and 
                                                
450 Fikret Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi, p. 
137.
451 ibid., p. 138.
452 Vural Savaş, Atatürk’ün Kemiklerini Sızlatan Parti CHP, pp. 71-72.
453 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 242.
454 ibid., p. 242.
455 ibid., p. 244.
456 Can Dündar and Rıdvan Akar, Ecevit ve Gizli Arşivi, p. 499.
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make NTP “stillborn”.457 However, Cem continued to establish his party and make 
visits to different cities of Turkey before the elections. He published Yeni Bir Türkiye 
İçin (For a New Turkey)458 in order to explain basic principles of NTP. Because of 
his positive image as the friendly, tolerant politician and his successes as the Foreign 
Minister, Cem was welcomed with great hospitality and amity everywhere during his 
electoral campaign.459 However, people said that because of their fears against the 
Islamist JDP they would vote for RPP instead of NTP.460 Cem with his friends 
prepared a new party program461, party constitution462 and party regulations463 book 
for the NTP.
In the 3 November 2002 elections, Cem’s NTP could get only 1.15 % of the 
votes. Cem felt very sorry for hundreds, thousands of people who worked with him 
in the electoral campaigns and also for Turkey since he was feeling the coming of 
very intense days in the near future. In the elections, only two parties (JDP with 
34.29 %, RPP with 19.38%) were able to pass the 10 % electoral threshold. In other 
words, Turkish people were punishing all parties (DLP, MP, NAP and NTP) because 
of two terrible economic crises and were giving chances to new parties. JDP was able 
to establish its single party government and rule the country easily without searching 
for consensus because of its high majority in TGNA. Cem and NTP took their chance 
also in the 2004 local elections. Before the elections, Cem prepared a short book 
called Sosyal Demokrasinin Geleceği (The Future of Social Democracy)464. 
However, NTP had only 0.32 % in local elections and due to party’s failure, 
                                                
457 Fikret Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi, p. 
139.
458 İsmail Cem. 2003. Yeni Bir Türkiye İçin… . İstanbul: Cem Ofset Matbaacılık Sanayi AŞ.
459 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 249.
460 ibid., p. 248.
461 YTP. 2002. Yeni Türkiye (YTP) Parti Programı.
462 YTP. 2002. Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP) Tüzüğü.
463 YTP. 2003. Yeni Türkiye Yönetmelikler.
464 İsmail Cem. 2004. Sosyal Demokrasinin Geleceği, İstanbul: Cem Ofset Matbaacılık Sanayi AŞ.
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economic problems and Cem’s health problems the party decided to merge with RPP 
on 24 October 2004.465 Cem continued to work as the advisor of RPP leader Deniz 
Baykal and became a member of RPP’s Parliament466 but because of his health 
problems, he later drew away from active politics. Cem witnessed like many other 
observers a division on the left after JDP’s take-over between liberal leftists and 
national leftists (ulusalcı in Turkish) and tried to point to RPP as the center for all 
leftists.
2.12. The Last Years
İsmail Cem, in his own words, was a bit “disordered” and careless 
considering his health.467 He did not have the discipline or habit to have a check-up.
He did not spare time to exercise. He also smoked cigarettes when he was young. 
After his retirement from politics, it was discovered by his doctor friends that he had 
lung cancer. He went to New York for his treatment. However, neither NTP’s failure, 
nor his health problems prevented him from working and writing as “a man of 
letters”. After his death, his daughter İpek Cem Taha said that her father had “ink 
blots” all over his hands.468 He wrote two very important books; Strateji Yunanistan 
Kıbrıs (Strategy Greece Cyprus)469 and Avrupa’nın “Birliği” ve Türkiye (Europe’s 
Union and Turkey)470 which consisted of his memories in the office of the Foreign 
Ministry and his analysis about Turkey’s foreign policy and future. He was writing 
the third volume of this series which was related to the Middle East before his death. 
He also gave lectures at İstanbul Bilgi University. He criticized the JDP 
                                                
465 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, pp. 250-251.
466 ibid., p. 287.
467 ibid., p. 279.
468 ibid., p. x.
469 İsmail Cem. 2004. Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya Birinci cilt: Strateji Yunanistan Kıbrıs. İstanbul: Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları.
470 İsmail Cem. 2005. Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya İkinci cilt: Avrupa’nın “Birliği” ve Türkiye. İstanbul: 
Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
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government’s way of handling EU politics and foreign policy in general and blamed 
JDP for being “submissive”.471 He also mentioned that full accession to the EU 
seemed difficult for the moment but the process would be beneficial for Turkey to 
develop its democratic standards.472 Cem also made it clear that nationalism is very 
dangerous within a country between different ethnic groups, but it is very necessary 
and useful in international relations if a country tries to defend itself.473 He made 
detailed interviews with journalist Can Dündar and at the first anniversary of his 
death Dündar published a best-seller book derived from these interviews called “Ben 
Böyle Veda Etmeliyim (This is How I Should Say Goodbye)”. 
During his retirement, Cem had the chance to watch his favorite football team 
Galatasaray’s games comfortably. He remembered Galatasaray’s UEFA Cup 
championship as one of his happiest days in life. He continued to take pictures and to 
be interested in photography. Even in his bed, he took pictures of animals from the 
television screen.474 Without heavy duties on his shoulders anymore, he had the 
chance to listen to his favorite music genres; classical Turkish music such as Dede 
Efendi and classical Western music including Vivaldi and Mozart. When Dündar 
asked about his regrets, Cem gave a single answer and said “not being able to spend 
more time with my family”.475 He also said that he had a happy life and lived “a 
good adventure” on earth. He gave a message to Turkish people about trusting in 
Turkey’s future and believing in themselves. He also wrote the lines of his “farewell” 
himself and said goodbye to this world similarly to how he thought and wanted…
                                                
471 “Teslimiyetçi” in Turkish. See; Can Dündar, “Filleri Tepeye Taşıyan Adam”, Milliyet on 18 
October 2006.
472 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 209.
473 Can Dündar, “Filleri Tepeye Taşıyan Adam”, Milliyet on 18 October 2006.
474 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 267.
475 ibid., p. 286.
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FAREWELL
On a date at remote future
As being very old
I should leave quietly
Not seen by anyone
And not disturbing anybody.
On my table
Works that remained from yesterday
Articles unfinished
Books waiting to be read
And memories and hopes.
By pulling the elephants from their tails
My mission was to pass the hills
Days are over but not the elephants
I tried my best
You should finish the rest.
I did not waste my life
I could have done much more
But I still should say thank “Thank God”
And my dearest friends,
This is How I Should Say Goodbye. 476
                                                
476 VEDA
Çok ileri bir tarihte 
Çok yaşlı olarak 
Sessizce ayrılmalıyım 
Kimseye pek gözükmeden 
Ve kimseyi rahatsız etmeden. 
Masamın üzerinde 
Dünden kalan işler 
Tamamlanmamış yazılar 
Okunmayı bekleyen kitaplar 
Ve anılar ve umutlar. 
Filleri kuyruğundan çekerek 
Tepeleri aşırtmaktı görevim 
Günler bitti filler tükenmedi 
Ben elimden geleni yaptım 
Gerisini siz tamamlayın. 
Boşa geçmedi hayatım 
Daha fazlası olabilirdi ama 
Buna da şükür demeliyim 
İşte sevgili dostlar 
Ben böyle veda etmeliyim.
See; Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 289.
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İsmail Cem died on 24 January 2007 in İstanbul. He was honored with a state 
funeral, at which the President of Turkey’s Grand National Assembly Bülent Arınç, 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, current and former leaders of the political 
parties (including RPP’s leader Deniz Baykal and many others) and his close friend 
the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Yorgo Papandreou, attended. Cem
was interred at the Zincirlikuyu Cemetery. Papandreou laid on his grave a branch 
from the olive tree they both had planted in 2000 in Greece as a symbol of peace
between the two countries. At Cem’s funeral, Papandreou said “İsmail was a very 
good friend and I am saddened by this (news) ... İsmail was a man with whom I 
shared a vision, we worked hard together for this vision of peace”.477 Following his 
passing, Cem’s close friend and owner of the Cem Publishing Company Oktay 
Duran published a book called İsmail Cem’in Ardından (After İsmail Cem)478
consisting of articles and notes written on Cem by distinguished statesmen (including 
the former President of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the former 
President of the Republic of Turkey of Northern Cyprus Rauf Denktaş), politicians 
(including Turkish Prime Minister and JDP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, RPP 
leader Deniz Baykal, PASOK leader Yorgo Papandreu), journalists (including Altan 
Öymen, Çetin Altan, Cüneyt Arcayürek, Emin Çölaşan, Fikret Bila, Hasan Cemal, 
Hıncal Uluç, Mehmet Ali Birand) and intellectuals (including Prof. Talat Halman, 
Prof. Orhan Güvenen, Zülfi Livaneli).  His close friend Prof. Güvenen’s words 
represented the sadness of a man after the death of a brilliant person and friend; 
“Achievements and deeds of great men always become a model after their passing in 
increasing dimensions. Young people who would grow up with your breath and your 
                                                
477 International Herald Tribune, 24.01.2007, “Ex-Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, who sought 
to improve relations with Greece, dies”, retrieved on 14.10.2008 from 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/24/europe/EU-GEN-Turkey-Obit-Cem.php.
478 Oktay Duran. 2007. İsmail Cem’in Ardından.  İstanbul: Cem Ofset.
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model personality; will take responsibilities and learn that even politics could be 
done by wisdom, humanity, justice, honesty, good manners, culture and nobility just 
like you did”479.
As a consequence of his gentle-humanist personality, democratic-libertarian 
political views and his successful deeds as a statesman, Cem’s name has not been 
forgotten after his passing and does not seem in danger of being forgotten in the near 
future. After his death, the RPP Karşıyaka municipality built a cultural house with 
Cem’s name in Karşıyaka, İzmir. The RPP Çankaya municipality on the other hand 
built a public park carrying Cem’s name and having Cem’s bust in Çankaya, Ankara. 
Cem’s books still continue to print new editions and his deeds and personality 
constitute a respected and special place in Turkish politics. Recently, Antalya 
municipality organized a television awards contest that will take place each year with 
the name “İsmail Cem Television Awards” in order to commemorate Cem and to 
reward successful television programmes480. 
                                                
479 “Büyük insanların eseri, Kendilerinden sonra çoğalan boyutlarda örnek olur. Sizin, soluğunuzla, 
örnek kişiliğinizle, büyüyecek çocuklar, sorumluluk alacak gençler, çok zor olan siyasetin de bilgi, 
insanlık, adalet, dürüstlük, görgü, kültür ve soylulukla yapılabildiğini, sizde görecekler”. See; Oktay 
Duran, İsmail Cem’in Ardından, pp. 111-112.
480 For details see; İsmail Cem Televizyon Ödülleri web site, http://www.ismailcemodulleri.com/. 
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CHAPTER III
CEM AS A PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
Although İsmail Cem is often remembered as a social democratic politician 
and Foreign Minister of Turkey, in fact he was an influential public intellectual in the 
1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, İsmail Cem gained a reputation as a young and 
peculiar Marxist who had a special interest in Ottoman history and became 
influential in leftist but also in conservative-rightist circles. In this era, Cem’s main 
problem was the underdevelopment of Turkey and he envisaged a state-led 
developmental model from a Marxist class-based perspective in order to solve 
Turkey’s backwardness problem. He was one of the earliest Turkish leftists who tried 
to adapt Marxism to Turkey’s conditions and find roots for Turkish socialism in the 
Ottoman past. In the 1980s, Cem was recognized in Turkish intelligentsia as one of 
the rare social democracy theoreticians in the country. Instead of underdevelopment, 
his main motive this time was the necessity of pluralism and the need to develop 
democratic culture in Turkey. He had a shy but visible change of opinion about free-
market economics. In the 1990s, Cem appeared as the creator of the “New Left” or 
the “Anatolian Left” together with Deniz Baykal and put forward a comprehensive 
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political project in order to solve Turkey’s political and socioeconomic problems and 
reconcile leftist-Kemalist segments with the rest of the society.
3.1. Account of History and Model of Underdevelopment
İsmail Cem, unlike many intellectuals from the leftist tradition in Turkey, 
showed a great deal of interest and sympathy towards Ottoman-Turkish political 
history. Starting from the 1970s, Cem explained Turkish history from a historical 
materialist perspective. His famous book entitled Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi
(The History of Underdevelopment in Turkey) is the best example of Cem’s account 
of history from a socialist perspective. Although Cem passed through a 
transformation process from socialist to social democrat from the 1970s to the 1990s 
and his critical attitude towards Westernization softened during this time, his account 
of history mostly remained the same. The History of Underdevelopment in Turkey
presents Cem’s views on history best and in a plausible and total form. Cem, with 
this book, gained a special place in the leftist tradition and it will be best to analyze 
this book in order to comprehend Cem’s account of history.
According to İsmail Cem, there are two main stages for societies during 
history. The first stage is called “old equilibrium society (eski denge toplumu)” in 
which a society has a self-sufficient subsistence economy in addition to strong 
conservatism and great emphasis on traditions.1 Old equilibrium societies have great 
prejudices and fears against the unknown and new things since they can not risk their 
lives, which depend on a perfect balance of the allocation of limited natural 
resources. Old equilibrium societies do not consider themselves as underdeveloped 
or backward since they do not have relations with the outside world as it was 
                                                
1 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 21-22.
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observed by Pierre Bourdieu in his research on Algeria.2 Old equilibrium societies 
are completely static and innovative activities are almost non-existent. The 
stagnation but also continuation of the economy and social life is provided by the 
sensitive balance between needs and resources, population and resources and 
technique (technology) and resources.3 Technique here is used for referring to 
devices and instruments that are used in the agricultural and stockbreeding activities. 
So, old equilibrium societies’ economies are completely based on agriculture, 
stockbreeding and hunting-gathering activities. People are mostly nomadic in old 
equilibrium societies and this helps them to get rid of the negative effects of climate 
change and epidemic diseases.4 In order to prevent dissipation, waste of time and 
energy, old equilibrium societies create hierarchical and static orders for themselves 
and they try to cooperate and make division of tasks.5
In İsmail Cem’s view, societies (Western societies) that were able to change 
the old equilibrium by their own internal dynamics and make progress considering 
their needs, population and technique, become developed societies whereas societies 
(Eastern societies) who were forced to contravene to the old equilibrium by an 
outside effect were directed towards underdevelopment. The abolition of the old 
equilibrium takes place by the change in needs, population and technique of that 
society.6 Undeveloped societies’ old equilibrium is destroyed due to three conditions; 
sight effect (gözlem etkeni), health effect (sağlık etkeni) and outside coercion 
(zorlama etkeni). Sight effect refers to relations and interactions with more 
developed societies that force a society to change its consummation habit and imitate 
the developed society. This causes an imbalance in the resource-need equation of that 
                                                
2 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 23.
3 ibid., p. 22.
4 ibid., pp. 26-27.
5 ibid., pp. 28-29.
6 ibid., p. 30.
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society and also a socio-cultural change and dualism. It also creates a kind of 
comprador class that becomes the advantageous group of the new equilibrium.7
Trade, colonialism and imperialism played a great role in Cem’s view in the 
emergence of new underdevelopment equilibrium in Eastern societies. Sight effect 
leads to increasing poverty due to an imbalance between the production-consumption 
equation and the emergence of a comprador class and also the commercial failure of 
internal industries due to their weakness against technologically developed and 
cheaper foreign goods.8 The new equilibrium also destroys old social relations and 
cultural values and increases individualism and solidarity among the society.9 While 
for the developed societies who were able to establish a new equilibrium by their 
own internal social dynamics, this process becomes a way of increasing their profit 
by trade, colonialism or imperialism, for underdeveloped societies this becomes a 
permanent way of staying in the underdeveloped position and becoming more and 
more dependent on the Western countries. Health effect may be the only positive 
consequence of this process in Cem’s view, since developed societies care indirectly 
about underdeveloped societies’ workers’ and people’s health with the aim of 
protecting their market (by keeping consumers alive) and acquiring cheap labor.10
So, colonial periods were beneficial for underdeveloped societies considering a 
visible fall in death percentage rates and a sudden rise in the average life span. The 
third effect, outside coercion, takes place when developed societies made social and 
political engineering for undeveloped countries in order to increase their profit. So, 
individual and property rights in addition to some other sociopolitical practices 
completely abolished the old equilibrium of these societies and in a sense prevented 
                                                
7 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 33.
8 ibid., pp. 34-35.
9 ibid., p. 36.
10 ibid., p. 38.
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their own progress in time by making them dependent on the West.11 Market system 
and increasing individualism corrupted old traditions and societal values which also 
led to a social and moral decay in the underdeveloped societies. Western societies 
regulated underdeveloped societies according to their own needs and established 
countries based on single crop economies (sugar from Cuba, coffee from Brazil, 
grapes from Algeria or tea from Sri Lanka).12 Single crop economies imposed by 
Western societies prevented underdeveloped societies to develop in other industries 
and as soon as their natural resources were consumed, they became a completely
backward society.13
In Cem’s view, old equilibrium societies are not backward considering their 
harmonious social relations and developed cultural activities but when their balance 
is destroyed and a new equilibrium is imposed from outside, they are born as 
undeveloped due to their dependency on the West.14 Cem calls this situation as 
“backwardness” or “underdevelopment” and thinks that it is not a natural process. 
Underdevelopment increases conflicts and contradictions within a society, for 
instance an African society or clan could spend millions of dollars for Western made 
weapons in order to destroy the rival clan although most of its inhabitants could not 
find food.15 Class-based inequalities become much more visible and heavier and new 
comprador segments or classes begin to take power in these societies. Cem thought 
that even if this society acquires its political independence, this situation may remain 
because of the presence of this privileged comprador class and socio-cultural dualism 
that emerged in the underdevelopment process.16 According to Cem, the only 
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13 ibid., p. 43.
14 ibid., p. 44.
15 ibid., p. 45.
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solution to get rid of underdevelopment is to produce social emancipation plans and 
implement developmental economic models.
İsmail Cem’s account of history and his model of underdevelopment also 
constitute the basis of his explanations about Ottoman and Turkish Republican 
history which will be analyzed in the following parts. Cem, in a sense, tried to unify 
his theory of history of underdevelopment with classical Marxist based class-conflict 
analyses and present a model to explain the underdevelopment or backwardness case 
for Eastern societies and especially for Turkey. In that sense, Cem -by using history-
determined some communitarian aspects of the Ottoman state system and analyzed 
the semi-colonization of the Ottoman state in order to strengthen his socialist and 
anti-imperialist political and economic model. It must be also added that Cem’s 
account of history and model of underdevelopment were heavily shaped by French 
economist René Gendarme’s views that became popular in the 1960s with his work 
La Pauvreté des Nations (Poverty of Nations). Cem quoted Gendarme very often in 
his book and tried to enrich his theory by using Gendarme’s explanations. It must be 
also noted that Cem’s account of old equilibrium societies has also similarities with 
the Marxist stage of primitive or tribal communism.17 One difference from Marxism 
was Cem’s peculiar effort to adapt the Marxist method of historical materialism to an 
Eastern country like Turkey similar to neo-Marxist movements.
The effect of neo-Marxism (Dependency School and Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s18 World System Theory) was also visible in the writings of İsmail 
Cem. Dependency Theory is an ideological school that appeared in Latin America in 
                                                
17 German philosopher Karl Marx, via his historical materialism method, categorized human history 
into six main stages; primitive (tribal) communism, slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism and 
communism. The first one of these stages -primitive communism- refers to cooperative tribal societies 
which have many similarities with Cem’s old equilibrium societies. See; Ernest Mandel. 1999. 
Marksizme Giriş. İstanbul: Yazın Yayıncılık, pp. 21-23.
18 Immanuel Wallerstein (1930-) is an American sociologist known for his neo-Marxist views and 
World System Theory. 
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the 1960s. Dependency theorists Samir Amin19 and Ernest Mandel20 criticized the 
Euro-centric thinking in the academic world and claimed that countries that were 
exposed to European imperialism in the past, stayed behind these countries and they 
cannot compete with these developed, industrialized countries in a liberal, capitalist 
world system. They offered protective policies and import substitution 
industrialization models for these countries and complained about European 
imperialism, not only in the economic sphere but also in cultural, linguistic, religious 
spheres. They blamed capitalism and classical modernization theory for being 
acultural, ahistorical and Euro-centric. Similar to Dependency School, World System 
Theory, which was created by Immanuel Wallerstein, pointed out the inequalities 
between developed and less developed countries. Wallerstein divided countries into 
three groups: core, periphery and semi-periphery countries. He basically claimed that 
core countries are Western industrialized countries that profit more from the world’s 
capitalist order by importing cheap labor and raw materials and exporting expensive 
technological products. Peripheral countries are third world countries that were 
colonies in the past and that can only take place in the capitalist market now by 
selling raw materials. Semi-peripheral states are those which were not colonized in 
the past and they can exploit peripheral countries but still they are subjugated to the 
domination of core countries.21 There are many common points between Cem’s 
model of underdevelopment and neo-Marxist theories since all of them blame 
Western countries for confining Eastern societies to the situation of backwardness or 
underdevelopment due to Western imperialism and international capitalism. In 
addition, similar to Cem’s model of underdevelopment, neo-Marxist movements 
                                                
19 Samir Amin (1931-) is an Egyptian economist and one of the founders of neo-Marxist Dependency 
School.
20 Ernest Mandel (1923-1995) is a German Marxist theorist who contributed to the development of 
Marxist literature and Dependency School.
21 For details see; Immanuel Wallerstein. 1996. Tarihsel Kapitalizm. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. 
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approached the Westernization process of Eastern countries skeptically and offered 
non-capitalist industrialization methods. Together with a few elite socialist thinkers 
of the 1960s, Cem was one of the first Turkish leftists who tried to adapt Marxism to 
the unique conditions of Turkey and the Eastern world and tried to find roots for 
Turkish socialism in the Ottoman past. Due to Turkey’s unique position as a semi-
periphery country according to Wallerstein’s categorization, Cem’s theory and other 
neo-Marxist theories became very influential especially in the 1960s and 1970s.
3.2. On Ottoman History
İsmail Cem defines the Ottoman state as rational, just and an expert on 
governing. In his view, the Ottoman state had never become completely Islamic and 
was able to interpret religion according to the needs of the society and economy.22
Thus, in a sense İsmail Cem viewed the Ottoman state as semi-secular. Cem also did 
not hesitate to praise Ottomans’ search for peace and rationality (later during his term 
as Foreign Minister Cem used this argument for increasing Turkey’s effect in the 
region).23 Cem thought that the Ottoman system is today considered as the historical 
model for tolerance and “Ottomans were tolerant because being tolerant was the only 
way of life that would permit them to be a great and strong empire and to live in 
peace within their own borders”.24 In other words, Ottomans were tolerant because 
“they had a huge benefit in being tolerant” and the Ottoman wisdom “was able to 
detect this basic reality”.25 Cem also made a materialistic explanation of Ottoman 
tolerance. He pointed out that Christian subjects of the Empire, which constituted 30 
                                                
22 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 15.
23 “Nowhere in the world is there another example of such diverse ethnic and confessional 
communities enjoying centuries of such peaceful and durable relations among themselves and with the 
central authority, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire”. See; İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New 
Century, p. 10.
24 ibid., p. 50.
25 ibid., p. 50.
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to 50 percent of the total population, were exempted from military service and thus 
were paid a special tax (cizye)26 that counted much in the state budget.27 Moreover, 
the Empire was trying to take the support or at least to procure the passive 
compliance of the Balkan peasantry in order to defeat Balkan landlords while making 
new conquests towards the West.28 Tolerance brought no harm to the majority, 
caused little trouble for minorities and provided for the cultural interaction and 
coexistence between different segments of the society.29 Ottomans also trusted and 
took help from the non-Muslim populations with the Devşirme system, which 
composed its bureaucracy from the converted non-Muslim Ottoman children who 
were given a special education in Enderun School30 within the Palace.
According to İsmail Cem, the Ottoman system was based on a strong sense of 
statism which included the ownership of nearly all lands and territories by the Sultan 
and thus, by the state31 and the division of society into two classes; the ruling askeri
(military) class and reaya (subjects).32 Since territory was the strongest means of 
production in the Ottoman system, strong statism in the ownership of lands provided 
                                                
26 Cizye (tribute) was an important part of the Ottoman budget, taken from non-Muslim subjects of the 
Empire in return not to serve in the Ottoman Army. Halil İnalcık stated that in 1528, cizye revenues 
were constituting the 8 % of the Ottoman budget. See; Halil İnalcık. 2000. Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi I. Cilt 1300-1600. İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, pp. 105-
107.
27 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, pp. 50-51.
28 ibid., p. 51.
29 ibid., p. 51.
30 The Enderun School, which means “inner part (iç kısım)” in Persian, was a special boarding school 
for non-Muslim children of the Ottoman society (especially for Christians). Enderun was successful in 
the cultural interaction and higher education of students since many successful Ottoman statesmen 
were products of this process. The Enderun School functioned strictly for bureaucratic purposes and 
that is why the graduates were permanently devoted to government service. The graduates became 
servants of the Sultan or other notables, to serve in the Six Divisions of Cavalry, or to serve as 
Janissaries. Some of the most talented Devshirmehs worked in Topkapı Palace, where they were 
trained for high positions within the Ottoman Divan (court-Council) or military. See; İlber Ortaylı, 
2006. Osmanlı’yı Yeniden Keşfetmek. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, pp. 173-180.
31 Professor Halil İnalcık underlines that this principle originated from Islamic law and ümmet 
(Islamic community) understanding. See; Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomik ve 
Sosyal Tarihi I. Cilt 1300-1600, p. 145.
32 The military class consisted not only of soldiers but of all employers of the Sultan and the state. 
See; ibid., p. 52. 
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a huge central power to the Ottoman state.33 Territory was considered in three 
categories in the Ottoman system. The first category was öşriyye, the land belonging 
to the Muslim population. Öşriyye territory could be sold and inherited in conformity 
with Islamic law and the owners were expected to pay öşür tax to the state. Haraciye
on the other hand referred to the lands owned by non-Muslim populations and 
owners of Haraciye lands were forced to pay both öşür or Harac-ı Mukassem and 
Harac-ı Muvazzaf taxes. The third category of the land was called as Arz-ı Miri34 and 
constituted the very high majority of the total lands. Arz-ı Miri lands belonged to the 
state and subjects living on these lands were in the position of renters.35 Owners of 
Arz-ı Miri lands were expected to feed a certain kind of soldier called Tımarlı Sipahi. 
Tımarlı Sipahis were expected to prepare themselves for the situation of war. 
According to Cem, the Ottoman land system prevented the emergence of a landlord 
class and thus posed a much more progressive system than European feudalism.36
Ottoman public officers who dealt with the collection of taxes were wage earners and 
they did not have the chance to increase their personal power in the region.37
Peasants and people living in rural areas were also pleased with the system since 
most of their taxes were returning as service and protection to their region. In total, 
Cem praised the Ottoman system for preventing feudal pressures over peasants and 
                                                
33 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 53.
34 Arz-ı Miri or Miri lands constituted 90 % of the total lands. See; Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi I. Cilt 1300-1600, p. 147.
35 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 54-56.
36 See; ibid., p. 58. However, in general Marxists such as Milkova thought that this situation prevented 
class-based conflicts and caused stability in Ottoman society unlike Western societies where class-
based conflicts brought progress. See; Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal 
Tarihi I. Cilt 1300-1600, pp. 149-150.
37 Tımar owners had some local powers such as collecting taxes by renting unrecorded, unofficial 
small lands in their territory to subjects, but did not have feudal autonomy like European landlords 
and did not have chance to exercise their own law system or to establish their own local army. See; 
ibid., pp. 157-158.
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reducing exploitation, but he also stated that peasants were not free citizens and 
upward social mobility was very difficult for them.38
As far as İsmail Cem was concerned, the Ottoman army was a very important 
factor in the well-working of the Ottoman system. The Ottoman army consisted of 
two main branches; Janissaries (Yeniçeriler) and other paid soldiers and Tımarlı 
Sipahis and other provincial soldiers.39 Janissaries were professional soldiers who 
were chosen by recruitment among non-Muslim children at young ages and specially 
trained. They acted like the soldiers of the palace40, but due to their autonomous 
power they also later engaged in political struggles in the palace. Tımarlı Sipahis and 
provincial soldiers were soldiers acquired thanks to the Ottoman miri land system. 
Although Janissaries were more popular, according to İsmail Cem Tımarlı Sipahis
and the success of the miri land system were the main causes of Ottomans’ rise and 
territorial enlargement.41 A very high majority of the army consisted of Tımarlı 
Sipahis and other provincial soldiers and Janissaries were only a small professional 
part of the army. According to İsmail Cem, the perfection of the Ottoman army was 
spoiled after problems emerged in the Ottoman land system. At the beginning, the 
system worked smoothly and the Ottomans made consecutive conquests. Tımarlı 
Sipahis spread to all parts of the country and they were not politicized like Alevi-
Bektaşi Janissaries. Sipahis lived within the society and they had interactions with 
ordinary people which increased the people’s support for the state and the army. 
Unlike Janissaries who could revolt and choose not to fight if they were not paid, 
Sipahis’ well-being was related to the protection of Ottoman lands and this gave 
them a kind of special patriotism. In addition, Sipahis constituted the very high 
                                                
38 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 60-61.
39 ibid., p. 62.
40 They are also called “Kapıkulu soldiers”.
41 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 63.
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majority of the army until the 17th century and this reduced the state’s military 
expenditures and in a sense provided a “producer-üretici” army instead of a 
“consumer-tüketici” one.42 The Miri system provided both a strong patriotic army 
and a well-organized agricultural policy for the Ottoman State. 
Cem thought that this structure of land and army was also in conformity with 
the Ottomans’ statist economy in general. Through its officials and army system, the 
Ottoman state had total control of its land which was the biggest means of 
production. Ottomans were able to do this by interpreting Islam in accordance with 
society’s needs in a rationalistic manner. Justice and equality were the most 
important Islamic concepts that shaped Ottoman politics and Islam’s anti-
individualist communal (cemaatçi) mentality helped the Ottoman state to establish a 
centralist regime.43 Ottoman subjects were expected to be humble, patriotic, anti-
egoist and anti-materialist by the “father” state.44 The Ottoman state in fact had the 
character of a patrimonial state45 which was responsible for its people’s safety. 
According to Cem, the Ottoman state’s economic duties also provided Ottomans 
some characteristics of a social state.46 The state spent most of its tax revenues in 
order to increase some services in regions. Hospitals, mosques, soup kitchens 
(imarethane), madrasahs (medrese) and carvansarays (kervansaray) were established 
by the state regularly in order to satisfy its subjects’ needs.47 The state also actively 
determined the price of goods by making inquiries and negotiations with the 
                                                
42 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 66-67.
43 ibid., pp. 72-73.
44 ibid., p. 114.
45 The Patrimonialism legacy of Ottomans also shaped politics in the Republic of Turkey. A strong 
state tradition continued to exist in modern Turkey. For a detailed analysis see; Metin Heper. 1985. 
The State Tradition in Turkey. Walkington: The Eothen Press or in Turkish see; Heper, Metin. 2006. 
Türkiye’de Devlet Geleneği. Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları.
46 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 77-78.
47 ibid., p. 94.
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craftsmen.48 Ownership of the means of production (land) and the regulatory role of 
the state considering prices and conditions of the market were the basic instruments 
the Ottoman state used in order to keep its centralized economic regime. Guilds of 
artisans and merchants49 were other institutions that facilitated the interaction and 
communication between the state and its subjects. Guilds allowed the state to control 
the quality and the price of goods as well as to prevent unfair competition between 
producers and the emergence of a monopoly.50 Although the Ottoman state had 
highly profitable tax revenues from the Silk Road (İpek Yolu) and Spice Trade 
(Baharat Yolu), exports and imports were under state control and the general 
tendency of the state was to provide for the continuation of the subsistence 
economy.51 Charitable foundations (vakıf) were another important part of the 
Ottoman system which served to regulate the state’s revenues from lands and taxes. 
The vakıf system worked perfectly at the beginning, but after the weakening of the 
state due to populist practices it caused the emergence of the mürtezika segment 
which consisted of people who took wages from the state but contributed nothing in 
return.52
The centrality of the political system of the Ottoman state which had ruled 
millions of people from different ethnic, religious and sectarian origins on three 
continents was provided by the protection of subjects against feudal landlords. The 
weakening of feudalism and the protection and services provided to new subjects of 
the state increased the legitimacy of Ottoman rule in the eyes of people.53 Although 
the Ottoman state was a state of the Middle-Ages, it did not show the characteristics 
                                                
48 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 81.
49 Lonca in Turkish.
50 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 82-83.
51 ibid., p. 84.
52 ibid., p. 98.
53 ibid., p. 103.
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of feudalism such as the aristocratic hierarchy of European states.54 Religious 
tolerance and respect towards different religions and sects unlike other states of that 
period were other factors that contributed a lot to the high sense of legitimacy of the 
Ottoman state. Ottomans never forced their non-Muslim subjects to convert to Islam 
and instead took cizye taxes from non-Muslim populations in return for their 
exemption from military service and for their protection.55 The centrality of the 
economy and the Tımarlı Sipahi practice of the army together with the politically 
central state composed a well-working consistent system based on rationalism rather 
than dogmatism. The miri system of land provided a strong patriotic army which was 
a crucial aspect of a strong state during those centuries. 
The Ottoman state expanded its territories enormously and became a vast 
empire. In Cem’s belief, the excessive territorial enlargement brought problems to 
the Ottoman state and starting from the 17th century the perfect system began to 
spoil. First of all, the state’s regulating power was reduced and feudal structure 
started to be ignored in some regions due to vast territories of the state which were 
impossible to totally control56. Cem thought that south-Eastern Anatolia was a 
typical example where feudalism was ignored in the Ottoman state57. It must be 
remembered that in 1808 by Deed of Alliance (Sened-i İttifak)58, the Ottoman state 
recognized the power of local notables.59 Secondly, guilds began to lose their power 
and lost their place to religious brotherhoods. The distance between state and subject 
(center and periphery) widened due to the ineffectiveness of guilds which operated 
                                                
54 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 126.
55 ibid., pp. 105-106.
56 ibid., p. 111.
57 ibid., pp. 125-126.
58 Many historians looked at Sened-i İttifak as the Magna Carta Treaty of Ottoman History 
considering the limitation of the Sultan’s power against local notables (ayan) and governors (vali) 
although this seems rather an exaggerated claim. See; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. 2006. 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye Cilt 2 Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern 
Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975. İstanbul: E Yayınları, p. 27.
59 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 245.
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somehow as civil society organizations or syndicates in the past. Artisans who were 
members of these guilds could not develop their economic and sociopolitical power 
against excessively patrimonial state. In this sense, İsmail Cem thought that the 
flourishing of a pre-bourgeois class was prevented by the state and Ottoman social 
progression was blocked.60 The social dynamism lost its place to the status quo and 
regression. The lack of dynamism and proactive management in Ottomans 
strengthened the downward trend and made reformism nearly impossible. Smuggling 
activities and the appearance of new feudal riches reduced the state’s power and 
subjects began to live in more difficult conditions due to heavy taxes.61 State officials 
in time lost their honest and patriotic stance and corruption together with bribery 
became a source of headache for the state. In order to catch rapidly developing 
European economies (thanks to the Age of Discoveries and colonialism) and find a 
solution to its financial crisis, instead of developing a new statist economic model, 
the Ottoman state chose the easy way out and began to hire and sell its territories. In 
Cem’s materialist point of view, change in the Ottoman land system was a turning 
point and was the real reason for the Ottoman’s fall. Implementation of iltizam, 
which means the state’s delegating its property rights or tax-taking authority to a 
person in return for money, directed state officials to use state resources ineffectively 
in order to get rich or take shares in newly emerged riches called mültezim.62
According to Cem, the Ottoman state was trying to create its own riches or its own 
bourgeoisie against European merchants, but since this process was not natural and 
full of corruption and waste, it became unsuccessful.63 In that sense, the system 
                                                
60 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 124.
61 ibid., p. 141.
62 ibid., p. 145.
63 According to Professor Akşin, the implementation of iltizam was a necessity for the Ottoman State 
related to the invention of rifle guns and other fire arms in European states. Fire arms technology 
required infantrymen to be able to use a rifle gun instead of horse rider Tımarlı Sipahis. Thus, the 
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changed in a negative way and the process of becoming underdeveloped gradually 
started. The emergence of the mültezim class not only overshadowed the state’s 
positive image of the father who gives justice to its subjects, but it also spoiled both 
the Ottoman land ownership system which was based on the state’s ownership of 
nearly all lands and the Ottoman military system that was based on Tımarlı Sipahis.64
So, Ottoman land became an instrument of personal benefit and Tımarlı Sipahi
power in the Ottoman Army disappeared.65 The army was left to undisciplined 
Janissaries and the excessive power of Janissaries also created political struggles and 
instability in the political system.66 Cem claimed that the main reason of the Jelali 
(Celali) Revolts67 was the degradation of the Ottoman land system which caused 
much more difficult conditions of life for Ottoman subjects, especially for peasants.68
Revolts later took support of state officials (both ehl-i örf which consisted of flag 
officers-sancakbeyi, beylerbeyi and subaşı who regulated and secured land systems 
and lands and also ehl-i şer which consisted of kadı, müderris and hoca who dealt 
with the judicial and religious affairs) too and weakened the central government for 
decades.69 Together with the state’s high taxes, the emergence of the mültezim class 
that had some similarities with feudal landlords in a sense forced Anatolian people to 
revolt against the state. Cem called this process “delayed feudalism-geç kalmış 
feodalizm” and considered it as a much more backward and unequal system than the 
                                                                                                                                         
Ottoman State in order to increase the number of Janissaries and infantrymen by taking money from 
mültezim, had to change its land and army system and tried to compete with its European rivals. See; 
Sina Akşin. 2007. Kısa Türkiye Tarihi. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, pp. 13-14.
64 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 174-175.
65 ibid., p. 180.
66 ibid., p. 185.
67 “Jelali Revolts” is a term used to refer to a series of rebellions in Anatolia initiated by unemployed 
previously paid soldiers against the Ottoman state in the late 16th and early 17th (1596-1610) centuries. 
See; Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi I. Cilt 1300-1600, p. 450.
68 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 192-193.
69 ibid., pp. 196-197.
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traditional Ottoman system.70 In Cem’s view, feudalism, which is based on weak 
central authority and private ownership of lands in the hands of landlords, ended the 
Ottomans’ just system and decreased its legitimacy in the newly conquered areas.71
With the rising importance of personal wealth, corruption and moral degeneration 
became widespread in state and social life. The corrupt working of charitable 
foundations (vakıf) and the rapid population increase which caused a rise in 
unemployment were other important factors of the fall of the Ottoman state and the 
emergence of the underdevelopment process according to İsmail Cem.
İsmail Cem thought that there were also many important reasons for the 
Ottoman collapse originating from Europe. Due to liberating effects of the 
Renaissance and the emergence of an innovative bourgeois class, starting from the 
15th century, European states began to send ships to different seas of the world in 
order to discover virgin territories in Africa and America, a period known as the Age 
of Discovery or Age of Exploration. The discovery of India and America was 
realized in this context and European countries acquired new natural resources and 
raw materials which helped them to accelerate their industrialization and 
urbanization process.72 The newly flourishing bourgeoisie increased its power thanks 
to new discoveries and trade opportunities and rural-to-urban migration waves 
started in European lands. At the same time, while the bourgeoisie was gaining 
power, central authorities (kingdoms) were also consolidating their power and 
increasing their central authority by breaking the power of feudal lords and the 
Church with the help of the bourgeoisie.73 The Age of Explorations created a boom 
in European capital accumulation and gold reserves, which forced European states to 
                                                
70 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 195.
71 ibid., p. 201.
72 ibid., p. 152.
73 ibid., p. 153.
  
 
103
find new markets and to increase their trade. The abundance of natural resources also 
helped them to improve their techniques and make progress in science.74 Taken 
together, these conditions created very dynamic societies and rapidly growing 
economies. The Age of Discovery also neutralized classical trade routes and caused 
enormous damage to European states’ Eastern rival - the Ottoman state.75 As 
European countries became richer and richer, they began to buy more of the 
Ottomans’ resources at high prices which created inflation and a shortage in the 
Ottoman market. Although the state and some smugglers were earning more, 
compared to European progress, the Ottoman state became very weak and not even 
able to supply the demand in the domestic market.76 These were the main outsider 
effects contributing to the Ottoman fall according to İsmail Cem and together with 
the collapse of the Ottoman land and military system, the Ottoman state began to lose 
its power against its European rivals.
The economic fall of the state, which was followed by the degradation of the 
land and military system, caused social and moral problems in the state. These 
problems grew after the introduction of a foreign debt-based economy.  The first 
foreign debt was taken in the period of Abdülhamid I in the late 18th century and 
continued consistently with growing amounts.77 European states and merchants were 
also able to profit from their economic privileges called capitulations78 which were 
given when Ottomans were much more powerful than European states. The 
weakening of the Tımarlı Sipahi army and territorial losses against technologically 
improved European states and Russia, in İsmail Cem’s view, ingrained 
                                                
74 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 154-155.
75 ibid., p. 156.
76 ibid., pp. 157-158.
77 ibid., p. 224.
78 The Ottoman State, by giving capitulations, aimed to find allies among Christian nations and to get 
some strategic materials easily. See; Halil İnalcık, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal 
Tarihi I. Cilt 1300-1600, p. 238.
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underdevelopment in the Ottomans. From now on, the Ottoman state was “sick” in 
the eyes of European states and a process of colonization of the Ottomans was on the 
European states’ agenda. While European states had gone through a process of 
industrialization, the Ottoman state was trying to adapt its old system to capitalism 
due to pressures coming from Europe. European states and merchants were disturbed 
by three practices in the Ottoman state. First, according to Ottoman trade regulation, 
European businessmen did not have the chance to engage in domestic trade in 
Ottoman territory and they had only the chance to sell their goods to the state. This 
prevented them from making more profit within the Ottoman market and acquire 
power in the state. Secondly, with the yed-i vahit principle, the Ottoman state had 
previously given monopoly rights to certain merchants and businessmen in some 
sectors and this prevented European businessmen from taking part in these sectors. 
Thirdly, sale of Ottoman territories to a foreigner was forbidden by the state and 
these three practices were the target of European capitalism.79 In this situation, the 
1838 Ottoman-British Trade Agreement was a turning point for Cem. By this 
agreement, the Ottoman state showed its desperation against European capitalism 
and adopted a “laissez faire, laissez passer” program by British pressure. British 
businessmen acquired the same rights as Ottoman businessmen and they began to 
control the Ottoman domestic market. The yed-i vahit application was removed and 
the agreement was followed by other agreements made with France, Spain, Belgium, 
Prussia, Denmark and other European countries.80 İsmail Cem believed that change 
in the economic structure certainly had some political consequences and reforms like 
the Tanzimat (1839) and Islahat (1856) edicts were in fact superstructural changes 
made by the Ottoman state due to European pressures in order to regulate the state to 
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its new colony position.81 In Cem’s view, Westernization reforms of the 19th century 
were in fact colonial steps although they brought some freedoms and security 
guarantees to Ottoman subjects, too. Moreover, Cem, by quoting from Professor 
Halil İnalcık, claimed that the so-called Ottoman modernization came together with 
the weakening of central authority82 and the increasing power of pre-modern feudal 
local notables and the mültezim class who suppress people, which could be described 
as a clear contradiction compared to many other modernization movements that 
sought strict centralization83. 
According to İsmail Cem, one of the most important steps of Ottoman 
colonization was the establishment of the Public Debt (Düyun-u Umumiye) system. 
By using this system, European bankers and states in a sense damped the Ottoman 
state in heavy debts and interests and increased their authority over Ottoman 
politics.84 Pashas started to be classified by their closeness to other states and they 
began to act as the representatives of these states. The Ottoman state did not have a 
chance to follow policies regarding its own interests because of its dependency on 
other states. So, in other words, Cem thought that the Westernization of the state lost 
its meaning of modernization and became a tool of colonialism in the 19th century.85
Pashas, local notables, ethnic-religious minorities and European collaborator 
businessmen and bureaucrats became champions of this process and they formed a 
kind of comprador class defending Westernization. However, ordinary people who 
were discontented with their increasing poverty and the weakening of their state, 
opposed Westernization. This opposition was realized on the surface and the state’s 
                                                
81 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 233.
82 For detailed research on European institutions in the Ottoman state in the early 20th century see; 
Adnan Şişman. 2006. XX. Yüzyıl Başlarında Osmanlı Devletinde Yabancı Devletlerin Kültürel ve 
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83 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 260.
84 ibid., pp. 234-236.
85 ibid., p. 243.
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Westernization reforms became a target, but in İsmail Cem’s view the problem was 
about the substructure and colonization of the state. Westernization was mostly 
supported by three segments; pashas, local notables and minority groups. Pashas 
supported Westernization in order to protect and increase their personal benefits and 
wealth and also some of them believed that there was no other alternative to save the 
state. Local notables supported the Westernization process in order to secure their 
lands by European private property laws and break the power of the central 
government. Minorities on the other hand were trying to acquire their independence 
by strengthening financially and organizing associations and paramilitary 
organizations.86 By the Westernization process, (with Tanzimat and Islahat reforms) 
the security of life and wealth of the businessmen, pashas, top ranked bureaucrats 
and minorities was guaranteed by the Ottoman state. In addition, regulations 
preventing free market economics were removed and the state conceded to a foreign 
and minority capital dominated market.87 Change in state structure and culture (new 
uniforms of state officials and soldiers, a new Istanbulite language dominated by 
French words etc.) created a dualism in the society as was explained in Cem’s model 
of underdevelopment. These reforms were accepted only by a small elite and 
implemented in a forceful (from top to bottom) way. Moreover, their practice was no 
more than an artificial imitation of European societies and states. Exported reforms 
forced Anatolian people to embrace their traditional and pious life more and more 
enthusiastically and the Islamic fundamentalist seeds of discord were planted in this 
process.88 Cem wrote that the problem of duality in Turkish social structure started 
with the Westernization process and could not be handled until today.89
                                                
86 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 245-246.
87 ibid., p. 247.
88 ibid., p. 250.
89 ibid., pp. 518-519.
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İsmail Cem thought that the process of colonization of the Ottoman state 
naturally brought the process of collapse. Now, the Ottoman economy and politics 
were in the hands of European firms, businessmen and politicians. The Ottoman 
market was dominated by foreign goods and only non-Muslim minorities of the state 
had the chance to develop their positions by trade and close relations with 
Europeans. The competition between a few small Muslim Ottoman businessmen and 
European businessmen was like a match between heavyweight and flyweight boxers 
for İsmail Cem.90 Soon, in the early 20th century, the competition between European 
states brought them into the position of World War I and the Ottoman state was now 
subjected to physical imperialism in addition to its cultural and economic 
dependency. The period of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) 
could not prevent the collapse of the state and the Ottoman state collapsed together 
with its 600 year old glorious history. İsmail Cem, while making a total critique of 
the Ottoman state, underlines the problematic practice of Westernization which was 
not based on the idea of improving people’s life conditions and liberties and 
developing the state but rather on satisfying European states by giving them political 
and economic concessions. In his view, although the Westernization process brought 
progress in some areas (constitutionalism, increasing civil liberties etc.), it created a 
comprador class at the expense of exploiting the Anatolian people together with a 
cultural dualism which would always be a problem for Anatolia. In forming his 
theories and ideas about the Ottoman State, Cem referred mostly to the great works 
of Ömer Lütfi Barkan (Türkiye’de Toprak Meselesi-Land Issue in Turkey)91, Halil 
İnalcık (various books and articles), Mustafa Akdağ (Celali İsyanları-Jelali 
                                                
90 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 254.
91 Ömer Lütfi Barkan. 1980. Türkiye’de Toprak Meselesi. İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınevi.
  
 
108
Revolts)92 and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı. Cem’s positive look towards Ottoman 
justice, religious tolerance, communal mentality and statist land system was a 
deviance from the classical Western Marxist look but it was very much in line with 
the Eastern socialist understanding of Asiatic type of production school (ATÜT)93
that became influential in Turkey and in third world countries during the 1960s and 
1970s. Cem in that sense could also be considered as one of the earliest intellectuals 
who brought Ottoman past discussions on the agenda in leftist intellectual circles and 
advocated a kind of socialist state more reconciled with the Ottoman State by 
focusing on some social aspects and the communitarian mentality of the Ottoman 
system. In that sense, Cem correctly saw the growing Ottoman past discussions that 
had become very popular in the country in the 2000s and wanted Turkey to become 
more influential in foreign policy by using historical-cultural assets coming from the 
Ottomans.
3.3. On Single-Party Rule 
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and its allies Germany and the 
Empire of Austria-Hungary in the First World War, on 30 October 1918 the 
Armistice of Mudros (Mondros Mütarekesi) was signed between the Ottoman 
Empire and the Allies of World War I, namely the United Kingdom and France. The 
treaty granted the Allies the right to occupy forts controlling the Straits of the 
Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and the right to occupy -in case of disorder- any 
                                                
92 Mustafa Akdağ. 1993. Celali İsyanları. İstanbul: Cem Yayınları.
93 Asiatic type of production (Asya tipi üretim tarzı-ATÜT) was a term first used by Karl Marx in his 
work Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. Marx, by using this term, tried to point out the difference 
between historical differences of property ownership between European and Eastern societies. In the 
1960s, ATÜT discussions played a significant role in the formation of socialist theories. See; Metin 
Heper, Türkiye Sözlüğü Siyaset, Toplum ve Kültür, p. 142.
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territory in case of a threat to security.94 Soon after, Allied powers entered Istanbul 
with the aim of occupying the city.95 The partition of the Empire was on the agenda 
for Allied powers but a resistance movement was initiated by Mustafa Kemal and his 
friends starting from 19 May 1919 after the Greek invasion of İzmir on 15 May 
1919.96 Kemal and his friends, by taking support of the Anatolian people, formed a 
new Grand National Assembly in Ankara on 23 April 1920 and administered the 
Independence War from this Assembly.97 The National Struggle gained power and 
popular support especially after the Sevres Treaty, the “peace treaty” signed between 
the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul government) and Allies on 10 August 1920, which 
imposed heavy conditions on Turkey and partitioned the Anatolian land between 
Greek, French, British and Italian powers.98 The resistance movement was able to 
concentrate its power and organize an army by taking help from the USSR and 
finally defeated the Greek occupying army and established the Republic of Turkey 
on 29 October 1923.99 The establishment of the Turkish national movement led to 
the end of the Ottoman Empire and its millet system100 and with the Kemalist 
reforms created a modern and secular Turkish nation-state. For Professor İnalcık, the 
                                                
94 It refers to the famous article 7 of the Mondros Treaty. See; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye Cilt 2 Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern 
Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975, pp. 405-406.
95 For a detailed study on this topic see; Nur Bilge Criss. 1999. Istanbul: Under Allied Occupation, 
1918-1923, Leiden: Brill.
96 Halil İnalcık. 2007. Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye. İstanbul: Kırmızı Yayınları, p. 11.
97 Halil İnalcık, Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye, p. 16.
98 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye Cilt 2 Reform, 
Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975, pp. 421-422.
99 Previously the Republic gained international recognition by the Lausanne Treaty which was signed 
on 24 July 1923 and settled the Anatolian and East Thracian parts of the partitioning of the Ottoman 
Empire by annulment of the Treaty of Sevres as a consequence of the Turkish War of Independence 
between the Allies of World War I and the Ankara-based Grand National Assembly of Turkey led by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The treaty also led to the international recognition of the sovereignty of the 
new Republic of Turkey as the successor state of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. See; Stanford J. 
Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye Cilt 2 Reform, Devrim ve 
Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975, pp. 433-436.
100 The Ottoman Empire was shaped by the “millet system” understanding. According to the millet 
system, Ottoman State recognized differences among different social groups in the society according 
to religious beliefs. Ethnic or linguistic differences were ignored and the society was basically divided 
into two groups: Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims included Greeks, Armenians and Jewish 
subjects of the state and were considered as minority groups.
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creation of the modern Republic was the consequence of two centuries old Ottoman 
modernization history and opened a new chapter in Turkish history.101
After the establishment of the Republic, the President and the “father of the 
Turks” Mustafa Kemal Atatürk introduced a broad range of reforms (political, social, 
legal, economic and cultural) and the young republic turned its face towards the 
West. “Unconditional, unrestricted sovereignty belongs to the nation” was one of the
foremost principles of the new secular Turkish Republic and the Sultanate and 
Caliphate were abolished by Atatürk.102 After the establishment of modern Kemalist 
Turkey, the country engaged in the process of creating a Turkish nation and a 
modern state. Although Kemalist discourse was highly anti-imperialistic, its aim was 
to create a Western type democracy to catch up with the contemporary civilization. 
The young Republic made reforms in the fields of culture and cut its ties with the 
ancient regime suddenly. This sudden and brutal change and the elitist Jacobinist 
nature of the new modern regime created problems throughout Turkish history. For 
instance, Professor Şerif Mardin explains this tension between the militantly secular 
military-bureaucratic regime and pious Anatolian people with center-periphery 
dichotomy.103 The elite of the Republic considered itself as the vanguard of 
modernization and did not hesitate to impose reforms from above in order to “elevate 
the people to the level of contemporary civilization”. Professor Ergun Özbudun also 
points out the lack of social support that the Kemalist Revolution and modernization 
project had: “Turkish Revolution was not a social revolution; rather, it combined 
                                                
101 Halil İnalcık, Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye, p. 19.
102 Professor İnalcık considers the abolition of the Caliphate as a grand revolution and the most 
important step of secularization. See; Halil İnalcık, Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye, pp. 24-25, 67-75.
103 “The new Republican ideology, by denying the place of Islam as a discourse and its role as a 
cement of society, increased the distance between the educated and the uneducated”. See; Şerif 
Mardin. 1997. “Projects as methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science” in Sibel 
Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (ed.) Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, p. 71.
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features of a war of national liberation and of a political revolution”.104 Moreover, 
the Turkish Revolution was not only a political change but rather it aimed to create a 
new modern “Turkish man” and changed many things in the field of culture.105 So, 
many reforms were made by the Kemalist government to cut the new regime’s ties 
with the “corrupt ancient regime” which was seen as the scapegoat for all problems.
Although İsmail Cem tried to analyze the single-party period and Turkish 
Republic in general from a critical point of view, his look towards Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and Turks’ National Struggle was overall positive. In his view, Atatürk was a 
genius who was able to acquire power in very difficult conditions by taking support 
from very different segments of the society (Islamists, nationalists, Kurds, 
communists106 etc.) by his clever strategies during the National Struggle. Moreover, 
he believes that without Atatürk, the Republic of Turkey might have never existed.107
According to Cem, the Turkish Independence War was a real miracle because the 
real difficulty was not the strength of the Greek army or the derangement of the 
Kuvayi Milliye but rather the lack of support given to the National Struggle by the 
Anatolian people and especially by local notables at the beginning of the war. Local 
notables at the beginning of the foreign invasion seemed indifferent and some of 
them seemed even happy since they thought they could earn more money when 
anarchy would stop.108 Anatolian people were on the other hand very weak, 
crestfallen and unwilling to fight against the enemy. Cem thought that the genius of 
Atatürk was to use foreign soldiers’ inappropriate behaviors as propaganda material 
                                                
104 Ergun Özbudun. 1981. “The nature of the Kemalist political regime” in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun 
Özbudun (ed.) Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State. London: C. Hurst & Company, p. 83.
105 Halil İnalcık, Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye, p. 78.
106 Turkish communists including their leader Mustafa Suphi actively supported the Turkish 
Independence War. See; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern 
Türkiye Cilt 2 Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975, p. 404.
107 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 273.
108 ibid., p. 275.
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and to motivated Anatolian people with courage and nationalism.109 With Atatürk’s 
tactical genius, pious Anatolian people and most of the local notables supported the 
National Struggle but the backbone of the resistance was constituted by nationalist 
young officers and intellectuals. However, there were also splits among officers and 
intellectuals. Some of them favored an American mandate or a restored monarchy 
whereas some of them boldly defended the necessity of establishing a Republic. In 
Cem’s opinion, Mustafa Kemal and his friends were able to establish an independent 
Republic from the wreck of an empire by using Soviet help and French abstention 
cleverly.110
İsmail Cem thinks that although the starting principles of the new Republic 
were progressive, its economic and social policies were not able to reverse the 
underdevelopment pattern inherited from the Ottomans. The economic policy of the 
young Republic was a national capitalist economy (milli iktisat), which meant to 
create a national bourgeoisie by statist-seeming liberal policies.111 This was Mustafa 
Kemal and his close friends’ main choice but due to the conditions of the Great 
Depression112, this policy was pending in the 1930s and more statist policies and a 
policy of state led development were adopted.113 According to the national economic 
program, which was first presented at the İzmir National Economy Congress on 17 
February 1923, the state was conceptualized as responsible only for affairs and 
sectors where the private sector could not work properly. Moreover, projects that 
                                                
109 Islamists have been using this argument for decades in order to emphasize the religious-Islamist 
character of the National Struggle which was later erased by the founders of the Republic in their 
view. See; İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 275.
110 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 277.
111 ibid., p. 279.
112 The Great Depression was the global economic crisis that started in the USA’s stock market in 
1929 and soon affected the whole world economy terribly in the 1930s. The Great Depression caused 
the devaluation of the liberal economy and the rise of Keynesianism or more statist economic 
approaches in the world. 
113 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye Cilt 2 Reform, 
Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975, p. 460.
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were defended by Mustafa Kemal during the National Struggle period such as land 
reform and the statist economic model were not even mentioned in the Congress.114
Cem, by quoting from İsmet İnönü, tried to show that Atatürk was always in favor of 
private enterprises but he knew that in a country where nobody had capital 
accumulation, the state had to take the lead and during the National Struggle he had 
to look more sympathetic to Bolsheviks in order to take their help.115 For Cem, the 
“national economy” or the national capitalist economic model had no other meaning 
than the replacement of European and minority owned capital by the Turkish and 
Muslim businessmen class.116 What he was critical of was Mustafa Kemal and other 
founding figures’ liberal approach to economics, which had to be changed after the 
Great Depression. In addition to economic problems caused by the Great Depression, 
the Turkish Republic’s acceptance of paying Ottoman debts brought a heavy burden 
to the Turkish economy and Atatürk and other important names of the Republic 
decided to take control of the economy into the hands of the state. According to Cem, 
the first and second economic plans117 prepared in accordance with the new statist 
economic model brought some positive aspects such as the nationalization of foreign 
companies and an increase in state investments.118 During this process, statism 
showed its dominance in the intellectual world, too. So, Kadro magazine119 became a 
                                                
114 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 279.
115 ibid., p. 280.
116 ibid., pp. 285-286.
117 According to the Shaws, the two five year plans that were prepared in the 1930s were inspired 
from the USSR’s Gosplan - State Committee for Planning. See; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural 
Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye Cilt 2 Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern 
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118 ibid., p. 288.
119 Kadro movement takes its name from the monthly Kadro journal which was published between 
January 1932 and December 1934 by a group of intellectuals of the early Republican period. Although 
the journal was politely forced to cease publication in December 1934 by the state and only thirty-six 
issues very limited in number were published, the movement left a deep impact on the thinking 
patterns of Turkish intellectuals, the character of Turkish modernity and on the interpretation of 
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Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge and İsmail Hüsrev Tökin) who had links with the Turkish Communist Party 
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very influential intellectual forum where statist views were advocated out loud. 
However, in İsmail Cem’s view, even the adoption of a statist economic model did 
not abrogate the Ottoman legacy of the center-periphery dilemma and the dominance 
of a small “happy minority (mutlu azınlık)” in the country.120 Moreover, the 
industrialization attempts of the single-party period mostly remained unsuccessful 
due to lack of capital accumulation.121
According to İsmail Cem the happy minority group consisted of three main 
segments; Istanbulite business circles and Anatolian local notables, officers that were 
engaged in the National Struggle and gained a special place in the new status quo and 
deputies and top ranked bureaucrats.122 Although these three segments had internal 
conflicts too, their real struggle was for protecting and developing their own 
positions at the expense of ordinary people and honest patriotic public servants. This 
coalition’s first job was to replace minority and European based elite and to acquire 
power to affect the decision-making process in the country. İş Bankası123 in that 
sense was established by Celal Bayar124 to favor this coalition and constitute a new 
                                                                                                                                         
(TKP) in the past and this increased both attentions and reactions on the movement. Kadro writers 
defended a statist autarchic economic model in addition to an authoritarian central state. For detailed 
information see; Mustafa Türkeş. 1999. “The Ideology of the Kadro Movement: A Patriotic Leftist 
Movement in Turkey” in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.) Turkey Before and After Atatürk. London: Frank Cass 
Publishers. Also see; George S. Harris. 2002. The Communists and the Kadro Movement Shaping 
Ideology in Atatürk’s Turkey. Istanbul: The Isis Press and İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin. 2003. Bir 
Cumhuriyet Öyküsü: Kadrocuları ve Kadro’yu Anlamak. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları 134.
120 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 289.
121 İsmail Cem, Türkiye Üzerine (Araştırmalar), p. 49.
122 ibid., p. 56.
123 İş Bankası or Türkiye İş Bankası was the Turkish Republic’s first public bank and premiere 
national financial institution which dated back to 26 August 1924, mandated by Atatürk, after the first 
Economy Congress in İzmir. İş Bankası began to operate with two branches and 37 staff under the 
leadership of Celal Bayar, the first General Manager to run the bank. In addition to İş Bankası, other 
state banks such as Etibank, Denizcilik Bankası, Emlak Kredi Bankası and İller Bankası played major 
roles in the development of the Turkish economy. See; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye Cilt 2 Reform, Devrim ve Cumhuriyet: Modern 
Türkiye’nin Doğuşu 1808-1975, p. 462.
124 Celal Bayar (1883-1986) was a Turkish politician (ex-RPP deputy and one of the founders of 
Democrat Party) and the third President of the Republic (1950-1960) of the state known for his liberal 
economic approaches. Bayar was also the first General Manager of İş Bankası. Bayar was given the 
death penalty after the 27 May 1960 military coup but his punishment was commuted to life 
imprisonment because of his old age. Later, in 1964 he was released from prison due to his poor 
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bourgeois class.125 This coalition’s representative in the RPP was also Celal Bayar 
and his friends, and the İş Bank group126 engaged in a harsh struggle against İsmet 
İnönü and Recep Peker’s bureaucratic group (Ülkü group) in the 1930s and 1940s. 
According to Cem although the new Republic economically made little progress İş 
Bank group’s reign in the party in the 1920s, after the adoption of statism and the 
dominance of a statist-bureaucratic group, concrete development projects flourished 
such as the founding of Sümerbank, Etibank and Mining Bank, the establishment of 
sugar, paper and textile factories and the construction of new mining foundations, 
harbors and highroads.127 Moreover, the state had foreign trade surplus and its 
market was dominated by domestic goods. While Cem praised the relative success of 
the statist development model of the 1930s, he also pointed out critically that 
considering social security and syndical rights no improvements were made by the 
state and socialist ideology was heavily suppressed.128 Workers worked in terrible 
conditions in state or few privately-owned factories but the situation of peasants was 
no different from the workers. Local notables had noncontestable authority in their 
villages like the representative of the state in rural areas and peasants had to obey 
their rules without objecting.129 Because of the weakness of the state and the army 
after long years of Independence Wars, the new state had to take the support of local 
notables in order to keep its presence in the rural areas. However, this caused a statist 
economic model which worked against peasants and lower segments in favor of local 
notables. The bureaucratic segment was the most helpful servant of Istanbulite 
capital owners and local notables in this new system. According to Cem, this was not 
                                                                                                                                         
health and was pardoned in 1966. Full political rights were restored to him in 1974. See; Metin Heper, 
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caused by the bureaucracy’s weakness against the capital owners or local notables, 
but rather because of its lack of class-based approaches and ideological statism.130
Top ranked bureaucrats faithfully believed in the solidarism understanding of 
Kemalism131 which claimed that class-based inequalities could be prevented in 
Turkish society where no class distinctions had evolved. So, in Cem’s view 
bureaucrats’ candidness and solidarist approach to the issues was in fact no different 
from supporting the higher segments of the society.132 Lower segments’ negative 
attitude towards their Western lifestyle and values was also another factor that 
approximated bureaucracy to the bourgeoisie.133 That is why the single-party 
period’s democratic qualities remained highly limited (Cem thought of this period as 
authoritative) and were available only for a group of small coalition partners which 
was similar to other authoritarian and fascist regimes of that period.134
İsmail Cem pointed out that conditions of the Second World War (such as the 
conscription and nourishment of 500.000 soldiers) had very negative consequences 
on the Turkish economy in the 1940s - for example the inflationist policies adopted 
by the state135. Inflationist policies caused shortages in agricultural production and 
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131 Solidarism refers to a philosophical doctrine developed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim, 
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even bread was rationed. Through the National Protection Law (Milli Korunma 
Kanunu) and Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi), the state tried to reduce exports and 
imports and to raise funds for the state’s defense expenditures especially by 
suppressing non-Muslim segments of the society.136 However, the increasing role of 
bureaucracy in the economic sphere brought corruption and “war time riches”. 
Moreover, people were very unhappy with the authoritarian rule of the single-party 
now in more difficult economic conditions. Increasing land taxes (Toprak Vergisi) 
collected by the state from local notables and peasants also caused a huge decrease in 
the legitimacy of the single-party government during these years and created a 
convenient condition for the emergence of populist rural-based parties such as the 
Democrat Party. While local notables had the chance to survive against heavy taxes, 
ordinary peasants’ only choice was to sell all their property in order to survive. 
According to Cem, the increasing pressures of bureaucracy over Istanbulite 
bourgeois and Anatolian local notables directed them to favor a more liberal system 
in which bureaucracy’s role would be diminished.137 The socialist leaning and 
authoritarian policies and practices of İsmet Pasha, who led the bureaucratic group in 
RPP, scared the “happy minority” in the country especially after the beginning of the 
talks for land reform after the Second World War.138 The land reform project was the 
final blow for the happy minority and after Turkey’s transition to multi-party rule all 
bourgeoisie and land owner segments of the country began to strongly support the 
Democrat Party due to their anger towards bureaucracy and new liberal ideas that 
strongly flourished in the country after Turkey’s rapprochement with the USA due to 
the Soviet threat after the Second World War.139
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In Cem’s view, during this single-party period Turkey was an 
underdeveloped but independent country but after the conditions that emerged in the 
late 1940s by tying itself to the West in an asymmetrical way, Turkey began to lose 
its independence like a semi-colony.140 Although the new Republic had revolutionary 
and progressive ideals, bureaucracy as in conformity with its nature -Cem thought 
that from a Marxist point of view, bureaucracy is always close to sovereign classes 
and higher segments of the society- retreated from its ideals day by day and could not 
have the chance to leave the happy minority’s privileges that were against the 
people’s benefit.141 Furthermore, Cem expressed that the biggest delusion of the 
Republican elite was to believe in the idea that a class of bourgeoisie that would 
carry the class-based characteristics of a natural bourgeois class could be created by 
state initiative through creating businessmen having excessive capital 
accumulation.142 However, since this process was artificial and conditions were very 
different from the West, “late” Turkish modernization or Westernization led to the 
semi-colonization of the country.143 Synthetic Turkish bourgeoisie, which owed its 
existence to the state, did not have a progressive role like its Western counterparts 
and did not aim to cast down the old regime for establishing a better one.144
Cem also pointed out that the primary characteristic of Kemalism and the 
single-party period was radicalism, a political wave developed in France which 
                                                
140 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, p. 314.
141 ibid., p. 315.
142 ibid., p. 336.
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totally rejects conservatism, insists on complete secularism, positivism, 
republicanism, pragmatism and distrusts other ideologies.145 Radicalist movements 
generally depended on the petty bourgeois and bureaucratic segments of the society 
and became very popular among the Turkish intelligentsia due to the huge French 
cultural influence on the Ottoman Empire.146 According to Cem, the Young Ottoman 
(Yeni Osmanlılar) and Young Turk (Jön Türkler) movements and the Union and 
Progress Party and Republican People’s Party (until the 1970s) were the most 
significant political institutions highly based on Ottoman-Turkish radicalism147
which played positive roles in the Turkish modernization but also created a tradition 
sometimes overshadowing contemporary democratic understanding due to their 
monist political approaches.148 For instance, the failures of transition to a multi-party 
system in the early years of the Republic and the banning of the Progressive 
Republican Party149 and the Free Party150 were concrete proofs of radicalist aspects 
of the single-party period which could not accept any other ideology than of itself.151
According to Cem, two aspects of a radicalist and guardianship (vesayet) regime 
were the ability to determine the rules of the game by itself and to create taboos in 
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order to draw frontiers against freedom of thought, two aspects that could also be 
seen in Turkish radicalism and the single-party period.152
3.4. On the Democrat Party Period and the 27 May 1960 Military Intervention
İsmail Cem evaluated Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system as a natural 
consequence of the Ottomans’ and Turkey’s problematic Westernization process that 
also brought some positive consequences. In his view, starting with Sultan Selim 
III153, Turks have always tried to make a Western make-up to their state to please the 
European powers and save their own decaying state.154 The Kemalist Revolution and 
reforms introduced by the new Republic were also modernization-Europeanization 
efforts and this process naturally led to a political system close to Western liberal 
democracies. In addition, transition to a multi-party regime and the take-over of the 
DP government were natural consequences of the Turkish state’s efforts to create a 
bourgeois class. That is why; in Cem’s opinion the 1950 transformation was a kind 
of “bourgeois revolution” 155 or “democratic revolution”156 that was envisaged by the 
state. In Cem’s view, DP was a populist movement that was naturally born against 
the bureaucratic oppressive state and socially had a progressive character.157 Cem 
also thought that although Democrat Party governments used religious rhetoric in the 
country, they always tried to look sympathetic and European to Western countries 
and as it was confessed by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, they tried to transform 
Turkey into “little America”158 and to create “a millionaire in every district”.159 DP 
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followed a pro-Western foreign policy and this tradition was maintained by the 
Justice Party although after the famous “Johnson’s Letter” event, Turkey began to 
diversify its foreign policy options. In that sense, İsmail Cem claims that the “Kâbe 
(Kaaba) of all Turkish governments resided in the West”.160 In Cem’s view, DP 
period was a continuation of Turkey’s Westernization efforts. Since during the 
single-party period the Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie was created by the state, now it 
was time for the bourgeoisie to step over and take the lead from the bureaucracy 
similar to European democracies. DP represented the urban bourgeoisie and rural 
local notables like liberal parties in Europe but Turkey had its own exceptions from 
Europe considering its religion, history and anti-individualist social structure. 
Moreover, according to Cem, the most problematic part of Turkish modernization 
was the false consciousness in believing that “adapting Europe’s economic, legal, 
political and cultural institutions would bring economic development”.161
İsmail Cem wrote that the rise of DP also meant the attack of the Turkish 
bourgeoisie and local notables to pacify the bureaucratic-military elite that was 
represented by RPP.162 Ordinary people and peasants were also sympathetic towards 
DP because of the heavy conditions imposed by RPP during the Second World War 
and DP’s more tolerant approach to religious issues. Thus, anti-Westernization 
reactions of Anatolian people targeted RPP as their enemy and found a channel of 
representation in DP similar to the example of the Progressive Republican Party and 
Free Party. RPP elite’s and bureaucrats’ snobbish and sarcastic approach to DP
voters due to cultural reasons was another factor that increased DP’s power.163
According to Cem, DP ideologues were clever enough to understand people’s wishes 
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and that is why they established clientelistic relations with local notables and small 
land owners by purchasing their products at higher prices. With the help of local 
notables, the DP government was able to make necessary changes without the 
pressure of bureaucracy or gendarmes over people and in that sense replaced the 
image of an “oppressive state (ceberut devlet)” with a “protective state (koruyucu 
devlet)”.164 Although the very high majority of anti-Western Islamist reactionists 
were poor peasants and DP followed a liberal economic policy that favored 
privileged classes, DP was able to take the peasantry’s support by superstructural, 
cultural policies. For instance, the earliest deed of the DP government was to change 
the language of call to prayer into Arabic.165 Prime Minister Menderes, by making a 
bold “successful and unsuccessful reforms” classification on Kemalist reforms, tried 
to consolidate the DP’s conservative voter segments.166 DP, by using Marshall Aid 
and limiting bureaucratic obstacles, tried to practically facilitate rural people’s lives. 
In that sense, DP was at the beginning somehow successful at bringing some central 
values and concepts to the periphery such as democratic culture.167 Moreover, 
inflationist policies that favored the bourgeoisie and local notables created a 
convenient environment for the emergence of new industries and new investments 
that created job opportunities for lower classes. Through foreign loans and 
inflationist policies, DP achieved to modernize and increase agricultural production 
and thus, Turkey had considerable economic growth rates during DP’s early years.168
Considering foreign policy, DP’s earliest deed was to send Mehmetçik169 to the 
Korean War in order to consolidate Turkey’s role in the Western bloc and to increase 
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its chance for NATO membership. President of the Republic Celal Bayar thought 
that entrance to NATO would be followed by loans and credits provided to Turkey 
with the help of the USA.170 According to İsmail Cem, DP’s preference for realizing 
an economic development through a weak bourgeoisie was unsuccessful and that is 
why Turkey had to become more dependent on the Western bloc in order to take 
support for foreign investment, economic aid and loans and credits provided by the 
World Bank.171
İsmail Cem’s critical approach towards DP mostly consisted of the party’s 
economic preferences. In Cem’s view, DP continued RPP’s wrong economy policy 
that was initiated first in 1948 with the Turkish-American Economic Agreement. The 
plan was simple; to achieve aggressive growth rates and to facilitate people’s lives by 
establishing new roads and establishments, but at the expense of taking serious 
amounts of debt and credit from the World Bank and the USA.172 Turkey’s weak 
bourgeoisie and DP elite saw foreign -especially American- domination over the 
Turkish economy as a chance to get rid of the bureaucratic pressures within the 
country. However, their plan turned out to be unsuccessful since the Turkish 
economy under American control favored the USA more than Turkey and 
dependency on the USA made Turkey a weaker state both in the economic and 
political arena.173 According to Cem, the rhetoric of the Cold War was used by the 
American state to control countries within the Western bloc and expand its economy 
by selling its goods and weapons to these countries.174 Cem thought that Turkey was 
one of these American victims of the Cold War. DP was the USA’s political 
instrument in applying this policy upon Turkey and during DP rule the Turkish 
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economy was reshaped according to American interests. First of all, during DP rule 
the Turkish agriculture sector was modernized and supported in order to provide 
cheap grains and other agricultural products to Western Europe and the Western 
world. This policy prevented Turkey from industrializing rapidly and reduced the 
rate of its agriculture sector. Secondly, Turkey was transformed into a free-market 
country by the DP government and customs and tariffs were lowered. Laws 
protecting foreign capital -such as the Foreign Capital Incentive Law (Yabancı 
Sermayeyi Teşvik Yasası) and the Oil Law (Petrol Yasası) in 1954- were approved by 
the DP government. This brought the invasion of the Turkish market by American 
goods and companies and favored the USA more than Turkey. Thirdly, the loans and 
credits provided by the World Bank with American support were allocated to Turkey 
with the condition of making new purchases from the USA or supporting the private 
sector instead of making new investments by the state.175 Loan policies of the World 
Bank were used by the USA as an instrument to control Turkey’s political and 
economic destiny and Turkey was forced to become a country with huge debts and is 
reliant on the West. Industrialization and growth plans prepared by the government 
based on World Bank loans became unsuccessful and Turkish debts increased 
regularly. Turkey’s export rates did not increase contrary to its import rates. The 
Turkish economy was prepared as a related industry assisting American and 
European economies by providing them cheap raw material and an assembly 
industry.176 So, economically Turkey was designed as an assistant to the USA 
favoring American interests more than its own interests. In addition, Turkey had to 
face the risk of being a neighbor to the USSR and giving up its political 
independence.  
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Cem’s other point of criticism towards DP was the party’s oppressive policies 
towards the intellectuals and journalists, which played a significant role in 
legitimizing the 27 May 1960 military intervention.177 Cem thought that the most 
important reason for the 27 May was the discomfort of the bureaucracy which had 
lost its power and became subjected to heavy pressures during DP rule. Although in 
accordance with Kemalist principles, bureaucracy (including the Turkish Armed 
Forces) had previously accepted the supremacy of democracy and the rule of 
civilians, DP rule’s exclusion of the bureaucracy from the ruling coalition, its 
authoritarian practices that acquired legitimacy from the 1924 constitution and 
economic problems which emerged after inflationist policies created anger towards 
the DP.178 That is why bureaucratic institutions and intellectuals constituted the 
leading force behind the intervention.179 The new 1961 constitution had a 
“progressive character” and aimed at limiting the executive power and distributing 
power among bureaucratic-state institutions such as the National Security Council, 
Republican Senate, Constitutional Court, autonomous universities, State Planning 
Organization.180 Cem until the 1980s politically supported the 27 May intervention 
since he believed that in a country where civil democratic forces were still very 
weak, there was no other way than a progressive military intervention that could 
prevent a party dictatorship which aimed to close down the opposition party (RPP) 
and to establish its totalitarian rule.181 However, he also admitted that DP rule had 
some positive and progressive characteristics and that is why the majority or at least 
half of the people were content with DP rule.182 According to Cem, DP was 
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important because it brought modernity to the peripheries of the society and in a 
sense initiated the process of modernization and democratization in the periphery 
although the party established itself not against but instead in favor of sovereign 
segments of the society.183 Starting from the early 1980s, Cem’s look towards all 
military interventions including the progressive 27 May became negative and he 
adopted a totally civilian democratic stance against military interventions by using 
the term “pluralist democracy”184 and praising Turkish people’s common sense and 
tolerance in politics which goes beyond Turkish intellectuals’ macro ideals.185
3.5. On the Justice Party Period and the 12 March Regime
İsmail Cem thought that the Justice Party government was also a continuation 
of Turkish modernization and a successor to the Democrat Party which had shown 
some different characteristics due to the conditions of the Cold War and Turkey’s 
problematic strategic partnership with the USA after the “Johnson’s Letter”. 
According to Cem, both DP and JP governments’ class preferences were in favor of 
sovereign segments and that is why Turkish modernization also meant the 
strengthening of sovereign classes.186 Although the new 1961 constitution tried to 
limit the power of the executive in favor of the state, the “snowball effect” the 
segments that were against Westernization brought JP to the government as the 
successor of DP. The negative effects of the National Unity Committee rule and the 
psychological situation that emerged after the execution of Adnan Menderes were 
also other factors that increased JP’s votes in the 1961 elections compared to DP 
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votes in 1957 elections.187 Thus, the coalition between the bourgeoisie, local notables 
and bureaucracy was reestablished and continued to stay in power in the 1960s but 
this time with increasing power of the bureaucracy.
İsmail Cem thought that unlike DP, JP was very successful in making a leap 
forward concerning industrialization.188 JP governments, headed by Demirel, were 
able to employ a hundreds of thousands of rural to urban migrants by making rapid 
industrialization led by the state.189 According to Cem, JP and Demirel’s great 
electoral success during the 1960s was dependent on the successful industrialization 
and employment of people more than cultural or religious reasons.190 Although 
Demirel was recognized as a pro-liberal and pro-American politician within the 
country due to the influential propaganda of the left, Cem admitted that Demirel -
though he was not a socialist or a revolutionary protecting that rights of lower 
classes- implemented a planned growth economy and dared to reduce the profits of 
the bourgeoisie by bringing heavy taxes in some sectors such as construction, real 
estate and the assembly industry.191 He wrote, whether due to social developments or 
by its own economic perspective, the JP government implemented the most rational 
and clever economic model during the 1960s.192 However, the Turkish economy 
mostly stayed dependent on the USA and the Turkish bourgeoisie could not go 
beyond the assembly industry (montaj sanayii).193 JP and Demirel tried to make a 
new coalition between bureaucracy, bourgeoisie and local notables, but the 
emergence of the proletariat and socialist opposition forced Demirel to take workers 
into the partnership and disturb bourgeoisie and local notables in some aspects. Later 
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the discomfort of the bourgeoisie and local notables played the dominant role in the 
military interventions of 1971 and 1980.
Cem thought that JP had also played a “progressive role” in foreign policy 
since classical pro-Western foreign policy adopted after Atatürk’s death had to be 
revised during Demirel’s leadership due to external conditions and internal 
dynamics.194 That is why Demirel governments, deliberately or not, created a more 
independent foreign policy. Demirel’s Middle Eastern policy, such as not allowing 
American Forces to use military bases in Turkey in their operation against Lebanon, 
was progressive and not pro-American or pro-Israeli unlike DP’s foreign policy in 
Cem’s opinion.195 The JP government also tried to diversify Turkish foreign policy 
by developing economic cooperation with USSR and creating links with China.196
Cem, quoting İdris Küçükömer, claimed that the Demirel government, “in its search 
for a new balance by making new experiments, engaged in confrontations with 
imperialism in some areas”.197 In Cem’s view, due to Cold War conditions and 
Turkey’s dependency on the USA in many areas including military, economic, 
political and intelligence affairs, Demirel government’s independent policies took 
harsh reactions from the pro-Western and pro-capitalist privileged segments of the 
Turkish state and society and these events in a sense prepared a necessary ground for 
the memorandum given by the Turkish Armed Forces on 12 March 1971.
As a young intellectual and journalist of the 1970s, who witnessed the chaotic
atmosphere of Turkey of that period, İsmail Cem tried to make a socialistic and 
materialistic explanation of the 12 March memorandum in his long book Tarih 
Açısından 12 Mart (12 March in Terms of History) in detail. Cem’s perspective was 
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primarily based on class relations but he also reserved a large place for international 
relations (especially the role of the USA) due to the heavy conditions of the Cold 
War and the excessive power of the USA and USSR in the countries belonging to 
their respective own camps (members of NATO198 and the Warsaw Pact199). İsmail 
Cem, with confidence on his views based on the deterministic nature of dialectic 
materialism, explained the 12 March phenomenon from a socialist, class-based point 
of view and wrote that “that invisible hand of history was never apparent as it was in 
the case of 12 March”.200 Cem’s first deed when writing about the 12 March was to 
apologize to the Turkish youth who became intensively politicized and engaged in 
armed clashes due to the grand ambitions of elder generations. With humanist 
motives, Cem complained about the political violence that was caused by anti-
democratic and wrong calculations fed with grand ambitions and led to the death and 
imprisonment of thousands of young people (Cem probably referred to searches for 
leftist juntas here).201
In Cem’s view, the first and basic reason for “12 March fascism” was the 
Demirel government’s actions overshadowing the interests of the privileged 
bourgeois segments in the country. Cem pointed out that the democratic leap forward 
that Turkey had achieved due to the 1961 constitution which created a free 
environment where syndical activities and socialist views could develop within the 
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country. The democratic transformation of the left by giving up revolutionary 
Marxism, took democratic socialism to the governments in many parts of the world 
and that is why sovereign classes (bourgeoisie, landowners), by making a coalition 
with bureaucratic institutions, established fascist regimes overthrowing socialist 
governments in Brazil, Greece, Chile and Turkey.202 So, Cem thought that while 
petty bourgeois radicalism (such as the Yön movement) was criticizing the 
parliamentary regime and blaming it for being in the service of American 
imperialism and sovereign classes with their Aristotelian plain logic, it was not able 
to see that a coup or even a “progressive revolution” suspending the democratic 
regime would eventually end up being in the service of imperialism and would easily 
turn into fascism.203 Fascism, in Cem’s theory, was the alliance of sovereign classes 
and bureaucratic institutions in the case of rising leftist movements and the risk of 
losing their positions and thus, Cem never approved the suspension of democracy 
even for “progressive movements” since he thought that especially in a newly 
developing country like Turkey a revolution or a coup made by progressive aims 
could be a toy in the hands of imperialism and sovereign classes since it could easily 
face isolationism at the international level. 
For Cem, Turkey’s democratic transformation in the 1960s led to the 
strengthening of socialist views and eventually demands for collectivization, land 
reform and labor movements that frightened the bourgeoisie.204  Especially 
widespread worker demonstrations such as 15-16 June events in 1970 got 
bourgeoisie agitated and triggered its fears about a socialist take-over.205 The 
emergence of the Turkish Labor Party’s opposition in Turkey’s Grand National 
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Assembly, the “left of the center” transformation of RPP and the intellectual 
domination of statist-socialist views as well as demands and discussions about 
nationalization of strategic sectors increased Turkish bourgeoisie’s fears.206 In this 
situation, while some segments of the Kemalist-leftist opposition came up with 
“progressive ideas”, their search for adventurism and other ways than parliamentary 
democracy gave hope to the bourgeoisie that a fascist military regime could be 
established as a reaction to these movements by using their anti-democratic stances 
as pretext.207 The bourgeoisie saw its salvation thus not in democracy, but rather in 
the coup which would be the consequence of escalating political violence in order to 
protect its privileges that came under risk due to increasing socialist demands. So, the 
false and anti-democratic revolutionary spirit of that time, also evoked by some 
intelligence people of the period such as Mahir Kaynak208, was one of the most 
important bases of the coup.209 So, the first reason of 12 March was about the desire 
of the bourgeoisie not to lose its privileges in a country where socialist opposition
and collectivization-nationalization demands were on the rise.
The second important reason for 12 March was the USA and its influence on 
Turkey but it was also triggered from rising socialist opposition in the times of the 
Cold War. As it was mentioned earlier, Demirel government’s populist deeds 
sometimes contradicted the interests of the bourgeoisie and the USA and its lack of 
capacity in preventing the spread of socialist ideology were the other stimuli for the 
12 March fascism.210 The effort of monopolies and “Istanbulite capital” to protect 
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their advantaged position against rising Anatolian conservative entrepreneurs and 
firms was also an additional factor that led to the 12 March regime.211 The Turkish 
bourgeoisie was in favor of Turkey’s dependency on the USA and the Western bloc 
and was ready to give up democracy in order to preserve their wealth and privileged 
status. That is why Turkish elite supported a pro-American foreign policy which 
contradicted with the Demirel government’s search for autonomy and more 
independence in foreign policy within the conditions of the Cold War. 
3.6. The Turkish Left in the 1960s and 1970s
İsmail Cem, both as an observer and an active participant, analyzed Turkish 
leftist movements in the 1960s and the 1970s very closely.212 By the early 1970s, 
Cem thought that the Turkish left was divided into three main groups; Kemalist-
leftist circles, what Cem called “petty bourgeois radicals” (the Yön movement and 
the National Democratic Revolution front), the Republican People’s Party and social 
democratic circles and Marxist-socialist opposition (mainly Turkish Labor Party 
circles).213 Cem himself was closer to European socialism than Kemalist left or 
Chinese or Soviet versions of socialism but he was also skeptical and critical 
about the so-called Westernization process in Turkish history. His ideas in the 
1960s and early 1970s were at first closer to the TLP and then to Ecevit’s 
democratic left movement within the RPP.
To understand the conditions in which different leftist movements were 
established and evolved, one should first take into account the political climate of 
the time. Turkey in the 1960s was radically different from how it had been in the 
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1950s. Following the intervention of 27 May 1960, the decade was a period of 
rapid change for the country in many aspects. The intervention, as Türkkaya 
Ataöv claims, was “a revolution that shook but did not change Turkey’s political 
body”.214 According to Ataöv, at the beginning the coup aimed at putting an end 
to the increasingly oppressive Menderes government. Hovewer, it soon became a 
radical movement that changed the social and political atmosphere of the country. 
Although the 27 May coup aimed to restrict the political elite’s power by introducing 
checks and balances via some state institutions (e.g. the National Security Council, 
Constitutional Court, Senate), the 1961 constitution is often accepted as the most 
liberal constitution of Turkey considering its providence for extensive basic rights 
and liberties for individuals as well as for democratic actors including trade unions 
and other non-governmental organizations. The 1961 constitution also established 
the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) to revive the planned 
development model that was harmed during the 1950s under the rule of the DP.215
For many, the 1961 constitution had a liberal and democratic component, 
which had never been seen in Turkey. Under the new constitution the citizens 
enjoyed a remarkable degree of freedom. A wider spectrum of political activity 
was tolerated. The new regime was to assume a social, democratic and secular 
character.216 “Out of the new constitution’s 157 basic articles, 19 were devoted to 
social and economic rights and duties”.217 The constitution contained guarantees 
of freedom of thought, expression, association and publication as well as other 
individual rights and liberties. Citizens enjoyed more civil rights. The universities 
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215 İlhan Akdere and Zeynep Karadeniz. 1994. Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1. İstanbul: Evrensel 
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were guaranteed greater autonomy; students were given the freedom to organize 
their own associations. Trade unions were given the right to strike and engage in 
collective bargaining. The result of the liberal constitution was the increasing 
leftist politicization of the press and especially universities. That is why the 27 
May and 1961 constitution for a long time were welcomed by the Turkish left. 
Against the authoritarian rule of Menderes, nearly all socialist figures in the 
country including even the TKP (Turkish Communist Party) supported the 
coup.218 Moreover, for Behice Boran the coup gave the Turkish socialist 
movement an important opportunity to organize itself, disseminate its ideas and 
bring out its publications freely within a legal framework.219 However, some 
figures in the left, such as Mehmet Ali Aybar, were categorically against the 
coup.220
After the military intervention of 1960, in this kind of sociopolitical 
atmosphere, socialism appeared as one of the major ideological and political 
currents of thought and a progressive developmental model that could solve 
Turkey’s backwardness. Indeed, in the newly liberalized atmosphere that 
followed the intervention and the new constitution, one of the most interesting 
developments was the growth of radical groups.221 The involvement of these 
groups in domestic politics increased considerably as they were able to propagate 
their ideas and distribute their publications more freely. There were important 
international developments like the Vietnam War, Israeli aggression in the 
Middle East and the general anti-Americanism trend throughout the world. 
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Keynesian economics was also on the rise against the liberal economic theory.222
The involvement of these political groups (intelligentsia, students, unions, civil 
society organizations) in domestic politics increased considerably as they were 
able to propagate their ideas and distribute their publications freely. The 27 May 
coup was followed by the dismissal of 14 junior rank officers who carried out the 
coup, because of their anti-democratic ideas and their unwillingness to restore 
democracy.223 It should also be noted that socialism in the 1960s was understood 
and introduced primarily as an ideology and a technique of action designated to 
achieve rapid modernization and social justice. To reach these goals, socialism 
proposed “central planning based on state authority”.224
A-) Petty Bourgeois Radicalism (the Yön Movement and NDR groups)
Yön magazine was established in December 1961 by a group of leftist 
intellectuals. The first issue of Yön appeared on 20 December 1961 and its 
publication continued until 30 June 1967. Although there were intellectuals with 
different formulations of Socialism (There were Marxist pro-Soviet thinkers like 
Sadun Aren, Çetin Altan, Kemalist pro-military socialists like Doğan Avcıoğlu, 
Mihri Belli, social democrats like Mümtaz Soysal, ex-Kadroists like Şevket Süreyya 
Aydemir and liberal leftists like Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and Abdi İpekçi) all writers 
who wrote in the journal called themselves socialists. However, the main ideologue 
of the movement was Doğan Avcıoğlu who later became very famous with his book 
Türkiye’nin Düzeni (The System of Turkey).225 The Yön group was mainly 
comprised of intellectuals, bureaucrats and “patriotic” officers. Yön magazine and 
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its movement became very influential in the 1960s simultaneously with the 
establishment of the first socialist party in the country, the Turkish Labor Party. The 
same group of intellectuals also established “The Society of Socialist Culture 
(Sosyalist Kültür Derneği)” in those years. TLP leaders such as Behice Boran and 
Erdoğan Başar opposed the emergence of Yön and the Society of Socialist Culture. 
They thought that this would create a split among Turkish socialists.226 Yön typified 
the socialism of the 1960s in many respects. Yön writers claimed that they were 
against communism and that socialism was the “antidote of communism”227 but their 
writings strengthened communist movements in the country. The dominant ideology 
of the movement was the pro-Kemalist National Democratic Revolution thesis. This 
was mostly defended by Doğan Avcıoğlu228 and Mihri Belli in the journal. 
Yön’s ideological leader Doğan Avcıoğlu stated that there are basically three 
ways of development: the communist path, the capitalist American path and the 
statist-national revolutionary path. He argued that this third model which became 
very successful in Bulgaria, Romania and Central Asia, was the most appropriate 
development model for Turkey.229 Moreover, Avcıoğlu put forward an interesting 
idea about the relation between authoritarianism and democracy. He claimed that the 
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“Atatürk regime was more authoritarian than the Demirel regime but more 
democratic. There may exist both a multiparty dictatorship of capital, which is liberal 
in form but anti-democratic, and an outwardly authoritarian one-party democracy, 
which relies on the laboring masses. It is not the form that is important but the 
content”.230 Avcıoğlu and Mümtaz Soysal also criticized the parliamentarian regime 
for serving the interests of the bourgeois class. In order to realize the National 
Democratic Revolution, they did not trust the parliamentarian democracy like TLP. 
Rather, they trusted non-parliamentary forces by which they meant the “left-leaning 
section of the military and civilian intelligentsia, the trade unions, and the youth 
organizations”.231 For the Yön circle, the backward social and economic structures 
and conditions of the country would not allow the progressive forces to come to 
power by election. Yön writers called these non-parliamentary forces “dynamic 
forces (zinde kuvvetler)”232 which would bring a real Kemalist regime through a 
military coup or a revolution from above.233
Yön writers thought that achieving a classless society was possible by making 
a National Democratic Revolution. Doğan Avcıoğlu thought that “there are no 
serious grounds for suggesting that the Kemalist patriotic intelligentsia will not adopt 
the goals of the national liberation front”.234 While theorizing this united front, 
Avcıoğlu avoided making a class analysis.235 Doğan Avcıoğlu also differentiated the 
anti-imperialist Kemalist Turkish Army, which consisted of young men from 
impoverished and poor families, from the more professional armies of the Western 
countries which were established to protect the interest of the bourgeois class. 
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Moreover, Yön thinkers claimed that only these active, dynamic forces consisting of 
military, civilian and intellectual elites had the revolutionary tradition in Turkey.236
These ideas became very popular in the military, too. Colonel Talat Aydemir, 
influenced by the ideas defended in the Yön magazine, tried to make a “Kemalist 
Revolution” twice in 1962 and 1963 but failed to realize the coup. He was executed 
after his second trial. Yön was banned for a while after Aydemir’s second attempt to 
make a military intervention.237
Yön writers claimed that Turkey had won political independence under 
Atatürk’s rule but now needed economic independence. They also mentioned the 
necessity of making a land reform to end the dominant political status of landowners. 
Avcıoğlu tried to show how the land reform project could not be implemented in the 
single-party era and the Democrat Party used this issue to garner votes by taking 
support from local notables.238 Moreover, Avcıoğlu clearly mentioned his belief in 
the necessity of a planned economy and criticized the failure of the early statist 
(étatiste) economy.239 The Yön movement was also very critical of Marxist groups of 
their time. Avcıoğlu wrote “we believe that in the near future Turkey will move on to 
the socialist path of development. But the building of socialism requires a lengthy 
period of time. Therefore, instead of waving socialist slogans, it is necessary to work 
out a formula of a united front capable of attracting all forces capable of casting aside 
the obstacles on the way to socialism”.240 Yön thinkers did not only argue about the 
proletariat which they thought of as a small, newly flourishing class in their theory. 
They gave equal emphasis to the peasantry that constituted 75% of the population. 
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Avcıoğlu asserted that “the national liberation movement is possible only on the 
basis of a union of the working class and the peasants”.241 Yön writers also exalted 
Atatürk frequently as the founder of a politically independent Turkey. However, they 
added that the next mission -that was up to them- was to create an economically 
independent Turkey that was not realized by state and political elites after Atatürk’s 
death. They tried to mix Kemalist and Marxist elements and to formulate a theory 
very similar to the Kadro movement. They thought that Kemalism and socialism had 
something very important in common: statism.242 The Yön group advocated a non-
parliamentary strategy to seize political power similar to Baathist243 regimes in 
the Middle East. Imperialism, feudalism, and the big comprador bourgeoisie were 
identified as the main obstacles to establishing a “national democracy”. So, for 
the Yön movement, the main revolutionary task was to construct a national 
democratic front in which all anti-feudal, anti-imperialist forces would unite in 
order to carry out the national democratic revolution. Yön’s ideology was clearly 
eclectic since it had elements of Kemalism, Marxism, Maoism and social 
democracy. Faruk Alpkaya categorized the Yön movement as a part of “Leftist 
Kemalism (Sol Kemalizm)”, a unique ideology that became very influential in 
Turkey in the political and intellectual sphere in the 20th century.244
Another important aspect of the Yön movement was its categorization of 
progressive and reactionary, independent of the political nature of the regime 
(parliamentary or authoritarian regime) solely based on economic based class-
relations. Similar to the ideas of the Yön movement and the National Democratic 
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Revolution thesis, Cem during the 1970s thought that a parliamentary democratic 
regime did not necessarily mean a progressive order and even a “dictatorship 
could be progressive if it tries to eliminate class-based inequalities”.245 However, 
Cem -unlike Yön and the NDR type of leftism- never approved bureaucratic from 
top-down projects and always underlined the importance of taking ordinary 
people’s support within a democratic structure. He believed that a progressive 
government that would eliminate inequalities and increase freedoms was indeed 
possible within the democratic parliamentary regime and in that sense tried to 
make peace between the Marxist movement and liberal democracy in Turkey 
similar to what Eduard Bernstein246 did in Germany. In that sense, Cem was able 
to see that the pluralist democracy model in Western democracies was the product 
of the opposition of the proletariat against the limited liberal democracy of the 
bourgeois class and was the best regime for defending the rights of the working 
classes.247
As a defender of democratic socialism similar to socialist parties in Europe 
at that time (the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and French Socialist 
Party), İsmail Cem never became too close to the Yön movement but he also 
admitted that Yön and Devrim magazines, published by Doğan Avcıoğlu, were 
very beneficial in the recognition and promotion of leftist views in Turkey.248
Similarly, after Avcıoğlu’s death Cem wrote an article about Doğan Avcıoğlu and 
praised him as one of vanguards of the socialist movement in Turkey although he 
expressed that his methods were controversial.249 These controversial methods were 
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about a military coup which would be undertaken by the progressive intelligentsia 
and officers and that would change the society from top to bottom. Cem never 
approved Avcıoğlu and the Yön movement’s strategy of an alliance between the 
working masses and progressive state bureaucracy that would topple the 
government by a military coup.250 In his view, leftist “adventurism (maceracılık)” 
(seeking a leftist junta or guerilla movement) was used as pretext for military 
intervention in the past and in that sense helped rightist groups.251 İsmail Cem 
thought that the 12 March experience taught a lot to the Turkish left and primarily 
taught how to distinguish petty bourgeois radicalism from real socialism.252 Cem 
was very harsh and sentimental in criticizing people who defended these views 
since he claimed that these people had sent young university students to death 
with the aim of realizing their own dreams.253
İsmail Cem’s criticisms were very meaningful since after the dissolution 
of the leftist 9 March junta of Doğan Avcıoğlu and the declaration of the rightist 
12 March memorandum, many Turkish university students who believed in the 
socialist take-over of the military, initiated guerilla movements both in cities and 
rural parts of the country and eventually were killed by the police or soldiers. 
These young people, including Deniz Gezmiş254, Mahir Çayan255, İbrahim 
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Kaypakkaya256 and many others, were labeled as defenders of the MDD (Milli 
Demokratik Devrim-National Democratic Revolution) thesis. The National 
Democratic Revolution (NDR) movement was an important leftist fraction of the 
Turkish left of the 1960s. This radical current formed itself first around the journal 
called, Türk Solu (Turkish Left).257 The leading writer of the journal was Mihri Belli, 
a former member of the Turkish Communist Party and then member of the TLP. He 
was the leading ideologue of the NDR strategy. Under his leadership, the NDR 
movement became one of the most significant socialist factions in Turkey. Belli and 
NDR members made great efforts to spread their ideology within TLP, but especially 
after the take-over of Sadun Aren- Behice Boran group in TLP, they were separated 
from the party. There were some other important writers in the NDR movement such 
as Ahmet Say, Muzaffer Erdost, Vahap Erdoğdu and Muvaffak Şeref. NDR was 
ideologically close to the Yön movement but they implemented the strategy of 
guerilla warfare and found followers especially among university students. 
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Supporters of NDR believed that in a backward country like Turkey, the main 
struggle would be against imperialism and feudalism. Since the proletariat was too 
weak as a class, revolutionary change could only be carried out by a broad national 
front of all the exploited social classes and groups, including intellectuals, officers 
and the national bourgeoisie. This revolution directed against landowners and 
compradors would be of a national and democratic character, not a socialist one. 
NDR had an eclectic ideology which “amalgamated Kemalism and Maoism”.258
NDR’s main enemy was the comprador bourgeoisie that acted against the national 
interests of the country.259
NDR took its roots from Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu (Federation of Idea 
Clubs), socialist university clubs established after 27 May and backed by the TLP. 
However, in the late 1960s, the Federation changed not only its name but also the 
very character of its political perspective. In the autumn of 1969, the Türkiye
Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu (Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey), 
shortly known as Dev-Genç, was established, as the ideological and political 
platform of NDR. From 1970 onwards, the youth groups around Dev-Genç decided 
to establish their own independent political organizations with their own student 
leaders and initiated an armed guerrilla struggle. Especially after the 12 March 
memorandum and rising violence against the leftist groups by police and ultra-
nationalist militants, student leaders from Dev-Genç established their own illegal 
groups to start an armed struggle against their enemies. NDR gained much strength 
and popularity after the dissolution of the 9 March junta and the declaration of the 12 
March regime since young students realized that they did not have a chance to make 
a revolution with the help of the military.
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As Cem criticized, both Yön and NDR’s ideas directed young people to 
engage in revolutionary dreams instead of democratic electoral successes, and in that 
sense sent them to death. Cem never approved of these violence-based strategies and 
he also did not recognize them as real socialist movements. In Cem’s thinking, these 
movements (NDR fractions and Yön movement) were based on a romantic bourgeois 
nationalism mixed up with Marxist-Leninist anti-imperialist ideology but were far 
from making healthy class-based analyses of the country.260 According to Cem, a 
real socialist movement had to be defended within democracy and with non-violent 
methods by taking the support of the people instead of thinking for the people.261
Cem also asserted that these romantic revolutionary movements and youth idealism 
prepared a convenient environment and a strong pretext for capital owners and 
sovereign segments of the country for an authoritarian regime that would end up in 
armed clashes in favor of privileged groups.262 In that sense, he underlined that 
student activism and idealism became an instrument for the plotters and organizers of 
the coup.263 However, Cem also felt sorry for the young, brave and idealist children 
of the country who were misdirected by leftist ideologues and died horribly because 
of their idealism and patriotism.264 For Cem, blaming these children of Turkey was 
the easiest thing to do in order to ignore the country’s own mistakes. Cem’s negative 
approach to leftist adventurism and his insistence on democratic methods never 
changed and he always criticized and blamed these figures for preventing a real 
democracy from developing in Turkey.265
B-) Turkish Labor Party and Marxist circles
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İsmail Cem thought that the failures of the Yön movement and NDR 
adventurism showed that he and many other figures on the left including İdris 
Küçükömer, Mehmet Ali Aybar were right in promoting the democratic socialist 
stance of the Turkish Labor Party. In Cem’s view there were three main events 
that shaped the Turkish left in the 1970s; 12 March, the social democratic 
transformation of RPP and oppressive National Front governments.266 After 12 
March, due to the promotion of Islamist-nationalist liberalism by the state and the 
emergence of National Front governments and thanks to the earlier democratic 
socialist legacy of TLP, RPP had to adopt a social democratic stance that was also 
strongly supported by the Turkish people. In Cem’s view, RPP’s success was 
based on TLP’s ideology and legacy which he supported strongly starting from 
the mid 1960s.
In this political context mentioned before, the Turkish Labor Party was 
established by 40-50 unionists including İbrahim Güzelce, Kemal Türkler, Kemal 
Nebioğlu, Şaban Yıldız and Nuri Beşer on 14 February 1961.267 TLP presented its 
ideology as the next step of Kemalism by preventing direct conflict with the 
official ideology.268 TLP also presented itself as totally committed to the 
parliamentary system as a reformist, European type socialist party. Mehmet Ali 
Aybar expressed clearly that TLP was against the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and was committed to democratic principles.269 Aybar was defining their ideology 
as “güleryüzlü sosyalizm (socialism with a smiling face)”.270 The distinguishing 
feature of the TLP, from its contemporary socialist movements like NDR and 
Yön, was its insistence on parliamentary methods. From its foundation, the 
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official policy of the party was to take power by parliamentary means within the 
legal framework. In various sections of the party program, it was stressed that the 
party would follow democratic ways and would respect the constitution. The 
leader of the party, Aybar, clearly supported the view of the need for the 
constitutional and parliamentary struggle in order to take power. He claimed that 
the new constitution was “open to socialism”. 
For advocates of the TLP, the main task of the Turkish socialists was not a 
national democratic revolution but a socialist revolution which, of course, would 
be carried out by democratic means. And proponents of the party gave the leading 
role in the revolutionary movement to the Turkish working class. They did not 
accept the view held by Yön and the NDR circles that the proletariat of the 
country was politically immature. However, TLP’s linkage to the working class 
was very weak. TLP defines its program as a “non-capitalist path of 
development”.271 One of its major concerns was the private sector. It was stated 
that the private sector would be permitted only as a secondary measure and 
maintained in a supplementary role to the state sector.272 As such, statism 
(étatisme) was one of the main elements of the TLP’s program. The state sector 
should play a chief and leading role in the development of the national economy. 
Another important element was planning. The TLP envisaged centralized 
planning for all sectors in the economy, including the private sector; and the 
nationalization of all foreign companies, foreign trade, banks, credit houses, 
insurance companies, several transport enterprises and major means of production 
and industrial enterprises. Another important aspect of the program was its 
emphasis on the land problem. TLP demanded that land ownership should be 
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limited and that large agricultural lands should be distributed to landless and poor 
peasants. In this way, they emphasized the importance of completing the Kemalist 
revolution by making land reform. TLP also had an anti-imperialist character. It 
proposed a more independent, peaceful foreign policy and friendly relations with 
Turkey’s neighbors in parallel with Atatürk’s “Peace at home, peace in the 
world” principle. Moreover, TLP was conservative about the Kurdish problem. 
Although TLP was often accused by Süleyman Demirel and other Justice Party 
members of encouraging Kurdish secessionism, in fact, TLP considered the 
Kurdish question as a regional economic backwardness problem and did not have 
a secessionist character.273 TLP also offered a new taxation system (progressive 
taxation) which would favor the poor.
On 17 November 1963, the TLP participated in municipal elections. 
Despite all efforts, however, it received nearly 40.000 votes. But after the 1963 
elections especially rural people and workers’ interest in TLP increased.274 The 
most important party event was the parliamentary elections held on 10 October 
1965.  The participation of TLP changed the very character of the 1965 election 
campaign and the nature of Turkish politics. TLP unexpectedly received 276.101 
votes (2.83 percent of the total votes) and won fifteen seats in the parliament. The 
existence of TLP in the parliament led to serious discussions within the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly and even the Justice Party deputies’ physical abuses to 
the TLP deputy and famous journalist Çetin Altan.275 Plausibly, the shift of RPP 
from center to the “left of the center” was realized due to TLP’s successful 
opposition. 
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Although TLP made a very good start, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in August 1968 deepened and accelerated the political and ideological rifts within the 
party leadership. Aybar spoke out against the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. 
His protest against the invasion also gave him the chance to express his 
understanding of socialism.276 He clearly advocated a non-authoritarian, democratic 
socialism similar to Euro-communism. Aybar was severely criticized by the other 
party leaders, like Behice Boran and Sadun Aren, of adopting new theories on 
socialism. The disagreements between the party leadership continued in the 1968 
congress. During the debates on Aybar’s theory, three factions emerged, the Aybar 
group, the Aren-Boran group, and the NDR group. This congress marked a turning 
point in the party’s political life, raising the alarm for an upcoming crisis in the party. 
These struggles between the factions lead to a decline in the party’s political activity, 
seen clearly in the 1969 general elections during which the TLP only received 
243.631 votes (2.58 % of the total votes) and won only two seats in the parliament. 
Aybar was held responsible for the failure of the party in the 1969 elections and he 
declared his resignation from the position of party leader. After the 12 March 
memorandum, on 20 July 1971 TLP was closed down and most of the party leaders 
were arrested. 
İsmail Cem did not hide his sympathy for the democratic socialist stance of 
TLP in his articles and books starting from the late 1960s. However, he also did not 
hesitate to criticize TLP. First of all, he claimed that Turkish intellectuals were not 
aware of Anatolian people’s problems since they did not previously enter into the 
field and stayed only in their corners.277 TLP was the product of Turkish 
intellectuals’ first real encounter with the Anatolian people. However, according to 
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Cem, TLP’s ideological basis was weak considering the weakness of the proletariat 
in the country but the excessive role given to the proletariat in the party programme 
and ideology.278 Moreover, in his view some people’s personal reputation and weight 
became heavier than the party itself and this was a sign of the party’s weak 
ideological stance.279 Concerning the struggle within the party, Cem stayed closer to 
Mehmet Ali Aybar and socialism with a smiling face. He wrote harshly against the 
USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia and claimed that socialism with a smiling face 
was about humanism of the left that was absent in the Soviet or Chinese model280 and 
did not support the resignation of Aybar from party leadership.281 For him, the TLP’s 
lack of success was not related to leadership, but rather related to the weak 
ideological and organizational structure of the party. 
Cem thought that due to the immature nature of the Turkish proletariat, TLP 
had to be primarily based on intellectuals and this caused increasing individualistic 
attitudes instead of ideological and class-based attitudes within the party.282 Cem also 
wrote that TLP’s strong opposition within the parliament forced the Demirel 
government to follow a more independent foreign policy and to adopt improved 
social policies and also triggered RPP’s social democratic transformation.283
Moreover, TLP was challenging the classical bureaucratic and anti-Marxist socialist 
approaches of the Yön movement that were very popular in the 1960s within the 
Turkish intelligentsia.284 Cem, in the early 1970s, advised the Turkish left to 
reorganize itself in accordance with the 1961 constitution, which in his view was 
open to a socialist government, by taking lessons from the failures of Yön and NDR, 
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and to establish a proletariat-based socialist party, a real working class party instead 
of an intellectual-based party like TLP by eliminating social democratic stances and 
petty bourgeois adventurism.285 Cem’s sympathy for TLP was primarily and most 
importantly caused by his belief in democracy and democratic methods instead of
militarism (Yön’s utopia of leftist junta) or guerilla warfare (NDR thesis). 
C-) The Republican People’s Party and social democratic circles
Cem’s close stance to TLP began to change after the banning of this party and 
the transformation of RPP into a social democratic party under the leadership of 
Bülent Ecevit after the 12 March memorandum. Cem interpreted the 12 March from 
a class-based perspective and labeled the so-called “Atatürkist” technocratic 
government of the 12 March for being on the verge of fascism.286 Cem’s 
opposition to the 12 March’s technocratic government backed up by the military 
under the Prime Ministry of RPP Deputy Nihat Erim, made him a star in the 
media and on the left similar to the young secretary general of RPP, Bülent 
Ecevit.287 Ecevit also criticized İsmet İnönü for supporting the technocratic 
government dictated by the military. Although Cem always showed his respect 
towards İsmet İnönü and praised him for being the champion of democratic 
transition he was very critical of İnönü’s calm and neutral stance about 12 
March.288 Ecevit and Cem’s rise was accelerated after their democratic stance and 
combative rhetoric against the military memorandum. Both fought to transform 
the RPP from the state’s party into a people’s party under the guidance of social 
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democratic principles.289 In their view, 12 March was the consequence of the 
Demirel government’s orientation towards a multi-dimensional international 
policy after problems that occurred with the USA. Their rhetoric was anti-
imperialist, in favor of state-led economic development and more equal allocation 
and distribution of the state’s resources. On 14 May 1972, the young and 
charismatic Bülent Ecevit succeeded the impossible and became the third 
secretary-general of RPP after Atatürk and İnönü by defeating İsmet İnönü at the 
Congress.290 RPP was renewing and reforming itself and Cem came closer to the 
new social democratic RPP. 
Ayşe Güneş Ayata claimed that RPP’s social democratic transformation 
started in 1957 with the Declaration of Primary Goals (İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi) 
which in fact constituted the basis of the libertarian 1961 constitution.291 For 
Ayata, the left of the center was based on some institutional reforms that the party 
proposed such as collective bargaining and striking rights, associational 
freedoms, a planned economy and a social welfare state.292 A further search for 
new ideas was initiated by the intellectual circles around the party magazine 
Özgür İnsan (Free Man). Özgür İnsan was published 15 days after Ecevit’s 
election as the party’s leader. Ecevit was the editorial writer of the magazine and 
different intellectuals within and around the party published there.293 According 
to Günay, the magazine’s ideology was shaped by Ecevit and its reformist stance 
was close to İdris Küçükömer.294 The new, young and dynamic group of 
intellectuals around Ecevit also pointed out the growing working class population 
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and poor living conditions on the periphery of big cities as a determining factor of 
elections and was tried to shape RPP’s new economic program.295
According to Cem, the key to change in RPP was to criticize the single-party 
period and authoritarian and bureaucratic tendencies of the party which had been 
preventing the party from embracing people. This may not mean necessarily the 
negation of the past and ignorance of the positive aspects of the single-party period, 
but it should contain self-criticism.296 Cem thought that the socialist opposition of 
TLP in the 1960s heavily affected RPP’s classical electoral basis that consisted of 
civil servants and educated town people (petty bourgeois) and in this context, RPP 
had to accept its “left of the center” identity.297 According to Özkan Ağtaş, İnönü’s 
“left of the center” preference was related to building a barrier against the rapidly 
rising communist and anti-communist movements and also to establishing a social 
welfare state in order to satisfy the needs of millions of rural to urban migrants that 
had begun to work in big cities as blue-collar workers.298 Cem wrote that, at the 
beginning, the content of this identity was not clear, but young and dynamic 
secretary-general of RPP, Bülent Ecevit, had many brilliant ideas about getting closer 
with people and filling up the content of the left of the center.299 Ecevit knew that left 
of the center meant the transformation of the party and that is why he wrote a booklet 
called Ortanın Solu (left of the center) in 1966. In this book, Ecevit defined left of 
the center as a kind of humanist political consciousness and act based on social relief 
and charity.300 He praised the single-party period of RPP for providing the 
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independence of the country, but claimed that now it was time for developing the 
economic conditions of people in accordance with social democratic principles.301
According to Ecevit, the main principles of the left of center were individual and 
societal freedom (independence), freedom of opinion, humanism, revolutionary spirit 
against the conservative right, democratic stance against the extreme left and social 
democratic solutions for class-based inequalities.302 Ecevit was perhaps not a 
theoretical genius and his political ideology was largely shaped by mystic poets and 
heroic and libertarian characters of novels rather than social democratic and Marxist 
theoreticians303, but his ideas were simple, clear and gave hope to many Turkish 
people.
İsmail Cem believed that Ecevit’s rapprochement with working classes 
created problems in the party especially among the classical petty bourgeois, 
bureaucratic and local notable supporters of the party and from the mid 1960s, a 
power struggle between the old, pro-İnönü RPP and young, pro-Ecevit RPP 
started.304 In Cem’s view, this changing and new RPP was not anymore a reliable 
partner for the privileged segments and bureaucratic institutions that were committed 
to Westernization.305 The time for a final struggle between the two groups within the 
party came after the 12 March memorandum. Cem claimed that although both İnönü 
and Ecevit were against the 12 March memorandum and military’s intervention in 
politics in general, İnönü’s soft criticism towards 12 March as a responsible 
statesman and his style of politics based on compromise was highly different and less 
popular than Ecevit’s passionate rhetoric and determinant stance against military 
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intervention.306 That is why, for Cem, Ecevit’s victory over legendary İsmet Pasha in 
the RPP Congress of 1972 was not a surprise, but rather historically inevitable.307
After Ecevit’s take over, the formula of “Turkish Armed Forces plus RPP equals to 
government (TAF + RPP = government)” was not feasible anymore.308
As far as İsmail Cem was concerned, Ecevit’s new RPP continued to make 
openings toward the left by revising its populism (halkçılık) principle.309 Ecevit and 
social democrats tried to concretize their populism by defending further 
democratization for the country and increasing individual freedoms. This meant the 
negation of classical bureaucratic ideas of the party and their replacement with 
democratic, populist ideas.310 RPP in that sense was opening a new chapter and 
accepting that there should be no other source of legitimacy than electoral success 
(people’s support). Cem praised RPP for developing democratic principles not only 
ideologically for the country, but also practically within the party by establishing a 
strong and democratic organization.311 According to İsmail Cem, the new RPP’s 
class preference was also different from the previous RPP. Ecevit’s RPP was 
inclining to get votes from working classes, peasants, poor segments of the society in 
addition to its classical voter segments including the bureaucracy and petty bourgeois 
class and was not trying to look sympathetic to bureaucratic institutions and 
bourgeois segments anymore.312 Cem observed that starting from the early 1970s this 
transformation also appealed to Islamist-conservative people and in that sense, 
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prepared a convenient ground for RPP-NSP coalition.313 Cem thought that RPP’s 
electoral success in 1973 and 1977 elections were based on the party’s successful 
ideological transformation and its careful attitude of not excluding people. In other 
words, Ecevit’s RPP was responding to the new identities, belongings and needs of 
the people that became apparent after Turkey’s rapid modernization and 
urbanization.314 Left of the center was not enough for this grand metamorphosis, 
which is why after Ecevit’s leadership RPP began to use the term “democratic left 
(demokratik sol)” instead of left of the center.
İsmail Cem made an interview with Ecevit in 1975 for Politika newspaper  in 
order to substantiate the basic principles of the movement and published a booklet 
entitled Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar (Main Concepts and 
Problems on the Democratic Left). In the interview, Ecevit and Cem discussed the 
meaning of “halk (people)” and “halkçılık (populism)” and they stated that populism 
should be based on the protection of the interests of people who do not have a means 
of production or have small properties (small landowning peasants).315 According to 
Ecevit, people who see themselves as parts of a privileged group could not be a part 
of “halk” and populism.316 In accordance with his populism, Ecevit thought that 
bureaucrats and state officials could not act superciliously against people as in the 
times of the single-party period and as the regime became more democratic, their 
attitudes would also become more democratic.317 For Ecevit, the main task of the 
democratic left movement was to create an environment of equal opportunity for 
everybody.318 This could be achieved only through creating a party of people from 
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the old party of the state. Against accusations of being communist, Ecevit confessed 
to Cem that he was using Marxist analyses in order to understand history and society, 
but he was not a Marxist.319 Ecevit underlined that his style of leftist politics was 
democratic and libertarian whereas many other leftist-Marxist movements were not 
democratic at all.320 He also stated that his insistence on the term “democratic left” 
was caused by the close relationship between social democracy and Marxism.321
Ecevit also explained to Cem his economic model based on urban villages 
(köykent)322 and the public sector (halk sektörü)323.
İsmail Cem actively supported the social democratic transformation of the 
RPP and wrote that RPP’s electoral successes in 1973 and 1977 were caused by this 
transformation. Cem also made a correct guess before the 1977 elections and claimed 
that RPP would receive more than 40 % of the votes.324 In Cem’s idea, the core of 
the democratic left movement was industrialization, urbanization and 
democratization of Turkey.325 In his view, the democratization task was substantiated 
in the party’s 1976 program and it sought increasing political participation and
increasing freedom of thought and expression for all segments of the society.326
However, in his view RPP was lacking this democratization task within the party due 
to intra-party problems related to the strong leadership and factional struggles.327
Cem knew that leaving the legacy of bureaucratic-rationalist RPP (the classical role 
of petty bourgeoisie in the party) and accepting full-scale social democratic 
principles was not an easy task for RPP because of the weakness of social democratic 
                                                
319 İsmail Cem, Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar, p. 28.
320 ibid., p. 51.
321 ibid., p. 52.
322 ibid., pp. 60-69.
323 ibid., pp. 73-77.
324 İsmail Cem, Siyaset Yazıları: 1975-1980 Türkiyesi, p. 72.
325 İsmail Cem, Sol’daki Arayış, p. 34.
326 ibid., p. 35.
327 ibid., p. 36.
  
 
157
tradition in Turkey, but this could be achieved since social democracy is a 
conciliatory ideology.328 Cem thought that the new RPP could embrace whole 
segments of the society but the party should draw a leftist and rightist border. The 
rightist border of the party should be based on defending the interest of working 
classes against monopolies and monopolistic capital, whereas the leftist border of the 
party should be based on accepting democracy.329
In accordance with his social democratic worldview, he thought that RPP, as 
a social democratic party, should have internal dynamism and intra-party democracy 
which would allow the party not to break off from social dynamism.330 He foresaw 
that the Turkish bourgeoisie and privileged groups in the country would try to direct 
RPP toward liberalism, but RPP should resist these groups if it would contradict with 
its social democratic principles.331 Cem also thought that in order to break the effect 
of the petty bourgeoisie within the party, RPP should develop its links with workers 
and unions.332 Cem knew that RPP’s biggest disadvantage was the unhealthy 
Westernization history of the Turkish Republic, which had always favored particular 
groups in society and due to an increasing economic gap between privileged groups 
and ordinary people Turkish people supported rightist parties that were against the 
RPP.333 That is why he wanted RPP to become a social democratic party closer to 
ordinary people and thought that this would correct the historical conditioning of 
people not supporting RPP because of cultural and lifestyle differences.334 He knew 
that this could be only achieved by getting rid of the “ignorant people” rhetoric and 
trying to work for the people within the society. Cem was also critical of the RPP’s 
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program and organization in the 1970s and thought that organization was the most 
important aspect for a social democratic party.335 Another problematic aspect of RPP 
in Cem’s idea was the lack of intraparty democracy that prevented the flourishing of 
new and better ideas.336 Another important aspect of RPP’s leftism in the 1970s was 
its populist character that gained popularity among the people. Although Cem had 
always prevailed among the working class and in that sense seemed anti-populist and 
closer to proletarian Marxism, he supported Ecevit’s populist rhetoric that was full of 
anti-Marxist arguments.337
3.7. Eastern Socialism and Asiatic Mode of Production Discussions 
İsmail Cem, with his peculiar critical stance against the classical bureaucratic 
leftism of Turkey, gained popularity both on the left and the right. This was also 
caused by Cem’s effort to create an original Marxist interpretation and model for 
Eastern countries and Turkey. Cem, by studying Ottoman history, understood the 
historical differences between Turkey and European countries and knew that 
classical Marxist theses could not be applicable to Turkey and other Eastern 
societies. In fact, Marxist theory in its orthodox form preached that a well-developed 
capitalist economy was an essential prerequisite for socialism. However, Eastern 
societies were mostly agrarian and their social structure was very different from 
developed Western bourgeois societies. Thus, socialists from non-Western countries 
(Turkey, China, Arab countries, Latin American countries) had to realize this basic 
reality and try to find a new way to interpret Marxism in their own country. What 
were called “Third World socialism” and “Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP or 
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Asya Tipi Üretim Tarzı-ATÜT in Turkish)” discussions emerged from this necessity 
and became very influential in the academic and political world in the 1960s and 
1970s. Due to the Kemalist legacy, which could be interpreted as a pioneer ideology 
for Third World socialism in some aspects, Asiatic Mode of Production discussions 
became very influential in Turkey in the 1960’s and 1970’s.
The Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) discussions became popular in the 
world after the publication of Karl Wittfogel’s338 concept of Oriental Despotism.339
In the political sphere, the existence of China and the popularity of Maoism were 
also important factors that fanned this discussion. In Turkey, AMP discussions 
became noticeable in the late 1960s with the works of Turkish economist Sencer 
Divitçioğlu (Asiatic Mode of Production and Ottoman Society-Asya Üretim Tarzı ve 
Osmanlı Toplumu was Divitçioğlu’s first important book that was published in 
1967), İdris Küçükömer (Alienation of the System-Düzenin Yabancılaşması was 
Küçükömer’s most popular work that was first published in 1969) and with the 
novels of Kemal Tahir (Tahir’s two important novels Devlet Ana-Mother State and 
Yorgun Savaşçı-Tired Warrior that were published in 1967 focused on the 
differences of Ottoman-Turkish social structure).340 Intellectuals like Divitçioğlu, 
Küçükömer and Tahir believed that rightist-liberal parties in Turkey (Democrat 
Party, Justice Party tradition) were in fact real political parties of the Turkish people 
unlike the Turkish bureaucracy’s political party RPP and they were more leftist and 
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populist in their essence.341 According to these intellectuals, due to its statist-
bureaucratic stance, RPP was more of a rightist party but for cultural reasons the 
perception of the people was the opposite in Turkey. Doğan Avcıoğlu and some 
writers of the Yön movement also underlined Turkish exceptionalism and the 
importance of Asiatic Mode of Production discussions but their political and 
ideological programme was completely different from other AMP writers.342 İsmail 
Cem while forming his theory, was also largely affected by this discussion similar to 
all intellectuals of that period. AMP discussions focused on the uniqueness and 
exception of Turkish society compared to European societies and were based on a 
critical approach towards Westernization.  
İsmail Cem’s view related to the Ottoman land system resembled 
Divitçioğlu’s analysis343 since they were both praising the Ottoman State from the 
left because of its anti-feudal and anti-exploitative characteristic in the past. This 
understanding also coincided with Kemal Tahir’s notion of a generous mother state 
(Kerim Devlet, Devlet Ana) that was expressed in his novels.344 Although Tahir was 
only a novelist, according to Kayalı the most accurate class-based analyses of 
Ottoman society were made in Tahir’s novels.345 Later in the 1970s, AMP 
discussions became very popular and new scientific researches were made in Turkey. 
For instance, Çağlar Keyder analyzed the Ottoman land system in a more 
systematized way and claimed that until the 17th century, the Ottoman State was a 
typical representative of AMP and starting from the 17th century its feudal aspects 
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began to increase.346 AMP referred to a statist and anti-feudal system but some 
writers’ exaggerated appraisal of AMP as an egalitarian socialist system, later was
heavily criticized by leftist intellectuals like Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay. Kılıçbay pointed 
out that the relatively low exploitation of the Ottoman peasantry did not change the 
Ottoman State’s despotic character.347 Şerif Mardin also, starting from the 1970s, 
made in depth analyses of Ottoman society and supported the AMP thesis while 
criticizing the center-periphery cleavage of Ottoman-Turkish society.348
AMP discussions influenced Cem especially through the works of Kemal 
Tahir and İdris Küçükömer. Kemal Tahir was a unique figure in the Turkish left with 
his admiration of the Ottoman system and novelist identity. İsmail Cem’s devotion to 
Kemal Tahir was a determining factor in his political stance.349 In fact, Cem was near 
Kemal Tahir a day before his death in 1973 in Mehmet Barlas’ house for a meeting 
among some intellectuals of the period including Mete Tunçay, Ali Sirmen and Afşin 
Germen.350 After his death, Cem in his article defined Kemal Tahir as the man who 
first confronted Turkey with its past.351 Kemal Tahir had always been a controversial 
figure on the left because of his sympathetic and curious look towards Ottoman 
society and especially towards village. As a writer and a political activist, Tahir saw 
a contradiction between the socio-cultural and political structure of Turkey and 
solutions that Marxism offered. Because of his belief that Westernization was not 
suited for Turkish society, he began to find Marxism to be also inefficient. Marxist 
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historical theory was based on existence of a bourgeois class but there was no such 
class in Ottoman-Turkish history. So, Tahir began to search for alternative 
development models. Because of the Turkish left’s nourishment from Kemalist 
tradition and urban intellectuals, Tahir’s ideological positioning created problems in 
the left.352 Kemal Tahir at first focused on problems of peasants in his novels. Then, 
he dealt with Turkish history, especially events of recent history. In his novel Devlet 
Ana (Mother State) he described governmental and social structure of Ottoman 
society at its beginnings. Tahir was courageous enough to question trials after İzmir 
assassination353 in his novel Kurt Kanunu (Law of Wolf), which were in fact the 
disposal of ex-Unionist staff and to analyze the closure of Free Party in his novel Yol 
Ayrımı (Turnout).354
İdris Küçükömer was the other important name that gained a place in AMP 
discussions and contributed to the evolution of İsmail Cem’s ideas. Küçükömer was 
defending revolution from below and was very critical of the state’s dominant role in 
Turkish modernization. Küçükömer also approached pious Anatolian people with 
sympathy. His most influential work was Düzenin Yabancılaşması (Alienation of the 
System). Küçükömer was a member of Turkish Labor Party but his ideas were very 
different from the party’s overall socialist stance.355 Küçükömer’s ideas began to be 
influential especially before and during the RPP-NSP coalition in the early 1970’s. 
He claimed that history necessitated such a coalition and political Islam was kind of 
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a metaphysical reaction of suppressed classes.356 İsmail Cem also saw the growing 
Islamic movement in the 1970s as a “metaphysical reaction of suppressed 
masses”.357 For Küçükömer, the superstructural clash in Turkey was between secular 
and Islamist groups, but the real structural clash was between the capital owners-
bureaucratic oligarchy coalition and ordinary people.358 Although he was presented 
as supporting rightist-liberal parties because of his criticism towards bureaucratic 
tendencies in RPP, he was in fact defending a social democratic or democratic 
socialist programme in TLP, RPP and later in SDPP.359 While he was defending 
populism and civil society against statism, he was also a hardliner anti-imperialist.360
Küçükömer was extremely critical of the Union and Progress and Republican 
People’s Party tradition and thought that the bureaucratic segment in Ottoman-
Turkish political history had always been alienated from the people.361 Küçükömer, 
similar to Cem, analyzed Ottoman social structure and concluded that Ottomans had 
never become feudal or capitalist like Western countries.362 In that sense, he was 
using AMP to explain Ottoman stagnation and claiming that the real revolutionary 
segment of Turkey was Islamist populist segments against Unionists and 
Kemalists.363
İsmail Cem’s perception of the left was largely influenced by AMP 
discussions in addition to the classical Kemalist and Marxist theses. Although Cem 
defended Western type socialism against Soviet and Chinese models, praised state-
led economic development and advocated a modern democratic lifestyle, he was 
critical of Turkish modernization’s statist and top-to-down character. Similar to 
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Küçükömer, Divitçioğlu and Tahir, he wanted pious Anatolian people to make peace 
with the state and thus he supported Ecevit in his efforts to transform RPP into a 
populist party. In that sense, Cem’s understanding of secularism was not hard as 
classical Kemalist-leftist stance (This will be explained in detail in the fifth chapter).  
Cem was very well aware of Turkey’s difference from Western countries and he 
thought that Turkey should be industrialized, modernized, urbanized and 
democratized in its unique way based on economic statism (socialism) and in this 
way it would reach contemporary Western civilization. However, Cem starting from 
the 1980s began to claim that Turkish socioeconomic structure was not very different 
from European states and thus, Turkey should become a part of Europe along the 
lines with European bourgeois democratic model. In that sense, Cem began to be 
transformed into a European social democrat from an Eastern socialist starting from 
the 1980s. During his political career, Cem was not stuck to AMP discussions or his 
theory on Turkey’s underdevelopment and he revised his views about Westernization 
and Turkey’s place in the Europe, although he kept his criticism towards single-party 
period and Kemalist legacy because of its radical modernist aspects and anti-populist 
tendencies. 
3.8. The 12 September 1980 Military Coup
İsmail Cem witnessed and in a sense predicted the coming of 12 September 
1980 military coup very closely. He tried to analyze National Front governments and 
the increasing political violence atmosphere of the late 1970s within the perspective 
of class-based analyses and international relations formed due to Cold War 
conditions. In Cem’s view, the rise of fascist militant right was not coincidental after 
the huge success of RPP in the 1973 elections and had some reasons related to class-
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based conflicts and international politics.364 In Cem’s view the first reason of the rise 
of extreme right was class-based conflicts in the country. Cem thought that the 
privileged segments (bourgeoisie) of the country that are backed up by the military-
political establishment supported or at least tolerated the rise of fascism and 
Nationalistic Action Party’s anti-democratic tendencies with the idea of protecting 
themselves against the rising socialism threat.365 Thus, Cem thought there was a 
convenient atmosphere for National Front governments under the leadership of 
Justice Party leader Süleyman Demirel with the participation of former RPP deputy 
Turhan Feyzioğlu (leader of Republican Reliance Party and a reliable name in the 
eyes of bourgeoisie), Türkeş’s NAP and Erbakan’s NSP. Cem noticed that Demirel 
was able to unify all rightist tendencies with his exaggerated anti-communist rhetoric 
but was also getting away from democracy.366 In Cem’s view, Turkey was also 
getting away from democracy since politicians had begun to blame their rivals 
“traitor”.367 The anti-democratic tendencies were becoming stronger due to the 
distorted education system of the country that produced violence among youth368 and 
did not allow democratic pluralism and tolerance for alternative views.369 Cem 
foresaw the rise of the extreme right starting from the 12 March and tried to interpret 
this as a structural phenomenon rather than a conjectural tendency.370 İsmail Cem 
thought that the single-party experience of Turkey and especially the “National 
Chief” period of İnönü created a convenient ideological atmosphere and basis for 
fascist and authoritarian regimes.371 Moreover, due to petty bourgeois radicals and 
rising socialist movements, Cem thought that the bourgeoisie could try to cooperate 
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with the bureaucracy (military) and establish an authoritarian regime in order to 
secure itself.372 Cem believed that the gauchist373 tendencies in the left and fascist, 
ultra-nationalist tendencies in the right was transforming the country into a battlefield 
and dragging the country towards a military coup.374
According to İsmail Cem, the second important reason of the rise of extreme 
right in Turkey was related to international relations and the preferences of USA that 
had serious influence in the shaping of Turkey’s internal politics as the leader of 
Western capitalist bloc and NATO. Cem thought that although European countries, 
especially European leftists, supported democratization and democratic movements 
in Turkey375, the USA deliberately helped rightist groups to suppress leftist 
movements that could be dangerous for the USA because of their anti-imperialist 
stance. Cem, by quoting İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, was trying to show that the USA 
was very active in the rise of rightist terror in Turkey.376 He thought that it was leftist 
adventurism (seeking for junta and student guerilla movements) that created a pretext 
for the 12 March memorandum and that the current political violence backed up by 
the government could be a pretext for another intervention in the future.377
Due to these two main reasons, Cem understood that the extreme right was 
dangerously rising in the country and was profiting from the ethnic and sectarian 
cleavages in the country. Cem thought that the enmity towards the Alevi community 
that is supported by the religious and nationalist extreme right could be very 
dangerous for democratic life in Turkey.378 In that sense, Cem boldly compared 
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National Front governments and their militants to Nazis and their SS379 troops.380
Cem stated that socioeconomic and political progress of working classes and the 
democratization of the country disturbed privileged segments and created a reaction. 
Cem thought that eventually democracy would prevail and RPP would gain a huge 
victory in the 1977 elections.381 He made a correct guess and foresaw the success of 
RPP in the 1977 elections (RPP acquired 41.4 % of the votes and declared a real 
victory of the left), but he was very optimistic and naïve about the success of 
democracy in Turkey since international factors and political violence were dragging 
Turkey towards a new military intervention. Cem was also angry towards politicians 
and journalists that were bringing Turkey to the current polarized and violent 
situation and blaming them for sending young people to death.382 In addition, he was 
trying to interpret how and why meaningless violent attacks against leftist groups 
(such as the 1 May 1977 massacre in which 34 people died) were happening and 
writing about hidden forces behind these terrorist acts.383 Especially after the Iranian 
Revolution (later Iranian Islamic Revolution) of 1979, the Western countries were 
seriously disturbed by rising anti-Western tendencies in the Middle East and in that 
sense wanted to secure their position in Turkey by supporting an authoritarian 
regime.
İsmail Cem wrote that due to National Front governments, Süleyman Demirel 
had secured himself as the leader of the rightist wing and extreme nationalists and 
political Islamists had found a place in state’s institutions and organizations.384
Although Cem supported Demirel in the 1960s due to his efforts to diversify 
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Turkey’s foreign policy preferences, after the National Front governments he 
criticized Demirel harshly and compared his transformation to the Scottish author 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s famous novel character Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde.385 Cem was 
also not supporting Demirel’s foreign policy anymore and thought that the National 
Front government’s Cyprus policy was scandalous.386 Moreover, he thought that 
Demirel was pulling the military into civilian politics by not preventing but rather 
supporting political violence activities and polarization in the country.387 Cem was 
defining political struggle between rightist and leftist as a struggle between clarity 
and darkness and did not hide his anger towards National Front governments that 
protected ultra-nationalist and Islamist terrorist groups.388 In that sense, he was 
claiming that Demirel and National Front government was legalizing and giving 
legitimacy to rightist terror by their avoidance of these activities.389 In the rising 
polarization atmosphere of the 1970s, Cem was harshly accusing Demirel and 
rightist circles but the violence was coming both from the left and the right. Thus, 
Cem could be claimed to lose his objectivity a bit in the late 1970s due to the high
degree of polarization. İsmail Cem also sensed the coming of a military coup since 
he wrote that the higher segments were giving up hope with JP and RPP and leaning 
towards the Turkish Armed Forces.390 From his Marxist point of view, Cem thought 
that, for the bourgeoisie, democracy and authoritarian regime are two options and the 
bourgeoisie would prefer a military regime if it began to feel suffocated due to leftist 
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opposition.391 That is why, Cem believed that the proletariat is the basis of a real 
democratic regime and that RPP should support and engage in close relationships 
with working classes and syndical movements.392 Another problematic aspect of the 
1970s was the terrible economic situation of the country especially after the heavy 
embargos implemented by Western countries against Turkey after the Cyprus Peace 
Operation. In that sense, absence of foreign currency, scarcity of raw materials, and 
increasing foreign debt were the main economic problems that spoiled democratic 
life in Turkey.393 The Western economic blockade against Turkey also showed the 
reaction of Western countries against Turkey’s unexpected Cyprus Operation and 
rising socialist and anti-Western movements in the country. However, the Western 
bloc also knew that it could not afford Turkey’s radical transformation and moving 
away from the West.394 Eventually, Cem’s prediction was right and Turkey moved 
towards a military regime. After the assassination of his cousin Abdi İpekçi just three 
months before the 12 September coup Cem left Turkey and moved to Paris.395
On September 12 at 04.00 clock in the morning, the National Security 
Council  headed by Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren declared a coup d'état on 
the national channel. The NSC then declared martial law throughout the country, 
abolished the parliament and the government, suspended the constitution and banned 
all political parties and trade unions. The coup also decided to adopt a new 
constitution that included mechanisms to prevent what they saw as impeding the 
functioning of democracy. The new constitution brought clear limits and definitions. 
On 7 November 1982 the new Constitution was put to a referendum, which was 
accepted with a resounding 92 %. On 9 November 1982 Kenan Evren was appointed 
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President for the next seven years. In 1983, Turkey passed to democratic civilian life 
again although the military kept its exit guarantees and only three parties approved 
by the military could run in the elections. According to Yüksel Taşkın, while the 12 
September regime aimed to suppress popular class-based leftist-socialist tendencies
in the country, it also created new unexpected radical movements such as political 
Islam and secessionist Kurdish ethnic nationalism.396
3.9. On Kemalism
Although Kemalism is not accepted as a total ideology but only “a technique 
for discovering the truth and dissolving illusions”397 like that of French ideologues 
and a final and radical interpretation of 150 years old Ottoman modernization398 for 
many, we see that in the 1930s there were many attempts to formulate Kemalism as a 
concrete, substantial ideology. The most important ones among these “competing 
Kemalisms” were Ülkü and Kadro movements. Kadro and Ülkü movements 
appeared at a time when the statist economic development model and 
authoritarianism were very popular in the European world especially after the Great 
Depression and the rise of fascism. Clashes within the Republican People’s Party, 
especially between the liberal İş Bank group led by Celal Bayar and bureaucratic 
group led by İsmet İnönü, created a convenient environment for Kadro to make 
                                                
396 Yüksel Taşkın. 2004. “12 Eylül Atatürkçülüğü ya da Bir Kemalist Restorasyon Teşebbüsü Olarak 
12 Eylül” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce cilt 2 Kemalizm. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 582.
397 Professor Heper asserted that Atatürkism or Kemalism did not refer to a quality or type of thought, 
but rather as a technique for discovering truth and dissolving illusions similar to French Idéologues of 
the post-Enlightenment process. Heper points out that “For Atatürk too, the efforts to discover the 
direction in which society was moving entailed resorting to a scientific approach”. See; Metin, Heper, 
The State Tradition In Turkey, p. 63. Heper also pointed out that Atatürk never thought to establish a 
state based on personal rule and tried to arrange the new republic’s laws for making it as people's 
state. Moreover, he thought that Atatürk always believed in scienticism in positivist manner and used 
rationalism in state affairs. In that sense, Heper claimed that Atatürk envisioned a transient 
transcendental state.
398 Halil İnalcık, Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye, p. 65.
  
 
171
publication freely.399 Alongside with Kadro and Ülkü movements, there was 
Republican Conservatives group that tried to formulate a Kemalist ideology that was 
more compatible with Islam and conservatism.400 Kemalism continued to be 
reformulated and presented as an ideology especially after military interventions. 
These interpretations were different from each other and reflected Turkey’s foreign 
policy and economic preferences. In that sense, 27 May 1960s leftist Kemalism401
and 12 September 1980s nationalist-Islamist Atatürkism (Turkish-Islam synthesis) 
based on free-market economics402 differed highly from each other. Metin Heper 
thought that Atatürkism was based on a strategy of creating a transient moderate 
transcendental state but his followers were not able to distinguish his strategy from 
his tactics and in that sense, even opponents of Atatürk could have presented 
themselves as “genuine Atatürkists” by finding a quotation from him in accordance 
with their real ideology.403
For many including Suna Kili, Kemalism or Atatürkism was a paradigm of 
modernization that rejects Islamic perspectives or foreign ideologies. “Both 
pragmatic and functional, Atatürkism alone is what is needed to see to it that Turkey 
is successful in its use of its future-oriented paradigm of national modernization.404
Kili claimed that Western positivism and solidarism had an impact on Kemalism 
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which aimed to modernize archaic social structure, value system and lifestyle in 
Anatolia. Six arrows of the Republican People’s Party which symbolize six 
principles of Kemalism form the basis of Kemalist or Atatürkist ideology. These six 
principles namely: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Etatism (Statism), 
Laicism (Secularism) and Revolutionism (Reformism) earned semi-ideology status 
with regard to Kemalism, though these principles did not evolve as static ideological 
obsessions.405
İsmail Cem analyzed Kemalism as a kind of radicalism.406 In his view, 
Kemalism was similar to the radicalist movement in France which rejected 
conservatism and depended on petty bourgeois segments including urban people, 
intellectuals, bureaucrats and local notables.407 Cem thought that all radical 
movements including Kemalism were based on principles of republicanism, 
secularism and positivism and that they had a pragmatist character. Moreover, all 
radical movements had distrust towards macro ideologies, including widespread 
practice of technocracy and elitism, due to their enlightening mission in an 
unenlightened society.408 Cem claimed that the leftist interpretation of radicalism was 
also possible but this would not mean a real social democratic or socialist movement. 
İsmail Cem wrote that this radicalism tradition began to affect Turkish intelligentsia 
starting from the 19th century and organizations like Young Turks and Committee of 
Union and Progress were radicalist movements that aimed to modernize the Ottoman 
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state and enlighten Ottoman society.409 Due to Abdülhamid’s despotism, many 
young intellectuals of the 19th century had to escape to Europe, especially France. 
Radicalism tradition in Turkey was strengthened after this period since young 
Ottoman intellectuals had the chance to closely observe French radicalism and 
positivism. That is why, Cem claimed the classical Turkish left was largely based on 
the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy instead of the proletariat and the Turkish left 
has had a petty bourgeois character from the beginning.410 In that sense, Cem 
considered classical pre-Ecevit RPP of the 1960s as a leftist version of radicalism 
known as Kemalism in Turkey.411 Except for a short period in the 1970s under 
Ecevit’s leadership, Cem thought there had never been a real socialist or social 
democratic party in Turkey and RPP always kept its radical aspects. While İsmail 
Cem was making his criticism towards Kemalism, he was often referring to Leftist 
Kemalism and did not put other rightist versions of Kemalism on his agenda. Thus, it 
would be better to focus on Leftist Kemalism before passing to Cem’s criticism of 
Kemalism.
Faruk Alpkaya in his research on Leftist Kemalism (Sol Kemalizm), 
concluded that Leftist Kemalism is an ideology of “Turkish exceptionism” that has 
become always very influential especially in the times of breaking up.412 Alpkaya 
thought that similar to Cem’s thesis, Leftist Kemalism was nourished from the 
radical ideology of the French Revolution and created its own intellectuals in each 
period.413 However, Alpkaya noted that due to 12 September’s official Atatürkism, 
which was based on the ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, Leftist Kemalists 
were for a while driven out into different positions (social democracy, liberalism, 
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socialism, Maoism) in the left.414 Alpkaya also pointed out that starting from the 
2000s, due to Turkey’s economic problems and foreign policy crisis, Leftist 
Kemalism again became influential in the country although he claimed that this 
never had a concrete economic and political programme except the aim of ruling
Turkey from Turkey.415 Three important names of the Leftist Kemalism ideology 
that İsmail Cem was affected by and had personal intimacy with were Uğur Mumcu, 
Attila İlhan and İlhan Selçuk.
Uğur Mumcu (1942-1993) was a bold and famous Turkish journalist who 
wrote for the leading Kemalist daily Cumhuriyet.416 Mumcu was killed by a bomb 
placed in his car, outside his home on 24 January 1993. There are numerous 
hypotheses over who was responsible for his murder but the dominant view is that 
this assassination was related to Iran and political Islamist groups in Turkey. Mumcu 
is a symbolic figure in the left especially for Leftist Kemalists. Mumcu was also a 
close friend of İsmail Cem although they did have some differences in their political 
stances. Mumcu similar to Yön movement thought that the primary conflict in 
international capitalism was between imperialism and exploited nations.417 Mumcu 
and other Leftist Kemalists never ignored class conflicts within Turkey but their 
primary focus was foreign policy and their basic motive was anti-imperialism. 
Starting from the 1960s Uğur Mumcu had always emphasized the anti-imperialist 
character of Kemalism and tried to unify different versions of the left in the line of 
Leftist Kemalism.418 Mumcu was also important because unlike Doğan Avcıoğlu he 
never renounced parliamentary democracy and underlined the fact that even Turkish 
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Independence War was ruled by a parliament.419 His Leftist Kemalism took its roots 
from the Kuvayi Milliye movement and Turkish Independence War and was based on 
Western, modern, secular lifestyle and anti-imperialist independent foreign policy.420
Mumcu was very sensitive about defending secularism against rising Islamism 
danger and also about Kemalist nationalism against growing Kurdish ethno-
nationalism.421 His approaches to these two issues (Kurdish question and political 
Islam) were also related to his perception of imperialism and he thought that foreign 
countries had supported PKK terrorism and tolerated religious fundamentalist 
movements in Turkey. Compared to İsmail Cem, Mumcu was closer to classical, 
more nationalist Kemalism, and he was less critical of single-party period. Cem and 
Mumcu shared the same views on democracy and freedom of opinion. Mumcu, 
especially after the 1980 coup, had always underlined the necessity of democratic 
parliamentary methods in politics and together with Cem they had a clean democratic 
record, unlike many leftist Kemalists who engaged in militarist solutions.
Attila İlhan (1925-2005) was also another important and unique figure in the 
Leftist Kemalism tradition, and was an acquaintance of Cem. In fact, İlhan, in the 
1970s when Cem was heading TRT, praised Cem for “transforming TRT into 
people’s television”.422 Similar to İsmail Cem, Attila İlhan had great sympathy and 
curiosity towards the Seljuk-Ottoman past of the Turks and in that sense he was a 
unique figure in Leftist Kemalism. Moreover, unlike other Leftist Kemalists, İlhan 
posed a harsh criticism towards single-party period, especially towards İsmet 
İnönü.423 However, while criticizing İnönü harshly and blaming him for starting the 
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counter-revolution, Attila İlhan had always exalted Atatürk as the heroic leader of 
Turkey’s anti-imperialist Independence War.424 Similar to Uğur Mumcu and other 
Leftist Kemalists, anti-imperialism was the main motive in İlhan’s novels and 
ideology. İlhan’s anti-imperialism seemed to have turned into anti-globalism in the 
1990s with the new world order.425 For İlhan, İsmet İnönü was responsible for the 
degeneration of Kemalism and its transformation into imitation of the West.426
Another aspect of İlhan’s ideology was the role of Sultan Galiev427 and Galievism. 
Galiev’s theory about oppressed nations was visible in İlhan’s thinking and İlhan
claimed that Atatürk must have shown more interest to Galiev during the National 
Struggle.428 Cem and İlhan had both unique figures in the left for their curiosity and 
admiration of Ottoman past but İlhan especially starting from the 1990s adopted a 
more nationalist and statist ideology (ulusalcılık) that gave a small place to 
democracy and questioned Turkey’s place in the Western world. Here he differed 
compared to Cem, who had become more sensitive on democracy and transformed 
into a pro-European social democrat.
İlhan Selçuk (1925-2010) was the other symbol figure and leading 
theoretician of Leftist Kemalism. Although Mehmet Soydaş and Atilla Lök analyzed 
İlhan Selçuk from an extremely critical perspective, in Turkey Selçuk has been seen 
as the “Wise Man of Turkish Enlightenment (Aydınlanma Bilgesi)” by many 
leftists.429 Together with Uğur Mumcu, he worked in Yön magazine and became the 
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right wing of Yön movement’s leader Doğan Avcıoğlu. Together with Avcıoğlu, 
İlhan Selçuk tried to formulate a socialist version of Kemalism that would be reached 
by a leftist military take-over. Selçuk was imprisoned and tortured after 12 March. 
After being released, he began to write in Cumhuriyet newspaper and later became 
the respected editor-in-chief of the paper.430 Selçuk throughout his life defended 
Kemalism and saw it as the basis of Turkish Enlightenment which meant the 
emancipation of reason from faith and science from religion.431 Secularism, unitary 
nation state and state led rapid industrialization were his three main themes.432 He 
thought that both Turkish Alevis and Turkish Sunnis are different from Arabs and 
have a tendency to adopt secularism and modernity.433 Selçuk, similar to other Leftist 
Kemalists, never rejected class conflicts but he also never thought that a socialist 
revolution could be made in Turkey under the existing conditions. Selçuk has always 
underlined that without passing from or rather terminating the Enlightenment 
process, a real social democratic or liberal political ideology could not be established 
in Turkey. In that sense, he asserted that the aim of the Kemalist Republic was to 
create the free individual instead of subjects.434 Selçuk starting from the 1960s was 
also the leading writer and ideologue of Cumhuriyet newspaper which can be 
described as the castle of Leftist Kemalism.435Although İsmail Cem and İlhan Selçuk 
were good friends and they shared the same ideal of establishing a modern 
democratic and industrialized Turkey, their understanding of democracy and 
secularism highly differed from each other starting from the 1960s. Cem had always 
sympathized with democratic parliamentarian methods (TLP and Ecevit’s RPP) 
                                                
430 Mehmet Soydaş and Atilla Lök, “İlhan Selçuk”, p. 513.
431 ibid., pp. 514-515.
432 ibid., p. 514.
433 ibid., p. 515.
434 ibid., p. 515.
435 Bağış Erten and Görkem Doğan, “Cumhuriyet’in Cumhuriyet’i: Cumhuriyet Gazetesi”, p. 509
  
 
178
whereas Selçuk did not hide his sympathy for military coups that will restore 
Republican ideals (Yön movement). Cem was also much more libertarian compared 
to Selçuk especially concerning state’s attitude towards religious people. Selçuk was 
very critical and suspicious of Islamic groups’ aims and he was in favor of state 
interventionism in order to suppress religious fundamentalism, whereas Cem was an 
unusual figure in the Turkish left who defended freedom for all segments of the 
society including pious people and religious groups.
İsmail Cem’s criticism towards Kemalism was mostly caused by the 
solidarity aspect of the Republic. Cem claimed that with a naïve belief, Kemalists 
thought that being able to defeat imperialism would end exploitation and all 
segments could develop themselves in brotherhood with a national economy under 
the objective arbitration of the Kemalist state.436 Cem accepted that this view was 
good-intentioned but it was also naïve and unrealistic since the interest of the 
bourgeoisie, land owners and local notables naturally contradicted with the interest 
of peasants.437 In that sense, Kemalists’ naïve objective stance for Cem was nothing 
but supporting the stronger side and naturally leads to the exploitation of lower 
segments. As a leftist thinker coming from Marxist tradition, Cem rejected the 
solidarist view of Kemalism and criticized the single-party period and Kemalist 
ideology in general from this class-based perspective. For Cem, this was caused by 
the lack of intellectual accumulation that Ottoman officers had concerning 
economics.438 Moreover, due to its weak class-based position as a small bureaucratic 
group, founders of the Republic had to form a coalition with bourgeoisie and local 
notables at the expense of suppressing proletariat and peasants.439 In that sense, Cem 
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claimed that while the founders of the Republic, the military-bureaucratic 
intelligentsia, supported Westernization in order to catch up with the contemporary 
civilization by making mainly superstructural reforms, they could not realize their 
aims of infrastructural reforms (land reform) due to the weak social positioning and 
thus, they had to engage in a coalition with higher social classes.440 Another aspect of 
Cem’s criticism towards Kemalism was its superstructural character that had realized 
modernization only on the superstructural level and could not realize the 
infrastructural economic modernization. This argument was also frequently used by 
RPP leader Bülent Ecevit in the 1970s.441 In that sense, Ecevit and Cem both 
advocated an economic leap forward by a statist-socialist economic model.
While defining RPP largely as a leftist-radical party, Cem never hesitated to 
praise the positive aspects of Kemalism. In his view, radical movements including 
Kemalism had some similarities with leftist movements and helped their country and 
society to get modernized and create the necessary conditions for transition to a 
democratic regime.442 In that sense, Cem’s views resembled Ergun Özbudun’s ideas 
about the nature of Kemalist political regime. Özbudun also underlined that RPP had 
always allowed opposition in itself (İş Bank group led by Bayar, Republican 
Conservatives, Kadro Movement) which made transition to multi-party democracy 
easier for Turkey unlike in communist regimes. Özbudun, by applying Clement 
Moore’s classification of single-party regime ideologies into four categories as 
totalitarian, chiliastic, tutelary and administrative, placed RPP as a tutelage party, or 
a party acting like a tutor and a guardian for its people which not show characteristics 
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of a totalitarian regime.443 While Cem criticized the lack of democratic aspects 
shown by the single-party rule, he also praised the modernist aspects that opened a 
way for democracy in the coming decades. In one of his latest publications Sosyal 
Demokrasinin Geleceği (The Future of Social Democracy), Cem defined Kemalism 
as the source of social democracy’s progressive and innovative principles in Turkey 
and expressed that Turkey’s social democracy takes its roots from the Republican 
Revolution.444 In that sense, he labeled his party -NTP- as the “continuation of 
Republican Revolution in democracy”.445 Many other social democratic writers 
including pro-European Aydın Cıngı also agreed with Cem and thought that Turkish 
social democracy evolved and was nourished by Kemalism and Turkish 
Enlightenment (modernization movements that started in the 19th century) in addition 
to universal social democratic values.446 Kemalism’s modernistic-progressive 
features were also praised by many observers including Bernard Lewis447, Arnold J. 
Toynbee, Maurice Duverger and Suna Kili448. 
Starting from 1980s and 1990s, Cem tried to formulate a moderate social 
democratic ideology or a kind of moderate Kemalism by erasing the radicalist 
aspects of classical Kemalism in order to embrace pious segments of the society, as 
well as Kurds in Turkey. Thus, although for many Cem could be labeled as an anti-
Kemalist especially in his youth and until the 1980s because of his positive look 
towards Ottomans and harsh criticism of single-party period, in fact he was trying to 
transform Kemalism into social democracy by softening its radicalist aspects and 
revising it in order to weaken and prevent anti-democratic acts (military coups) and 
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tendencies (gauchism) made in the name of Kemalism. Cem’s criticism towards 
Kemalism was also noticeably softened after his engagement in active politics since 
considering their party grassroots RPP and DLP could not afford to censure 
Kemalism and Atatürk legacy.  
3.10. On Marxism and Social Democracy
Although İsmail Cem had passed through an ideological transformation 
between the 1970s and 1990s, his basic approach to history has always been 
materialistic. Cem expressed his views on Marxism and social democracy best in his 
book Social Democracy or Democratic Socialism What Is It, What It Is Not (Sosyal 
Demokrasi Ya Da Demokratik Sosyalizm Nedir, Ne Değildir)449 which was first 
published in 1984 and continued to make new prints since it has become a classical 
book. Cem in this book summarized the emergence and the development of the 
Marxist movement and its transformation into social democracy.
İsmail Cem’s theoretical formulation on social democracy was similar to 
other leading social democratic thinkers around the world, though Cem’s vision for 
Turkish socialism or social democracy differed from European social democracy in 
the 1960s and 1970s due to the different historical development of Turkey. 
According to Cem, social democracy or democratic socialism (Cem used these two 
terms interchangeably) is a political ideology that emerged in the late 19th century 
Europe with the works of Eduard Bernstein’s German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD)450 and England’s Fabian Society451 and it had economic, social, political and 
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cultural dimensions.452 In Cem’s perspective, social democracy has never been a 
rigid ideology like Marxism and it developed its own unique and dynamic character, 
although it was originally derived from Marxism.453 In his view, social democracy is 
the socialist ideology that is in conformity with the rules of pluralist democracy. Cem 
never accepted the simplistic formula of “middle way between capitalism and 
Marxism” for defining social democracy since he believed that social democratic 
ideology had much deeper characteristics.454 For him, social democracy was the 
conditional pact made by the proletariat and bourgeoisie in order to achieve peaceful 
coexistence.455 By this pact or contract, the proletariat gave up revolutionary Marxist 
ideals and accepted the existence of the bourgeoisie, and secured its presence with 
the condition of having full scale of political freedoms. Thus the proletariat was a 
part of the decision-making process and government by parliamentary, representative 
and pluralist democracy.456 İsmail Cem also underlined that pluralist parliamentary 
democracy is not a temporary choice or the lesser of two evils situation for social 
democrats but rather a free-will choice that is more democratic and beneficial for 
workers.457 Cem thought that social democratic parties should embrace all segments 
of the society although they are primarily parties of the worker class.458 In his view, 
syndicates and unions are natural allies of social democratic parties and real social 
democratic parties should have organic links with these associations.459 Cem 
believed that social democratic parties and movements could differ in some ways in 
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different contexts since they would have been nourished with local values and they 
would have had different historical development process.460
As far as Cem was concerned, social democratic economic model is not based 
on the principle of banning private ownership of the means of production but rather 
preventing and reducing inequalities in the allocation of resources and power.461 The 
social democratic economic model was developed with the works of important 
leaders and thinkers including Henri De Man462, Otto Bauer463 and John Maynard 
Keynes464 and does not reject the existence of a capitalist economy though it aims to 
revise it.465 Social democracy is not about a simple reformism; rather it aimed to 
create a new egalitarian model of social development where political participation 
and life qualities would be better through planning and a new democratic and social 
state would be established. 
İsmail Cem also tried to determine the theoretical roots of social democratic 
ideology. In his view, Eduard Bernstein was an underestimated theoretician who 
founded the basis of social democratic ideology. Cem wrote that Bernstein’s 
ideological transformation also led to the evolution of German Social Democratic 
Party-SPD and the historical developments proved Bernstein’s rightness in most of 
his theories and ideas.466 İsmail Cem agreed with Peter Gay467 that Bernstein was 
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more of a historical product and necessity rather than a theoretical genius who saw 
the problematic aspects of orthodox Marxism.468 Bernstein was the earliest 
scholar/person who saw the democratic government potential of socialism and the 
transformation of SPD from cadre to mass party after the abolition of anti-socialist 
laws in Germany.469 According to Cem there were three main reasons for this trend. 
First of all, starting from the late 19th century, SPD was becoming a popular political 
party of the growing proletariat and its electoral successes were creating a convenient 
environment for giving up revolutionary Marxism and accepting the virtues of 
parliamentary democracy. Secondly, German economy was constantly growing and 
creating new and better job opportunities for the German people, which was another 
factor that reduced the power of orthodox Marxism.470 Thirdly, the growing power of 
syndicates and unions and their democratic stance due to their aim to ameliorate the 
proletariat’s working conditions and social rights in the short run within the 
parliamentary democratic regime supported the revisionism trend in the German 
left.471
Under these conditions, Bernstein came up with a criticism of revolutionary 
Marxism and a new philosophy of socialism that differed from orthodox Marxism in 
some ways which led to very comprehensive ideological and political consequences. 
According to Cem who quoted Gay, the first of these choices was to refuse or 
remove the dialectic method of Marxism from its center since Bernstein thought that 
this was caused by the effect of extreme idealism of Hegel (who made its mark on 
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Karl Marx).472 Bernstein reached this point of analysis through a series of false 
predictions made by Marx and other orthodox Marxists including himself and 
concluded that this was caused because of leaving the empirical world and plunging 
into Hegel’s world of ideals.473 Thus, Bernstein tried to remove the dialectic 
approach from the center of socialist theory and tried to replace it with revisionism. 
Bernstein by rejecting the monist dialectic materialism method as the ultimate source 
of truth and by perceiving it only as a method and a factor similar to superstructural 
conditions like ideology and ethics, opened the way for revisionism among the 
Marxist intelligentsia.474 In Cem’s view, the second important choice made by 
Bernstein was to refuse the use of violence without any qualification or condition. 
Cem claimed Bernstein had realized that by analyzing whole human history as the 
struggle between two classes from a historical materialist perspective directed Marx 
and other Marxist theoreticians to see the use of power and coercion as normal and 
steer away from real Marxist humanism.475 In his view, by the negation of dialectics 
and the use of force, Bernstein opened the way for himself and other Marxist 
philosophers to invent the peaceful evolutionary way to socialism. Bernstein did not 
see human history solely as the struggle of classes and he pointed out that there are 
also situations of cooperation between different classes. In that sense, Bernstein saw 
the state not as the personal instrument of sovereign classes but a mechanism 
controlled and shared by different classes up to different degrees.476 Thirdly, İsmail 
Cem pointed out that Eduard Bernstein, by giving up the historical inevitability thesis 
of dialectic materialism, increased the role of will and ethics in Marxist politics.477
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Unlike orthodox Marxists like Rosa Luxemburg478 who totally rejected the role of 
free will in the take-over of socialist governments and based her whole theory on 
historical materialism, Bernstein never ignored the role of historical class struggles 
and tried to make a new explanation by using both the role of history and will.479
Cem, by quoting Peter Gay, explained this situation as the “replacement of scientific 
socialism’s certainty with the optimism of moralist socialism”.480 Fourthly, Cem 
similar to other Bernstein analysts underlined that Bernstein was very affected by 
Immanuel Kant481 and his skeptic and critical approach to pure rationalism and pure 
empiricism. He thought Hegelian dialectics directed Marxists to intellectual idleness 
because of the lack of skepticism. He tried to apply Kant’s criticism towards 
rationalism and Enlightenment to Marxism and to test Marxist truths in real life by 
an empiricist motive in order to measure their validity and criticized Marxism when 
he noticed that there are some differences between theory and practice.482
One of the earliest problems Bernstein observed was that unlike classical 
Marxist claims German capitalism was able to increase the ratio of small and middle 
size enterprises in the economy and thus, reducing the gap between rich and poor 
through the enlargement of middle class and the prevention of monopolies. Bernstein 
by giving statistics was able to prove that in addition to a growing middle class, the 
proletariat’s life conditions were also getting better unlike orthodox Marxist theory 
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had sought. İsmail Cem also observed that Bernstein never believed in the collapse 
of capitalism unlike many other Marxists since he detected that the welfare of 
European societies had been increasing and with the new credit and finance system a 
global crisis that would end in the collapse of capitalism was nearly impossible. Cem 
thought that Bernstein’s views were proven to be correct after the Great Depression 
since this huge crisis did not end in the collapse of capitalism but brought 
Keynesianism and socialist practices to the agenda of world states.483 Moreover, Cem 
praised Bernstein’s idea of transforming SDP into a mass party since he also believed 
that a party which solely represents the working class cannot embrace the whole 
society and could not find solutions to many problems.484 Likewise, İsmail Cem 
adopted Bernstein’s constructive attitude in politics and criticized the destructive 
aspects of revolutionary Marxism.485 Another similarity between the two thinkers 
was that they both saw democracy as a means and an end in itself in order to realize a 
democratic socialist government which could be developed in an evolutionary way 
within a capitalist regime.486
According to İsmail Cem, the second important source of social democratic 
ideology was Karl Kautsky487. Although Kautsky was at the beginning known as an 
ardent opponent of Bernstein’s revisionism and called himself a consistent orthodox 
Marxist during his whole political-intellectual life488, following the 1905 Russian 
Revolution489 Kautsky became closer to social democracy and struggled against 
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orthodox Marxist views defended by Rosa Luxemburg and many others.490 In fact, 
Karl Kautsky represented the middle way in SPD between Bernstein and revisionists, 
and Luxemburg and radicals, and tried to reconcile these two wings.491 Kautsky 
during his whole life never supported Lenin and Bolshevism and in that sense 
became the second important base of democratic socialism or social democracy. 
Kautsky’s main motive that separated his way from Lenin and Bolshevism was that 
he was not in favor of terrorism and terroristic methods. In his view, terrorism 
degenerated socialism and this could be prevented only through the rejection of 
terrorist methods and the acceptance of democracy.492 His views became so 
influential in the left that Lenin wrote a book called The Proletarian Revolution and 
the Renegade Kautsky with the aim of humiliating him. 
İsmail Cem thought that Karl Kautsky’s most important contribution to 
Marxist theory was his idea that a proletarian government could be established not as 
a result of the increasing alienation (estrangement) and impoverishment of the 
working class but rather through their increasing wealth, political consciousness and 
political power.493 In that sense, Kautsky saw emancipation not in the radicalization 
of the proletariat but rather in its progress and revised the basic revolutionary motive 
of orthodox Marxism. For Kautsky, revolution was not about street clashes and 
political demonstrations; it was about the replacement of a class by another. 
Reformation, on the other hand, was about the legal changes by the sovereign 
class.494 Kautsky’s definition of the working class was also broader than many other 
Marxist thinkers who only insisted on factory workers using their physical labor. 
                                                                                                                                         
party system and a Russian Constitution in 1906. However, the tsar would close down the Duma 16 
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Kautsky thought that all employees who do not own the means of production, could 
be considered as workers and physical activity was not a necessity.495 In Cem’s view, 
another contribution of Kautsky was related to his ideas on the role of intelligentsia. 
Kautsky unlike Lenin (who thought that he could replace intellectuals with 
bureaucrats in the new system), believed that the intelligentsia as a separate class 
could be added to the struggle of workers and without the support of the 
intelligentsia a socialist regime could only establish its hegemony through the 
creation of a new extremely powerful bureaucratic class.496 Kautsky believed that 
Bolshevism’s biggest mistake was to underestimate the role of intelligentsia as a 
separate class and to have tried to replace it with terroristic methods and bureaucratic 
institutions.497 Another important criticism point of Kautsky was related to the terror 
methods of Bolshevism. İsmail Cem underlined Kautsky’s ideas that violence could 
be used as a political means when a weak government backed up by a minority was 
trying to take control.498 In Kautsky’s perspective, terror methods belonged to 
bourgeois revolutions and a government based on working class (all people not 
having the means of production) would not need to use such methods if it were 
backed up by the majority.499  Similarly, he believed that a government of the 
proletariat could provide extensive freedoms to other segments of society since it 
would only expect other segments to accept the decision of the majority of the 
people.500 In that sense, he rejected Bolshevik revanchism in addition to terror 
methods defended by Lenin.501
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What made Kautsky come closer to social democracy was his idea that a 
government of workers should accept and respect the existence of its historical anti-
thesis -that is the bourgeois class- because otherwise it would soon transform itself 
into a regime of terror that would always create and destroy its opposition.502 This 
meant the acceptance of the bourgeoisie and separated Kautsky’s ways from those of 
some other Marxists.503 İsmail Cem points out that this approach directed Kautsky to 
embrace representative and parliamentary democracy which was often labeled as the 
classical or bourgeois democracy by orthodox Marxists.504 Kautsky’s only condition 
for this was the establishment of a political party truly representing the interests of 
the working class with full scale democratic political rights.505 In that sense, Kautsky 
supported pluralist representative and parliamentary democracy and thought that a 
developed, highly conscious working class would easily take over the government 
since it constituted the majority of the society. By choosing democracy and 
parliamentary methods instead of political violence, Kautsky declared himself as an 
evolutionary socialist (it was also in conformity with his Darwinist understanding in 
science) rather than revolutionary one and opened a way for social democracy.506
İsmail Cem tried to formulate and base his social democratic ideas basically 
on Kautsky and Bernstein, two founding names of the social democratic ideology. 
However, Cem followed the European social democratic and socialist parties very 
closely during his entire life and was especially affected by the success of French 
socialists in the early 1980s under the leadership of François Mitterrand. In the 
1990s, Cem this time seemed to be affected by the British Labor Party and its 
successful and charismatic leader Tony Blair and his ideology known as the “third 
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way” or “Blairism”. While liberals were celebrating the fall of Berlin Wall and the 
collapse of USSR as the ultimate victory of liberalism, social democrats including 
İsmail Cem and Ercan Karakaş were claiming that the neo-liberal world order could 
not be successful and the role of social democracy had increased in this new 
context.507 Cem also knew and accepted that social democracy was a historical 
product of European class struggles and these ideologies should be adapted and 
reformulated when applied to Turkish society. While criticizing radicalist aspects of 
Kemalism and praising social democracy, Cem in fact wanted to formulate a 
moderate social democratic-Kemalist synthesis that would embrace Turkish society 
and that would be convenient to democracy and current political realities. 
3.11. Contributions
As a public intellectual, İsmail Cem deserves to be analyzed closely mostly 
because of his peculiar position and original views that are not part of classical 
Kemalist or leftist views in Turkey. Cem’s important and original position in Turkish 
intellectual life could be categorized under five main headings.
First of all, Cem’s curiosity and admiration of the Ottoman system was a kind 
of revolution in the Turkish left since the Ottoman past was a taboo for decades in 
Turkey, especially in the leftist-Kemalist intellectual circles. Thus, Cem made an 
important contribution by analyzing and praising the Ottoman past and trying to 
reconcile Kemalist-leftist segments with their history. In that sense, Cem tried to 
counter balance the radicalist aspects of the early Republican period and to realize an 
intellectual peace between the Republic and the Ottoman State. While doing this, he 
was thinking beyond predetermined patterns (such as a leftist and Republican 
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intellectual could not have interest in Ottoman past) and breaking the intellectual 
routine. This mentality also constituted the basis of Cem’s understanding of social 
peace between intellectual elite and ordinary pious masses. His interest and 
sympathy towards Turkey’s Ottoman past and system later helped Cem a lot when he 
became Foreign Minister in developing a macro-strategy of expanding Turkey’s 
political, economical and cultural power through Ottoman historical and cultural 
assets and becoming a regional power (this will be explained in Chapter 6).
Secondly, Cem tried to find a leftist-socialist vein or root in the Ottoman past 
and focused on the solidarist and communitarian aspects of the Ottoman system 
instead of solely focusing on the characteristics of Marxism, which he thought as a 
product of harsh class struggles in Europe. In that sense, Cem tried to adapt Marxism 
and later social democracy to Turkish society and made efforts to create a synthesis. 
Cem’s efforts for a synthesis and his creativity were very valuable since Turkish 
intelligentsia for many years had worked only as a translation agency and copied 
what they had saw and read in Europe. Moreover, Ottoman studies for long decades 
stayed as an area reserved for Turkish nationalists and Islamists and Cem’s interest in 
the Ottoman system and his search for a peculiar Turkish left taking with roots in the 
Ottoman system was a pioneering effort.
Thirdly, although he was from a modern, wealthy Istanbulite family, in his 
personal and intellectual life Cem had always tried to use empathy and understand 
people who are different from himself as well as political views that were different 
from his ideas. That is why, although leftism was his primary identity starting from 
the 1970s, Cem has always been a trustworthy democrat and believed in the 
necessity of pluralism in politics. Humanism and making efforts to understand the 
other were not ordinary qualities that had been seen in Turkish intellectuals 
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especially during the conditions of the Cold War, at a time when intellectuals 
(similar to political parties and masses) were strongly polarized as leftist or rightist.   
Fourthly, although İsmail Cem was coming from a Westernized family and he 
had a Western type education in Robert College and Lausanne University, during his 
whole intellectual and political life he tried to base his ideas on local and national 
values and tried to take Islamist and nationalist groups’ advantage of being native. In 
fact, Cem’s interest in the Ottoman system or his political project of the Anatolian 
Left (together with Baykal) were in conformity with his political stance and were 
aiming to demolish the walls between ordinary people and RPP and intellectuals.
Fifthly, İsmail Cem especially starting from the 1980s, began to focus on 
Turkey’s political culture and never solely equated electoralism with democracy. As 
a believer of democracy, he always defended free and fair elections and never 
supported or approved methods that were outside of democracy in politics (political 
violence, coups etc.), but Cem underlined that democracy is more of a lifestyle and a 
political cultural model whose implementation in an economically poor and poorly 
educated society is not an easy task just by making democratic laws and creating 
democratic institutions. In that sense, he defended popular vote but not populism.
İsmail Cem’s main problematic in the 1970s was the backwardness of Turkey 
similar to nearly all intellectuals of that period. Cem, as young Turkish intellectual 
educated in USA and Europe, was probably affected by America’s and Europe’s 
development and began to feel sorry for his country’s underdevelopment. Similar to 
many intellectuals of the period, he believed that a state-led socialist leaning 
economy would help Turkey to develop and grow rapidly and catch up with the 
developed countries. However, while defending statism, he never advocated a Soviet 
or Chinese model and stayed closer to European socialism that envisaged a mixed 
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Keynesian economy similar to the economic policy of the early Republican period in 
Turkey. But Cem, unlike the single-party period’s economic policy, wanted both 
growth and equal distribution and defended labor classes’ rights by criticizing the 
Kemalist economics for creating a “happy minority”. Unlike many intellectuals of 
this period who advocated a leftist military coup favoring socialism or a student-
based revolution from villages or from cities, Cem stayed legal, believing in 
democratic parliamentary struggle. His ideas resembled Turkish Labor Party’s 
programme about democratic socialism. Cem never believed in adventurism or 
gauchism and wanted democratic socialist Turkey to be established by 
parliamentarian methods.  
İsmail Cem saw the rise of center-right in Turkey as a natural reaction to 
bureaucratic modernization of the single-party period that opposed Anatolian 
people’s traditions in some ways. Thus, Cem, contrary to counter-revolution 
argument of Kemalist-leftist circles, celebrated 1950 elections as a bourgeois 
revolution or a kind of democratic revolution; however he never approved of DP’s 
economic policy since he thought it favored higher segments of the society such as 
landowners and bourgeoisie. That DP’s foreign policy fully committed to the USA 
and the West was also a source of problems for Cem. Cem admitted that although the 
27 May intervention brought some positive consequences such as the making of 
1961 constitution, it started the tradition of military coup in Turkey that harmed 
Turkish democracy and led to many other military coups. Cem supported stated-led 
development projects of the JP government and also pointed out that Demirel and 
Çağlayangil’s efforts to create a new multi-dimensional foreign policy were 
appropriate. Cem also thought that the rise of anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism 
as well as labor-based socialist and unionist movements in Turkey, frightened 
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Turkish bourgeoisie and led to the escalation of political violence in the 1970s. Cem 
was extremely critical of the 12 September regime since that the regime used 
political violence as a tool to shape the society and the state, suspended or limited all 
democratic freedoms and rights and also worked in favor of the bourgeoisie. 
Starting from the 1980s, Cem’s main problem became democracy and 
democratic culture instead of development. After witnessing the 12 September 
regime’s violent deeds, Cem began to underline the necessity of coexistence and a 
pluralist model for Turkey in all of his articles and books. This was because there 
were many different political views because of ethnic, religious and sectarian groups 
in Turkish society. He tried to show that democracy is not only about institutions and 
procedures, but also about the flourishing of democratic culture in all parts and 
institutions of the society. He also had a shy but visible change of opinion about 
nature of free-market economics. He tried to formulate a social democratic economic 
policy in conformity with the new world order. In the 1990s, both as a public 
intellectual and a politician, Cem began to defend “new left” and put forward a 
comprehensive political project in order to solve Turkey’s democracy problems 
related to civil-military relations, the Kurdish question and political Islam-secularism 
discussions (these topics will be explained in the fifth chapter). Cem was also one of 
the rare figures in the Turkish left that tried to unify academic knowledge with 
societal realities and had always used the term “social democracy” in order to unite 
very different segments of the society. While criticizing the single-party period, Cem 
tried to use a moderate and peaceful language and praised some positive aspects of 
Kemalism such as to provide a smooth transition to pluralist democracy unlike many 
political Islamists or Kurdish nationalists that denied the positive aspects of the 
Republic and rejected it as a whole. While criticizing Kemalism and single-party era, 
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Cem was constructive rather than destructive and that allowed Cem to be better 
understood and suffer less from prejudices. Although Cem took harsh reactions from 
Kemalist segment especially in the 1970s, in a sense he advocated a moderate social 
democratic Kemalism and aimed to reconcile the regime with its opponents at the 
point of democracy. In that sense, his aim was to glamorize the Republic with full 
scale democracy and to create a literate, libertarian, productive and egalitarian 
society by the means of social democracy. 
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CHAPTER IV
CEM AS A POLITICIAN
Although İsmail Cem, a leftist intellectual coming from a wealthy family, was an 
unusual politician figure for Turkey, his democratic stance and moderate views for 
Turkey’s democratic problems allowed him to attract attentions and gain sympathy from 
all segments of the Turkish society. Cem’s political career started in the 1980s and 
reached its peak in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the Foreign Minister of Turkey. 
However, Cem’s leadership and Prime Ministry ideals could not be realized and he said 
farewell to politics after the failure of his New Turkey Party.
4.1. Understanding of Democracy and the “New Left”
Although İsmail Cem became famous and gained popularity as a young leftist 
journalist and public intellectual and also the innovative director of TRT in the 1970s, 
today he is remembered most as a social democratic politician. In fact, İsmail Cem had 
always been in politics and previously became a member of RPP first in the late 1950s
and later 1970s and organized some activities for the party. However, Cem’s 
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professional political career started in the 1980s and he became a member of SDPP in 
1985. He was elected İstanbul deputy from SDPP in 1987 and 1991. Cem’s active 
political career coincided with the liberal transformation of the country after 12 
September 1980 military coup. 
Following the 12 September 1980 military coup and the transformation of 
Turkey from above which sought a more liberalized and internationalized economy, 
İsmail Cem also had to reconsider his “leftism” and embraced a new social democratic 
understanding based on pluralism and an economy based on free-market economics. His 
understanding of democracy was weakened with regards to economic democracy and he 
embraced free-market economics but with the addition of the necessity of a social state 
and equality of opportunity for everyone. In addition, Cem began to emphasize the 
positive qualities of a democratic regime much more often than before and tried to 
define democracy. Turkish transformation and Cem’s personal transformation also 
coincided with the weakening and the collapse of USSR and the newly established 
hegemony of Western type democracy and free-market economics as the only and 
ultimate truth all around the world. The Western left was reconsidering itself and trying 
to create middle roads between capitalism and socialism as the “third way” and Cem 
was following these developments very closely. By being a graduate student in Political 
Science in Paris and by witnessing the take-over of government by French socialists and 
François Mitterrand, Cem improved his knowledge on modern social democracy. The 
topic of his master’s thesis was “democratic socialism” and thus, Cem had the chance to 
read the whole social democracy literature especially the writings of Karl Kautsky and 
Eduard Bernstein. He was renewing himself and forming the basis of his social 
democratic ideology and he studied new theoretical outlooks on modern social 
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democracy and also prepared himself for active politics. Meanwhile, the deeds of the 
authoritarian military regime in Turkey created a strong support for increasing civil 
democratic liberties and also brought people from different political views closer. That is 
why Cem, along with people from very different worldviews, published a short article in 
a book entitled Democracy and criticized the 12 September regime and tried to underline 
the advantages of democracy after his return to Turkey.1 Cem’s article was about the 
supremacy of “pluralist democracy” and its name was “The Necessity to Coexist” 
(Birbirine Katlanmak Zorunluluğu). Alongside Cem, there were articles by intellectuals 
from both left and right such as Erdal İnönü, Cemil Meriç, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, 
Cahit Tanyol, Mehmet Ali Aybar praising the virtues of democracy. Cem underlined and 
criticized the monist ultimate truth understanding in Turkish politics which was making 
a pluralist democracy very difficult in Turkey.2
The new position of Cem was primarily caused by his understanding of 
democracy. Cem, unlike many of its other definitions, had always highlighted 
democracy as a lifestyle.3 He thought that in order to consolidate a democratic regime, 
democratic practices should be adopted in all institutions and democratic norms should 
be internalized by all segments of the society. In that sense, Cem refused to define 
democracy solely as electoral procedures and underlined that democratic norms should 
be spread everywhere, to families, to political parties, to schools, to mosques and to 
barracks.4 Cem’s particular approach to democracy and his insistence on democratic 
culture made his views closer to the cultural approach in democratization studies. In 
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addition to classical modernization theory (Seymour Martin Lipset), structural, class-
based analysis (Barrington Moore) and transition approach (Dankwart Rustow), the 
fourth approach in comparative democratization studies is related to political culture. 
This approach was first used by Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba in their 
work The Civic Culture5. Almond and Verba argued that there was a positive correlation 
between civil society organizations and people’s participation into civil society 
organizations and a country’s democratic consolidation. In that sense, Almond and 
Verba categorized societies into three groups as parochial, subject and participant 
societies. Scholars including Ronald Inglehart, Valery Bunce and Robert Putnam 
maintained Almond and Verba’s approach and developed the cultural approach in 
democratization studies. Cem’s peculiar approach in Turkish politics as defining
democracy as a lifestyle and aiming to create a participant society is similar to the 
cultural approach in democratization studies. Throughout his political career, Cem had 
always exalted democracy and aimed to spread democratic values everywhere in his 
country. 
Secondly, İsmail Cem thought that in a country like Turkey where statist-
bureaucratic tendencies are very strong, the state should support civil society initiatives 
and present this as a lifestyle and as a requirement of participatory democracy.6 He 
supported Professor Şerif Mardin’s thesis of center-periphery cleavage in Turkish 
society but did not blame the Turkish Republic for this dichotomy and pointed out that 
the Republic inherited this from the Ottoman State.7 According to Cem, the center-
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periphery cleavage and this indifference of the periphery was the most important factor 
that prevented a healthy democratic regime in Turkey. That is why political struggles in 
Turkey were often the product of intra-elite disputes and bureaucratic groupings.8 In that 
sense, Cem wrote that Turkish democratic history was not a product of class struggles 
like in Western societies, but rather the consequence of the dominance of a new 
Westernized bureaucratic group and the lack of democratic understanding in many
institutions including political parties.9 Cem believed that this situation was consolidated 
by the education system especially with regard to the teaching of history which is based 
on the struggle between good and bad and ultimate truth.10 He also asserted that thanks 
to the transformation of the country that started in 1946, Turkey is now more similar to a 
Western country considering its class-based relations unlike its different social history 
and Turkey is now obliged to a democratic regime.11 According to Cem, in order to 
improve and consolidate Turkish democracy, we have to change our habits and 
characteristics that are not in conformity with modern democracy.12 For Cem, the leftist 
border of the new left was to accept pluralist democracy not as a means but as an end in 
itself, whereas the rightist border was to be at least democratic.13
Thirdly, similar to the Marxist revisionism, Cem’s leftist stance after 1980 was 
built upon pluralist democracy and peaceful coexistence. In his view, first of all, 
democracy was a regime that could be successfully processed only if political struggles 
were made within democratic borders without violence.14 Secondly, a democratic regime 
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necessitates a kind of cooperation and accord in certain issues about the characteristics
and procedures of the regime between the real representatives of different social 
forces.15 Cem thought that what made democracy desirable and legitimate was also its 
ability to perpetuate the peaceful coexistence of rival forces.16  In that sense, democracy 
was the free struggle of rival forces within a legal and peaceful perspective, where trying 
to destroy a rival force would mean nothing but renouncing the democratic presence of 
another force.17 That is why a democratic regime should represent the balance of social 
forces and should not favor a particular segment or a social group.18
Cem also tried to classify the problems of Turkish democracy into four headings. 
In his view, the first and the most important problem was the lack of participation.19 In 
Cem’s opinion, this was caused because people saw politics as a sporting match between 
different teams and did not internalize democracy as a means to change the conditions of 
their lives.20 The second problem Cem determined was the lack of compromise and 
accord (uzlaşma) in Turkish politics. Cem thought this could be achieved through 
dialogue and empathy.21 Thirdly, Cem thought that in Turkish democracy there is a 
problem of representation since political parties do not have strong links with people 
(such as social democratic parties’ links with syndicates in Western democracies) and a 
very low intra-party democracy which do not allow politics to address the real issues and 
problems of ordinary people.22 The fourth problem Cem stated was the low level of 
internalization of democracy by Turkish people and Turkey’s institutions, which could 
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be surpassed only with the spread of democratic lifestyles everywhere.23 Cem also 
underlined that democracy is the only thing that does not have an alternative in a 
democratic regime and it should be carefully protected and developed.24 For all these 
reasons, Cem and Baykal underlined the importance of tolerance and empathy in their 
Anatolian Left (Anadolu Solu) or New Left ideology, which meant tolerance for Sunni 
religious piety but also at the same time tolerance for Alevi community.25
The fourth aspect of Cem’s new ideological stance was related to the 
underdevelopment issue. While starting from the 1970s İsmail Cem had always 
emphasized Turkey’s backwardness and supported state led development models, after 
the 12 September coup Cem began to support the view that Turkey could reach the 
standards of European democracy through the EU process.26 Cem probably witnessed 
and was encouraged by the quick transformation and democratization of some European 
countries including Portugal, Spain and Greece in the 1980s but did not explain in detail 
how materialistic conditions had changed in Turkey from the 1970s to 1990s. In that 
sense, Cem’s transformation from an Eastern socialist to Western social democrat was 
concretized on his change of stance about Turkey’s underdevelopment. 
İsmail Cem also tried to explain why democracy is the best regime and why 
people should accept, internalize and carefully protect democracy in his book Siyaset 
Yazıları: “Geçiş Dönemi Türkiyesi” (1981-1984 Yılları). He claimed that if Turkey had 
not transformed into a democratic regime in 1950, there would be still villages without 
electricity and no infrastructure in the country because democracy allowed the Anatolian 
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people, especially the peasants, to be considered important for the center because of 
populism to attract votes.27 Democracy for Cem was a means to provide better life 
conditions and improved chance for people to develop themselves.28 This could be 
achieved only through spreading democratic culture and giving people messages of 
peace, tolerance and understanding to each other.29 For Cem, there was no such thing as 
second class democracy or less developed democracy and democracy should be 
achieved totally as a whole. Thus, political struggles should be made within the borders 
of democratic pluralism and Turkey should make peace with different lifestyles and its 
past.30 Since democracy is a universal regime, Turkey also should adopt democracy with 
universal principles.31 At this point, we can easily notice that Cem’s critical approach 
towards Westernization and Western type democracy had changed in time and Cem 
began to embrace Western democratic ideals as universal norms.
İsmail Cem wrote that the democratic transformation of Turkey forced the state 
to become a regulatory state (düzenleyici devlet) by giving up some of its authority of 
the past. This meant a transition to regulatory state from banning state (yasakçı devlet).32
While this transformation meant increasing political freedoms and the promotion of 
liberal democracy in the political sphere, in the economic sphere it also promoted free-
market economics. Cem knew that liberal economics (free-market economics) could be 
implemented in two ways; either within an authoritarian regime such as in the 
Philippines, South Korea and Chili or within democratic regimes such as in Western 
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European countries.33 Cem wanted Turkey to become a democratic free-market country 
like Western democracies and that is why he always emphasized the necessity of 
democracy. He claimed that the new left would be based on the new social democratic 
economic model. This model would embrace whole segments, social classes of the 
society but would be based primarily on working classes similar to European social 
democratic parties including the French Socialist Party, Swedish Social Democratic 
Party and Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE).34 Cem insisted that neo-liberalism 
tried to present economics purely as a technical matter and suppress all alternative 
projects, but in fact in economics there have always been ideological preferences.35 In 
his view, new left projects should be prepared from a macro perspective and economic 
preferences should be congruent with general ideological and social-cultural 
preferences.36 Cem thought that in time the neo-liberal attacks that started in the 1970s
became very strong and elitism began to be perceived as normal. That is why he thought 
that the left should make a new leap forward and save humanity from the egoistic, elitist 
approaches of neo-liberalism.37 In his perspective, the new left should be based 
primarily on freedom and secondly on equality but if it only promotes freedom, equality 
would not be desirable if it limits freedom.38 In that sense, Cem criticized the Soviet 
model and its bureaucratic structure that promotes inequalities and limits freedoms.39
According to Cem, the lack of freedom and equality obsession caused in the end the 
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collapse of the Soviet model.40 Unlike social democratic movements, Cem thought that 
communist and Soviet models looked at freedom as an instrumental concept whereas for 
the European left freedom was an end and objection in itself (Cem says that social 
democrats should seek freedom for freedom’s sake).41 The new left economic model, 
unlike the Soviet model, should try to expand private property and richness for the 
whole society but not at the expense of freedom.42 In that sense, Cem was advocating 
free-market economics that would work positively for everyone and tried to orient the 
Turkish left to give up from its statist economic and political obsessions.43 In his view, 
the role of the state in economics should be to make necessary organizations for the 
equally and well-balanced allocation of resources.44 In order to achieve this goal, 
privatizations or nationalizations could be made according to social needs. 
In the early 1980s Cem was still claiming that he was defending classical 
European socialism and not a “third way”, but in time he began to use the terms “third 
way” and “new left” more frequently. Together with Deniz Baykal, İsmail Cem tried to 
explain what he meant by “new left” and wrote a booklet45 and a book46. Baykal and 
Cem stated the aim of the new left as a renewal in the left and in Social Democratic 
Populist Party (SDPP) by initiating a theoretical debate about the essence of social 
democracy.47 The first point they criticized was the presence of nationalism and statism 
(étatisme) in Kemalism’s “six arrows” which constituted the basis of RPP and SDPP.48
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They also tried to determine the problems of Turkish democracy and offer their solution 
proposals. The first problem they underlined was the low legitimacy and prestige of the 
parliament in general and the institution of politics due to widespread corruption. Baykal 
and Cem claimed that the working of the parliament should be more transparent and 
open to the participation of the people and nongovernmental organizations.49 The second 
important problem of Turkey was poor economic performance in their view. What they 
offered in order to correct Turkey’s economic performance was to end clandestine 
unregistered economy (kayıtdışı ekonomi) and to increase state’s tax revenues in order to 
spend more on infrastructural investments.50 They also complained about the lack of 
success of the state enterprises and offered privatization or autonomization (özerkleşme) 
for unproductive enterprises.51 They claimed that the state’s first aim in economics was 
to reduce the unemployment rate and to create a growing and more equally shared 
economy.52 The third problem expressed by Baykal and Cem was the lack of equality of 
opportunity in Turkey and the presence of elite privileged groups in all sectors and parts 
of the country.53 In their view, equality of opportunity could be provided for everyone 
by developing underdeveloped regions and segments of the society and improving the 
education, health and social security system of the country. The fourth problem in their 
perspective was the existence of weak civil society in Turkey. In order to overcome this 
problem, they offered a participatory democracy where nongovernmental organizations 
would actively engage in the decision-making process and a peaceful, democratic 
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country in which all lifestyles could freely live, would be created.54 The fifth issue they 
stated was the new and more democratic and tolerant interpretation of laicism or 
secularism which would end polarization between different lifestyles and social 
groups.55 In that sense, Baykal and Cem showed a tolerant approach to the headscarf
(türban) issue and aimed to make a revision of classical statist secularism. Sixthly, they 
aimed to overcome the Kurdish question by offering land reform, economic 
development and individual cultural-democratic freedoms for ethnic identities.56 Lastly, 
they offered to revise the classical foreign policy of Turkey and wanted Turkey to 
become a more influential actor in international relations by using its historical-cultural 
ties with different countries. They stated that EU membership is a main goal for the 
country but this should not be the only aim of Turkish foreign policy.57
4. 2. Contemporary Turkey
After his two terms in the TGNA as SDPP’s İstanbul deputy and his short 
Ministry of Culture, Cem was elected Kayseri deputy twice from DLP in 1995 and 1999. 
After 28 February process, he entered into the office of Foreign Ministry. With his 
successful foreign policy strategies, Turkey took important steps concerning struggle 
against terrorism and became a full member candidate for European Union (Cem’s 
foreign policy will be explained in Chapter 6). He was the star of the coalition 
government and he enjoyed a great support from European media and political circles. 
In Turkey too, he had media support and public sympathy for his political successes and 
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personality. So, just before the dissolution of coalition government in 2002, İsmail Cem 
took his chances with the new party he established; the New Turkey Party (NTP). 
İsmail Cem took a lot of support from the media and liberal and leftist 
intelligentsia due to his successes in the office of Foreign Ministry. Cem claimed that his 
party would constitute the government of contemporary majority and would be a party 
that would solve problems by change instead of creating new problems.58 He underlined 
that Turkey should “fear nothing but its fears” and should become a world state in the 
21st century.59 He presented his party as a center-left party that could embrace everyone, 
all segments of the society.60 Cem praised the Kemalist legacy of the left but also added 
that modern social democracy’s aspects should be added to classical Kemalist principles 
in order to create the government of 21st century.61 He presented a leftism based on 
pluralism instead of statism, libertarianism instead of authoritarianism.62 His social 
democratic project was based on seven main principles: equality of opportunity for 
everyone, job opportunity and employment for everyone, social security for those who 
need it, abolition of privileges in the country, freedom, democracy and peace within the 
country, a developing-growing economy, and security for all alternative lifestyles.63 He 
defined his party’s mission as “renovate Turkey” and like the name of the party tried to 
create a new and democratic Turkey.64
After the failure of New Turkey Party in the 2002 general elections, İsmail Cem 
did not resign from active politics until his party’s merge with RPP on 24 October 2004 
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and continued to head NTP.65 He underlined that his party would keep major social 
democratic principles, unlike the neo-liberal transformation of European social 
democrats that led to failure of Tony Blair and decaying British social democracy, but it 
will also try new methods in order to reach people.66 Cem thought that social 
democracy’s classical voters consisted of middle-class segments and working class and 
that his party should primarily embrace these segments.67 He admitted that social 
democracy could not get over the collapse of USSR and rising neo-liberal hegemony but 
it should face the new conditions of the century and especially globalization as soon as 
possible.68 He promised political ethic law and a reform in the judicial system in order to 
democratize Turkey and bring it closer to European standards.69 Environmentalism and 
environmental policies were also a new aspect of NTP similar to the Green parties of 
European countries.70 Cem also followed the Justice and Development Party’s 
performance very closely and brought harsh criticism to the JDP on some issues 
including foreign policy, economics and secularism. 
According to Cem, the secularism-Islamism clash in the early 21st century (after 
9/11 and the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq) brought a dangerous 
polarization in Turkey and created a false dichotomy between the RPP and the JDP.71 He 
analyzed the 2002 elections as the race of fears since pious people were afraid of RPP’s 
harsh secularism rhetoric and secularist segments were afraid of JDP’s Islamist slogans 
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and policies.72 Similar to his thesis of the 1970s, he criticized bureaucratic approaches in 
the left and asserted that rightist and Islamist parties (JDP in 2002 elections) gathered
leftist votes due to their close stance to people.73 He criticized RPP for being the 
defender of status quo unlike his party the NTP, which was innovative and reformist.74
He argued that the NTP would not be a party that would continue the old feuds but
rather it would unify and embrace different segments of the society.75 He also expressed 
his fears about the JDP although he stated that he did not approach the JDP with 
prejudice. Cem basically defined the JDP as the party of grand capital.76 However, he 
supported the JDP’s reforms about Turkey’s full accession to EU.77 In his view, full 
accession to EU was very important for Turkey but it should not be turned into an 
obsession and if it was not realized, it would not mean the end of the world.78
İsmail Cem also blamed the JDP for making secret agreements with USA about 
helping the U.S. invasion of Iraq.79 He warned the government not to be involved in 
invasion of Iraq unless a decision was made under the roof of the United Nations.80 In 
his view, Turkey should keep its close relationship with the USA but this did not mean 
accepting all American proposals.81 He criticized the JDP government’s disrespectful 
approach to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ President of the Republic Rauf 
Denktaş.82 Considering some of its practices in foreign policy and economics, he labeled 
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the JDP as a party having the mentality of a colony (müstemleke zihniyeti)83 and wrote 
that self-respect (haysiyet) is very necessary in foreign policy.84 He encouraged the JDP
officials for being more courageous and self-respectful in international relations for 
being respected and powerful.85 By praising himself, he thought that he handled a 
Turkey on the peak of foreign policy in 2002 but the JDP soon lost this position and 
transformed Turkey into a weaker actor.86 Especially, the JDP’s weak reaction after the 
capture and hooding of Turkish soldiers by the American army was a scandal in Cem’s 
perspective.87 In his view, the JDP economically favored grand capital instead of the 
people on the street, was acting without any backbone in foreign policy, was defending 
some policies that were not in conformity with the secular principles of the Republic and 
was spreading corruption and immorality.88 He also found the JDP dissimulative 
(takiyyeci) in some issues and thought that it was a marginal and highly ideological party 
that forcefully dictated its program from above.89
Cem also made a self-criticism of Turkish social democracy’s legacy of three 
decades. He primarily stated that Turkish social democracy began to move away from 
social democratic principles and embraced neo-liberalism starting from the 1980s.90
Secondly, he thought that the left was not successful in renewing itself and reaching the 
dynamism of the society.91 Third, he asserted that the left has turned into its 
bureaucratic-elitist structure before 1972 due to the erroneous policies of RPP and 
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fourth, the left has distanced itself from its classical proletarian voters.92 Fifth, he 
believed that the left could not reach people’s sensitivities and their internal world.93
Sixth, Turkish social democracy in his view was not able to develop solutions to macro 
problems of Turkey such as unemployment.94 Moreover, he criticized the Turkish left 
for not being democratic in itself while trying to be social.95 Also, he thought that the 
left did not aim to expand its voters and always tried to keep what was in his hands,
forgetting its aim of being in power. Lastly, the Turkish left could not spread hope and 
enthusiasm to Turkish people and in a sense left poor people and lower segments of the 
society to the justice of Islamist parties.96 İsmail Cem also tried to summarize the 
principles and the aims of new Turkish social democracy as a reconciled, peaceful, 
libertarian, growing, getting richer, renewing, fairly managed, non-feudal, clean and 
green Turkey where female-male equality and social solidarity is provided for.97 He 
made efforts to create a real social democratic party like the European social democratic 
parties and gave enormous emphasis to intraparty democracy in NTP’s charter (tüzük). 
For instance, NTP charter necessitated a presidential election at a maximum of three
years and limited a person’s presidency with four terms.98
4.3. Contributions
İsmail Cem had four terms and 15 years in Turkish Parliament and had a very 
fruitful political career. Especially during his Foreign Ministry, Cem became a star and 
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was largely credited with Turkey's declaration as a full member candidate during the 
Helsinki summit in 1999. The capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and Turkish-
Greek rapprochement were other important achievements in Cem’s career. However, in 
addition to Cem’s political and international successes, today he is probably 
remembered most with his humane qualities and kind rhetoric in politics. Coming from a 
wealthy and well-rooted family, İsmail Cem with his intellectual capacity, mild political 
debating style and humanistic approach to politics in a sense brought courtesy to Turkish 
politics. Cem’s kind political style was in fact a reflection of his humanist social 
democratic worldview. After his passing, all columnists and politicians were underlining 
Cem’s humane personality and mild manners. For instance, Milliyet newspaper 
columnist Fikret Bila wrote that “Cem was the closest politician to Ecevit in terms of 
courtesy” and another Milliyet writer Melih Aşık stated that “Cem was friendly to all 
political analysts and journalists even to those who harshly criticize him”.99 DLP leader 
Zeki Sezer also stated that Cem’s most important legacy in politics was his courtesy and 
ability to reach consensus.100 During his whole political career, Cem got positive 
reactions from different political circles because of his democratic, humanist stance and 
polite debating style. Cem’s courtesy brought prestige to Turkish politics especially 
compared to later ill-mannered political discussions and polemics. Cem’s style in 
politics in fact resembled the skills of a successful diplomat with a determinate but 
elegant debating style101. In that sense, Cem could be labeled as a diplomat politician 
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rather than charismatic populist or demagogue type of politician. He could be also 
described as an iron fist in velvet gloves because of his gentle but not retreating debating 
and negotiating style. These qualities also helped Turkey to develop stronger 
cooperative relations with countries that have political problems or historical conflicts 
with Turkey. When he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cem’s friendship with his 
counterpart Mr. Papandreou and his peaceful and kind rhetoric allowed two countries to 
get over their historical struggles and recent political crisis. Cem’s diplomat politician 
qualities might also have played a role in Turkish people’s perception of him as a great 
man of duty, but not as a political leader since he was not successful at elections with his 
NTP. As a consequence of his gentle-humanist personality, democratic-libertarian 
political views and his successful deeds as a statesman, Cem’s name has not been 
forgotten after his passing and probably will not be in the near future.
Another important legacy of İsmail Cem in Turkish politics is related to his 
innovative personality. Starting from his visit to USA when he was 16, Cem has always 
had interest in high technology and he wanted his country to become as technologically 
developed as the USA.102 As the innovative young director of TRT in 1974, he made a 
technological leap forward in order to add all parts and cities of Turkey to the service 
area. Following the construction of TRT studios in İstanbul, new broadcasting stations 
opened in Antalya, İstanbul, İzmir, Kayseri and Mudanya.103 Preparations for the 
opening of new broadcasting stations in Samsun, Gaziantep and Diyarbakır were 
terminated.104 TRT was broadcasting five days and twenty hours per week before Cem’s 
take over. Cem increased TRT’s broadcasting to seven days and fifty-two hours per 
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week.105 Moreover, in his tenure in office as the Minister of Culture in the mid 1990s, 
Cem was the only Minister who used a laptop computer.106   
Another important contribution made by İsmail Cem was the use of the notion of 
change and dynamism in Turkish politics. Although Turkey has always been a country 
with social dynamism and a large-scale of youth population, dynamism and the notion of 
change was not effectively underlined in Turkish politics before Cem. In their intraparty 
opposition against SDPP leader Erdal İnönü, Cem together with Baykal had always 
emphasized change and published a booklet entitled “Değişim” (Change)107 in order to 
display their program to everyone. After three defeats against İnönü, Baykal and Cem 
did not give up and published a book called Yeni Sol (New Left) in order to put forward 
their program for social democracy’s transformation and change.108 One of the earliest 
deed of Cem as the Minister of Foreign Affairs was to change the classical passive 
Turkish foreign policy understanding and replace it with a dynamic foreign policy 
mentality. After the dissolution of the coalition government, Cem finally established his 
own party NTP and became the leader of the party in 2002. The name of the party was 
“New Turkey Party”, a name very convenient for Cem’s insistence of change and 
innovation for long years. The party had a reformist character and Cem’s rhetoric was 
again mostly based on change. 
İsmail Cem was also a self-confident and ambitious man, a quality to be found in 
all successful politicians. Although he was a gentle man, Cem never hesitated to step 
forward and take initiative in politics. For instance, on 26 June 1988, at the second 
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regular Congress of SDPP, İsmail Cem stepped forward and in the control struggles over 
the party between leader Erdal İnönü and group vice President Deniz Baykal, he 
courageously became a candidate for party’s leadership.109 Cem later said that he was 
not hopeful about winning, but what he wanted to boost dynamism and discussions 
about renewal and the ideological transformation about the party.110 However, his 
surprise candidacy shows his motivation and ambitions for leadership and political 
success. In 1993, after the unexpected death of Turgut Özal, TPP leader Süleyman 
Demirel became the ninth President of the Republic. İsmail Cem unexpectedly became a 
candidate for the Presidency, but he could not find the support he needed. This was the 
second time Cem was trying to step forward and this was surely indicating that behind 
his very tolerant and gentle personality, Cem was a self-confident and ambitious man,
especially in politics. Cem’s ambitious and courageous personality appeared third time 
in 2002. When Ecevit was hospitalized due to his poor health, the media started a 
campaign against his government and all journalists underlined the necessity of a pro-
Western liberal or social democratic party that would be ruled by a healthy leader. 
Although Cem was very respectful towards Ecevit, he resigned from DLP and together 
with Hüsamettin Özkan and Kemal Derviş they began to make plans for a new political 
party. The media was labeling Özkan-Derviş-Cem trio as the “troika movement”111 and 
many important intellectuals, journalists and academicians were declaring that they 
would support this movement. Cem was thought to be the leader of the movement, 
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Derviş as the Minister of Economics and Özkan as the Interior Affairs Minister.112 On 
12 July 2002, İsmail Cem held a press conference and declared that the troika movement 
would transform into a political party of the “modern majority” that would lead Turkey 
to the full accession to EU.113 This was the third time he was taking risks and stepping 
forward for his political ambitions although the results were not satisfactory in all of 
these three cases. In that sense, İsmail Cem’s leadership ambition was finally realized in 
2002 but he could not be successful with his NTP and had to be contended with Foreign 
Ministry. Moreover, although everybody know that politics is a ruthless game and 
conditions forced Cem to step forward, Cem’s last efforts to become a leader during 
Ecevit’s poor health conditions damaged his honest and trustworthy image in the eyes of 
some people since many people believe that this period was not that natural and normal. 
This image might also have led to the failure of Cem’s New Turkey Party in 2002 
general and 2004 local elections.  
Another important contribution and characteristic of İsmail Cem as a social 
democratic politician was his insistence on localness, a rarely seen attitude in the 
Turkish left which has a long tradition of from top to down modernization due to its 
Kemalist legacy. Both as a public intellectual and a politician, İsmail Cem tried to base 
his model of social democracy on native and national historical and cultural values and 
showed a great deal of interest towards Ottoman-Turkish history. Although Cem was 
coming from a rich and westernized family, his effort to understand pious people’s 
internal worlds and moral values was very valuable and it helped and encouraged 
Turkish left to embrace people and internalize democracy more and more. At this point, 
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Cem’s identities as a public intellectual and as a politician were unified at the point of 
non-conditional democracy. Cem and Baykal tried to formulate the “Anatolian Left” in 
order to eliminate the strong prejudices of pious people towards the RPP and towards the 
left in general. Unlike some radical figures of the left during his whole intellectual and 
political life Cem never disrespected people’s values and religious sentiments and acted 
as a good role model.
Maybe the most important contribution made by İsmail Cem in Turkish political 
life was intellectual depth. İsmail Cem, with his intellectual personality and depth, 
brought an academic quality to Turkish politics. Compared to other political figures who 
had a lower education level and less intellectual accumulation over Turkish political 
history, Cem raised the bar in political discussions. In many political debates and 
polemics within the country and on the international level, Cem had chance to show his 
superior knowledge of history and political science. For instance, before Turkish-Greek 
rapprochement, Cem was criticizing Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros 
Pangalos harshly for his country’s support for terrorism and blamed it for making racism 
by referencing the fascist Greek government during the Second World War that 
delivered 58.000 Jews to Nazi government in Germany, a statement that stirred the pot 
in Europe, the USA and Israel.114 In addition, when violence broke out between players 
and officials (policemen) at the end of a European Champions League match between 
Galatasaray and their Italian rivals AS Roma football clubs in 2002, Cem warned 
international community and said “This is very serious. The Italian police showed no 
mercy, striking our players with their sticks. Watching from television and looking at the 
newspapers, I thought I was watching the time of fascist Mussolini, not Europe in 2002” 
                                                
114 İsmail Cem, Dış İşleri Bakanı İsmail Cem Konuşmalar Demeçler Açıklamalar, p. 245.
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by referencing fascist past of Italy.115 During his Foreign Ministry, Cem’s cultural 
accumulation and intellectual personality helped him to establish good relations with his 
counterparts. After his passing away, Milliyet columnist Taha Akyol was stating that he 
was one of the most important intellectuals of the country and his works, especially his 
famous book The History of Underdevelopment in Turkey, which related the Ottoman 
State to the Turkish Republic, is no less valuable than important professional historians’ 
classical books.116
İsmail Cem also deserves to be remembered for his colorful and versatile 
personality. Unlike typical boring politician figures in Turkey who seem to have been
born and have been living solely for politics, Cem had always been an exciting person 
and had other many skills and hobbies other than politics. Photography was Cem’s most 
widely recognized hobby and skill. Cem published two photographic album books and 
arranged five exhibitions. In photography, Cem adopted an artistic style and produced 
photographs based on the color harmony of picturesque landscapes rather than a social 
realist perspective.117 Even when he was bedridden in his last days, he was taking 
pictures of animals from the television screen.118 He wrote poems and read many literary 
books throughout his life. He visited many parts of the world and took pictures. Cem 
was also devoted to animals and cared for a canary and dogs in addition to his aquarium 
hobby. Cem was also a sports lover and he especially loved football (soccer). He was a 
good fan of the Galatasaray football club and he sometimes went to football matches. 
                                                
115 BBC News, retrieved on 23.12.2010 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1872964.stm.
116 Hürriyet newspaper internet archive, retrieved on 05.05.2010 from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/5828913.asp?m=1&gid=112&srid=3428&oid=1. 
117 Cüneyt Özdemir, Reytingsiz Sohbetler, pp. 99-100.
118 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 267.
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The last important aspect that can be shown as an example of İsmail Cem’s 
contributions to Turkish politics is related to moral values. İsmail Cem had always 
underlined the importance of morality and criticized Turkish system for not producing 
basic moral values such as the supremacy of honesty and prevention of corruption.119
For Cem, Turkey needed to back up its Islamic moral values with secular morality
(ethics) in order to get rid of corruption problem similar to the synthesis of Christian and 
humanist morality in Europe. He admitted that although the necessity of good morality 
was understood and somehow achieved in the early years of the Republic, after the 
decline of earlier republican enthusiasm, Turkey has become a country without culture 
and morality.120 In accordance with his views on the necessity of high morality, Cem 
had always been an honest and clean politician and unlike many Turkish politicians 
hiding behind their legislative immunity, Cem’s name was never involved in a scandal 
or criminal event. After his death, the JDP deputy and Minister of Social Security Murat 
Başesgioğlu was also pointing out Cem’s honesty and high morality unlike many other 
politicians in Turkey.121 Cem’s insistence on secular morality was also very important in 
a country having Muslim population, since morality can be easily equated with religious 
fundamentalism and dogmatism. 
The most important criticism made towards Cem was related to his decision of 
leaving Ecevit alone in his difficult days. Cem also seemed sentimental and a bit 
regretful while talking about this period to journalist Can Dündar. He had a similar type 
of experience when he was offered his position in the Ministry of Culture and had to 
                                                
119 İsmail Cem, Gelecek İçin Denemeler, pp. 174-178.
120 ibid., p. 179.
121 Hürriyet newspaper internet archive, retrieved on 05.05.2010 from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/5828913.asp?m=1&gid=112&srid=3428&oid=1. 
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leave his friend Deniz Baykal in 1995. However, it should be noted that these are very 
common behaviors in politics all over the world and many people had only found Cem’s 
attitude strange because of Cem’s honest and reliable personality and image.
Another point of criticism towards Cem could be made in terms of leadership 
charisma. Although Cem was a good-looking and sympathetic politician having a 
trustworthy image in the eyes of Turkish people, it should be noted that he was not that 
successful in creating bonds with ordinary people unlike charismatic leaders in Turkish 
political history such as Bülent Ecevit or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In that sense, Cem’s 
leadership ideal was not realistic and he was better off as a second and wise man behind 
a charismatic leader.
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CHAPTER V
VIEWS ON CHALLENGES TO CONTEMPORARY 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
İsmail Cem, starting from the beginning of his writing-journalism career, did not 
hesitate to write on controversial topics and take responsibility for contributing to the 
democratization and democratic consolidation of his own country. In this chapter, İsmail 
Cem’s views on three main problems related to Turkish democratic consolidation: 
namely, civil-military relations, the Kurdish question and political Islam - secularism 
discussions will be analyzed by focusing on Cem’s own writings on these issues. 
5.1. Civil-Military Relations
Civil-military relations have been a controversial and vital topic in Turkish 
politics. There were four major military interventions (the 27 May 1960 and 12 
September 1980 military coups, the 12 March 1971 memorandum and the 28 February 
1997 National Security Council meeting) and many other open and hidden intervention 
attempts in Turkish political history (most familiar attempts were two failed revolts 
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made by Colonel Talat Aydemir in the early 1960s). Professor Ergun Özbudun stated 
that although unlike Latin American countries’ armies, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) did 
not stay in power for a long a period and restored democracy within a reasonably short
period after each intervention, and on each occasion the military also “gained important 
exit guarantees that enhanced its role in the subsequent democratic regime”.1 While TAF 
acquired large civilian support for its interventions due to extreme political polarization 
and violence in the country, in recent years there has been growing reaction (both from 
leftist and rightist circles) against past military interventions and current attempts to 
shape the civilian political sphere. The military’s weight in Turkish politics has been 
reasonably diminished by the EU full integration process but the TAF’s unique and 
important position in Turkish political system (due to historical, cultural, political factors 
and the state tradition2) still continues albeit at a lower degree. Frank Tachau and Metin 
Heper in their article “The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey” by using Eric 
Nordlinger’s classification of different roles of military as moderator, guardian and ruler 
types, analyzed the TAF’s role in Turkish politics and claimed that during Cold War 
conditions the TAF hesitated between its moderator and guardianship roles.3 It could be 
asserted that following Turkey’s transition to democracy after 12 September 1980 (in 
which the military could be claimed to have assumed the ruler role), TAF began to 
accept the conditions of a European type democracy while still trying to keep its 
moderator role. 
                                                
1 Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, p. 105.
2 For Professor Heper, Ottoman-Turkish state elites’ perception of civil society remained largely Hegelian 
and thus, “civil society was for the most part conceived as a sphere of universal egoism”. So, Heper 
thought that Ottoman-Turkish political history tells us that the Turkish state tradition is based on a strong 
state and a weak civil society formulation, a patrimonial and monist tradition of the state. See; Metin 
Heper, The State Tradition In Turkey, pp. 16-17.
3 For a detailed analysis, see; Frank Tachau and Metin Heper. “The State, Politics, and the Military in 
Turkey” in Comparative Politics, 16, No. 1, October 1983, pp. 17-33.
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The first military intervention took place on 27 May 1960 as a reaction to 
increasing Democrat Party authoritarianism. The coup is still interpreted as a revolution 
by many Kemalist and leftist thinkers because it happened as a consequence of protest 
demonstrations organized by students and citizens in İstanbul and Ankara. Especially the 
demonstration known as “555 K”4 showed that the DP authoritarianism against 
opposition journalists and students created a strong reaction in urban elite and provided 
for a convenient environment for military intervention. The “555 K” meeting was 
followed by the unprecedented protest demonstration of military cadets on 21 May 1960 
in Ankara.5 On 27 May 1960, the government was taken over by the National Unity 
Committee composed by lower-ranked military officers who later invited support of 
retired and respected general Cemal Gürsel.6 İsmail Cem thought that the DP’s 
oppressive policies towards the intellectuals and journalists played a significant role in 
the legitimacy of 27 May 1960 military intervention.7 In Cem’s view, the most important 
reason of the 27 May intervention was the discomfort of the bureaucracy which had lost 
its power and became subjected to arbitrary pressures during DP rule. Although in 
accordance with Kemalist principles, bureaucracy (including the Turkish Armed Forces) 
had previously accepted the supremacy of democracy and the rule of civilians, the DP 
rule’s exclusion of the bureaucracy from the ruling coalition, its authoritarian practices 
that acquired legitimacy from the 1924 constitution and economic problems due to their 
inflationist policies created anger towards the DP.8 That is why, bureaucratic institutions 
                                                
4 It is a symbol referring to the date and place of the demonstration as the 5th day of the 5th month at 5 
o’clock pm in Ankara’s Kızılay district (5 May 1960 at 17.00 in Kızılay).
5 Andrew Mango. 2004. The Turks Today. London: John Murray Publishers, p. 52. 
6 ibid., pp. 52-53.
7 İsmail Cem, Türkiye Üzerine (Araştırmalar), p. 40. 
8 İsmail Cem, Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi, pp. 395-396.
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and intellectuals constituted the leading force behind the intervention.9 The new 1961 
constitution aimed at limiting executive power and distributing power among 
bureaucratic-state institutions such as the National Security Council, Republican Senate, 
Constitutional Court, autonomous universities and State Planning Organization, and for 
many it had a democratic character.10 Cem until the 1980s politically supported the 27 
May intervention11 since he believed that in a country where civil democratic forces are 
still very weak, there is no other way except for a progressive military intervention that 
could prevent a party dictatorship which aimed to close down the opposition party (RPP) 
and to establish its authoritarian rule.12 Some other writers, especially from liberal and 
Islamist tradition, also blamed the USA for the 27 May intervention since they claimed 
that Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was searching for Soviet help and credits due to 
the economic crisis and new industrial investments just a few months before the coup.13
The second intervention occurred on 12 March 1971 when Turkish Armed 
Forces issued a memorandum against the Demirel government which could not prevent 
rising student demonstrations and self-styled guerilla movements. In Cem’s view, the 
first and basic reason of 12 March fascism was about some deeds of the Demirel 
government overshadowing the interests of the privileged bourgeois segments in the 
country. Cem pointed out that the democratic leap forward that Turkey had achieved due 
to the 1961 constitution created a free environment where syndical activities and 
                                                
9 Cem considers the 27 May as the “product of urban educated people”. See; ibid., p. 398.
10 ibid., pp. 397-399.
11 27 May 1960 intervention is still widely seen as a revolution in the Kemalist-leftist tradition. See; “27 
Mayıs İhtilali”, Cumhuriyet, retrieved on 30.10.2009 from 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?im=yhs&hn=59104.
12 İsmail Cem, Türkiye Üzerine (Araştırmalar), p. 41.
13 See Cengiz, Çandar, “Amerika, bu “darbe”nin neresinde?”, Hürriyet, retrieved on 30.10.2009 from 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=8561783. For many others, this may be a turning point of 
conspiracy theories in Turkish political life.  
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socialist views could develop freely within the country. The democratic transformation 
of the left by giving up revolutionary Marxism brought democratic socialism to the 
governments in many parts of the world and that is why sovereign classes (bourgeoisie, 
landowners), by making a coalition with bureaucratic institutions, established fascist 
regimes, overthrowing socialist governments in Brazil, Greece, Chile and Turkey.14 For 
Cem, Turkey’s democratic transformation in the 1960s led to the strengthening of 
socialist views and eventually demands for collectivization, land reform and labor 
movements that frightened the bourgeoisie.15  Especially big worker demonstrations 
such as the 15-16 June events in 1970 agitated the bourgeoisie and triggered its fears 
about a socialist take-over.16 The emergence of the Turkish Labor Party’s opposition in 
Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, the “left of the center” transformation of the RPP 
and the intellectual domination of statist-socialist views as well as demands and 
discussions about nationalization of strategic sectors increased Turkish bourgeoisie’s 
fears.17 The second important cause of 12 March was the USA and its effect on Turkey 
during the Cold War. Demirel government’s populist deeds sometimes contradicted with 
the interests of the bourgeoisie and the USA, and its lack of capacity to prevent the 
widespread socialist ideology was the other stimulus for the 12 March fascism.18 The 
efforts of monopolies and “Istanbulite capital” to protect their advantaged position 
against rising Anatolian conservative entrepreneurs and firms were also additional 
factors that led to the 12 March regime.19 The Turkish bourgeoisie was in favor of 
Turkey’s dependency on the USA and the Western bloc and was ready to give up 
                                                
14 İsmail Cem, Tarih Açısından 12 Mart, p. 327.
15 ibid., pp. 329-342.
16 ibid., p. 337.
17 ibid., p. 339.
18 ibid., pp. 352-355.
19 ibid., pp. 355-363.
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democracy in order to preserve their wealth and privileged status. That is why, the 
Turkish elite was supporting a pro-American foreign policy which contradicted with 
Demirel government’s search for autonomy and more independence under the 
conditions of the Cold War.20
The third military intervention came on 12 September 1980 as a reaction to 
Turkey’s terrible economic and political situation and armed clashes on the streets 
between leftist and rightist groups that led to the death of thousands of people 
throughout the 1970s. For İsmail Cem, there were two main reasons for the 12 
September coup. In Cem’s view the first reason of the rise of extreme right was class-
based conflicts in the country. Cem thought that the privileged segments (bourgeoisie) of 
the country that were backed up by the military-political establishment supported or at 
least tolerated the rise of fascism and Nationalist Action Party’s anti-democratic 
tendencies with the idea of protecting themselves against the threat of rising socialism.21
According to İsmail Cem, the second important reason of the rise of extreme right in 
Turkey was related to international relations and the preferences of USA that had serious 
influence in the shaping of Turkey’s internal politics as the leader of Western capitalist 
bloc and NATO. Cem thought that although European countries, especially European 
leftists supported democratization and democratic movements in Turkey22, the USA 
deliberately helped rightist groups to suppress leftist movements that could be dangerous 
for the USA because of their anti-imperialistic stance. The U.S. support of the coup was 
also acknowledged by the CIA Ankara station chief Paul Henze. After the government 
                                                
20 It must be stated that after the famous Johnson Letter, Demirel governments tried to develop a multi-
dimensional foreign policy -for instance Turkey became a member of Organization of the Islamic 
Conference- and their policies sometimes contradicted American foreign policy preferences.    
21 İsmail Cem, Tarih Açısından 12 Mart, pp. 12-13.
22 ibid, p. 22.
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was overthrown, Henze cabled Washington, saying, “Our boys in Ankara did it”.23 This 
has created the impression that the USA stood behind the coup. Henze denied this during 
a June 2003 interview on CNN Türk’s Manşet, but two days later Birand presented an 
interview with Henze recorded in 1997 in which he basically confirmed Mehmet Ali 
Birand’s story. 
The generals who came to power on 12 September took their time to lay the 
foundations of a new order.24 On September 12 at 04.00 clock in the morning, the 
National Security Council  headed by Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren declared 
the coup d'état on the national channel. The NSC then declared martial law throughout 
the country, abolished the Parliament and the government, suspended the constitution 
and banned all political parties and trade unions. Within a very short time, 650.000 
people were detained. Among these, nearly 230.000 were imprisoned, 30.000 escaped 
from the country, 14.000 were stripped of citizenship and 50 were executed.25 All 
important political figures of the period including Bülent Ecevit, Süleyman Demirel, 
Alparslan Türkeş, Deniz Baykal and Necmettin Erbakan were also incarcerated and 
temporarily suspended from politics. NSC regime made administrative reforms against 
terrorism, which included organizational changes and adaptations. The administrative 
reforms established coordination agencies, state of emergency (OHAL) rule, and a 
specialized section under police department. Meanwhile, a large arsenal of illegal arms 
was confiscated, including 7.000 machine-guns, 48.000 rifles, 640.000 handguns and 26 
                                                
23 Mehmet Ali Birand, 12 Eylül Saat: 04.00, p. 1.
24 Andrew Mango, The Turks Today, p. 81.
25 See; Ozan Örmeci, İttihat ve Terakki’den AKP’ye Türk Siyasal Tarihi, pp 85. One notable victim of the
hangings was a 17-year-old Erdal Eren, who later became a symbol of 12 September opposition.
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rocket launchers.26 The coup also decided to adopt a new constitution that included 
mechanisms to prevent what they saw as impeding the functioning of democracy. On 29 
June 1981 the military junta appointed 160 people as members of an Advisory Assembly 
to draft a new constitution. The new constitution brought clear limits and definitions, 
such as on the rules of election of the President of the Republic, which was stated as a 
factor for the coup d'état.27 On 7 November 1982 the new constitution was put to a 
referendum, which was accepted with a resounding 92% majority (some say due to 
pressure). On 9 November 1982 Kenan Evren was appointed President for the next 
seven years. In 1983, Turkey passed to democratic civilian life again although the 
military kept its exit guarantees and only three parties approved by the military could 
run in the elections.
Although starting from 1983, civil-military relations began to be normalized 
gradually, Professor Ergun Özbudun claimed that the TAF provided and kept its weight 
in civilian politics using five instruments. The first way was referring to “tutelary 
powers” which have been used by incorporating certain substantive values (territorial 
integrity, national sovereignty, secularism, Kemalist principles) cherished by the 
military into the constitution, by creating military-dominated formal institutions 
entrusted with the constitutional duty of preserving such values (National Security 
Council) or through ambiguous constitutional references to the role of military as 
guarantor of the constitution.28 The second way used by militaries in general and TAF in 
particular was reference to reserved domains (again National Security Council could be 
                                                
26 Andrew Mango, The Turks Today, p. 81.
27 Before 12 September, Turkish Parliament was unable to elect a President of the Republic which was 
another factor increasing the legitimacy of the coup.
28 Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, pp. 106-
110.
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given as an example) which meant a high degree of military autonomy in certain policy 
areas such as in defense policy.29 Thirdly, military regimes may attempt to manipulate 
electoral processes to preserve themselves a larger share of power in the upcoming 
democratic regime as it was seen in Turkey’s 1983 general elections in which only three 
parties approved by the military could be run.30 Fourthly, departing military regimes 
may try to make some of their actions irreversible such as the transitional article 15 of 
Turkey’s 1982 constitution which stated that the laws passed by the ruling military 
council could not be challenged for unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Court 
even after transition to democracy.31 Lastly, military regimes may try to declare amnesty 
laws on crimes committed by the military regime which was implemented by the 
transitional article 15 in the 1982 constitution.32
Professor Ergun Özbudun underlines that the 1983 Turkish democratic transition 
was “almost a textbook example of the degree to which a departing military regime can 
dictate the conditions of its departure” and only 25 years after transition a very 
significant degree of civilianization could occur.33 In that sense, Özbudun claimed that 
the “post-1983 period led many observers to think that a satisfactory degree of civilian 
control over the military had been achieved and that Turkey was no longer 
fundamentally different from established Western democracies”.34 Especially after the 
election of first civilian president (Turgut Özal) since the 1950s, Heper and Güney 
concluded that “as the Third Turkish Republic entered its second decade, civil-military 
                                                
29 Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, pp. 110-
112.
30 ibid., pp. 112-114. 
31 ibid., pp. 114-115.
32 ibid., pp. 115-116.
33 ibid., p. 117. 
34 ibid., p. 119.
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relations came close to the liberal-democratic model”.35 Two exceptions to this view can 
be stated as the 28 February 1997 process and the recent e-memorandum crisis. The 
February 28 process is named after the date of the historical National Security Council 
meeting on 28 February 1997 in which the TAF dictated some conditions to the 
government such as eight-year compulsory secular education and eventually led to the 
dissolution of Refahyol government (coalition of Necmettin Erbakan’s Virtue Party and 
Tansu Çiller’s True Path Party). Although the process was not totally convenient for a 
civil-democratic regime, at least the military and secular segments used media and 
democratic institutions (such as the National Security Council and the post of President 
of Republic by Süleyman Demirel) which led many observers to define this process as a 
“post-modern coup”. Özbudun stated that the 28 February process demonstrated the 
limits of the military’s tolerance for civilian leadership which means two core values -
indivisible integrity of the state and the secular character of the Republic- could not be 
surpassed.36 More recently, on 27 April 2007, TAF declared from its website an “e-
memorandum” targeting the JDP government and again emphasized the military’s limits 
concerning secularism and nation-state which shows that civil-military relations in 
Turkey are still problematic. The e-memorandum is claimed to have caused the JDP’s 
landslide electoral success in the July 22, 2007 general elections and in a sense seemed 
to weaken military’s weight in politics but it also increased polarization in the country.
İsmail Cem naturally wrote and developed his theories about this most important 
and controversial issue of Turkish democracy. Although he admitted that he had 
                                                
35 Metin Heper and Aylin Güney. 1996. “The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic” in 
Armed Forces and Society, no: 22, Summer 1996, p. 636. 
36 Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, p. 121.
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welcomed the 27 May 1960 intervention when he was young37, Cem as a social 
democrat never approved or supported military interventions even at the expense of 
coming up against some important figures in the left that engaged in search for leftist 
junta in the 1960s. Cem’s ideas about the nature of civil-military relations were formed 
in accordance with his theories about international relations and class-based analyses. 
First of all, Cem pointed out that the TAF as the founder of Turkish Republic considered 
itself as the vanguard of modernization and did not hesitate to intervene in Turkish 
political life after the passing of Atatürk especially after transition to multi-party regime 
with the help of Cold War conditions. During single party rule, Cem thought that there 
was a coalition organized by the Republican elite and formed between the military 
(bureaucracy in general), Istanbulite business circles and Anatolian local notables.38 This 
structure was somehow protected with the help of Cold War mostly due to American 
support of the status quo in Turkey which was functioning as the gendarme station of 
NATO and Western bloc in those years. 
Cem as a young Marxist thought that bureaucracy and bureaucratic institutions 
(such as the military) was always close to sovereign classes and higher segments of the 
society. In that sense, Cem aimed to explain military interventions from a class-based 
materialistic point of view. Especially for 12 March and 12 September, Cem always 
underlined Turkish bourgeoisie’s provocative efforts for military interventions against 
the rising leftist-socialist movements in the country that had threatened Turkish 
bourgeoisie’s privileged status and wealth. Cem, with great confidence on his views 
based on the deterministic nature of dialectic materialism, explained the 12 March 
                                                
37 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 56.
38 İsmail Cem, Türkiye Üzerine (Araştırmalar), p. 56.
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phenomenon from a socialist, class-based point of view and wrote “that invisible hand of 
history was never apparent as it was in the case of 12 March”.39 For Cem, Turkey’s 
democratic transformation in the 1960s led to the strengthening of socialist views and 
eventually demands for collectivization, land reform and labor movements that
frightened the bourgeoisie.40 The emergence of Turkish Labor Party’s opposition with 
the Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, the “left of the center” transformation of RPP 
and the intellectual domination of statist-socialist views as well as demands and 
discussions about nationalization of strategic sectors increased Turkish bourgeoisie’s 
fears.41 Similar to his views on 12 March, Cem thought that the coming of the 12 
September coup was also not a coincidence and a shock for a conscious person who 
could make class-based analysis. Cem thought that the privileged segments 
(bourgeoisie) of the country that were backed up by the military-political establishment 
supported or at least tolerated the rise of fascism and Nationalist Action Party’s anti-
democratic tendencies with the idea of protecting themselves against the rising threat of 
socialism before 12 September coup.42 In other words, İsmail Cem had always 
underlined the role of Turkish bourgeoisie’s fear of rising leftist movements in the 
formation of 12 March and 12 September coups.
The second important aspect of military coups in Turkey that was argued by 
İsmail Cem was the role of the USA and NATO. Cem pointed that starting from the 
mid-1960s Turkey’s search for a more independent foreign policy (closer relations with 
the USSR, becoming a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference) disturbed 
                                                
39 İsmail Cem, Tarih Açısından 12 Mart, p. 15.
40 ibid., pp. 329-342.
41 ibid., p. 339.
42 İsmail Cem, Siyaset Yazıları: 1975-1980 Türkiyesi, p. 11.
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the USA and Washington actively supported the rise of extreme right and escalating 
political violence in Turkey. Cem, by quoting from former Foreign Minister of Justice 
Party governments İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, tried to show that the USA (via its 
intelligence service CIA) was very active in the rise of rightist terror in Turkey.43
İsmail Cem has always supported the gradual civilianization of the Turkish 
regime after transition to democracy in 1983. However, unlike many radical figures 
from the leftist tradition, Cem supported the pioneering and progressive role of the 
Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish modernization and refrained from making provocative 
statements that could weaken the TAF and thus could create security problems for 
country. He developed a democratic, civilian and pluralist social democratic language in 
accordance with his political views and adopted a well-balanced rhetoric while 
criticizing the heavy role of military in Turkish politics in order not to erode the prestige 
of Turkish military, an important strategic element of Turkish state.
5.2. The Kurdish Question
Although the “Kurdish question” has been a central issue in both the domestic 
and foreign policy of the Republic from its foundation, in fact Kurdish ethno-
nationalism has become one of the biggest challenges to the Turkish state and 
democracy only in the last two or three decades. The Kurdish question has always been 
a controversial and problematic issue in Turkey since the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923 both on national and international levels. The question of Kurds in 
Turkey is not an easy-to-solve problem mostly because of the legal status of Kurds in 
Turkey. According to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, Kurds, who now constitute 10 to 
                                                
43 İsmail Cem, Siyaset Yazıları: 1975-1980 Türkiyesi, p. 66.
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1544 or 13.2 to 15.645 percent of the total population, are not accepted as a minority 
group but rather as principal elements, first-class citizens of the republic. Secondly, the 
concept of minority has been very different in different time periods and in different 
contexts. Thirdly, although Kurds are not accepted as a minority group and some of 
them are strongly against the idea of defining themselves as a minority group, their 
demands to take advantage of minority group rights in accordance with European Union 
criterion, make the situation even more complex.
In order to understand the Kurdish question in Turkish Republic, we must first 
analyze the situation of Kurds in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman State was formed by 
Turkic Muslim tribes in the late 13th and early 14th century and soon began to expand its 
territories. The Ottoman Empire was an expansionist, multi-ethnic empire and Turks 
were only a part of Ottoman population. Roderic Davison gives the statistical proof 
about the heterogeneity of Ottoman population in the late 19th century. “In the Empire, 
Turkish population was only around 35 percent of the total population whereas Arabs 
constituted 13.8 percent, Romanians 11.4 percent, Bulgarians 7.8 percent, Serbo-
Croatians 7 percent, Armenians 6.5 percent, Greeks 5.5 percent, Albanians 3.1 percent, 
Kurds 2.6 percent and Circassians 2.6 percent”.46 People were separated as Muslim or 
non-Muslim and rather than Turk or Kurd. This structure of the Ottoman Empire was 
shaped by the “millet system” understanding. According to the millet system, the 
Ottoman State recognized differences among different social groups in the society 
according to religious beliefs. Ethnic or linguistic differences were ignored and the 
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46 Roderic Davison. 1979. “Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response” in William 
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society was basically divided into two groups: Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims 
including Greeks, Armenians and Jewish subjects of the state, were considered as 
minority groups. The protection of non-Muslim minority groups’ rights in the Ottoman 
Empire was undertaken by European imperial powers and used as an issue to weaken the 
state. Starting from 1839, with the Edict of Administrative Reforms (Gülhane Hatt-ı 
Hümayunu or Tanzimat Fermanı in Turkish), the Ottoman State tried to make necessary 
reforms to satisfy European countries and prevent them from engaging in the Ottoman 
State’s internal affairs. Except for non-Muslim groups, the Muslim population was 
considered as first-class citizens and did not acquire the status of minority. Kurds were 
also part of the Muslim population and like all other Muslim groups was not considered 
as a minority group. They had relative autonomy (İsmail Cem thought that Ottomans 
were not successful in eroding feudalism in south-eastern villages of Anatolia unlike 
many other regions47) but were still tied to the central authority. Professor Heper points 
out that Ottomans’ interest in the areas where the Kurds lived “was derived from the 
need to defend the eastern boundaries of their empire, not necessarily from a desire to 
subjugate and eventually assimilate the Kurds. Consequently, the chieftains in high 
mountain ranges were not only granted autonomy - in the internal affairs of their people, 
but they were also given tımar in return for policing the border areas and maintaining 
their tranquility”.48
Kemalist state’s attitude towards Kurds is a highly controversial but important 
issue for us to understand the Kurdish opposition. Atatürk’s restrictive attitude towards 
Kurds has been generally criticized under today’s norms and rules. In fact, Atatürk had 
                                                
47 İsmail Cem, Gelecek İçin Denemeler, p. 143.
48 Metin Heper, Devlet ve Kürtler, pp. 70-72.
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always recognized the distinctiveness of Kurds. He called Turks and Kurds “ırk kardeş 
(brothers-in-race)”49 because in his mind Turks and Kurds had many things in common 
and their cultures were very much alike. Mustafa Kemal did not have contact with 
Kurdish people until 1916, the time when he was promoted as Brigadier-General in 
Diyarbakır. Mustafa Kemal’s diary written in those years proves to us his lack of 
knowledge and the sense of difference he had about Kurds. “Mustafa Kemal’s tone is 
remarkably detached: he observes his surroundings with the curiosity of an outsider. He 
does not express any views on the Kurds”.50 Mango claims Mustafa Kemal also once 
said that “I am in favor of granting all manner of rights and privileges in order to ensure 
the attachment and the prosperity and progress of our Kurdish brothers, on condition that 
the Ottoman State is not split up”.51 Moreover, in his speeches before the establishment 
of the Republic, he used the term “people of Turkey (Türkiye halkı)” instead of Turks. 
In fact, Mango claimed that Atatürk in the early 1920s even toyed with the idea of 
giving local autonomy to Kurds. “As for areas inhabited by Kurds, we consider it a 
necessity both of our domestic and of our foreign policy to set up a local government 
gradually”.52 “As a result, wherever the population of a district is Kurdish, it will govern 
itself automatically”.53 During the years of Independence War, Mustafa Kemal did not 
act harshly towards Kurds because the very high majority of Kurdish tribes were 
supporting the National Struggle and Atatürk was not willing to lose Kurdish support. 
Özbudun also points out this tolerant attitude of Kemalism towards Kurds in the early 
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51 ibid., p. 7 .
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years of the Republic.54 İsmail Cem thought that the Kemalist Republic, by not making 
land reform, tried to sustain the Ottoman mentality on the south-eastern villages.55
Kurdish nationalism appeared very lately during the last years of the Ottoman 
Empire. Kurdistan Promotion Association (Kürt Teali Cemiyeti or Kürdistan Teali 
Cemiyeti) was established with the help of Britain in 1918 but it was banned later by 
Mustafa Kemal.56 During the years of National Struggle, Kurds fought against imperial 
powers alongside with Turks. The Kurdish problem showed itself seriously for first time 
in 1925 with the Sheikh Said Revolt. Sheikh Said was a religious Kurdish landowner 
who had good connections and reputation in the eastern and southeastern parts of 
Anatolia. By taking help from Britain57 and making agreements with Kurdish 
landowners of the region who wanted to establish an independent Kurdistan state, Said 
started a huge revolt and became a headache for the young republic for a few months. 
The Sheikh Said Revolt is often introduced as an Islamic revolt but in reality there are 
many other reasons behind Said’s rebellion such as the desires of Kurdish people to 
create an independent state, the reaction of Kurdish landowners to the probable land 
reform project of the Republic and their fears of losing their privileged status58, the plan 
                                                
54 “Atatürk’ün 1 Mayıs 1920 günü TBMM’de yaptığı konuşma da, kendisinin bu konudaki duyarlılığını 
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yalnız Çerkes değildir, yalnız Kürt değildir, yalnız Laz değildir.”. See; Ergun Özbudun. 1998. “Milli 
Mücadele ve Cumhuriyet'in Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu” in 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan 
Yurttaş’a Doğru. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, p. 153.
55 İsmail Cem, Gelecek İçin Denemeler, p. 144 .
56 For details see; Bilal Şimşir. 2007. Kürtçülük / 1787-1923. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
57 Although this is a controversial claim and we do not have any concrete evidence many Turkish 
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58 Professor Heper also pointed out the feudal characteristic of the revolt. See; Metin Heper, Devlet ve 
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of Britain to create problems in Turkey to decrease Turkish influence in Mosul and
Kirkuk and reactionary groups’ anger towards the Western, secular new Turkish state. 
Sheikh Said Revolt was suppressed by the state in few months and by Maintenance of 
Order Law (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) harsh punishments were given to people who were 
engaged in the revolt.59 Atatürk’s relatively tolerant attitude towards Kurds began to 
change after the Sheikh Said rebellion. Although Kemalist Turkish state never adopted a 
racist approach and defined Turkishness as a civic identity60, the Turkish Republic did 
not act in conformity with the conditions of the Lausanne Peace Treaty.61 However, 
authoritarian tendencies of the 1930s could be analyzed within the conditions of the 
period which led to rise of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes everywhere in the 
world.62 Following the Sheikh Said revolt, 16 other Kurdish revolts took place in south-
eastern Anatolia and the Kurdish question persisted.63 However, within the conditions of 
the Cold War, the Kurdish question was forgotten or postponed due to prior international 
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bastığına kuşku yoktur”. See; Ergun Özbudun, “Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyet'in Resmi Belgelerinde 
Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu”, p. 158.
63 Metin Heper, Devlet ve Kürtler, p. 13.
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problems.  The Kurdish question came on the agenda again in the 1980s with the 
emergence of PKK64 terrorism as a part of the radical left in Turkey.65 According to 
Heper, Turks and Kurds during history have gone through a process of acculturation and 
Ottoman and Turkish states never officially adopted a forceful assimilation policy 
though there were some state officials who believed in the necessity of assimilation.66
Heper also claims that in accordance with the democratic pressures and principles of 
European Union, the Turkish state began to grant cultural rights to Kurds although group 
rights and federalism claims have always been considered too risky by the state.67
Turkish intelligentsia after the transition to multi-party democracy began to show 
interest towards the Kurdish question. Until the 1990s, Kurdish question had generally 
been an issue of the Turkish left and mostly seen as a problem related to feudalism. 
However, the recognition of Kurdish identity by the Turkish left later led to the 
emergence of Kurdish leftist movements which led to the emergence of PKK. In the 
academic world, the works of İsmail Beşikçi68 on the socioeconomic structure of Eastern 
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65 Metin Heper, Devlet ve Kürtler, p. 233.
66 ibid., pp. 267-268. 
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68 İsmail Beşikçi (1939-) is a Turkish scholar and writer known with his writings on Kurdish question. He 
has served 17 years in prison on propaganda charges stemming from his writings about the Kurdish 
population in Turkey. Beşikçi studied at the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, and 
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and to the processes of socio-economic and political change taking place made him a public enemy. While 
the book did not cause much debate either in academic or left intellectual circles in the beginning, the 
university took disciplinary measures against him which lead to a trial after the 1971 coup. He was 
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imprisonment for violating the indivisibility of the Turkish nation. Beşikçi did not have to serve his full 13 
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Anatolia may be accepted as the first example of the Kurdish left (although Beşikçi 
himself was not Kurdish).69 In that sense, the Kurdish left was largely affected by 
Turkish left’s modernist-Kemalist tendencies and showed a reaction towards feudal-
religious socio-economic structure of the south-eastern region.70 In addition to Beşikçi’s 
works, the political activities of some Kurdish politicians in the Turkish Labor Party 
(including Tarık Ziya Ekinci, Mehmet Ali Aslan and Kemal Burkay71) strengthened the 
Kurdish nationalist consciousness and the Kurdish left.72 In that sense, Turkey’s Kurdish 
left was nourished from the Turkish left and adopted a more modernist stance compared 
to the Iraqi Kurdish movement which was supported by the Barzani family and some 
other Kurdish tribes and remained largely feudal.73
In addition to the leftist-Marxist interest towards the Kurdish question, pro-
Islamic and socio-economic approaches towards the Kurdish question have existed in 
the academic-intellectual world and political arena in Turkey. [Zeki Sarıgil tried to make 
an empirical assessment of pro-Islamic and socio-economic approaches74.] The pro-
Islamic assessment basically emphasizes strengthening religious attachments and values 
(i.e. empowering an Islamic brotherhood understanding between Turks and Kurds) in 
                                                                                                                                               
years and benefited from the amnesty in late 1974. He unsuccessfully applied for a position at the Faculty 
of Political Sciences in Ankara, which in 1970 had appeared willing to employ him. He never found 
academic employment again and was henceforth to do his research as an independent scholar, in 
economically precarious circumstances. For many years, Ismail Beşikçi was the only non-Kurdish person 
in Turkey to speak out loud and clearly in defense of the rights of the Kurds. Continuing to write and 
speak in spite of all attempts to silence him, Beşikçi has become a powerful and important symbol for the 
Kurds and for the human rights movement of Turkey. He was charged for over 100 years but released 
from jail in 1999. He was a candidate of Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. 
69 Hamit Bozarslan. 2007. “Türkiye’de Kürt Sol Hareketi” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce cilt 8 
Sol. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 1170.
70 ibid., p. 1172.
71 Kemal Burkay (1937-) was a Kurdish originated socialist who established Kurdish Socialist Party and 
wrote many books on the Kurdish question. For a detailed analysis see; Azat Zana Gündoğan. 2007. 
“Kemal Burkay” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce cilt 8 Sol. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
72 Hamit Bozarslan, “Türkiye’de Kürt Sol Hareketi”, p. 1175.
73 ibid., p. 1176.
74 Sarıgil, Zeki (forthcoming), “Curbing Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey: An empirical assessment of 
pro-Islamic and socio-economic approaches”, Ethnic and Racial Studies.
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order to curb Kurdish ethno-nationalism. The socio-economic approach on the other 
hand, draws attention to improving the socio-economic status of individuals, especially 
in the impoverished southeast, which is populated mostly by Kurds.  Sarıgil notes out 
that in order to see which one of these approaches or policies might curb Kurdish ethno-
nationalism, a better grasp of the factors and dynamics behind pro-Kurdish tendencies in 
society is needed. However, although there is more open debate and an increasing 
number of scholarly studies on various aspects of Turkey’s Kurdish issue in the last 
decades the sources of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in society remain relatively under-
investigated. Thus, Sarıgil argues that we have rather limited empirical knowledge of the 
factors, which hinder or accelerate the appeal of Kurdish ethno-nationalist ideas and 
movements in society. Sarıgil by using World Values Survey data, investigates the 
impact of religiosity and socio-economic factors (i.e. the level of income and education) 
on support for Kurdish ethno-nationalist movements and formations (i.e. Kurdish ethno-
nationalism). Sarıgil concludes that statistical results indicate that religiosity does not 
really matter in terms of the likelihood of Kurdish ethno-nationalism; in other words, 
increases in religiosity do not necessarily reduce ethnic awareness. Interestingly, 
however, as the level of education and income increases, the likelihood of Kurdish 
ethno-nationalism decreases. These findings raise doubts about the validity of the pro-
Islamic approach but they do provide some support for the socio-economic approach in 
constraining Kurdish ethno-nationalism. 
Starting from his first book, İsmail Cem showed a great deal of interest towards 
the Kurdish question. However, Cem had always used a well-balanced rhetoric and 
never declared sympathy for the political violence unlike many people in the leftist 
tradition that approached PKK terrorism with sympathy. In the early 1990s while Cem 
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was about to leave the SDPP together with Baykal they criticized İnönü and other 
leading members of the SDPP for bringing the People’s Labor Party (HEP) deputies into 
the Parliament who were engaged with PKK and made clear his view that terrorism 
could not be accepted or sympathized with.75 Cem, in the early days of his journalism 
career, published a series of news and articles about social problems in the south-eastern 
part of Anatolia where the population mostly consisted of Kurdish citizens. “Acılı Doğu
(East in Pain)” was published between 12 June and 18 June 1970 in Milliyet and became 
a sensation in the media. Cem published this series in his first book Türkiye Üzerine 
Araştırmalar (Researches on Turkey). The book was journalistic and far from showing 
Cem’s theoretical knowledge, but it was still very important because it was one of the 
earliest books written on the Kurdish question. Cem was writing about his observations 
and analyses about his trip to south-eastern villages of Turkey.
The first issue he noticed and heard from the local people was the extreme 
pressures made by soldiers and policemen towards Kurdish people. People were saying 
that the soldiers were insulting them for their Kurdish identity by saying “dogs of 
Barzani” and the state’s oppressive attitudes were forcing them to hate the state.76 These 
officials, especially soldiers, were hurting people’s feelings and their inappropriate 
behaviors caused by secessionism fears were in fact strengthening secessionist 
thoughts.77 Cem thought that these behaviors of the public employees were also 
strengthening the feudal structure of the region since oppressed by the state; peasants 
were becoming thankful to their feudal lords.78 Cem predicted that an armed revolt 
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based on Kurdish nationalism could easily begin in the future because of the terrible 
deeds of the state officials especially commandos and soldiers.79 In that sense, Cem 
foresaw the emergence of PKK correctly. In the mid-1990s, Cem, by looking at the 
findings of Piar-Gallup research company’s inquiry on the Kurdish question, wrote that 
35 % of Kurdish people see the reason of the Kurdish problem mainly as a consequence 
of state’s oppressive policies in the region and 25 % of the people likewise pointed out 
state officials’ harsh and violent behavior towards the people as the main reason of the 
problem.80 In that sense; Cem believed that creating a well-working democratic state 
mechanism and better educating state officials could solve many problems related to the 
Kurdish question. He thought that first of all the state should be able to make Kurdish 
people primary citizens of the state by abolishing the state of emergency and backward 
lifestyle81. For Cem, the state of emergency was nothing but a limit on people’s basic 
rights and freedoms and it forced them into terrorism.82
İsmail Cem admitted that the only problem in the south-eastern villages was not 
the restrictive, oppressive and discriminatory behavior of state officials. There was a 
more important materialistic problem and this was the feudal structure of the region. In 
Cem’s opinion, this was caused by the Ottoman and Turkish states’ erroneous policy of 
leaving the region to its status quo by sustaining the privileges of the landowners of the 
region.83 For Cem, this meant state within the state and a local feudal authority who 
could keep its hegemony over the local people. Cem focused mostly on the feudal 
structure of the region and approached the Kurdish issue in the 1960s and 1970s 
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primarily as a class-based and economic problem. The terrible income distribution in the 
region (feudal lords constituting 7.5 % of the population owned 70 % of the total 
lands)84 was the concrete proof of this non-egalitarian social structure. For him, the real 
problem was not between Turkishness and Kurdishness, but rather between local 
notables and landless peasants.85 Cem was against Kurdish nationalism and secessionism 
but he also argued that defending the rights of Kurdish people who were oppressed by 
the state because of Kurdish identity is not equal to Kurdish nationalism.86 In his view, 
Kurdish nationalism and support of Barzani was related to the local notables and feudal 
lords not to the ordinary peasants.87 Cem thought that if this feudal structure would 
remain, local notables would soon or later support Kurdish nationalism and Barzani but 
through a social reform, the state could gain the support of ordinary peasants.88 Cem 
complained about the state’s support to local notables that seemed to have a willingness 
and tendency to support Kurdish nationalism more than the peasants. Cem also noticed 
that by the early 1970s, peasants were on the eve of awakening since they were 
complaining about feudal lords and local notables’ pressures and claiming that “the 
mission of the feudal lord is to rob peasants”.89 Small riots in the region and land reform 
claims of the some peasants were also signs of growing class-based consciousness in 
Cem’s view.90 Moreover, Cem thought that rapid population growth in the region could 
easily change the social structure and power struggles.91 Due to feudalism, there were 
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some other problems including blood feuds (kan davası), patriarchy and armament.92
Cem’s insistence on problems of the feudal structure of the region never disappeared and 
he continued to write about the effect of feudalism on the emergence of PKK racism and 
secessionism.93 But starting from the 1990s, with the demise of socialism Cem focused 
more on other problems especially economic problems, identity politics and cultural 
rights.
The third main problem was the state’s policy of not developing and improving 
the infrastructural and social capabilities of the region. For Cem, this was a fascist 
approach and all these reasons contributed a lot to the birth of Kurdish nationalism.94
Cem wrote that the economic and technological condition of the region was very 
backward and people were struggling against the natural problems such as famine and 
eurygaster (süne).95 Due to terrible economic conditions, people had to engage in 
smuggling activities and the state was allowing this. People did not have education and 
some of them could not even speak Turkish properly.96 The lack of interest shown by the 
state to the social problems of the people living in this region was creating anger towards 
the state and the technological and economic gap between modern cities and south-
eastern villages show that the Republic was not successful in creating a “classless, non-
privileged, mixed society”97 as it was stated by Atatürk. Cem thought that in the early 
years of the Republic, this mentality emerged from the fear of Russian invasion and the 
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state did not want to develop the infrastructure of the region, but continuing with this 
mentality now seems nonsensical.98
The fourth issue and problem related to the Kurdish question was about the 
policies of foreign imperialist states. For instance, in the early 1970s Cem wrote that due 
to the close relationship between Iraq and the USSR, the United Kingdom was providing 
armament support to Barzani.99 He also wrote that foreign intelligence service agents 
were very active in the region.100 In the mid 1990s, Cem wrote that 45 % of non-Kurdish 
people saw the Kurdish question primarily as a consequence of PKK terrorism that was 
supported by foreign countries.101 As foreign minister, Cem showed great efforts to cut 
foreign support to PKK terrorism and he became very successful (this will explained in 
detail in the chapter 6). Cem never refrained from stating that the foreign support 
encouraged the emergence and strengthening of terrorism and wanted Turkey to be bold 
in foreign policy.102
İsmail Cem’s proposal for the solution to this problem was first dealt with the 
acceptance of the problem. In his view, there was a problem in the region that should be 
first seriously accepted by the state.103 Cem analyzed this problem on four aspects 
(restrictive, oppressive and discriminatory behavior of state officials, feudal structure of 
the region104, state’s erroneous policy of not developing and improving the 
infrastructural and social capabilities of the region, policies of imperialist states) and the
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first thing to do was to accept the problem. Cem also heavily criticized the ostrich policy 
(devekuşu politikası)105 of the state in the past.106
Secondly, Cem knew that Kurdish question is a gigantic issue where the balance 
of power in international relations and the history of the problem should also be known 
very well and placed on the agenda.107 For instance, Cem heavily criticized unwarranted 
declarations of Turkish state officials that dealt with preventing the emergence of a 
Kurdish state in northern Iraq in the past and claimed that these declarations were not 
prepared by looking at power relations in international relations.108 Cem thought that 
Turkish state officials had been so naïve in the past that they believed in the guarantees 
of Turkey’s so-called allies in the West (primarily the USA), because a Kurdish state 
had already been established in northern Iraq due to the Provide Comfort109
mechanism.110 For Cem, accepting Provide Comfort mechanism was nothing but 
supporting the division of Iraq into two or three parts and allowing the emergence of a 
Kurdish state, and Turkish state officials’ declarations about casus belli111 were not 
realistic.112 Cem also underlined that the emergence of a Kurdish state may not cause a 
problem for Turkey but it is controversial for many people and it is risky for Turkey to 
both help and also officially ignore the emergence of a new state in northern Iraq.113 For 
Cem, the Provide Comfort laid the foundation of a Kurdish state but also linked Turkey 
                                                
105 Acting as something does not exist by ignoring its presence. 
106 İsmail Cem, Gelecek İçin Denemeler, p. 126.
107 İsmail Cem, Türkiye Üzerine (Araştırmalar), pp. 36-37. 
108 İsmail Cem, Gelecek İçin Denemeler, p. 127.
109 Provide Comfort was the term used for referring to several military operations and humanitarian aid 
campaigns organized by USA with the help of Turkey in order to secure Iraqi Kurds from Iraqi dictator 
Saddam Hussein’s aggression.
110 İsmail Cem, Gelecek İçin Denemeler, pp. 127-128.
111 Casus belli is a term in international relations originated from Latin, meaning the justification for acts 
of war. 
112 İsmail Cem, Gelecek İçin Denemeler, p. 129.
113 ibid., p. 157.
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to its Western allies with strong ties.114 However, Turkey’s position in the West has 
always been second-class in Cem’s opinion and that is why Cem seemed to oppose the 
Provide Comfort mechanism and Turkey’s current position in the West.115 He thought 
that due to Provide Comfort, Turkey was subjected to increasing PKK terrorism and the 
emergence of a Kurdish state might harm Turkey’s social peace.116 During his tenure in 
office as Foreign Minister, Cem by his deeds showed the importance of international 
relations in the solution of PKK terrorism and the Kurdish question. Cem also wrote that 
Turkey should be confident of itself and whether a Kurdish state would be established or 
not, Turkey should not fear being divided.117 Cem underlined that the Kurdish question 
is primarily Turkey’s problem and although international conditions are very important, 
first of all, Turkey should handle its internal problem.118 In that sense, Cem both 
acknowledged foreign support to PKK terrorism (in his tenure in office Cem and 
Ecevit’s coalition government was successful in capturing PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan) 
but also rejected nationalist views pointing the sole reason of the problem as foreign 
countries’ plans.119
Thirdly, as a requirement of basic definition of the state120, Turkey should be 
able to protect its citizens, its employees, its borders and stop terrorism in the region.121
Cem claimed that the solution should be citizen-oriented and the Kurdish question 
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would never be solved unless the state took the support of the local people.122 For Cem, 
a state that could not control its borders is a weak state and Turkish state seemed very 
weak because of its inability to control its borders.123 Cem never approved or supported 
the rural guard (korucu) system and thought that this was similar to American policy 
against Vietcong in the past.124 In his view, Turkey’s failure at protecting its borders was 
weakening its prestige in international relations.125 In that sense, Turkey’s weak image 
due to its inability to control its borders and prevent terrorism was facilitating its loss of 
prestige in international affairs.126
Fourthly, Turkey should handle rising domestic nationalist and racist tendencies 
due to PKK terrorism. Cem claimed that nationalism in a country shown against 
imperialism is positive whereas ethnic or micro nationalism within a state is divisive and 
dangerous.127 PKK terrorism due to its racist essence, created a racist reaction against 
itself and Cem thought that the state should control these reactions. Fifthly, Turkey 
should handle its struggle against violent terrorism within the borders of legal-
democratic state and should not resort to illegality or extra-legal means since this could 
be used by Western states against Turkey.128 Sixthly, the Turkish state should 
immediately accept democratic cultural rights of Kurdish people and should not fear 
cultural pluralism.129
Seventhly, Cem offered the Ministry of National Defense (Milli Savunma 
Bakanlığı) to be transformed into a more authorized and qualified department where 
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theories about preventing PKK terrorism should be discussed and detailed plans would 
be made in coordination with the Prime Ministry and General Staff of the Turkish 
Armed Forces.130 Cem asserted that the classically weak positioning of National Defense 
Ministry made struggle against terrorism more difficult concerning coordination 
between different branches of the state.  
5.3. Political Islam - Secularism Discussions
Secularism and the state’s secular practice has always been a controversial topic 
in Turkey especially after the rise of political Islam starting from the 1980s. Secularism 
in Turkey was introduced first time with the 1924 constitution and later Atatürk’s 
reforms set the administrative and political requirements to create a modern, democratic, 
secular state aligned with the Kemalist ideology. After thirteen years of its introduction, 
laicism was explicitly stated in the second article of the Turkish constitution in 1937. 
Turkish constitutions starting from this date never recognized an official religion or 
promoted any. This includes also Islam, to which at least nominally more than 90 % of 
its citizens subscribe. Turkey’s secularism (laicism) does not call for a strict separation 
of religion and the state, but describes the state’s stance as one of “active neutrality” and 
tries to regulate the religious domain through the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı).131 The duties of the Directorate of Religious Affairs are to 
publish the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the 
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includes the control of religious affairs by the state. See; Baskın Oran and Elçin Aktoprak, “İslamcılar 
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public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places. The secular 
practices of the Turkish state have not been totally welcomed; from the first days of the 
Republic many uprisings (such as the Sheikh Said revolt or the Menemen Incident) 
occurred against secularism and center-right and political Islamist parties showed their 
importance at elections after transition to multi-party regime. There is no denying that 
Islam especially starting from the 1990s has become the most important component of 
Turkish politics. The rise of Welfare Party reached its peak in the 1995 general elections 
and the natural leader of the “National View” Necmettin Erbakan became the Prime 
Minister of the secular Turkish Republic. After the 28 February crisis, Islamist 
extremism seemed to have been suppressed by Turkish democracy backed up by the 
Turkish military and eventually Welfare Party was banned by the Constitutional 
Court.132 However the sudden rise of the JDP in 2002 elections, a liberal-conservative 
(Muslim democratic) party which takes its roots from the National View (Milli Görüş) 
movement, showed again that Islam is still very important for Turkish citizens 
considering their lives even their political behaviors.133
It must be noted that JDP represented a breakdown from classical Turkish 
political Islam tradition and there are many differences between the WP and the JDP. 
While comparing the two important Islamic parties, it is worth to take into account some 
concepts defined by Daniel Brumberg.  Brumberg mainly distinguishes the types of 
Islamism into three categories namely, “radical or militant fundamentalism, reformist 
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fundamentalism and strategic modernism or Islamic liberalism”.134 Accordingly, parties 
who pursue radical fundamentalism aimed at changing the system of the country through 
force and at the end form a regime based on Islamic laws. In reformist fundamentalism, 
the parties have the same aim with the radical fundamentalist that is establishing a state 
based on Islamic laws; however, these parties pursue moderate policies and continuously 
reject violence. In other words, through establishing mass electoral support they try to 
win the elections and construct a hidden agenda. This is also called dissimulation 
(takiyye). On the other hand, “Islamic liberals, which are quite rare in the Middle East, 
seek to extend religious freedoms in a broadly democratic environment”.135 Unlike the 
radical and reformist fundamentals, Islamic liberals do not aim at forming an Islamic 
state. Instead of doing this they try to co-exist with the secular establishment of the state. 
In this sense, there is no doubt that we can call the WP a reformist fundamentalist party 
and JDP an Islamic liberal party (at least considering its policies in its first term) by 
looking at and analyzing their policies and the deeds of their leaders. Secularism-
Islamism clash is still very visible and strong in Turkish political life and in a sense it 
creates a convenient environment for the TAF to possess extra powers and a special 
status of protecting the regime in the eyes of the secular urban population.
Professor Ergun Özbudun points out that with the rise of identity politics as a 
reaction to the culturally homogenizing effects of globalization, the nation-state has 
weakened and with the decline of social welfare state and the erosion of some social 
rights, political Islamist parties seemed to have filled the vacuum created by social 
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democratic parties that could not get in touch with lower classes.136 Binnaz Toprak also 
claims that the rise of Islamic movement in Turkey can be considered as a response to 
the life of metropolis which is “not only the financial-industrial center of the country but 
also the pivot of an alien culture in terms of its cosmopolitan mix”.137 According to 
Toprak, enormous rural to urban migration, which was the cause of rapid 
industrialization of the country, created a large rural population living in the periphery of 
big cities consisting of pious Anatolian people who are not familiar with urban values or 
lifestyles. Accordingly, “ruralization of city life” took place when these people felt 
alienated from the city life both because of their different cultural background and their 
economic deprivation. It was Welfare Party in the 1980s and 1990s for the first time 
which was able to create links with these people. These people were mostly workers 
having economic difficulties and Welfare Party was very successful in organizing people 
by helping them economically. Moreover, due to their economic problems and religious 
beliefs, these people were reactive against the official ideology of the state and they saw 
the Welfare Party as their savior. This process was strengthened by the rising neo-
conservative movement around the world even in the USA. Toprak also mentions the 
role of the state’s more tolerant approach towards Islam and religious parties as an 
antidote to socialist ideas in the rise of Islamic movements. 
İsmail Cem as a social democrat journalist-writer and politician spent much time 
on analyzing and solving this issue and wrote many articles on this topic. İsmail Cem, 
with his peculiar stance on this topic and more tolerant approach to pious masses, 
received positive responses from Islamist-conservative circles and symbolized a new 
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perspective in the left. In accordance with his account of history and the model of 
underdevelopment, İsmail Cem thought that Ottoman and Turkish history of 
Westernization created cultural duality and a privileged Westernized segment in the 
country. In that sense, he explained Islamist movements as the “metaphysical reaction of 
suppressed masses”138 caused by the presence of an Westernized elite group that has 
evolved culturally different from the ordinary people. Moreover, unlike classical 
Kemalist claims, in his view, the Ottoman state had never become completely Islamic 
and was able to interpret religion according to the needs of society and economy.139
Thus, in a sense İsmail Cem viewed the Ottoman state as semi-secular. Cem also did not 
hesitate to praise Ottomans’ search for peace and rationality.140 Cem claimed that the 
Islamic movement in Turkey was a reaction to bureaucratic-statist Westernization of the 
state starting from the 19th century.141 Westernization was dictated by European states 
and coincided with the weakening of the Empire. Thus, for many people Westernization 
and getting away from Islam meant the weakening of the Empire.142 In that sense, Cem 
thought that political Islam and Islamic reactionism had a populist character although it 
was not progressive.143 Cem also pointed out that Islamic reactionism always increased 
in the years of economic crises and difficulties.144
İsmail Cem’s peculiar stance in the left for his empathy for Islamist groups was 
not only in theory but also in practice since Cem actively supported the establishment of 
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the RPP-NSP coalition in 1973. Cem saw this coalition as a chance to get over Islamist-
secularist clash which he identified as “historical mistake (tarihi yanılgı)”.145 In Cem’s 
view, Turkey’s social problems were not related to superstructural secularism 
discussions but were rather related to class-based economic inequalities. Similar to 
Mümtaz Soysal, he saw the growing Islamic movement as a “metaphysical reaction of 
suppressed masses”.146 For Cem, the Islamic movement in Turkey was nothing but 
unconscious class-based reaction.147 In his view, it was the bourgeoisie who directed 
petty bourgeois radicals in the RPP to prevent the unification of all suppressed people by 
evoking the secularist-Islamist clash in the 1970s.148 Cem criticized the Turkish left for 
focusing mostly on superstructural aspects (lifestyle, dressing etc.) and asserted that 
privileged segments in Turkey used the Islamist-secularism clash very well in order to 
weaken leftist movements.149 However, Cem especially in the 1970s defined 
progressiveness in terms of infrastructural aspects and class-based politics instead of 
superstructural conditions.150
İsmail Cem after the 12 September 1980 military coup and against the rising 
political Islamist (National View) movement in Turkey, revised his views on secularism 
and Westernization although he kept his core views. He defined secularism as a 
guarantee for believers from different sects, religions and non-believers.151 In his view, 
secularism resided at the core of democracy and without secularism democracy could 
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not be established.152 He wanted the Directorate of Religious Affairs to contain and 
provide services for all sects (he refers to the Alevi community’s problems and 
exclusion from state’s official stance) and religions in the country.153 He also pointed out 
that in the long run the aim of secularism was to transfer state power and authority over 
religion to civil society and congregations (cemaat).154 He also boldly stated that a more 
libertarian, pluralist and democratic interpretation of secularism should be developed in 
Turkey in order to create social peace.155 He believed that thanks to the Ottoman legacy 
of religious tolerance, Turkey has the potential to realize this dream and terminate the 
secularism-Islamism clash that divides the country into poles and wastes its energy.156
On the very controversial topic of headscarf or turban, İsmail Cem wrote very 
boldly and stated that secularism should also be a guarantee for headscarf-wearing 
young women.157 In his view, an ideal secular state that Turkey could not establish yet, 
should be blind or at least objective in state affairs towards different beliefs but also 
should provide a free environment where all beliefs should be practiced freely.158 In that 
sense, Cem, being aware of the strong polarization in the country on this topic, offered 
to take freedoms in totality (özgürlükleri bir bütün olarak anlayabilmek) in order to 
solve the secularist-Islamist clash and obliterate fears against Islamic lifestyles.159 Thus, 
Cem never approved censorship and repressive attitudes against Islamism and defended 
dialogue between different groups and tolerance towards each other.160 However, Cem 
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also wrote that commercialization and exploitation of religion for political aims is a 
serious problem in the country and this should not be mixed with the democratic, 
libertarian and pluralist version of secularism.161 Cem criticized the Motherland Party 
(ANAP) for its exploitation of religion for political means in the 1980s.162 According to 
Cem, defending freedom of religion was not a deviation from social democracy but 
rather it resided at the core of leftist libertarianism.163 However, Cem did not also 
hesitate to criticize some of the JDP government’s deeds and rhetoric in his last years 
because of its libertarian approach solely on religious matters. İsmail Cem’s insistence 
on the necessity of a more democratic version of secularism also resembles Hale and 
Özbudun’s recent argument about the revision of “assertive secularism” with “passive 
secularism”164 and in that sense Cem correctly foresaw what was coming and what was 
needed more than two decades ago.
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CHAPTER VI
CEM’S FOREIGN POLICY (1997-2002)
İsmail Cem served as the Foreign Minister of Turkey between the years 1997 and 
2002. Cem was often perceived as a peace-seeking and successful minister both within 
the country and on the international public through his policies. İsmail Cem was also one 
of the few Turkish politicians well-known outside his own country. Before his 
resignation, he was one of Turkey’s longest-serving foreign ministers (nearly 5 years). 
Cem’s book Turkey in the New Century1 is a collection of Cem’s speeches, interviews, 
comments and memoirs about his tenure in office as the Foreign Minister which can 
help us in understanding his vision of international relations. The book has certain 
aspects of an autobiography but also carries the qualities of an academic international 
relations book since Cem had first-hand knowledge of important details about Turkey’s 
foreign policy. The book was first published in 2000 with the title Turkey in 21st
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Century2, but Cem later revised the book, added new parts and published with the title 
Turkey in the New Century. 
In the book, Cem offers a new approach to Turkish foreign policy by criticizing 
certain aspects of classical Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy.3 Cem believes that 
Turkish foreign policy had been alienated from its cultural roots and historical past and 
it must be replaced with a new understanding based on the awareness of Turkey’s rich 
identity and historical assets inherited from the Ottoman state.4 He assumed that the end 
of Cold War, the phenomena of globalization and the development of technology created 
many new opportunities in the foreign policy.5 He wanted Turkey to be confident of 
itself, not ashamed of its past and bold and peace-seeking at the same time for the future. 
He criticized Turkish politicians’ habit of perceiving foreign policy in the form of 
idealistic prescriptions such as friendly countries or hostile countries and offered a more 
flexible and rational approach to problems.6 Cem defined foreign policy as “a 
mathematical equation of a country’s interests”.7 He tried to create a convenient 
environment to be more flexible and active in foreign policy. Cem was not afraid to 
consider diversities in the country as richness and tried to overcome the forced 
alternatives.8 By forced alternatives, he meant the concepts often presented as 
contradictions such as Islam-secularism or West-East. He thought that these dichotomies 
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were exaggerated considering their relevance in both Turkey’s domestic and foreign 
politics. He defined Turkey as both European (Western) and Asian (Eastern).9
Cem in the next chapters tried to explain his views and analyses on Turkish-
American, Turkish-EU, Turkish-Eurasia and Turkish-Middle East relations and offered a 
new rational and multi-dimensional approach to these relations in order to increase 
Turkey’s interests. He especially focused on Turkey’s full accession to EU process and 
energy agreements made with Eurasian countries such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
project.10 In his view, Turkey should develop a rational and peace-seeking multi-
dimensional relationship style with all important organizations and countries based on 
protecting and developing Turkey’s interests. Becoming totally engaged in EU or USA 
would be a big mistake in Cem’s view. He later concentrated on the international war 
against terrorism and the ways through which Turkey could solve its own terrorism 
problem. The last parts of the book are separated into Turkish-Greece and Turkish-EU 
relations. In these parts, Cem gave first-hand information about Turkish-EU and 
Turkish-Greek relations and also shared his memories. Cem pointed out that with a 
liberal understanding in international politics, Turkey could never be successful and 
would always give concessions to the EU. He also made an analogy between Turkish-
EU relations and unrequited love.11 He offered a more rational, realistic and interest-
based approach to EU relations and claimed that if this happened the EU would 
approach Turkey in a different manner. Cem also labeled the JDP officials and 
diplomats as inexperienced and incompetent in foreign policy. He also never hesitated to 
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make a harsh criticism of the JDP government and blamed Gül and Erdoğan 
governments for giving concessions in negotiating with the European Union especially 
in areas concerning relations with Greece, Cyprus, Northern Iraq (Kurdish question) and 
the so-called Armenian genocide.
Talking about Turkish foreign policy, Cem has always underlined the importance 
of becoming a “world state” in 21st century.12 For him, Turkey, as a democratic country 
having reached European standards of human rights in the Islamic world, should be 
presented to other Middle Eastern countries as a model.13 Cem, in addition to his peace-
seeking foreign policy, engaged in friendly relations with his counterparts including 
Greek foreign minister Yorgo Papandreou, French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, 
Dutch Foreign Minister Jozias van Aartsen, Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa 
and United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (whom Cem considered as the 
most successful and obstinate U.S. Secretary of State).14 Cem admitted that his personal 
dealings and friendships also helped Turkey to follow an active foreign policy and get 
some results15 and personal relationships have an important place in international 
relations since they could increase sympathy and reliance of both sides towards each 
other.16 However, Cem also underlined that although for instance he was a good friend 
of Madeleine Albright, they engaged in serious discussions and harsh polemics since 
diplomacy is about countries’ national interests and these interests could sometimes 
intersect.17 For Cem, in addition to planning and executing Turkish foreign policy, the
Turkish Foreign Ministry has always carried an important historical mission of civilizing 
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and modernizing the country similar to that of the Turkish military.18 He praised all 
diplomats and staff of Turkish Foreign Ministry for their hardworking and patriotic 
personalities and criticized the prejudiced “mon chere”19 approach to Turkish diplomats 
due to their extreme accuracy in terms of courtesy.20 He remembered that many Turkish 
diplomats were targeted by ASALA21 and died as martyrs in the past.22 However, Cem 
also stated that Turkish Foreign Affairs have some deficiencies in terms of reformism, 
innovation and defending Turkey’s interests in a more assertive manner.23 In addition, 
Cem underlined that similar to pro-Western Turkish citizens and politicians, Turkish 
diplomats should have more knowledge about Turkish history and culture and should 
never feel an inferiority complex against Western countries.24
6.1. Turkish-American Relations
Historically, Turkish-American relations were very important for both countries. 
Although at the beginning (after the Second World War with Turkey’s accession to 
NATO) and particularly until the 1990s, relations largely revolved around military 
grounds, for the past fifteen years efforts have been made to diversify the nature of those 
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relations as should be the case between two equal partners.25 Turkish-American relations 
were shaken two times seriously; the first one after President Johnson’s letter and 
Cyprus Peace Operation made by Turkish between 1964-1980, and second one, very 
recently starting from the refusal of 1 March memorandum in Turkish Parliament. 
Starting from 2003, Turkish-American relations were progressing in an ambiguous way 
mostly because of free Kurdistan26 and moderate Islam27 discussions emanating from 
Washington. The general public opinion in Turkey is concentrated on the USA’s 
“Greater Middle East Project” and its long term plan of creating an independent Kurdish 
state in northern Iraq which would be enlarged into Turkey’s south-eastern provinces. 
The anti-American feelings of the Turkish people seem to have reached its highest 
level28 in the whole Republican history.29 Although the election of new American 
President Barrack Hussein Obama and his visit to Turkey could mark a new beginning 
in Turkish-American relations30, the problematic aspects between two countries’ 
                                                
25 For an analysis see; Nüzhet Kandemir, “Turkish-American Relations Past and Future”, retrieved on 
27.07.2010 from http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/28397.pdf.
26 Term used in Ralph Peter’s “Blood Borders” article, which was published on June 2006 in Armed 
Forces Journal magazine. The article included a map showing an independent Kurdish state on northern 
Iraq and south-eastern provinces of Turkey. See; Ralph Peters. “Blood Borders, How A Better Middle 
East Would Look” in Armed Forces Journal, June 2006, retrieved on 10.05.2008 from 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899/. 
27 Following JDP’s landslide victory in 22 July 2007 general elections, American diplomat and former 
Secretary of the State Richard Holbrooke defined Turkey and Malaysia as two examples of “moderate 
Islam” countries. See; Today’s Zaman, retrieved on 12.05.2008 from http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=123449.
28 In a survey that was made in 21 countries by British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), to the question of 
“Is the re-election of President George W. Bush affirmative for world peace and security?” the highest no 
replies came from Turkey with 82 %. See; Arnaud De Borchgrave. “Extreme Anti-Americanism in 
Turkey”, retrieved on 10.05.2008 from 
http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/3/11/182953.shtml.
29 For a study on the reflections of anti-Americanism on Turkish popular culture, see; Ozan Örmeci. 2008. 
Popüler Kültür, Ankara: Elips Kitap.
30 On 6 April 2009, US President Barrack Hussein Obama in his speech in the Turkish Parliament praised 
Turkey’s history and the role it can play today as a democratic and secular country having a very high 
majority of Muslim population. “They see your country at the crossroads of continents and touched by the 
currents of history. They know that this has been a place where civilizations meet and different peoples 
mingle. And they wonder whether you will be pulled in one direction or another” U.S. President Obama 
told Turkish deputies in his half-hour speech. See; Turkish Daily News, retrieved on 07.04.2009 from 
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relations still persist.31 In addition, the decision of a U.S. congressional panel, approving 
a resolution on Armenian allegations regarding the incidents of 1915 and calling the 
events as genocide on 5 March 2010, would certainly lead to deterioration in relations 
between two countries.32 Thus, it would not be wrong to claim that the accord between 
two countries during Cem’s Foreign Ministry seems to have disappeared in recent years.
İsmail Cem first experienced the USA and American culture when he was young,
in Robert College and during his voyage to the USA with the American Field Service 
exchange program for a year (1956-1957). Cem stayed with an American family 
(Parkhursts) in San Francisco and had the chance to observe and live the American way 
of life. Although Cem was impressed by the USA’s technological possibilities, glorious 
cities and freedom of thought, his sympathy for the aggrieved side led him to find 
American system too draconian and disadvantageous for the weaker ones. He also felt a 
kind of responsibility for developing his country and aiding the poor children who do 
not have same opportunities as Cem did after experiencing American life. He loved 
American people and found them helpful and optimistic, but opposed many American 
policies starting from his youth.33 Cem thought that due to conditions of Cold War, the
USA played a negative role in the development of Turkish democracy by provoking or 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11378421.asp?gid=244. Political analyst Bülent Alirıza, who 
directs the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., claims 
that President Obama’s trip to Turkey could be the beginning of new “Model Partnership” between two 
countries which could create “a modern international community that is respectful, secure and 
prosperous”. See; Bülent Alirıza. “President Obama’s Visit to Turkey: Building a Model Partnership”, 
CSIS, 08.04.2009,  retrieved on 12.04.2009 from http://www.csis.org. 
31 According to a research made by Pew Research Center, Turkish people who look positive towards USA 
rose from 12 % to 14 % after President Obama’s election but anti-Americanism continued to exist 
strongly. See; Cumhuriyet Portal, retrieved on 27.07.2009 from 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?im=yhs&hn=70870.
32 After the decision, Turkey’s ambassador in Washington D.C. Namık Tan was recalled to Turkey for 
consultations. See; Hürriyet Daily News, retrieved on 08.03.2010 from 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=0306105111300-2010-03-06. 
33 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 38.
  
 
267
at least supporting military coup regimes in the past due to security preferences. 
However, during the strong anti-imperialist wings of the 1960s and 1970s, Cem’s 
leftism was never close to Bolshevism or Maoism and rather resembled to European 
social democracy. In that sense, Cem had never been anti-American or enemy of 
Western civilization although he never approved of American imperialism or the high 
degree of American effect on Turkish politics. Cem thought that Bülent Ecevit was also 
similar to him and he loved USA only he was clever and bold enough to mention it when 
he saw a mistake that could spoil two countries’ relations.34 Cem also did not hesitate to 
make harsh criticisms of American involvement in Turkish politics35 and US led military 
coups in Turkey and in many parts of the world during the Cold War.
İsmail Cem during his tenure in office as Turkish Foreign Minister many times 
stated that he shares the view that U.S. is the leading force in the early 21st century due 
to its internal creative dynamism and its revolutionary achievements in disseminating 
information and knowledge.36 Cem thought that the USA would continue its leadership 
in the 21st century but instead of defining the USA as a “superpower”, he preferred to 
use “super generator of knowledge and information”.37 He stated that during his term 
Turkish-American relations were progressing on solid ground although he disagreed 
American policies concerning Cyprus and Iraq.38 Cem was aware of the fact that neither 
in size, nor in capacity were Turkey and United States comparable, but both countries 
had interests of a global nature since U.S. is a global power and Turkey is a multi-
                                                
34 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 241.
35 For a historical study on Turkish-American relations see; Çağrı Erhan. 2001. Türk-Amerikan 
İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
36 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, p. 72.
37 ibid., p. 72.
38 ibid., p. 73.
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regional power.39 For Cem, it is possible between two sides to “see eye to eye on all 
issues”.40 Cem had always been disturbed by the asymmetrical relationship between 
USA and Turkey and during his tenure in office he tried to reduce the huge deficit 
between Turkey’s trade with the USA.41 However, Cem admitted that Turkey still had 
important foreign trade deficit against the USA especially when military procurement 
expenditures came into the scene.42 Therefore, Cem as Turkish Foreign Minister, tried to 
lift all restrictions, quotas and barriers that prevented Turkish products to be openly 
compete in the American market.43
İsmail Cem considered Turkish-American relations as an example of stability in 
foreign relations and explained with three terms: consistency, predictability and 
reliability.44 Cem also thought that the Turkish-American alliance was not just a matter 
of ideals, but rather it is “deeply rooted in realities and interests”.45 Cem believed that 
Turkey’s inter-regional roles and the USA’s global roles intersected concerning Balkans, 
Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, the Middle East, Arab-Israeli conflict, problems of Iraq, 
security of the Gulf, the Caucasus and the Central Asia, Azeri-Armenian conflict and oil 
and energy politics.46 All these regions and countries, formerly being parts of Ottoman 
Empire, have important cultural, economic and political links with Turkey which could 
allow Turkey to be an influential actor in these regions. For Cem, Turkey’s NATO 
membership was also important in Turkish-American interests and although Turkey 
supports the development of the European Union’s defense organization, NATO is still 
                                                
39 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, pp. 72-73.
40 ibid., p. 73.
41 ibid., p. 73.
42 ibid., p. 73.
43 ibid., p. 74.
44 ibid., p. 74.
45 ibid., p. 74.
46 ibid., p. 74.
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pivotal in European defense.47 For all these reasons, Cem called Turkish-American 
relations “necessary symbiosis” due to the two countries’ common values of democracy 
and freedom and their overlapping interests in numerous fields.48 In regards to Central 
Asia and Caucasus, Cem claimed that the USA and Turkey were pursuing policies that 
were somewhat parallel and Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan project and the trans-Caspian natural 
gas pipeline49 are two great projects in which both countries have interests against 
Russia.50
Although Cem had a bright vision for the future of Turkish-American relations, 
he was very disappointed by the USA’s Iraq policy which he thought to be detrimental 
to the USA’s image and prestige as well as to Turkish-American relations. However, 
Cem also stated that although as Foreign Minister of Turkey he was against the invasion 
of Iraq and Turkey’s involvement in the operation, he would have done the same and 
tried to take Turkey’s maximum support if he had been on the American side.51 Cem 
later told journalist Can Dündar that he and Prime Minister Ecevit had meetings with 
Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney before the invasion and they 
tried everything in order to convince Americans about the negative effects of an 
American attack on Iraq but could not persuade them.52 In Cem’s view, for the future, 
Turkey should keep its close relationship with the USA, but this did not mean accepting 
all American proposals. In addition, Cem did not refrain to say that JDP’s relationship to 
USA was colony minded and damage relations between two countries since it wounds 
                                                
47 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, p. 76.
48 ibid., p. 77.
49 The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline is a proposed submarine pipeline between Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan. The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project if built would transport natural gas from Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan to central Europe, circumventing both Russia and Iran.
50 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, p. 91.
51 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 242.
52 ibid., p. 242.
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Turkish people and thus fuels anti-Americanism. Cem also believed that the USA had an 
important role in the dissolution of coalition government and the take-over of JDP in 
2002.53
6.2. Turkish-European Union Relations
Turkey’s application to accede to the European Union was made on 14 April 
1987.54 Turkey has been an associate member of the European Union (EU) and its 
predecessors since 1963. After the 10 founding members, Turkey was one of the first 
countries to become a member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and was also a 
founding member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 1961 and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
in 1973. Turkey has also been an associate member of the Western European Union 
since 1992, and is a part of the “Western Europe” branch of the Western European and 
Others Group (WEOG) at the United Nations. Turkey signed a Customs Union 
agreement with the EU in 1995 and was officially recognized as a candidate for full 
membership on 12 December 1999, at the Helsinki summit of the European Council.55
                                                
53 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, pp. 242-243.
54 For the chronology of Turkish-EU relations see; Özgül Erdemli. 2003. “Chronology: Turkey’s Relations 
with the EU” in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (ed.) Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, 
Economic Integration and International Dynamics. New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
55 For details about Helsinki Summit and afterwards see; Gamze Avcı. 2003. “Turkey’s Slow EU 
Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles to Membership or Simple Euro-skepticism?” in Ali Çarkoğlu and 
Barry Rubin (ed.) Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and 
International Dynamics. New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. Also see; Ziya Öniş. 2003. “Domestic Politics, 
International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era” in Ali 
Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (ed.) Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic 
Integration and International Dynamics. New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
  
 
271
Negotiations were started on 3 October 2005 but the membership bid has become a 
major controversy in the ongoing enlargement of the European Union.56
As Turkey takes steps towards full membership to the European Union57, 
skepticism of the EU countries regarding Turkish membership -due to historical, 
cultural, economic, political and psychological reasons- and the political conditions 
determined by the EU contribute to a growing ambivalence towards the idea of 
integration in Turkey. According to nationalist political/intellectual circles, the EU is 
seen as the contemporary version of European imperialism which covertly aims to
weaken, divide and rule Turkey. Specifically, the EU’s perspective on the Cyprus issue, 
the Armenian problem and the Kurdish question increases the uncertainties about 
European countries’ intentions and sincerity about Turkey’s accession. The rise of 
nationalism and “Islamophobia” as well as the takeover of right wing political parties 
instead of social democratic parties in Europe strengthen the current trend. The German 
                                                
56 For details see; EurActiv - European Union information web site, retrieved on 14.06.2010 from
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678. 
57 - On 17 December 2004, EU decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey.
- On 3 October 2005, three chapters of the Acquis Communautaire (Right of Establishment for Companies 
& Freedom to provide Services, Financial Services and Financial Control) were opened. 
- On 12 June 2006, chapter on Science and Research was opened and provisionally closed. 
- On 11 December 2006, continued dispute over Cyprus incited EU to freeze talks on eight chapters (Right 
of Establishment for Companies & Freedom to provide Services, Financial Services, Free Movement of 
Goods, Agriculture & Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External 
Relations) and to state that no chapters would be closed until a resolution is found. 
- On 29 March 2007, chapter on Enterprise and Industrial Regulations was opened. 
- On 25 June 2007, chapters on Statistics and Financial Control were opened, but the opening of the 
chapter on Economic and Monetary Policy was blocked by French President Nicholas Sarkozy. 
- On 19 December 2007, chapters on Health & Consumer Protection and on Trans-European Transport 
were opened.
- On 17 June 2008, chapters on Company Law and Intellectual Property Law were opened.
- On 19 December 2008, chapters on Economic & Monetary Policy and Information Society & Media 
were opened.
- On 30 June 2009, chapter on Taxation was opened.
- On 8 December 2009, chapter on Environment was opened.
- On 30 June 2010, chapter on Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy was opened.
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chancellor Angela Merkel’s statements about “privileged partnership”58 and the French 
president Nicholas Sarkozy’s insistence on a “Mediterranean Union”59 also contribute to 
the emerging downward trend in Turkish-EU relations. Turkish public opinion about EU 
membership seems to be focused on two extreme poles, which constantly degrade or 
ignore each other. Polls made in the recent years show that support for Turkey’s 
accession to the European Union has been decreasing dramatically and Turkish people 
have begun to lose their faith in the success of this project. A poll conducted by a 
respected inquiry company KONDA in 2007 shows that only 39 % of Turkish people 
think that “Turkey should absolutely become a full member of EU”, whereas 24 % of 
Turkish people are “extremely against EU membership”. The other 37 % of Turkish 
people think that “full membership to EU does not matter for them”.60 Another poll by 
A&G Company verifies KONDA’s results and shows that Turkish people who think that 
“Turkey should absolutely become a full member of EU” fell from 56.5 % to 30.1 % 
between 2002 and 2008.61 The future of the Turkish-EU relationship does not seem 
bright in the short term because of the complexity of the problems between two sides
and the hopeful and energetic situation in the days of Cem’s Foreign Ministry and the
JDP government’s early years seem to have been lost.
                                                
58 German chancellor Angela Merkel has been promoting the idea of privileged partnership for Turkey for 
a long time. But after coming to power, she “pledged to abide by commitments Germany had made for 
Turkish membership.” See; Turkish Daily News, retrieved on 23.05.2008 from 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=60851.
59 Before being elected the President of the Republic of France, Nicolas Sarkozy in a televised debate with 
his socialist rival Segolene Royal few weeks before the elections, stated that if elected president, he will 
start a debate on Turkey's EU membership and he will be against such membership. He also for the first 
time said that Turkey could only be a part of the Mediterranean Union. See; Turkish Daily News, retrieved 
on 22.05.2008 from http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=72308.
60 Tarhan Erdem. “Yeni Türkiye’yi Anlamak (Understanding New Turkey)”, retrieved on 09.05.2008 from 
http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/yeni_turkiye.pdf.
61 A&G Araştırma Şirketi, “AB’ye Üyelik (Membership to EU)”, retrieved on 10.05.2008 from 
http://www.agarastirma.com.tr/arastirmalar/ab_uyelik.pdf. 
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İsmail Cem learned and loved European culture from his childhood since he was 
brought up in modern Turkish family that adopted European culture and lifestyle. Cem 
also studied in Lausanne University in the early 1960s and observed European culture 
more closely. Cem was impressed by the great European culture and became able to 
speak French and English perfectly. Cem’s leftism and his ideal of social democracy 
was also heavily shaped by the European left especially that of the French Socialist 
Party (PS). Moreover, Cem became popular in international media mostly as the 
architect of Turkey’s acquisition of full membership candidate status to join the 
European Union.62 He was largely credited with Turkey's declaration as a full member 
candidate during the Helsinki summit in 1999, after much negotiation with the EU and a 
night trip by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and the then EU Commissioner 
Günter Verheugen to Ankara to iron out the last details. Cem has always loved European 
culture and expressed his wish for Turkey to become a full member of the European 
Union but he also added that this was not an obsession for Turkey.63 He criticized 
previous Turkish governments for not believing in Turkey’s place in the EU as a first-
class member and settled for second-class practices64 such as some disadvantageous 
clauses in the Customs Union agreement.65 For Cem, Turkey has a mixed identity of 
                                                
62 For example see; BBC News, “Profile: Ismail Cem - supreme diplomat”, retrieved on 29.05.2010 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2123057.stm.
63 See; Le Monde, “Entrer dans l’Union n’est pas une obsession pour la Turquie”, retrieved on 02.06.2010 
from http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-
bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=140457.
64 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 202.
65 On 31 December 1995, the Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union came into effect. 
Goods can travel between the two entities without any customs restrictions. The Customs Union does not 
cover essential economic areas, such as agriculture, to which bilateral trade concessions apply, services or 
public procurement. The EU-Turkey Customs Union is one of the steps towards full Turkish membership 
of the European Union itself. By the Association Council Decision of 6 March 1995, the Customs Union 
came into force on 31 December 1995. In 1996 a free trade area was established between Turkey and the 
European Union for products covered by the European Coal and Steel Community. Turkey is the only 
country that has become a member of Customs Union before joining European Union.
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being both European and Asian and both of these identities are important and 
historical.66 In his view, Turkey’s European identity has evolved in the 15th century 
especially after the conquest of İstanbul in 1453.67 If being European is a geographical 
category, the large part of Turkish history has taken place in the European continent and 
contemporary Turkey also has important villages in the Europe. If being European is a 
historical category, both Turkish and European history consist of interactions between 
these civilizations and Turks have always been part of European history. If being 
European is a cultural category, Turkey is a country that has been trying to catch up 
contemporary European culture in terms of democracy, pluralism, secularism, human 
rights, men-women equality etc.68
In that sense, Cem’s first aim was to change classical self-distrusted EU policy of 
Turkish state and to consider EU relations as an important component of Turkish foreign 
policy, rather than a separate and independent vision.69 For him, Turkey could pursue 
two goals not conflicting with each other at the same time, which meant being a full 
member of European Union and becoming a determining state in Eurasia.70 Cem knew 
about the negative European look towards Turkey and the serious obstacles that Turkey 
would face during membership process. Thus, he developed a strategy of intimidating 
EU countries by talking about withdrawing Turkey’s membership application and not 
talking about Turkey’s problems with EU officials on important matters including 
Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations, human rights issues and Kurdish question until
                                                
66 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, pp. 203-204.
67 ibid., p. 203.
68 ibid., p. 203.
69 ibid., p. 205.
70 ibid., pp. 205-206.
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Turkey was granted full membership candidacy status.71 This strategy did not work in 
the 1997 Luxembourg Summit but after the government and Cem’s decisive stance 
against the EU and European countries and after Cem’s bold press statements72, in the 
1999 Helsinki Summit Turkey was finally given full membership candidacy status.73 For 
Cem, this success was the result of a self-confident, not begging stance against EU, in 
addition to a cold and realistic profit and loss account analysis in foreign policy.74
Although he was the architect and the champion of Turkey’s EU membership, 
İsmail Cem was realistic enough to declare that Turkey’s EU full membership is very 
difficult to be realized because of the rising Islamophobia in European countries and 
European people’s negative outlook towards Turkey’s membership if referendums 
would take place after the termination accession negotiations.75 Cem also knew that the 
Turkish public opinion was also skeptical regarding accession to EU76 and the basis of 
this skepticism go far beyond technical problems.77 However, he underlined that Turkey 
should continue to pursue this path and should reach EU standards for its own people’s 
sake even if full membership to the Union would not be realized in the end.78 Cem also 
wrote a book specifically on Turkey’s relations with EU and tried to summarize the 
                                                
71 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, p. 207.
72 Few days before Helsinki Summit, Cem spoke to Financial Times and stated that “Turkey could give up 
from EU candidacy if an option like privileged partnership or conditional membership is offered”. See; 
ibid., p. 208. 
73 ibid., p. 208.
74 ibid., p. 209.
75 ibid., p. 209.
76 For details see; Ali Çarkoğlu. 2003. “Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public 
Support for EU Membership” in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (ed.) Turkey and the European Union: 
Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics. New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
77 Prof. Barry Rubin also reached the same conclusion. See; Barry Rubin. 2003. “Introduction” in Ali 
Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (ed.) Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic 
Integration and International Dynamics. New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
78 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 209.
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events in his tenure in office.79 The book had an autobiographic characteristic but it also 
had important “off the record” information about the Helsinki Summit.
6.3. Struggle Against Terrorism
Maybe the most important event in Cem’s tenure in office as Turkish Foreign 
Minister was the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the Adana Agreement 
made between Turkey and Syria. The Adana Agreement was made between Syria and 
Turkey on 20 October 1998 about not supporting terrorist organizations. This led to the 
deportation of Abdullah Öcalan from PKK camps in Syria and eventually his capture in 
Greek embassy in Kenya. The Adana Agreement was not easy to make.80 Cem 
remembers that 1998 was the peak for PKK terror and there was extreme anger towards 
terrorism in Turkish society. In this situation, Cem thought that Turkey should do 
something against Syria, an obvious supporter of PKK terrorism.81 In a fall National 
Security Committee meeting in 1998, a consensus was made and Chief of Turkish Land 
Forces General Atilla Ateş went to Hatay, a city on the Syrian border, and made a harsh 
speech against Syrian administration for its support of PKK terrorism.82 Ateş said; 
“Some of our neighbors like Syria is misjudging and exploiting Turkey’s good 
intentions. They support the bandit called Apo and harmed Turkey. We are at the end of 
our rope. All kinds of troubles are caused by Syria. Turkey is strong enough to protect 
                                                
79 İsmail Cem. 2005. Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya İkinci cilt: Avrupa’nın “Birliği” ve Türkiye, İstanbul: Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları.
80 For details see; Milliyet (daily newspaper), 8-9-10 November 2007.
81 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 225.
82 ibid., p. 226.
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its lands and respond to these troubles. If Turkey does not get what it wants, it would 
acquire the right to take any kinds of precautions”.83
Ateş’s speech, in which he warned Syrian government that its support for 
terrorism may lead to a war between Turkey and Syria, packed a punch and Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak assumed a mediator role between Turkey and Syria in order to 
prevent a war.84 Turkish Chief of General Staff of the period Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu later 
confessed that they were not completely ready for a military operation but the Turkish 
press played an important role in Syria’s retreat by giving the image of an upcoming 
war.85 The fear of Turkish coalition government was a military move from Greece in the 
Aegean islands if Turkey engages in a war situation with Syria.86 In addition, Ecevit at 
those days correctly predicted that the terrorist organization might have settled in 
northern Iraq if they were driven away from Syria.87 Cem, on the other hand, thought 
that if a military operation was made, Arab countries, China and Russia would come
against Turkey and only the potential support to Turkey would come from France due to 
Cem’s special efforts.88 The USA was also against Turkey’s use of military power 
against Syria and President Bill Clinton’s letter to the President of the Republic 
Süleyman Demirel clearly stated that Turkey should support Mobarak’s mediatorship.89
Mobarak’s mediation between Syria and Turkey turned out to be successful mostly 
because of Syria’s stepping back against Turkey and events led finally to the Adana 
Agreement between Syria and Turkey and eventually to the capture of the PKK leader 
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85 Milliyet, 9 November 2010, p. 20.
86 Milliyet, 10 November 2010, p. 22.
87 ibid., p. 22.
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Abdullah Öcalan near Greek embassy in Kenya. Cem admitted that Greece was caught 
red handed when Öcalan was captured in Kenya and he used this scandal very well in 
diplomacy.90 The Adana Agreement on the other hand was signed by Turkish Deputy-
Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal and Syrian Major General El-Hasan on 20 October 1998 and 
by this protocol Syria had undertaken several commitments in regards to Turkey’s 
security concerns.91 Cem knew this did not mean that the terrorist organization in Syria 
had been totally annihilated, but this was a sign of good faith between two countries.92
İsmail Cem was very sensitive about terrorism since he was victimized and lost 
his cousin Abdi İpekçi in the late 1970s after an assassination by ultra-nationalist 
groups. Thus, Cem always underlined that “nothing can justify terror” and Turkey has 
always been at that point.93 However, Cem asserted that Western political elite and 
media, due to their misunderstandings and prejudices, contributed to the tragedies that 
Turkey went through from 1987 to 1997 by supporting or at least ignoring race-based
ethnic and separatist PKK terrorism.94 Cem thought that Europeans were completely 
unaware of the realities in Turkey and their public opinion was in favor of terrorist 
organization’s false claims but he was able to convince some of his European colleagues 
to look into realities and to see through different views as well.95 Cem also thought that 
over-emphasizing ethnicity and ethnic and race-based politics led and may lead again 
disasters in Europe and elsewhere.96 Cem gave the plight of the Balkans in general and 
the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular as example of the dangers of ethnic 
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93 ibid., p. 103.
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based politics and warned his colleagues to be very cautious in dealing with race.97 Cem 
knew that Turkey had a Kurdish problem but he believed that this could be solved in a 
fully democratic regime that Turkey has been making consistent steps to reach, whereas
supporting ethnic nationalisms would lead to disasters. 
Cem thought 9/11 incident was the catalyst for the increasing will for struggling 
against terrorism but due to the wrong steps taken by Bush administration this created 
polarization between Western and Muslim world98 and Turkey was negatively 
affected.99 After the 9/11 disaster, Cem tried to educate his Western counterparts in 
order not to use the term “Islamic terrorism” by claiming that “terrorism has no religion, 
nationalist or excuse”.100 Cem also underlined that ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims 
and anti-Turkish rhetoric in European Union give the impression of a newly initiated 
anti-Islam crusade to populations both in Turkey and in Western Europe and 
strengthened the fundamentalist movements in the Muslim world.101
6.4. Cyprus Problem and Relations with Greece
The relations between Turkey and Greece have been marked by alternating 
periods of mutual hostility and reconciliation ever since Greece won its independence 
from the Ottoman Empire in 1821. Since then the two countries have faced each other in 
four major wars: the Greco-Turkish War (1897), the Balkan Wars of (1912-1913), the 
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First World War (1914-1918) and the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922). Two powerful 
and visionary postwar leaders, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos, were 
determined to establish normal relations between the two states.102 After years of 
negotiations, a treaty was concluded in 1930 and Greece renounced all its territorial 
claims over Turkey. This was followed by the Balkan Pact of 1934, in which Greece and 
Turkey joined Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Romania in a treaty of mutual assistance and 
settled outstanding issues. Both countries became members of NATO and together with 
Yugoslavia formed a new Balkan Pact for mutual defense against the Soviet Union. 
Turkish-Greek relations began to spoil in the late 1950s, mostly due to problems in 
Cyprus, a British protectorate that became an independent federal state in 1960. 
Starting from the early 1960s, Greek Cypriots desired unity with Greece (what 
they called “enosis”) and this desire turned into violent actions and massacres against 
Turkish Cypriots especially after the coup made in Greece and the take-over of a fascist 
Greek junta in 1967. On 15 July 1974, a band of Greek Cypriot nationalists that 
organized around a junta called EOKA B, staged a coup against the Cypriot President 
and Archbishop Makarios. EOKA B leader Nikos Sampson was appointed President. On 
20 July 1974, Turkey, using its guarantor status and rights arising from the trilateral 
accords of the 1959-1960 Zürich and London Agreements, occupied the northern part of 
Cyprus lands. Years later once again war between Greece and Turkey seemed inevitable 
but it was averted when Sampson’s coup collapsed a few days later and Makarios 
returned to power. In the mean time, the Greek military junta in Athens, which failed to 
confront the Turkish invasion, also fell from power but the damage to Turkish-Greek 
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relations was done and the occupation of Northern Cyprus by Turkish troops would be a 
sticking point in Greco-Turkish relations for decades to come. After eight years of failed 
negotiations with the leadership of the Greek Cypriot community, the north declared its 
independence on 15 November 1983 under the name of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. This unilateral declaration of independence was rejected by the UN 
and the Republic of Cyprus.103
In recent years the politics of reunification has dominated the island’s affairs. It 
was hoped that Cyprus’s planned accession into the European Union would act as a 
catalyst towards a settlement and in 2004 a United Nations-brokered peace settlement 
was presented in a referendum to both sides. In the referendum a majority of Turkish 
Cypriots accepted the proposal, but Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected it. As a 
result, Cyprus entered the European Union as a divided island, with Northern Cyprus 
effectively excluded. The Cyprus issue is still a serious source of problems in Turkish-
Greek relations and also an obstacle in Turkey’s accession to EU.104 Another important 
problem between the two countries is regarding sovereignty rights in the Aegean Sea. 
Both sides currently possess 6 nautical miles (11 km) off their shores in the Aegean Sea 
but Greece claims a right to a unilateral expansion to 12 nautical miles.
İsmail Cem attracted the attention of the global media mostly when he made 
enormous efforts to improve the relations between Turkey and Greece together with his 
counterpart Yorgo Papandreou. Turkey and Greece signed many important treaties in 
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Cem’s period and began to cooperate in many areas by erasing the bad memories of 
Kardak crisis, Greek support to PKK terrorism and Greek treatment of the Turkish 
community in Western Thrace.105 In February 1999, Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros 
Pangalos was forced to resign following the abduction of Kurdish leader Abdullah 
Öcalan. He was succeeded by his deputy Giorgios Papandreou and the former under-
secretary Ioannis Kranidiotis. Just as relations between Greece and Turkey had reached 
rock bottom, two men who favored rapprochement came into the scene and changed the 
destiny of two countries according to many international observers. However, while 
Turkish-Greek rapprochement was viewed positively by international media, in Turkey 
Cem was criticized for not driving Greece into the corner when he had chance after the 
discovery of Greek contributions to PKK terrorism.106 Due to his works for world peace, 
Cem was awarded together with Yorgo Papandreou as the “Statesman of the Year” in 
2000 by the East West Institute. Relations between the two countries began to improve 
after successive earthquakes hit both countries in the summer of 1999. The so called 
“earthquake diplomacy” generated sympathy in both countries and was praised by the 
international media.107 The earthquake diplomacy was followed by the warm personal 
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relations between Cem and Papandreou. In a famous scene which made headlines in 
both countries, Cem and Papandreou joined in Greek dancing “sirtaki” and singing on 
the Greek island of Samos. This meeting was followed up with a much-photographed 
holiday in Turkey of the two men and their families.108
Thanks to Cem and Papandreou’s efforts, Turkey and Greece signed important 
treaties in Cem’s period and began to cooperate in many areas. The first visit made by 
Papandreou in 17 January 2000.109 For Cem, Papandreou’s visit, first official visit of 
Greece to Ankara after 38 years, was “a new page even a new era” in the two countries’ 
relationships.110 Cem and Papandreou signed a series of agreements covering tourism, 
environmental protection, investments and the fight against crime and terrorism. 
Papandreou’s visit was followed by Cem’s reciprocal visit to Athens in February 2, 
2000. Cem’s visit was punctuated by the signing of the bilateral agreements focusing on 
technology and science, cooperation in sea transports, heightened economic cooperation, 
education and culture as well as a pact on establishing a framework to avoid customs 
violations.111 Turkish-Greek relations starting from these 9 agreements have been 
showing an upward trend and relations between the two countries have been getting 
stronger and deeper. About the Cyprus issue, İsmail Cem declared in 2001 that “Turkey 
might be forced to take measures in the event of a Greek Cypriot accession prior to an 
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agreement on the Cyprus question”.112 Cem’s speech was followed by Prime Minister 
Ecevit’s statement about Turkey’s annexation of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus if Cyprus becomes a member of EU before a peace settlement in Cyprus.113
However, during JDP rule, Turkish policy towards Cyprus changed and Turkey did not 
do much against Cyprus’ entry into EU without a settlement on the island although the 
peace process was supported by Turkish Cypriots. İsmail Cem also wrote a book 
specifically on Turkey’s relations with Greece and Cyprus issue and tried to inform the 
public about the development of the rapprochement process and the important role of 
personal relations and friendship in diplomacy.114
6.5. Relations with Eurasia
İsmail Cem had always stated that Turkey was both a European and a Eurasian 
country. Thus, Cem believed that Turkish foreign policy should be multi-dimensional 
and Turkey should try to use of advantages of its “historical geography (tarihi 
coğrafya)” in order to increase its influence in different regions that had previously 
stayed under Ottoman rule.115 Cem also underlined that he has a “strong belief that 
Turkey’s strategic future is linked with the emergence of Eurasia”.116 Cem thought that 
the most important reason for Eurasia’s increasing role in Turkish foreign policy was the 
end of Cold War and the emergence of a new paradigm of power based on economic 
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vitality and persistence rather than sheer military force.117 During Cold War, due to 
highest priority of military issues, Turkey’s relations with Western-Atlantic bloc was the 
major determinant of the country’s foreign policy whereas contemporary Turkey has 
many new economic and political opportunities because of its pivoting role in the 
emerging Eurasian reality. Cem asserts that contemporary Turkey “aspires to be the 
leading economic and political actor in Eurasia”.118 While talking about Eurasia, Cem 
thought of large territory stretching from Western Europe to Western China.119
İsmail Cem tried to clarify Eurasia’s importance in Turkish foreign policy for the 
future under three headings. The first is related to the integration of Europe and Asia in 
the near future in terms of production, communication and information technologies
thanks to the possibilities of open-market economies. Cem wrote that “much of the next 
millennium’s economic development will take place in Asia and the advent of new 
energy resources and communication corridors bears witness to this emerging reality”.120
Secondly, Cem thought the post-Cold War political framework provided Turkey with a 
new international environment of historic and cultural dimensions in Balkans, Caucasus 
and Central Asia as a long-standing actor in these geographies and Turkey has become a 
vital partner in many new countries’ economic restructuring.121 Thirdly, Cem believed 
that this strategic change also corresponded with a new consciousness in Turkey in terms 
of the use of shared history and parallel cultural characteristics in foreign policy.122 For 
all these reasons, Cem thought that Turkey, having the most dynamic economy, most 
advanced armed forces and the longest running democracy, “has optimal conditions to 
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contribute to stability and to enjoy the opportunities presented by the new Eurasian 
Order”.123 For Cem, “coupled with a new foreign policy combining economic 
progressivism with historical and cultural affinities, Turkey is riding the wave of a new 
economic momentum, transforming its former regional role into a global one”.124
However, Cem also noted that he may not be an “objective commentator” while talking 
about Turkey although he believed his views are realistic aspirations.125
For Central Asian countries, Cem thought that, Turkey as a country having 
cultural ties with these countries that actively supported their independence, has chance 
to start a new phase in their relationships. Cem thought that this phase would be less 
intuitive and informal perhaps, but that it “will grow in its intensity and substance, in the 
quality of its means and mechanisms”.126 This could be achieved only Cem realized if 
“we can now leave the over-emphasis on idealistic concepts and concentrate more on 
interests, on plans and details”.127 Cem thought that considering Central Asia, Turkish 
and American interests are common against Russia, which became another important 
actor again in the region after Vladimir Putin’s take over compared to ex-president Boris 
Yeltsin times.128 Cem thought that although Turkey had not got intention of pursuing a 
policy of hostility towards Russia or any other policy that will force the Central Asian 
and Caucasus countries to make a choice between Turkey and Russia, Russia and 
Turkey as two great civilizations of the region compete in some domains.129 Cem made 
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it clear that Turkey attached highest significance to peace and stability in the Caucasus 
as well as the preservation and consolidation of the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the countries in that region.130 In that sense, the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute and Armenian occupation of Azeri territory were two problems that 
worried Cem rather than Russia.131
6.6. Relations with Middle Eastern Countries
Although he was raised in a modern European like family, Cem always had 
curiosity and sympathy for Islamic culture and he tried to raise his knowledge of Islam 
since his youth. This quality of Cem’s, which was rare in Kemalist-leftist intelligentsia, 
allowed him to have good relations with the pious and Islamist segments of the country 
and to develop a more peaceful and moderate language on the deep secular-Islamist 
cleavage in Turkey. In foreign policy too, Cem wanted Turkey to establish peaceful 
relationships with the Islamic world and to help their progress and modernization by 
acting as a model country that has been able live both Islam and democracy.
İsmail Cem thought that during his tenure in office, Turkey achieved peace with
the Middle East and improved its relationships with the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference.132 Cem thought that although the OIC was (and is) not an influential 
international actor, due to the small steps taken during his Foreign Ministry, Turkey was 
later able to make its candidate Eklemeddin İhsanoğlu as the Secretary General of 
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OIC.133 Cem also showed great efforts in order to prevent the use of the term “Islamic 
terror” after the 9/11 incident and was the first person to state that “terrorism has no 
nationality, religion or excuse”.134
İsmail Cem had also established friendship and close relationship with chairman 
of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and previous Palestinian National Authority 
Yasser Arafat. Cem thought Arafat was a true fighter who had engaged in terrorism in 
the past in order to keep Palestinian liberation movement together but also at the same 
time was a compassionate person in his personal relations.135 Cem tried to take an active 
mediator or conciliator role in Palestine-Israel conflict and especially after Arafat’s 
request in 2001, and tried to relax the tension between two camps by contacting with 
Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami (whom Cem found reasonable) and U.S. 
Secretary of the State Madeleine Albright.136 Cem admitted that his efforts did not bring 
victory but still he had prepared a plan for the partition of Jerusalem by analyzing the 
Ottoman model of partition for Jerusalem and also managed to lessen the tension.137 His 
efforts were also praised both by Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat in the international 
public. Cem pointed out that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was the main cause of 
the failure of his efforts to create peace in Palestine.138 Cem together with his Greek 
counterpart Yorgo Papandreou visited Arafat in 2002 and tried to attract world’s 
attention to his miserable situation in his home where he was kept nearly as a 
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prisoner.139 For Cem, this was a humanitarian stance rather than an ideological-political 
attitude and together with Papandreou they contacted Shimon Peres to ameliorate
Arafat’s situation, although their efforts were prevented by Sharon.140
During Cem’s tenure in office Turkish-Israeli relations had also developed in 
various domains. Cem thought that the Turkish and Israeli economies were of a
complementary nature and this was strengthened by several agreements previously made 
between the two countries which constituted the basis for their economic, commercial, 
scientific and military cooperation.141 However, Cem made it clear that the military 
aspect of this cooperation with Israel was of “defense industries cooperation” and 
“military training agreements” (Turkey had parallel agreements with some 20 countries 
some of which were members of the Organization of Islamic Conference) and this was 
not directed against any third country.142 Cem supported peace in the Middle East and 
never compromised Turkey’s good relations with Israel or the Arab world in order to be 
on better terms with the other side.143 Cem was critical of Israeli government’s extreme 
use of military power in the region and he knew that speaking about peace in the early 
21st century was still very difficult due to escalating violence.144 Thus, Cem believed 
only final peace settlement might bring an end to the escalation of violence and both 
sides should take steps for reaching peace.
Another important issue related to the Middle East during Cem’s tenure in office 
was the situation of Iraq and its dictator Saddam Hussein. Cem was aware of American 
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preparations for the war and in order to prevent the war, he tried to organize a 
conference between Iraq and its neighboring countries. However, Cem thought that these 
efforts could not save Iraq and Saddam Hussein since Saddam did not trust in his efforts 
although many neighboring countries including Iran and especially Jordan were ready to 
take responsibility for preventing the war.145Cem had also personally met with Saddam 
Hussein and tried to convince him that this effort was not an American plan, but rather a 
Turkish project to prevent the war that would spoil the stability in the region.146 Cem 
was thinking that this was a huge and also last opportunity for Saddam, but he was 
disappointed of Saddam’s incomprehension of the seriousness of the situation.147 Cem 
thought that what had happened and today still happens in Iraq is a tragedy and Saddam 
also has a huge responsibility in that.148 In his interview with journalist Can Dündar, 
Cem told that as the Foreign Minister he always tried to prevent the coming of American 
soldiers onto Turkish soil for invading Iraq since it would have terrible consequences 
both for Turkey and the USA. He also added that the Justice and Development Party’s 
sudden rise and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s contacts in Washington gave him the 
impression that the JDP’s sudden rise was related to the 1 March memorandum.149 A 
similar interpretation was also made by journalist Fikret Bila150 but Bila was starting the 
civil coup from Ecevit’s pacification and illness, whereas Cem was focusing on the role 
of Kemal Derviş and the sudden rise of the JDP and Tayyip Erdoğan. Cem also pointed 
out that actively supporting and military engagement in American invasion in Iraq 
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would mean the loss of many hundreds of Turkish soldiers, spoiling relations with 
Turkey and the Arab countries and the Muslim world and also new security problems for 
Turcoman population in Iraq.151 However, he also told Can Dündar that he understood 
the USA’s decision after the 9/11 incident and the American government was expecting 
more support and help from its ally Turkey.152 Adjustment of relations with Syria was 
the other important issue during Cem’s Foreign Ministry (which was previously 
explained in the struggle against terrorism part).
6.7. Contributions
İsmail Cem served as the Foreign Minister of Turkey between the years 1997 and 
2002. Cem was often perceived as a rational, peace-seeking and successful minister both 
within the country and in the international public due to his policies. İsmail Cem’s deeds 
as Turkish Foreign Minister are extremely important as they represent a breakdown from 
classical Turkish foreign policy. During the Cold War, starting from the 1950s, as a 
NATO member Turkey’s foreign policy was based primarily on American preferences 
and focused on security issues. However, after the fall of Berlin Wall and the collapse of 
USSR, Turkish foreign policy in a sense began to feel existential problems but could not 
redefine its aims, test its limits or put forward a new vision for Turkey in the 21st century 
until Cem’s tenure in office. In that sense, Cem’s effort to make Turkey first a regional 
power and then a world state and to force people to think “bigger” and act more 
assertively in foreign policy in accordance with the imperial heritage of the Ottoman 
State, was a new chapter and a turning point in Turkish diplomatic history. 
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Starting from the 1970s, Cem had always praised some communitarian aspects of 
the Ottoman Empire and in a sense brought the Ottoman model as a preliminary 
example of contemporary pluralistic democratic society. In convenience with his 
positive views about the Ottoman model, in foreign policy also Cem defended Ottoman 
vision and wanted Turkey to become a more influential actor in international relations. 
He always underlined that Turkish foreign policy had been alienated from its cultural 
roots and historical past and it must be replaced with a new understanding which was 
based on the awareness of Turkey’s rich identity and historical assets inherited from the 
Ottoman state. He wanted Turkey to be confident of itself, not ashamed of its past and 
bold and peace-seeking at the same time for the future and criticized the classical lack of 
pragmatism of Turkish politicians in foreign policy as well as their habitude of 
stigmatizing countries as friend or foe instead of thinking rationally and realistically 
about Turkey’s interests. Cem tried to offer a multi-dimensional and realistic foreign 
policy and wanted Turkey to be more flexible and active in foreign policy. Imperial
vision in his approach to foreign policy could be criticized since Cem was a peace-
seeking leftist, but it should be noted that Cem never thought this vision as imperialism 
or colonialism but rather as a tool to increase his country’s economic and cultural effect.
For Cem, Turkey was both an Eastern and Western, an Asian and European, a 
Muslim and secular country and he believed that this could be Turkey’s most important 
advantage in foreign policy if Turkey developed a strategy of using all these identities to 
increase its interest. Although he was fully committed to Turkey’s full accession to EU, 
he knew that there would be serious problems in accession talks and Turkey should 
never act as a lowly begging country. Cem believed in the necessity of a Turkish-
American alliance for world peace but he always stated that this did not mean that 
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Turkey should accept all American requests. In that sense, he tried to increase Turkey’s 
portfolio in foreign policy by developing closer relations with Eurasian and Middle 
Eastern countries. In his view, Turkey should develop a rational and peace-seeking 
multi-dimensional relationship style with all important organizations and countries based 
on protecting and developing Turkey’s interests. He pointed out Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline project as the earliest example of Turkey’s strategic energy agreements made in 
the Eurasian zone.
During Cem’s tenure in office, Turkey had growing economic, social and 
diplomatic relations with its neighboring countries and became able to solve its 
problems with Greece and Syria. In doing this, Cem used both diplomacy and power in 
order to reach peace in the region. Concerning Turkish-Greek rapprochement, Cem used 
public diplomacy extremely well and changed negative views and prejudices about
Greece in Turkey similar to his counterpart Papandreou. Cem used the media and civil 
society organizations (especially during the earthquake diplomacy) while trying to 
change the perception of enmity between Turkish and Greek people. However, 
concerning relations with Syria Cem used Turkey’s military power as a threat and 
succeeded in solving the Turkish-Syrian disagreement about cooperating against 
terrorism. In that sense, Cem used the methods of both Realism153 (against Syria) and 
Liberalism154 (against Greece), two major schools in international relations theory. In 
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relations with Middle Eastern countries Cem was not afraid to mention Turkey’s Muslim 
identity though he never had a problem with secularism or Turkey’s secular state 
structure. He wanted Turkish diplomats to be more confident and aware of their glorious 
history while having relations with countries that were ruled for centuries by the 
Ottomans. Cem thought that this cultural heritage of the Ottomans could increase 
Turkey’s power and sympathy in these regions if used successfully. 
Cem thought that nationalism in foreign policy was a necessity (but in domestic 
politics Cem never approved nationalism especially ethnic kind of nationalism since it 
could easily turn into racism and separatism towards other ethnic groups) since foreign 
policy is “a mathematical equation of a country’s interests” and an area of power 
struggles. In that sense, Cem could be classified closer to realism rather than liberalism 
in international relations theory. However, Cem had never been a pro-military or pro-
war actor in foreign policy. He thought that a military solution was the last resort and 
could be made only for humanitarian reasons. In the 1970s as a young leftist intellectual 
and the head of TRT, he supported Cyprus Peace Operation since it was a humanitarian 
intervention against an illegal military junta and made in order to prevent massacres. 
Likewise, he thought that there should be a strong cooperation between countries against 
terrorist organizations and no one should support or ignore the negative aspects of 
terrorism. Cem wanted peace in everywhere, in his own country as well as in Palestine, 
in Kosovo or in Rwanda. 
After Cem’s tenure in office, Turkey under JDP rule tried to carry on this vision 
and tried to become a more influential regional and international actor during Abdullah 
                                                                                                                                               
between states is not limited to the political (high politics), but also economic (low politics) whether 
through commercial firms, organizations or individuals.
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Gül’s, Ali Babacan’s and Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Foreign Ministry periods. Thus, Cem 
could be labeled as the first man who opened Turkey’s doors for a multi-dimensional 
foreign policy and broke the limits of classical Turkish foreign policy of Cold War.
However, Cem’s multi-dimensional foreign policy, aiming for Turkey to become a 
regional power, could be stated as more about cooperation and friendship with the West 
compared to the Justice and Development Party period, especially Davutoğlu’s foreign 
policy since JDP’s relations with the West have been more closely questioned by 
Western countries in recent months and JDP’s multi-dimensional foreign policy was 
more ideological and had Islamic appeals for some observers.155 Turkish-Israeli relations 
were especially deteriorated during JDP rule and finally the tension nearly reached the 
point of a state of war between Turkey and Israel after the Israeli commandos’ attack 
towards a Turkish ship (Blue Marmara) carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza under 
blockade.156 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu threatened Israel that Turkey 
would sever ties unless Israel apologized for the deadly raid on ship.157 During Cem’s 
tenure in office, no such crisis had happened and Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign 
policy was perceived more in conformity with the West by international observers. In 
that sense, Cem’s multi-dimensional foreign policy was not ideological and did not 
reflect Islamic aspirations, but rather it was aiming to use Turkey’s historical-cultural 
                                                
155 For instance, see; Mary Beth Sheridan. “Turkey’s foreign policy raise concern in West and at home”, 
The Washington Post, retrieved on 07.06.2010 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/AR2010060604052.html?hpid=topnews. Also see; Andrew Mango. 
“Turkey and the U.S.: Ottoman Past Shadows Turkish Present” in Wall Street Journal, retrieved on 
19.07.2010 from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703615104575328622438027714.html.
156 Although the ship was full of human rights activists from the world, 9 Turkish people were killed by 
Israeli commandos. For details see; BBC News, “Israeli navy storms Gaza aid ship”, retrieved on 
02.06.2010 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle_east/10195997.stm.  
157 For details see; The Washington Post, “Turkey threatens to sever ties unless Israel apologizes for 
deadly raid on ship”, retrieved on 14.07.2010 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/05/AR2010070502889.html. 
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assets inherited from the Ottoman State in a rational and secular manner. Some 
observers claim that after Cem, multi-dimensional Turkish foreign policy has changed 
and Islamism became an ideological instrument.158 Here it should be noted that Cem in 
his multi-dimensional foreign policy was giving higher priority to Turkey’s European
identity and Western coalition since he wanted his country to become a consolidated 
democracy and democratic regimes are to be found only among Western-European
countries.
Since İsmail Cem worked as the Foreign Minister of Bülent Ecevit, an 
experienced Turkish politician and an authoritarian party leader who was really 
interested in foreign policy and international relations, one could question whether 
Turkish foreign policy during Cem’s tenure in office was masterminded by Ecevit or 
Cem. Here, many observers including Yaman Başkut claimed that although Cem was 
very respectful towards Ecevit, he was very active and independent in shaping Turkey’s 
foreign policy.159 Moreover, Cem was the intellectual force behind Turkish foreign 
policy since he tried to conceptualize his policy and deeds on the academic level and 
wrote books and made important speeches in order to clarify his aims. It should be also 
noted that Turkish Foreign Ministry has always been a well-rooted and important 
institution that probably guided Cem a lot in ruling Turkey’s international relations. In 
that sense, although Cem’s foreign policy was certainly guided by Turkish Foreign 
Ministry and was not contrary to Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s preferences, it would 
                                                
158 See; Barry Rubin. “Turkish Regime Changes Sides, West Averts Eyes”, retrieved on 09.06.2010 from 
http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2010/06/turkish-regime-changes-sides-west.html. Also see; Zvi Barel. 
“Sultan Erdogan”, Haaretz, retrieved on 12.06.2010 from http://www.haaretz.com/magazine/week-s-
end/sultan-erdogan-1.295452.
159 Yaman Başkut, Aferin İyiydin… Bir Diplomatın Anıları, p. 136.
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not be wrong to claim that he was the primary actor in determining and implementing 
Turkish foreign policy during his tenure in office.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
İsmail Cem (1940-2007) was a prestigious and important figure in Turkish 
intellectual and political life, who had spent his life investigating the characteristics and 
problems of Turkish modernization and social democratic solutions to these problems. 
İsmail Cem was a polymath person and a “Renaissance man”1 who had a successful, 
adventurous and colorful life as it was told in the Chapter 2. Cem had many identities 
including a leftist journalist, a social democratic politician, Turkish Foreign Minister, an 
amateur but talented photographer, a devoted husband, a democratic socialist unionist, a 
caring father, a poet, a Galatasaray fan etc. during his life. However, Cem’s five main 
identities that were analyzed in the thesis were: a man of letters and romance (Chapter 
2), a peculiar public intellectual in Turkish left (in Chapter 3), a popular social 
democratic politician (Chapter 4), an intellectual dealing with the main democratic 
problems of his country (Chapter 5) and a successful Foreign Minister (Chapter 6). In 
this chapter, main findings and important points of these chapters will be summarized.
                                                
1 The term Renaissance man is related and used to describe a person who is well educated or who excels in 
a wide variety of subjects or fields.
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As a man of letters and romance, İsmail Cem had a colorful life with rises and 
falls. He came from a rich, westernized family and had a good education in Işık College, 
Robert College and Lausanne University. Starting from his youth, especially after his 
trip to the USA, Cem began to feel sorry for other people who did not have his luck and 
opportunities and this was Cem’s fundamental feeling during his whole life. This feeling 
was the motive behind Cem’s leftism and efforts to empathize with pious masses. Cem’s 
career started as a journalist and soon he began to attract attentions with his theoretical 
knowledge and peculiar stance in the left with his articles and books. Especially in the 
lively times of 1960s and 1970s (at a time when democracy was not that popular), he 
deserved to be labeled as a real democrat in the left since he was one of the few leftists 
who did not favor a leftist coup or a student and guerilla based revolutionary movement
in Turkey. He supported first TLP and democratic socialism and later Ecevit’s social 
democratic RPP.  Cem was shaken and lost his hopes for a democratic Turkey after the 
assassination of his journalist cousin Abdi İpekçi and so he went abroad. However, after 
few years he returned to Turkey and engaged in active politics in order to help his 
country to democratize and get rid of the terrible effects of the 12 September 1980 coup. 
Starting from the mid 1980s, his primary occupation became politics and except for an 
extra few years of columnist job and temporary profession as lecturer in university, Cem 
concentrated solely on active politics.
İsmail Cem was a nice, humanist and gentile person but this did not mean he was 
not an ambitious man. In fact, Cem always had a leadership potential and leadership 
skills including knowledge, charisma, confidence and self-esteem and he always wanted 
to be the leader of what he was doing. Although Cem had always wanted to be a leader, 
both in journalism and politics he could not be successful as a leader. His efforts to 
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become a boss in media failed after the unsuccessful attempts of a weekly magazine 
ABC and a daily journal Politika. His leadership efforts in politics also failed with his 
New Turkey Party. Foreign Ministry was Cem’s highest position in his career and he did 
very important deeds as a Foreign Minister. He had a colorful life with his family. He 
had cheerful hobbies and activities such as photographing, watching Galatasaray 
matches in soccer, aquarium hobby, writing poems, reading and spending time with his 
family. İsmail Cem died on 24 January 2007 in İstanbul from lung cancer but his name 
has not been forgotten after his passing and does not seem to be forgotten in the near 
future.
As a social thinker, İsmail Cem deserves to be analyzed closely mostly because 
of his peculiar position and original views that are not part of classical Kemalist or leftist 
views in Turkey. To begin with, Cem’s admiration and great interest of Ottoman history 
was an unusual stance in Turkish left that started first with the novels of Kemal Tahir. 
Following Tahir, some intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s showed a great deal of 
interest towards Ottoman past, which could be considered as breaking a taboo created by 
the young Republic in order to prevent a possible decay of the new regime due 600 years 
old strong Ottoman legacy. Thus, Cem and some other intellectuals of the period 
including Mete Tunçay, Şerif Mardin, İdris Küçükömer and also to some degree the
RPP’s young and charismatic leader Bülent Ecevit in the political scene approached the
Ottoman past with sympathy and criticized the bureaucratic modernization tradition of 
the Republic. Due to their unusual stance in the left, some even called Cem and Ecevit 
as “Tahiri -follower of Tahir-” or Ottoman socialists. 
Cem defined the Ottoman state as rational, just and expert on governing. In his 
view, the Ottoman state had never become completely Islamic and was able to interpret 
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religion according to the needs of society and economy. According to Cem, the Ottoman 
system was based on a strong statism which included the ownership of nearly all lands 
and territories by the state and the division of society into two classes; the ruling askeri
(military) class and reaya (subjects). Since territory was the strongest means of 
production, strong statism in the ownership of lands provided a huge central power to 
the Ottoman state. Cem thought that the Ottoman land system prevented the emerging of 
a landlord class and thus posed a much more progressive system than European 
feudalism. As far as İsmail Cem was concerned, the Ottoman army was a very important 
factor in the well-working of the Ottoman system. In his view, the power of the 
Ottomans came from the perfection of miri land system and Tımarlı Sipahis army that 
was based on this system. From Cem’s perspective, Ottoman State had also the character 
of a patrimonial state which was responsible of its people’s safety. He thought Ottoman 
state’s economic duties were somehow similar to the characteristics of a social state. 
Cem claimed although this system worked perfectly for a few centuries, European 
states’ rapid and huge progress starting from the Age of Exploration was a turning point 
in world history. Other important problems were the excessive territorial enlargement of 
the state that caused administrative problems and the spoiling of the old land system due 
to economic problems and the implementation of iltizam.
İsmail Cem tried to explain the decline and fall of the Ottoman State with 
Marxist theory and used the concept “underdevelopment”. Cem wrote that 
underdevelopment was not a natural process but rather a consequence of the great 
advance made by European civilization that changed its classical subsistence economy 
by creating superior techniques and modes of production (through technological 
advance) as well as bringing cheap raw materials and labor force (through colonialism 
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and imperialism) to European states. This process was also strengthened by the 
liberating effects of Renaissance and Reformation and the intellectual-cultural progress 
of Europe. While this progress was a product of Europe’s internal dynamics, after its 
great leap forward European states’ forceful imposition and Eastern states’ imitation of 
Western modernization spoiled the old equilibrium and balance in Eastern societies and 
created the situation of backwardness, a situation which was based on high class-based 
inequalities (presence of an elite Westernized comprador class) and a cultural duality 
problem that divided societies and weakened these states. According to İsmail Cem, one 
of the most important steps of Ottoman colonization was the establishment of Public 
Debt (Düyun-u Umumiye) system. By using this system, European bankers and states in 
a sense damped Ottoman state in heavy debts and interests and increased their authority 
in Ottoman politics. In that sense, Cem wrote that Westernization of the state lost its 
meaning of modernization and became a tool of colonialism in the 19th century.
Cem’s interest in the Ottoman past was a conscious choice. Starting from his 
youth, Cem tried to learn and absorb both Western and Eastern (Islamic) cultures and 
thought that Turkish identity possesses both of these cultures. In that sense, Cem tried to 
reconcile the Kemalist-leftist segments of Turkish society with their history and to rasp 
the radical aspects of Republican modernization. In the 1970s, Cem tried to find roots of 
Turkish socialism in Ottoman state and social structure and saw communitarian 
mentality and the statist land system as well as some social aspects of Ottoman state as 
preliminary examples of socialism. In the 1980s, Cem tried to find the preliminary 
conditions of a pluralist democratic regime in the religiously and ethnically diverse 
Ottoman society. Later, in his Foreign Ministry too, Cem based his vision of Turkey’s 
transformation into a regional and world power on the glorious Ottoman past. One 
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personal reason about Cem’s great interest and sympathy towards Turkey’s Ottoman 
past and pious people unlike many of his leftists friends could be asserted as an effort to 
compensate for discussions about his family background (Sabetaism discussions) in his 
writing and political career. However, this would be rather an exaggerated claim since 
Cem during his whole intellectual and personal life he showed a consistent interest and 
respect towards Ottoman system and tried to base his views on history.   
In Cem’s opinion, Mustafa Kemal and his friends were able to establish an 
independent Republic from the wreck of an empire by using Soviet help and French 
abstention cleverly but they could not solve the problem of backwardness. Cem believed 
although the starting principles of the new Republic were progressive, its economic and 
social policies were not able to reverse the underdevelopment pattern inherited from the 
Ottomans. The economic policy of the young Republic was national capitalist economy 
(milli iktisat) which meant to create a national bourgeoisie by statist-seeming liberal 
policies. In Cem’s view, even the adoption of a statist economic model after the Great 
Depression did not abrogate the Ottoman legacy of center-periphery dilemma and the 
dominance of a small “happy minority (mutlu azınlık)” in the country. The happy 
minority group consisted of three main segments; Istanbulite business circles and 
Anatolian local notables, officers that were engaged in the National Struggle and 
deputies and top ranked bureaucrats. Although these three segments had internal 
conflicts too, their real struggle was for protecting and developing their own positions at 
the expense of ordinary people. That is why Cem thought that the single-party period’s 
democratic qualities remained highly limited. However, Cem also praised some 
modernistic aspects of the single-party period which later allowed Turkey to make a 
smooth transition to multi-party democracy. Cem made an important contribution to 
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Turkish politics and intellectual life by analyzing and praising the Ottoman past and 
trying to reconcile Kemalist-leftist segments with their history. In that sense, Cem tried 
to counter balance the radicalist aspects of the early Republican period.
In Cem’s view, during this single-party period Turkey was an underdeveloped 
but independent country but after the conditions that emerged in the late 1940s by tying 
itself to the West in an asymmetrical way, Turkey also began to lose its independence 
like a semi-colony. Although the new Republic had revolutionary and progressive ideals, 
the bureaucracy retreated from its ideals day by day and could not have the chance to 
leave the happy minority’s privileges against people. Cem evaluated Turkey’s transition 
to a multi-party system as a natural consequence of the Ottomans’ and Turkey’s 
problematic Westernization process that also brought some positive consequences. In 
addition, transition to a multi-party regime and the take-over of the DP government was 
a natural consequence of the Turkish state’s efforts to create a bourgeois class. That is 
why in Cem’s opinion the 1950 transformation was a kind of “bourgeois revolution” that 
was envisaged by the state. In Cem’s view, the DP was a populist movement that was 
naturally born against the bureaucratic oppressive state and socially had a progressive 
character. Cem also concluded that although Democrat Party governments used religious 
rhetoric in the country, they always tried to look sympathetic and European to Western 
countries. The DP represented the interest of urban bourgeoisie and rural local notables 
but also took the support of Anatolian peasantry by its conservative political discourse. 
Cem wrote that the rise of the DP also meant the attack of Turkish bourgeoisie and local 
notables to pacify bureaucratic-military elite that was represented by the RPP. Ordinary 
people and peasants were also sympathetic towards the DP because of the heavy 
conditions imposed by the RPP during the Second World War and DP’s more tolerant 
  
 
305
approach to religious issues. According to İsmail Cem, the DP’s preference of realizing 
economic development through a weak bourgeoisie was unsuccessful and that was why 
Turkey had to become more dependent on the Western bloc in order to take support for 
foreign investment, economic aid and loans and credits provided by the World Bank. 
Cem’s other point of criticism towards the DP was the party’s oppressive policies 
towards the intellectuals and journalists which also played a significant role in the 
legitimizing the 27 May 1960 military intervention. Cem believed that the most 
important reason of the 27 May intervention was the discomfort of the bureaucracy 
which had lost its power and became subjected to heavy pressures during DP rule.
During 1970s, Cem’s solution to Turkey’s backwardness was planned economy 
favoring development (kalkınma) similar to other leftists of the period including Doğan 
Avcıoğlu and Mehmet Ali Aybar. However, Cem differed from Avcıoğlu regarding the 
ways of realizing this developmental model. Avcıoğlu and many other popular names 
wanted the state and bureaucratic institutions to be the leader of this model whereas Cem 
wanted to erode cultural duality and integrate the society into this development. In that 
sense, Cem tried to adapt Marxism into Marxism and later social democracy to Turkish 
conditions and was largely affected from the Asiatic type of production discussions. 
Cem actively supported the RPP-NSP coalition in the 1970s and tried to interpret 
political Islam from a class-based perspective as a metaphysical reaction of suppressed 
masses.2 Cem also actively supported and engaged in RPP’s democratic transformation 
from a party of the state into a people’s party and sympathized with Ecevit’s leadership. 
At this period, he also became a public figure as a young and bright journalist, writer 
and the manager of TRT. During the 1970s although Cem was a socialist, he never 
                                                
2 Kurtuluş Kayalı, “Solda İdris Küçükömer Tartışmaları”, p. 1103.
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supported Bolshevism or Maoism and stayed closer to European socialism in terms of 
individual liberties and cultural leanings. However, he also knew that in an 
underdeveloped and still developing country the role of socialism should be to realize 
economic and social development. Cem interpreted the rise of extreme-right and street 
clashes in the 1970s with two basic causes: the Turkish bourgeoisie’s fear against 
exceeding class-based politics and the USA’s discomfort with Turkey’s more 
independent foreign policy in the conditions of Cold War. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Cem’s views became more moderate simultaneously 
with the demise of socialism and state led economics in the world. Thus, Cem began to 
defend social democracy louder and thought that the state should be a moderator of the 
market and should intervene into economy and appear as a fabricator only if it needed. 
As a social democrat, he wanted the state to be responsible for free health, education and 
social security system and defended equality of opportunity to be realized in order to be 
a fair race to be realized in the free-market conditions. His efforts to reconcile the state 
with the pious masses did not end and Cem always wanted the SDPP, RPP and later 
DLP to empathize with the ordinary people and find solutions to their socioeconomic 
problems without having prejudices against them. 
İsmail Cem’s contribution to Turkish intellectual life could be categorized under 
five headings. First of all, Cem’s interest and sympathy towards Ottoman system was a 
kind of revolution in Turkish left since the Ottoman past was a taboo for decades in 
Turkey, especially in the leftist-Kemalist intellectual circles. Thus, Cem made an 
important contribution by analyzing and praising the Ottoman past and trying to 
reconcile Kemalist-leftist segments with their history. In that sense, Cem tried to counter 
balance the radicalist aspects of the early Republican period and to realize an intellectual 
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peace between the Republic and the Ottoman State. Secondly, Cem tried to find a leftist-
socialist vein and a pluralist root in the Ottoman past and focused on the solidarist and 
communitarian aspects of Ottoman system instead of solely focusing on the 
characteristics of Marxism, which he thought of as a product of harsh class struggles in 
Europe. In that sense, Cem tried to adapt Marxism and later social democracy to Turkish 
society and made efforts to create a synthesis. Thirdly, although he was from a modern, 
wealthy Istanbulite family, in his personal and intellectual life Cem had always tried to 
use empathy and understand people who were different from himself as well as political 
views that were different from his ideas. That is why, although his leftism was his 
primary identity starting from the 1970s, Cem was always a trustworthy democrat, a real 
humanist and he believed in the necessity of pluralism in politics. Fourthly, although 
İsmail Cem was coming from a Westernized family and he had a Western type 
education in Robert College and Lausanne University, during his whole intellectual and 
political life he tried to base his ideas on local and national values and tried to consider
Islamist and nationalist groups’ advantage of being native. In fact, Cem’s interest in the 
Ottoman system or his political project of the Anatolian Left (together with Baykal) 
were in conformity with his political stance and aimed to demolish the walls between 
ordinary people and RPP and intellectuals. Lastly, İsmail Cem, starting from the 1980s, 
began to focus on Turkey’s political culture and never solely equated electoralism with 
democracy. As a believer of democracy, he always defended free and fair elections and 
never supported or approved methods that are out of democracy in politics (political 
violence, coups etc.). Cem underlined that democracy is more of a lifestyle and a 
political cultural model whose implementation in an economically poor and poorly 
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educated society is not an easy task just by making democratic laws and creating 
democratic institutions. In that sense, he defended popular vote but not populism.
Cem as a politician also left a strong legacy of courtesy and reformism, rare 
qualities to be found in classical Turkish politicians. Cem both as a public intellectual
and politician also showed that an effort of empathy towards others could easily make 
Turkey’s macro problems into small issues. Another important legacy of İsmail Cem in 
Turkish politics is related to his innovative personality. Starting from his visit to the 
USA when he was sixteen, Cem always had an interest in high technology and wanted 
his country to become as technologically developed as the USA. In addition, he was the 
leading politician in Turkey in using the notion of change and dynamism.3 İsmail Cem 
was also a self-confident and ambitious man, a quality to be found in all successful 
politicians. Although he was a gentle man, Cem never hesitated to step forward and take 
initiative in politics. However, Cem was able to become a leader finally in 2002 but was
unsuccessful with New Turkey Party. Another important contribution and characteristic 
of İsmail Cem as a social democratic politician was his insistence on localness, a rarely 
seen attitude in the Turkish left which has a long tradition of top-down modernization 
due to its Kemalist legacy. Both as a public intellectual and a politician, İsmail Cem 
tried to base his model of social democracy on native and national historical and cultural 
values and showed a great deal of interest towards Ottoman-Turkish history. Although 
Cem was coming from a rich and westernized family, his effort to understand pious 
people’s internal worlds and moral values was very valuable and it helped and 
                                                
3 According to Jost, who made important researches on the psychological bases of left and right 
differences in politics, innovation and the notion of change is often used and better received by people 
having leftist orientation. See; Jost, J. T. 2009. “Elective Affinities: On the Psychological Bases of Left-
Right Differences” in Psychological Inquiry, 20 (2-3), pp. 129-141.
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encouraged Turkish left to embrace people and internalize democracy more and more. 
Maybe the most important contribution made by İsmail Cem in Turkish political life was 
intellectual depth. İsmail Cem, with his intellectual personality and depth, brought 
academic quality to Turkish politics. Compared to other political figures having lower 
education level and intellectual accumulation, Cem raised the bar in political discussions 
and deserves a special place in Turkish political history. Another important quality of 
Cem was related to his moral stance and insistence on the necessity of secular morality 
that would prevent degeneration in politics and the interpretation of religion as the only 
code of morality. The only criticism made towards Cem was related to his decision of 
leaving Ecevit alone in his difficult days. He had a similar type of experience when he 
was offered the Ministry of Culture and had to leave his friend Deniz Baykal in 1995. 
However, it should be noted that these are very common behaviors in politics all over 
the world and many people had found Cem’s attitude strange because of Cem’s honest 
and reliable personality and image. Moreover, Cem’s leadership ambitions were not 
realistic since he did not possess the qualities of a charismatic leader that could create 
special bonds with ordinary people.
As a social democratic politician, Cem’s biggest contributions to Turkish politics 
were his invention of “new left” together with Deniz Baykal and his democratic and 
gentle rhetoric and stance in politics. Following the 12 September 1980 military coup 
and the transformation of Turkey from above which sought a more liberalized and 
internationalized economy, İsmail Cem also had to reconsider his 1970s model “leftism” 
and embrace a new social democratic understanding based on pluralism and an economy 
based on free-market economics instead of socialism. Cem embraced free-market 
economics but with the addition of the necessity of a social state and equality of 
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opportunity for everyone. In addition, Cem began to emphasize the positive qualities of 
a democratic regime much more often than before and tried to define democracy. 
Turkish transformation and Cem’s personal transformation also coincided with the 
weakening and the collapse of USSR and the newly established hegemony of Western 
type democracy and free-market economics as the only and ultimate truth all around the 
world. The Western left was reconsidering itself and trying to create middle roads 
between capitalism and socialism as the “third way” and Cem was following these 
developments very closely. In the 1980s, Cem’s main problem was not 
underdevelopment anymore. He was now underlining the importance of pluralism and 
democratic culture and basing his ideology on these concepts.
The new positioning of Cem was primarily caused by his understanding of 
democracy. Cem had always highlighted democracy as a lifestyle.4 He thought that in 
order to consolidate a democratic regime, democratic practices should be adopted in all 
institutions and democratic norms should be internalized by all segments of the society. 
In that sense, Cem refused to define democracy solely as electoral procedures and 
underlined that democratic norms should be spread everywhere, to families, to political 
parties, to schools, to mosques and to barracks. Cem’s new approach to democracy and 
his insistence on democratic culture made his views closer to the cultural approach in 
democratization studies. Secondly, Cem thought that in a country like Turkey where 
statist-bureaucratic tendencies are very strong, the state should support civil society 
initiatives and present this as a lifestyle as a requirement of participatory democracy. 
According to Cem, the center-periphery cleavage and this indifference of the periphery 
was the most important factor that prevented a healthy democratic regime in Turkey. 
                                                
4 İsmail Cem, Siyaset Yazıları: “Geçiş Dönemi Türkiyesi” (1981-1984 Yılları), p. 13.
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That is why political struggles in Turkey were often products of intra-elite disputes and 
bureaucratic groupings. Thirdly, similar to the Marxist revisionism, Cem’s leftist stance 
after 1980 was built upon pluralist democracy and peaceful coexistence understanding. 
Cem thought that what made democracy desirable and legitimate was also its ability to 
perpetuate the peaceful coexistence of rival forces. That is why a democratic regime 
should represent the balance of social forces and should not favor a particular segment 
or a social group. The fourth aspect of Cem’s new ideological stance was related to the 
underdevelopment issue. While starting from the 1970s İsmail Cem had always 
emphasized Turkey’s backwardness and supported state led development models, after 
the 12 September coup Cem began to support the view that Turkey could reach the 
standards of European democracy through the EU process and in a more liberalized and 
open economy. In that sense, Cem’s transformation from an Eastern socialist to Western 
social democrat was concretized on his change of stance about Turkey’s 
underdevelopment. 
Although Cem came from a highly different tradition (some even call it Ottoman 
socialist), in the 1980s and 1990s, similar to European socialist intellectuals and 
politicians, he went through a process of democratic transformation and he embraced 
free-market economics with the condition of equality of opportunity. The rebirth of 
social democracy in Europe took place after the fall of Berlin Wall and the collapse of 
communism and Cem was one of the earliest leftists in Turkey who caught the wave of 
the “third way”. Thus, Cem could also be considered as a part of the European social 
democratic wave similar to François Mitterrand in 1980s or Tony Blair in the 1990s. 
As an intellectual aiming to solve his country’s democratic problems İsmail Cem 
also wrote on the most important and controversial topics of Turkish politics and tried to 
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find peaceful social democratic solutions to Turkey’s troubles. Considering civil-
military relations, Cem had always supported the gradual civilization of the Turkish 
regime after transition to democracy in 1983. However, unlike many radical figures 
from the leftist tradition, Cem supported the pioneering and progressive role of the 
Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish modernization and refrained from making provocative 
statements that could weaken the TAF and thus could create security problems for 
country. He developed a democratic, civilian and pluralist social democratic language in 
accordance with his political views and adopted a well-balanced rhetoric while 
criticizing the heavy role of military in Turkish politics. 
On Kurdish question, Cem’s proposal for the solution of this problem was first 
about the acceptance of the problem. Cem analyzed this problem on four aspects 
(restrictive, oppressive and discriminatory behavior of state officials, feudal structure of 
the region, state’s erroneous policy of not developing and improving the infrastructural 
and social capabilities of the region and policies of imperialist states) and the first thing 
to do was to acknowledge the problem. Secondly, Cem knew that Kurdish question was
a gigantic issue where the balance of power in international relations and the history of 
the problem should also be known very well and placed on the agenda. Cem underlined 
that the Kurdish question is primarily Turkey’s problem and although international 
conditions are very important, Turkey should first handle its own internal problem. In 
that sense, Cem both acknowledged foreign support to PKK terrorism but also rejected 
nationalist views pointing the sole reason of the problem as foreign countries’ plans. 
Thirdly, as a requirement of the basic definition of the state, Turkey should be able to 
protect its citizens, its employees, its borders and stop terrorism in the region. Cem 
claimed that the solution should be citizen-oriented and the Kurdish question would 
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never be solved unless the state takes the support of the local people. Cem never 
approved or supported the rural guard system and thought that this was similar to 
American policy against Vietcong in the past. Fourthly, Turkey should handle rising 
domestic nationalist and racist tendencies due to PKK terrorism. PKK terrorism, due to 
its racist essence, created a racist reaction against itself and Cem thought that the state 
should control these reactions. Fifthly, Turkey should handle its struggle against violent 
terrorism within the borders of legal-democratic state and should not resort to illegality 
or extra-legal means since this could be used by Western states against Turkey. Sixthly, 
the Turkish state should immediately accept democratic cultural rights of Kurdish people 
and should not fear cultural pluralism. Seventhly, Cem offered the Ministry of National 
Defense to be transformed into a more authorized and qualified department where 
theories about preventing PKK terrorism should be discussed and detailed plans would 
be made in coordination with the Prime Ministry and General Staff of the Turkish 
Armed Forces. 
On the issue of political Islam-secularism discussions, İsmail Cem’s peculiar
stance in the left for his empathy for Islamist groups began to change after the 12 
September military coup and political developments in the 1980s and 1990s although 
Cem never used a language of hostility towards political Islamists. Cem defined 
secularism as a guarantee for believers from different sects, religions and non-believers. 
In his view, secularism resided at the core of democracy and without secularism 
democracy could not be established. He wanted the Directorate of Religious Affairs to 
contain and provide services for all sects and religions in the country. He also pointed 
out that in the long run the aim of secularism was to transfer state power and authority 
over religion to civil society and congregations. Cem also stated that (similar to the 
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passive secularism argument of Özbudun and Hale) a more libertarian, pluralist and 
democratic interpretation of secularism should be developed in Turkey in order to create 
social peace. He believed that thanks to the Ottoman legacy of religious tolerance, 
Turkey has the potential to realize this dream and terminate the secularism-Islamism 
clash that divides the country into poles and wastes its energy. On the very controversial 
topic of headscarf or turban, İsmail Cem wrote very boldly and stated that secularism 
should also be a guarantee for headscarf-wearing young women. In his view, an ideal 
secular state that Turkey could not establish yet, should be blind or at least objective in 
state affairs towards different beliefs and should provide a free environment where all 
beliefs should be practiced freely. In that sense, Cem, being aware of the strong 
polarization in the country on this topic, offered to take freedoms in totality in order to
solve the secularist-Islamist clash and obliterate fears against Islamic lifestyles. Cem 
never approved censorship and repressive attitudes against Islamism and defended 
dialogue between different groups and tolerance towards each other. However, Cem also
wrote that commercialization and exploitation of religion for political aims is also a 
serious problem in the country and criticized the MP, WP and JDP for their exploitation 
of religion for political means. According to Cem, defending freedom of religion was 
not a deviation from social democracy but rather it resided at the core of leftist 
libertarianism
As Turkish Foreign Minister, Cem was distinguished with his peace-seeking but 
also interest-based realist perspective. He was considered as the architect of Turkey’s 
membership status given by the EU in the Helsinki Summit of 1999. During his term, 
Turkey was able to capture the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and for a few years seemed 
to solve the problem of PKK terrorism. Cem together with his Greek counterpart Yorgo 
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Papandreou were largely credited in Turkish and international public after the Turkish-
Greek rapprochement that took place in 1999 and 2000 following a serious diplomatic 
crisis caused by the capture of Öcalan in a Greek embassy. So-called “earthquake 
diplomacy” soon turned into a personal friendship between Cem and Papandreou and the 
winds of peace began to blow on the both shores of the Aegean.  
One of the most important contribution of Cem as Foreign Minister was his 
insistence on the use of Turkey’s rich identity and historical assets inherited from the 
Ottoman state.5 Instead of a strict pro-Western or pro-Eastern foreign policy, Cem 
favored a multi-dimensional active foreign policy based on Turkey’s interests. He 
defined foreign policy as “a mathematical equation of a country’s interests” and tried to 
create a convenient environment to be more flexible and active in foreign policy. In that 
sense, Cem offered a new rational and multi-dimensional approach to international 
relations in order to increase Turkey’s interests. He focused on Turkey’s full accession 
to EU process and energy agreements made with Eurasian countries such as the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project as two of the most important issues in Turkish foreign 
policy. He also frequently highlighted the importance of Turkish model as a successful 
example that could show the right path to countries from the Muslim world that suffer 
from radicalism and authoritarian regimes in addition to the negative effects of Western 
imperialism. In his view, Turkey should develop a rational and peace-seeking multi-
dimensional relationship style with all important organizations and countries based on 
protecting and developing Turkey’s interests. Becoming totally engaged in the EU or the 
USA would be a big mistake in Cem’s view. Cem pointed out that with a liberal 
understanding in international politics, Turkey could never be successful and would 
                                                
5 İsmail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, p. 3.
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always give concessions to the EU. He wrote that nationalism in foreign policy is a 
positive aspect whereas it could be very dangerous if it used in internal politics. He also 
made an analogy between Turkish-EU relations and unrequited love6. He offered a more 
rational, realistic and interest-based approach to EU relations and claimed that if this 
happens the EU would approach Turkey in a different manner. Cem used the methods of 
both Realism and Liberalism in foreign policy and thought that this cultural heritage of 
the Ottomans could increase Turkey’s power and sympathy in these regions if it is used 
successfully. After Cem’s tenure in office, Turkey under JDP rule tried to carry on this 
vision and tried to become a more influential regional and international actor although in 
the last years some Western observers have began to question Turkey’s alliance to the
West and neo-Ottomanism discussions have become widespread.
Looking all aspects of Cem’s political life, it would not be wrong to assert that in 
order to deepen Turkish democracy without creating polarization in the society and fears 
against modernization and globalization, Turkey needs a better administration and 
moderate social democratic solutions to its cleavages especially on three main issues:
civil-military relations, the Kurdish question and the political Islam and secularism 
clash. Cem offered both the protection of the Republic’s ideals and the expansion of 
democracy and with his life and views was able to create a good model. Looking at his 
efforts to reconcile the Republic with its past and secularist segments with pious-Islamist 
masses, it would be rational to claim that he developed a kind of moderate Kemalism 
based on universal social democratic principles. Cem’s Foreign Ministry allowed a high 
majority of the Turkish people to accept globalization and full accession to European 
Union not as a threat to secularism or independence, but as a positive process that would 
                                                
6 Can Dündar, Ben Böyle Veda Etmeliyim, p. 201.
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complete the modernization and democratization movement of the country that started 
with its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Cem’s peculiar vision for Turkey’s EU 
membership and his foreign policy understanding based on a kind of synthesis between 
protecting national interests and supporting the democratization process and 
globalization seems to be necessary for Turkey to be better analyzed and understood 
especially after witnessing the problems in the last years that triggered fears of
globalization and polarized the Turkish society. Cem’s gentle rhetoric and his ability to 
empathize with political rivals could be an example for Turkish politicians especially to 
Turkish left which has always suffered from the lack of people’s support of its reformist 
projects. İsmail Cem’s views in fact were proving that Turkey still has chance to develop 
its founding model and could make peace with its society by making some meaningful 
steps without a rupture like in the case of the collapse of the Ottoman State. In that 
sense, Turkish people deserve a better administration that would prevent the division of 
Turkish society into extremely polarized hostile camps such as Islamist-secular, Alevi-
Sunni, leftist-rightist or Turk-Kurd. Cem’s political and intellectual legacy and 
democratic solutions to Turkey’s social and political problems could be useful in 21st
century.
Lastly, it would not be wrong to assert that İsmail Cem saw his life’s work as 
involving basically three tasks; to reconcile Turkey with its Ottoman past by softening
the radical modernist mentality of the earlier Republican period both on the intellectual 
and social levels, finding solutions to Turkey’s various political problems by making a 
social democratic interpretation of Kemalism and thus, achieving democratic 
consolidation in Turkey and finally to transform his country into a respected regional 
power in international relations by pursuing an active foreign policy through full 
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membership to European Union as well as developing relations with Middle Eastern and 
Eurasian countries. Both as a public intellectual and politician, he was able to take 
considerable steps in order to realize these three tasks. However, Cem did not have 
chance to complete his mission since he never reached the position of Prime Ministry. 
Having analyzed all aspects of his life, his personal traits, his intellectual and political
identity, it would not be wrong to assert that Cem’s strongest legacy was humanism and 
democracy and he sincerely believed that Turkey can establish its own healthy and 
consolidated democracy despite of its various problems by reforming its system. He 
believed that Turkey can become a part of Europe Union and Western civilization by 
keeping its own historical-cultural characteristics in addition to democratic norms and 
practices. Considering Turkey’s ongoing sociopolitical problems and discussions related 
to civil-military relations, the Kurdish question and political Islam-secularism clash, it 
would be easy to notice and purport that Cem’s vision for Turkey’s social peace and 
democratic development is not yet very-well understood by Turkish intellectuals and 
politicians.   
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Cem’s handwriting addressing to Prof. İhsan Doğramacı and his wife in the first page of 
his photographic album book “Seasons”
  
 
363
(3) Trumpet Flower (Borazan Çiçeği), İstanbul 1978
  
 
364
(14) Bosporus in the Fog (Siste Boğaz), İstanbul 1973
  
 
365
(15) Waterfall (Şelale), Japan 1975
(16) Flowers (Çiçekler), İstanbul 1982
  
 
366
(18) Yatağan River (Yatağan Nehri), Muğla 1985
  
 
367
(19) Scenery (Manzara), Kütahya 1980
  
 
368
(20) Thoughts (Düşünceler), İstanbul 1972 (Cem’s wife Elçin Cem)
  
 
369
(24) Meditation (Meditasyon), Paris 1980 (Cem’s wife Elçin Cem)
  
 
370
(32) Trees in Blue (Mavilikte Ağaçlar), Moda (İstanbul) 1983
  
 
371
(34) Old Fishermen (Yaşlı Balıkçı), İstanbul 1973
  
 
372
(37) Mother and Child (Anne ve Çocuk), İstanbul 1985
(38) Lovers (Âşıklar), Türkbükü (Muğla) 1983
  
 
373
(39) Sunset in the Bosporus (Boğazda Günbatımı), İstanbul 1984
  
 
374
(41) Autumn Colors (Sonbahar Renkleri), Ankara 1989
(42) Rose Leaves (Gül Yaprakları), İstanbul 1983
  
 
375
(46) Wild Berries (Yabani Kiraz), İstanbul 1984
  
 
376
(66) The Stare (Bakış), Arnavutköy 1978
  
 
377
(69) Burning Sun (Yakıcı Güneş), Bingöl 1985
  
 
378
(73) Les Clochards (Dilenciler), Paris 1981
(74) Roots (Kökler), Tenerife 1990
  
 
379
(87) Bosporus Under Snow (Karlar Altında Boğaz), İstanbul 1973
  
 
380
(92) Global Reality (Küresel Gerçek), Madeira 1991
  
 
381
(111) Solitude in the Desert (Çölde Yalnızlık), Egypt 1998
  
 
382
(112) Café in Isfahan (İsfahan’da Bir Kafe), Isfahan 1998
  
 
383
(135) Dawn at the Atlantic (Atlantik’te Günbatımı), Taken from an airplane 1978
 
 
